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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents a case study of civil society in Libya, examining the development of 
civil society associations from 1969 up to the present time. The study argues for, and 
utilises, a broad definition of the term “civil society” that includes traditional associations. 
The World Bank definition of civil society provides the basis of the analysis. The latter 
is presented via a contrasting assessment of Libyan NGOs under two different political 
regimes. The relationship with the state is shown to have been the primary factor shaping 
their form and character whether in terms of numbers or activities. State control and the 
legal framework governing civil society were the primary factors that limited the 
autonomy of these associations, under the Qadhafi regime. With the sudden absence of 
the state during and after the 2011 uprising, NGO numbers mushroomed. Associations 
took the initiative to establish themselves through collective action. The study shows how 
quickly and effectively NGOs came together to confront the regime and to occupy the 
public space left by the displaced government in order to provide essential services. The 
NGOs were able to provide the framework to prevent the collapse of society, which was 
an indication of the latent strength, effectiveness and importance of civil society in Libya, 
despite the ongoing challenges faced due to the collapse of the Qadhafi state apparatus.  
 
The thesis findings challenge the prevalent assumption that civil society, as commonly 
defined, has little strength in the Arab world. The broader definition of civil society used 
in this study (in accordance with the World Bank definition of the term) helps to provide 
a wide understanding of civil society and is thereby shown to have useful applications in 
various contexts, outside the presumed European norm.   
 
The thesis uses a range of qualitative research methodologies including interviews, 
documentary data and observation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction: Questions and Aims of the Thesis 
 
1.1 Premises 
The study of civil society has become central to several disciplines in the social sciences, 
including political science. Recent history has seen a steady increase in the number of 
groups, movements and organisations that are outside the State but which nonetheless 
influence society and politics at the local, national and international levels. These include 
environmental movements, women’s rights groups, peace associations, and organisations 
that seek to eradicate poverty, campaign against nuclear power etc. This thesis centres 
around an exploration of civil society.  In the case of Libya, with especial reference to the 
role played by the attitude of, and approach taken by the state to the formation and activity 
of civil society groups. In all of the analysis related to Libya the concept and definition 
of civil society which is used is that enshrined in the definition given by the World Bank 
(see Chapter 2, section 2, below). 
 
Civil society ( d e f i n e d  i n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  w a y s )  has become one of the most 
frequently discussed topics in the social and political sciences, drawing on several 
fields of study and subject areas, as stated by Mitsugi Endo: 
Academic interest in the concept of civil society has rapidly been 
increasing. As a result, there has appeared a mushrooming of the 
literature related to the concept, including both theoretical and analytical 
aspects. (1996:5) 
 
The topic has also become recognised as important by many international organisations, 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. 
 
Almost every study on civil society covers the relationship between civil society and 
the state, where the institutions of civil society, in the simplest definition, are 
intermediaries between the state and society. Although the State constitutes an 
important element in the establishment and effectiveness of these institutions, it may also 
be one of the main obstacles challenging their effectiveness. 
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As far as the Arab world is concerned, Eva Bellin (1995: 121) recognises that the language 
of civil society is used widely in the region and not only by those involved directly 
in its activities. She points out that: 
State officials use it to promote their projects of mobilisation and 
‘modernisation’, Islamists uses it to angle for a legal share of public 
space and independent activists and intellectuals use it to expand the 
boundaries of individual liberty. 
 
In the Arab region, debate about civil society has been ongoing for more than two 
decades, particularly in regard to how the term may be defined and what it does and does 
not include. Two significant questions have emerged. The first concerns the nature of the 
relationship between the institutions of civil society and the state; the second focuses on 
whether or not traditional social groupings (such as tribes) and contemporary Islamic 
movements are components of civil society. 
 
1.2 The Research Question and Conceptual Framework 
The main question pursued in this study is as follows: What does the experience of NGOs 
in Libya tell us about the relationship between civil society (as defined by the World Bank) 
and the Libyan state, 1969-2012? 
 
This question raises a number of issues which will need to be addressed: To what extent 
can Libyan NGOs be seen as occupying the public space between the family and the state? 
Does the existence and operation of NGOs in Libya really reflect a significant expansion 
of civil society? To what extent has the state dominated the activities, administration, 
policy-making and financial structures of NGOs? Do Libyans regard NGOs as an 
effective channel for meeting their needs (e.g. through the delivery of services or 
changing government policy)? How have the events of 2011 influenced civil engagement 
in Libya? To what extent has the transition had an impact on civil society? How does the 
situation facing pre-2011 associations differ from that facing the new ones established after 
2011? Lastly, how are these changes reflected in an increase in the numbers of 
associations in post-Qadhafi Libya? 
 
This thesis then is a study of civil society in Libya which examines the nature of NGOs 
in the country and seeks to assess what light this throws on the relationship between civil 
society and the Libyan state. It will explore the political, social and legal factors that 
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have constrained and enabled NGO associations under two very different political 
periods: that of Qadhafi’s authoritarian rule, and that of the transitional period which has 
followed the Libyan uprising of 2011. The thesis sets out to define what NGOs are and 
what civil society is, and then how NGOs fit as part of Libyan civil society. It will 
analyse how NGOs developed under circumstances where their foundation, although 
legal, was heavily constrained by the Qadhafi regime, such that they were in effect 
incorporated into a state-sponsored reform project. In post-Qadhafi Libya, consideration 
is given to how groups of people have established NGOs through collective action in the 
wake of the 2011 uprising and afterwards. Attention is paid to the legal restrictions and 
incentives placed on the establishment of NGOs in Libya, both before and after 2011; 
how NGOs have been funded, the level of public motivation on which they are based, and 
the scope of their activities. 
 
A prevalent assumption has been that civil society has little strength in the Arab world due 
to restrictions which have been imposed by governments, and the lack of a ''civic 
culture''1. The Libyan experience challenges this assumption, at least in terms of the 
ability of civil organisations to spring up quickly when they are permitted. Soon after 
the Qadhafi regime fell in 2011, the populations in the Libyan cities hurriedly formed 
associations which reflected their needs and around which they could organise their lives. 
As the state has pulled back, a new level of civil activity has begun to be established by 
NGOs. These developments confirm the hypothesis that the Libyan people exhibit a 
strong sense of civic membership, whether or not this is defined as ''civic culture''. 
 
The thesis will examine in detail a number of NGOs, in order to determine the political 
factors and legal framework which have either contributed to or limited their 
development within the context of civil society in Libya. This requires some discussion 
of what kind of civil society has existed in Libya historically, and how civil institutions 
functioned at that time. The political structure and nature of the Libyan State under 
Qadhafi then needs to be assessed, to see how this kind of state circumscribed or 
facilitated civil society. The thesis will study the legal structure relating to NGOs in 
Libya under Qadhafi, to show how the regime sought to control and limit NGOs. In 
                                                 
1 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1965:32) defined it as: “a balanced political culture in which political 
activity involvement, and rationality exist but balanced y passivity, traditionality and commitment to 
parochial values”. 
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examining NGOs under the Qadhafi regime, attention is also given to the Gadhafi 
Foundation ( G F )  in order to evaluate whether it can be classified as an NGO, and 
also to examine the nature of its activities. The GF will be assessed within the context of 
the Libyan state under the Qadhafi regime. 
 
The study would be incomplete if it dealt only with the Qadhafi regime. The post-
2011 period provides the basis on which a comparative dimension can be introduced. An 
account of the dramatic political and economic changes of Libya's ‘Arab Spring’ is 
necessary so as to enable an analysis of civil society and Libyan associations in post-
Qadhafi Libya. One possible benefit for civil society under the new regime is that 
Qadhafi had undermined state institutions. As a result of this, the collapse of his power 
has provided Libyans with an unprecedented opportunity to build everything anew. The 
erosion of traditional state institutions in Libya created an opportunity for Libyan people 
to become involved in civil associations. 
 
The study borrows the terms ‘invited’2 and ‘invented’ spaces of citizenship. Miraftab 
(2004:1) defines these terms as: 
‘Invited’ spaces are defined as the ones occupied by those grassroots and 
their allied non-governmental organizations that are legitimized by 
donors and government interventions. “Invented” spaces are those, also 
occupied by the grassroots and claimed by their collective action. 
 
Cornwall (2002:2) conceives the ''invited'' space as a kind of participation; she describes 
this a:  
Making room for different opinions to be heard where previously there 
were very limited opportunities for public involvement, and about 
enabling people to occupy spaces that were previously denied to them. 
 
I deploy the term ‘invited’ spaces to describe those occupied by NGOs that were 
legitimised by the old regime and subject to its interventions. By contrast, ‘invented’ 
spaces are those occupied by NGOs that have been founded by people’s collective 
actions. In effect this occurred only after the Qadhafi state fell apart in 2011.  
 
It is important to clarify here, however, that this thesis will not enter the debate over the 
link between civil society and democracy. This, in any case, is not directly relevant when 
                                                 
2 These terms were introduced by Cornwall (2002) and developed by Miraftab (2006) 
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the World Bank definition of civil society is used, as it is here. At the stage of political 
development which Libya has reached, there is little empirical basis on which 
conclusions could be drawn on this issue. Rather, civil society (as defined in the next 
chapter) is seen as a positive value in itself, given that, where there are organizations 
outside of the control of the state, there is something to balance the power of the state. 
 
The present study considers only one component of civil society, namely NGOs. The 
objective is to examine whether or not Libyan NGOs reflect the expansion of civil 
society (i.e. expand the range of activities which are not under direct state control), and 
how they interact with the state. This approach will throw light on the impediments, 
issues and problems faced by wider civil society. An understanding will be sought in 
this study of both the uniqueness and the commonality of Libyan NGOs, relative to 
those which exist elsewhere – and therefore how the civil society dimension differs. 
 
1.3 Defining NGOs and Conceptualising their Role 
The difficulties inherent in defining the term “NGO”, despite of its widespread usage, 
are a reflection of the complexity surrounding the phenomenon of NGOs themselves. 
 
Abdelrahman (2004:41) thinks that the “non” preceding the word “governmental” makes 
the term rather confusing: 
The term NGOs has a more confusing ‘negative’ connotation, signified 
by the prefix, ‘non’. This implies that NGOs exist only in contrast to 
organisations that are ‘governmental’, thus explaining what they are 
not rather than what they actually are. 
 
The term non-governmental organisation (NGO) was not widely used before the formation 
of the UN. When 132 international NGOs decided to co-operate with each other in 1910, 
they did so under the label “the Union of International Associations’’. The League of 
Nations officially referred to its “liaison with private organisations”. Meanwhile, under 
Article 71 of the UN Charter, “non-governmental organisations” have “suitable 
arrangements for consultation”. “Specialized agencies” and “NGOs” became UN 
technical jargon. Unlike much UN terminology, the term NGO passed into popular usage 
particularly from the early 1970s onwards. Article 71 of the UN’s Charter defines NGOs 
as “any organisation which is not part of a government and which has not been established 
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as a result of an agreement between governments”. Abdelrahman (2004:41) claims that 
this view is too broad to serve as a clear and precise definition.  
 
Anheier (2007: 39) points out, ‘the term NGOs (non-governmental organisations) is the 
term used to depict these organisations in the developing world …but it tends to refer 
only to a portion of what elsewhere is considered to be part of this sector’ (my emphasis). 
 
Clearly there is a lack of conceptual and terminological clarification regarding the nature, 
types and roles of various NGOs. Different scholars working on the same area of research 
may use different concepts and conceptual systems to group NGOs according to their 
similarities or other relevant factors. This approach has resulted in NGOs being 
categorised in a multiplicity of ways including Non-Profit Organisation (NPO), Public 
Voluntary Organisation (PVO), Membership Organisation (MO), Grassroots 
Organisation (GRO), People’s Organisation (PO), Civil Service Organisation (CSO), 
Third Sector Organisation (TSO), Non- Governmental Development Organisation 
(NGDO), Charitable Organisation (CO), Community-Based Organisation (CBO), 
Private Organisation (PO), Civil Society Organisation (CSO), Non-Governmental 
Institution (NGI) and Quasi-Non Governmental Organisation (QUANGO) (Etzioni 
1973; Anheier and Seibel 1990; Korten 1990; Tvedt1998) 
 
The underlying uncertainty was shared by Cernea (cited in Najam, 2003) who observed 
that “the residual nature of the term itself offers such a broad umbrella for a 
kaleidoscopic collection of organisations that attempts at simple definitions are quickly 
rendered meaningless”. This confusion stems from what Najam (1996: 205) viewed 
as “different conceptual lenses” being applied in discussions about NGOs.  
 
Libyan law No. 19 of 2001 defines associations as “any group of people seeking to 
provide social, cultural, sport, charitable and humane activities”, and adds that ”[t]hese 
associations can serve the whole country or specific regions and are non-profit seeking”.  
 
The lack of a precise definition and puzzling boundaries between different spheres 
has prompted some scholars to seek out a universally applicable’ definition and thus 
gain  a  better understanding of what NGOs are (Brown and Korten, 1991; Najam, 1996). 
However, such interest has prompted other scholars to argue that the preoccupation with 
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the conceptual aspect of NGOs has produced only a “partial view” of their nature and 
often “diminished” understanding of the actual contributions they make to solving 
developmental problems (Brown and Korten, 1989: 2). 
 
It is therefore important in research such as this that the concept of NGO used takes into 
account the geographical and cultural context it explores. NGOs in Arabic are usually 
known by the term (jam’ia). The term, mu’assasat ahliyia, which is equivalent to the 
English “civic associations”, is generally preferred by scholars working in this field as 
well as by the founders of these associations. 
 
It is noticeable that among these definitions, most emphasise two elements: being non-
profit seeking and independent from government.  
 
Given the available definitions discussed above, and the specific interests of this study, it 
seems useful to follow the UN Rule of Law unit (a UN resource group chaired by the 
Deputy Secretary-General, promoting the rule of law in member countries). This defines 
an NGO as: 
[A] not-for-profit group, principally independent from government, 
which is organized on a local, national or international level to address 
issues in support of the public good. Task-oriented and made up of people 
with a common interest, NGOs perform a variety of services and 
humanitarian functions, bring public concerns to governments, monitor 
policy and programme implementation, and encourage participation of 
civil society stakeholders at the community level. Some are organized 
around specific issues, such as human rights. 3 
 
It has been argued that although NGOs were unknown in the southern hemisphere during 
the colonial era, there were equivalents in the forms of traditional bodies and groupings   
such as religious establishments and movements, and generally in the areas of 
healthcare and education (Abdelrahman, 2004). Bodies known as associations have been 
established in different periods in the Arab World: for example, in Egypt after 1821. 
In Libya, as I will show in Chapter Three, the first body which described itself as 
an association was established by the Ibrahim Sirājaldīn movement in the era of Sultān 
Abd al-Hamīd II (1876-1908). This underground movement and its guiding ideas are 
                                                 
http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=23&emailit=y 3 
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considered today to mark the start of the growth of national awareness in Libya (al-
Miṣrātī, 2000:8 and al-Jarārī, 2005:471). The Italian colonial period witnessed the 
establishment by the Italians of a small number of associations, which tended to increase 
over that period. 
 
Over the last few decades, specific concerns have helped to determine the role of 
NGOs within the Arab context, reflecting a rapidly changing political, economic 
and social framework. The concerns have been shaped by interested scholars, 
governments, and many international organisations such as the World Bank, World Trade 
Organisation, human rights organisations and the UN. Two basic issues are reflected in 
this interest: one is the growth of NGOs in terms of their numbers and purposes; the second 
is the fact that globalisation has placed enormous challenges on the functioning of the 
state, which have in turn posed the question of how the state can deal with these changes 
within the principles of the national and sovereign state. NGOs play a substantial role in 
this transforming environment, in which they have emerged as new political actors. 
 
There has been widespread debate regarding the role of NGOs in strengthening civil 
society. Indeed, as mentioned above, this issue has started to be of concern to many 
international organisations like the World Bank, IMF and the UN. Pratt (2005:124) 
argues that: 
NGOs have the potential to belong to civil society and strengthen 
civil society in order to contribute to good governance. Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that NGOs are contributing to good governance at the 
moment. 
 
De Tocqueville hypothesises that civil associations (i.e. NGOs) will attempt to protect the 
rights of the people against the inherent authoritarianism of the state. As John Keane 
(1988:51) has claimed, De Tocqueville stressed that civil associations are crucial 
barriers against state despotism, in respect of which he considered them to be the 
“independent eye of society” (Makary, 2007:78). 
 
NGOs play a vital role due to their ability to work in parallel with state power in the 
globalised. (Nerfin, 1986:47). NGOs constitute the essence of civil society by helping 
people to pursue diverse interests. Moreover, they represent the political aspect of what 
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the World Bank refers to as “mechanisms through which citizens define and articulate a 
broad range of interests and make demands” (Brown, D. and Korten, D. 1989:8). 
 
There have been some positive acknowledgments of the potential role of NGOs as agents 
of the delivery of welfare services. Advocates of such provision see NGOs as efficient, 
small- scale, cost-effective and easily managed, and able to further policies of 
decentralisation, elimination of corruption, strengthening of civil society and facilitation 
of political participation at the grassroots level (Frantz, 1987; Bebbington, 1993 as cited 
in Gideon, 1998: 303). 
 
This section has attempted to provide an overview of the various definitions and 
applications of ‘NGO’. Although these organisations form the key focus of this study, 
other important related terms, particularly ‘civil society’ and ‘association’ will form part 
of the debate. The concept of ‘civil society’ and its many forms will be discussed in detail 
in Chapter Two. The thesis’s analysis of Libyan civil society, however, relates exclusively 
to the definition given by the World Bank.  
 
1.4 The Interest of the Topic  
My interest in the subject of the relationship between state and society began when I 
was called in for questioning to "Barā‘im wa Ashbāl wa Sawā‘id al-Fātiḥ" (BASF) a 
youth mobilisation camp, following my proposal to establish an association to protect 
children who were being emotionally and physically abused by their own families and 
parents. The regime had formed a restrictive legal and political framework which 
prohibited any sort of institution other than those of the people's authority system. At the 
same time, I had very little knowledge about civil society and a narrow concept of 
charities, believing their activities were limited to giving alms. 
 
My objective, at the time, was to approach parents and older siblings and make them 
aware of the destructive consequences of violence against children. Children had no 
rights, whatsoever, to protection under the law. Violence against children, including both 
corporal punishment and deliberate humiliation, had never been officially denounced. I 
noticed that the BASF focused only on integrating the younger generation into the 
revolutionary regime and recruiting more loyal individuals. Neither the BASF nor the 
Basic People Conferences (BPCs) had ever raised the problem of violence against 
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children. Therefore, I requested the BASF to adopt, in its programmes, a commitment to 
contact families and educate them in order to reduce violence against children. 
Meanwhile, my role was to secure volunteers to get involved in such activities. A few 
weeks later, I was called to the centre, where I was warned and even intimidated for 
thinking of establishing an entity that would be in direct communication with the public 
and disturb the course of revolutionary transition. I was told that the revolution of al-
Fatah had already met the needs of the whole population, granted all their rights and left 
nobody in need of any institution that would contradict the people's authority. In order for 
any entity to be in line with the people’s authority,4 it had to have been mentioned in the 
Green Book or the so called Universal Third Theory Interpretations, which were a series 
of political, economic and social precepts created by Qadhafi.  
 
At the turn of the 21st century, Saif al-Islam, the son of the late Colonel Qadhafi, 
stepped forward claiming that he would bring about reform and create a new Libya. 
The reform project he initiated included the establishment of ''civil society organisations'' 
(CSOs). This proposal for building civil society alongside the system of the people's 
authority was indicative of a simmering offstage conflict between the old and new elites, 
which was one of the obstacles that needed to be overcome by the new CSOs. A more 
basic obstacle to the success of this initiative these was the inherent character the people's 
authority system, which granted Colonel Qadhafi ultimate power in Libya This meant 
that all decisions operated in a top-down manner, restricting the possibility of direct 
participation by citizens, or the realisation of their initiatives. Public involvement in CSOs 
thus largely remained an orchestrated façade. Moreover, at the grassroots level, Libyan 
society under Qadhafi seemed far from constituting a fertile soil in which democracy 
could take root. 
 
Even the reforms which the regime did introduce were of limited real significance. In 
2001, as part of its campaign to reintegrate the country into international society, the 
Libyan government issued a new law - No. 19 - the purpose of which was to regulate 
''associational activities''. This followed the lifting of UN sanctions, and the regime’s 
attempt to initiate economic and legislative reform. The reason for creating a framework 
for the establishment of NGOs, however, was to respond to international pressure rather 
                                                 
The system will be explained in Chapter Five  4 
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than an attempt to genuinely meet people’s demands. The organisations formed did not 
emerge from the grassroots level, nor did they reflect the real needs of their members or 
the need to protect members’ interests. Even though law No. 19 was intended to grant 
the right of association, in practice it simply re-established the framework of a law 
passed in 1970 that had regulated associational activities in Libya. 
 
1.5 The Significance of this Study 
The study seeks to contribute to the literature on civil society in the Arab world in general. 
It focuses however, specifically on the major structural and cultural barriers to the 
project of developing civil society in Libya. 
 
This study is the first of its kind in Libya to explore the mapping of NGOs, their 
characteristics and activities, and the current and historical capacity within Libya. It is 
also the first study to tackle the effect of the dramatic changes resulting from the Arab 
Spring on Libyan civil society. It is hoped that these findings will be of interest to 
specialists in the Middle East, more the Libyan government, and population 
s pecifically. It is intended to initiate and contribute to a debate about ways of 
overcoming the obstacles faced by Libya in this sector. An aspect which this project will 
in some measure help to explain and redress. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
The approach taken in this thesis is qualitative. The aim of qualitative methods is to gain 
access to the ‘world’ of the people who are being researched (Burton, 2000: 197). 
Accordingly, the present study is an attempt to derive meaning from the perspectives of 
those who have established and work within these organisations, and from the material 
available in documentation and through observation. 
 
Many studies stress the importance of qualitative research within the social sciences. In 
particular Myers (1997:2) emphasises the significance of qualitative research on social 
aspects, such as culture and values, and states: ‘Qualitative research methods are designed 
to help researchers understand people and the social and cultural contexts within which 
they live’. Quantitative method aim to be more objective and data-led, but my research 
relies on interpretation diverse source and seeks to provide multifaceted overview, rather 
than a reduction a reduction ‘answer’ to the question. 
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I chose qualitative methods because this suits the study and enables the researcher 
most effectively to examine the main research question. Different types of qualitative 
research methods are employed, mainly interviews, observation and the analysis of 
documents. The latter is important when I discuss the legal framework governing 
Libyan NGOs. I use discourse analysis in seeking to understand Qadhafi and Saif al- 
Islam’s views from their speeches. 
 
Structurally, the study employs the following steps: first, it defines a research question 
(as above) which addresses the topic of Libyan NGOs; and second, it tries to find answers 
to this question, by examining the political, social and legal factors which influence the 
capacities and activities of the associations. As already stated, a variety of research 
tools are used to achieve this: first, documentary evidence, such as the regulatory codes 
and speeches of key figures, such as Qadhafi and his son Saif al-Islam; second, 
interviews conducted by the researcher with the leaders of various types of 
associations and with people who were involved in these associations’ activities; and 
third, the researcher’s own observations of the aforesaid associations. The latter are 
especially important in the second part of this study. 
 
A list of questions was prepared and classified with regard to the theme of each 
fieldwork chapter. The questions covered a range of issues in the NGOs’ management, 
funding and relations with the state. The questions list was designed to be flexible so that 
it could meet the different levels of participants and situations: flexibility is important 
in the Libyan environment. 
 
1.6.1 Interviews 
Interviews have been chosen as a method of collecting data for this study to redress 
the shortcomings of information available from official reports and of legislative and 
other types of documentation. The latter tend to represent the views of government and 
not those of NGOs or private individuals. The law is not able to explain the extent to 
which these organisations are in practice independent of the state, nor how far, in 
reality, the state dominates their activities and administration. It is possible through 
interviews to explore how the organisations understand and practice their independence 
from state hegemony. In other words, the researcher hopes to understand the 
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dimensions of the relationship rather than making a superficial analysis based on the 
regulatory framework. The study represents an attempt to derive some meaning from the 
perspectives of those people who have established and work within the NGOs. It is an 
approach that can, at least, go some way towards dealing with these kinds of issues. 
Additionally, it should be stressed that following the changes in Libya in 2011, 
interviews became the only viable source of data for this research, since at this time 
the associations were working mainly in the absence of government. Especially, there is 
lack of governance and reduced public services like the internet. 
 
The research material stems mainly from data collected during my field work conducted 
in Libya between 2010 and 2011 in the cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Misurata. The first 
stage of my fieldwork was carried out between March and April 2010, during which 
time 11 in-depth interviews were conducted with the leadership of associations involved 
in different types of civic activities. The majority of these associations were involved in 
charity work, but there were also some providing service delivery and advocacy. These 
associations were selected to represent the different types of Libyan NGOs. In regard to 
the Gaddafi Foundation (GF) I conducted three interviews, one with the executive 
director and two with heads of department. It was the largest and strongest NGO in Libya. 
The second stage of my fieldwork was carried out between August and September 2011 
in the cities of Benghazi and Misurata. This time around 26 in-depth interviews were 
conducted with the leaders of associations and also with some activists who participated 
in the 2011 uprising. 
 
The aim of the initial fieldwork was, as far as possible, to gather representative data about 
the different types of Libyan association, including their sizes and the range of civil 
activities in which they were involved. Thereafter, substantive questions could be 
raised with interviewees. The interviews consisted of a series of questions and follow-up 
probes. General questions were posed to all informants so that comparable data would 
be available for all interviews. Meanwhile, the follow-up questions differed according 
to the interviewees’ stories, and were intended to encourage them to divulge what they 
perceived as important information to the relevant research issues. The topics covered 
in interviews included: general information about civil society organisations, how they 
are funded and managed, voluntary work undertaken, their relationship with the Libyan 
state and foreign organisations, and interviewees’ own opinions about the whole NGO 
30 
 
phenomenon. Research questions and interviews were conducted in Arabic in order to 
make it possible to communicate with the informants and to facilitate their engagement 
with the research project. The interviews were recorded on a digital voice recorder. 
(Questions- appendix No. 1) 
 
Being an indigenous researcher studying my own society gave me certain significiant 
advantages in the research process, as I was better placed to build a balanced relationship 
between myself as a researcher and the interviewees, and develop natural interaction and 
trust with the interviewees. Moreover, some interviewees believe that my study will be 
useful for improving their work and will give them some useful guidance, since the 
findings of this research would be available to any organization, to discuss and build up 
new strategies and plans for the future. Being Libyan and from the same society, as well 
as speaking the same language, helped me to conduct the interviews at a variety of 
different times and places, and reduced much of the need for explanation about them. 
Also, being from the same culture was helpful in understanding the values of the 
interviewees and how they interpret different issues. Sharing the same language and 
nationality facilitated communication with the interviewees, since as an insider it was 
easier to build a relationship of the trust and to increase awareness of the significance and 
principle of the interview. However, some other factors, especially gender, played a 
limiting role in my ability to conduct interviews. In particular, my being a woman was 
sometimes given as a reason to refuse or cancel interviews. 
 
1.6.2 Documentation 
Yin (2003:85) states that: 
documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic 
[...] the information may come in a wide range of forms such as: letters, 
memoranda, and other communiqués, agendas and announcements, 
minutes of meetings, and other written reports; administrative 
documents, proposals, progress reports, and other internal documents; 
formal studies or evaluations of the same site under study; newspaper 
cuttings and other articles. 
 
The researcher has opted to use documentation, along with interviews, in the belief that 
these sources can enable a better understanding of the circumstances of civil society 
associations in Libya and of their relationship with the Libyan state.  
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Secondary sources will also be used in this study, such as newspapers, books, journals 
and all other data relevant to the research question. 
 
1.6.3 Observation 
Observation is another qualitative method. Flick (1998:215) argues that it:  
enables the researcher to find out how something factually works or 
occurs. Compared to that claim, presentations in interviews are said to 
comprise a mixture of how something is and of how something should 
be, which still needs to be untangled. 
 
The observations from the field notes provide an appropriate background for interpreting 
the interview data and deepening the understanding of the data. 
 
In the observations I made use of my background as a Libyan citizen, watching and 
observing the ''street'' and what people say about these associations and the services they 
provide. Also relevant were observations on how the activists of these associations 
behave in dealing with some of the beneficiaries, or in their responses to the calls which 
they receive. 
 
1.6.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis is an essential part of qualitative methods, to make sense of material 
collected through the four methods just outlined. My analysis of the material was guided 
by seeking to understand how the relationship between the political system and NGOs 
has been shaped in Libya. The analysis had to focus on the factors which contributed to 
the relationship, such as funding, management, the law and how NGOs understand their 
role in civil society. The themes which were identified as important were those that 
were frequently mentioned and relevant to the operation of independent NGOs. For 
example, among the central themes recognised by the study were the negative impact 
of Libyan state intervention in NGOs’ activities and the lack of funding. These factors 
were evident in the data, acting as restricting factors in the first stage (Qadhafi regime) 
and as positive factors in the second stage (with the absence of the state). 
 
I developed categories of NGOs’ activities by adopting a classification model. 
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1.7 Chapters Structure 
To best answer the various aspects of the research question I divided this study into nine 
chapters. The present chapter includes a rationale for the research, including the 
methodological framework and the suitability of the research and data collection 
methods.  
 
In the first section of Chapter Two the relevant background literature is reviewed. 
The chapter also discusses how the term ‘civil society’ can be defined, and analyses how 
it has been understood by scholars. The researcher then makes clear the definition of civil 
society which she will use, namely that given by the World Bank. Another section of the 
chapter discusses the relationship between civil society and the state, and provides some 
models that show different dimensions of the relationship. The chapter provides the 
theoretical framework for the thesis. 
 
Chapter Three looks at the historical background of civil society in Libya and traces 
its development under different political systems from 1835 to 1969. In order to provide 
understanding of the Libyan context, it explores various types of traditional organisation 
that acted as intermediaries between the family and the state, such as Sufi orders, tribes, 
and the waqf system. It then looks at the historical development of Libyan associations, 
showing how the different types of organisation and institution that existed in the past 
have reflected the role of civil society in Libya. 
 
Chapter Four considers the background to, and structure of the Qadhafi-era Libyan 
political system, and how this system affected the development of civil society. It 
questions whether there was space within these structures for civil society or whether the 
structures dominated all public activities. 
 
The legal framework surrounding civil society in Libya is dealt with in Chapter Five. 
It focuses on the relationship between the state and law. Also,  legal rules that supposedly 
guarantee freedom of association, in assessing whether Libyan law promotes or restricts 
the role of civil organisations. 
 
Chapter Six discusses the functions of associations in Libya under the Qadhafi regime 
with particular regard to activities such as education, healthcare and social relief services. 
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It also scrutinises the various problems faced by these organisations. It identifies and 
focuses on what appear to be the three main obstacles towards building a civil society: 
culture, inappropriate laws and structural impediments. 
 
Chapter Seven discusses the Qadhafi International Charity and Development 
Foundation (GICDF), which was the largest and strongest NGO in Libya, with the aim 
of defining its character as an organisation. Consideration is given to whether it served 
as a good model for reform. T he GICDF was involved in many activities and aided 
the development of Libyan civil society. It was unique as an NGO because its role 
went beyond that which is typical of civil society organisations. 
 
Chapter Eight examines the dynamic which sparked the uprising of 2011 in Libya. It 
attempts to map the changes which have taken place in Libya since 2011 and sheds 
light on the development of events. The chapter will be look at the nature of the changing 
of civil society from the perspective of the development of NGOs. Also this chapter 
examines the changes in civil society institutions after the collapse of the previous 
regime, especially in Benghazi and Misurata. In particular, it deals with how the sudden 
change in the political situation of Libya affected the emergence of civil society 
institutions, and how those associations have been established. Some thought is given in 
this chapter to the issue of how the associations can be classified. 
 
Finally, this study concludes with Chapter Nine which attempts to conclude and to 
predict possible future developments for civil society in Libya. 
 
1.8 Thematic Overview 
Overall, the thesis will show that Libyan pre-modern history suggests that the concept of 
civil society as developed in the European context is inadequate and needs to be 
broadened to include traditional social formats (including tribes and religious 
associations) which fulfilled a similar purpose as conventional CSOs but which would 
normally be excluded as being ascriptive or exclusivist groups. This is in keeping 
with the World Bank definition of the term. These traditional social groups 
allowed society to develop civic activism, volunteerism, and participatory activities 
which are similar to - but not necessarily the same as - those of European civil society. 
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Under Qadhafi, the Libyan State developed 'fierce' characteristics, with power residing 
in personalised rule, backed by coercion, rather than in the hollow institutions of the State. 
This denied civil society the space to develop, not least by the law being used to constrain 
and inhibit civil society formation. However, society was able to maintain limited and 
innovative forms of civic activism, volunteerism and participatory activity through the 
few NGOs that were allowed to operate, and through the tribal and religious formats 
which were allowed by Qadhafi. This civil culture was significantly but complexly 
boosted by the activities of the Gadhafi Foundation, which enabled degree of freedom of 
debate and new discourses that challenged the State. 
 
The complications and challenges of the positions held by the Gadhafi Foundation, as well 
as other organisations active in the civil society sphere are discussed in later chapters. The 
more appropriate definition of NGOs that this study recommends for the Libyan and 
related contexts will assist in understanding how they operate within and through specific 
social structures. 
 
When the uprising occurred, it was not led by organisations in civil society (since these had 
not been allowed to develop fully). However, as the hollow state institutions quickly fell, 
the culture of civic activism, volunteerism and participation which had been sustained 
throughout the previous decades meant that Libyans quickly formed associations and 
NGOs to fill the space now available to them, offering good potential for the development 
of a thriving post-transition civil society. 
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Chapter Two 
Civil Society and the State: the Theoretical Map 
 
This chapter seeks to examine and explain the concept of civil society in both its broad 
sense (which includes traditional organisations) and narrow sense (which excludes them). 
It also discusses several theoretical frameworks for studying different aspects of civil 
society. The definition of civil society as used in this thesis is made specific, and justified, 
in section 2.2. 
 
2.1 Origins: Development and Use of the Term 
The purpose of this section is to provide a historical background and to discuss how the 
idea of civil society has developed over time. It seeks to explain the philosophical, social, 
economic and political roots behind the emergence and development of the concept. This 
requires going back to the period when the idea of separating the State from civil society 
began to crystallise. I will trace the emergence of the modern idea of civil society by 
focussing on thinkers such as Locke, members of the Scottish Enlightenment, Hegel, 
Marx, De Tocqueville and Gramsci.  
 
2.1.1 The Starting Point 
As an outgrowth of the European Enlightenment period, Seligman (1995:11) summarises 
the main understanding of the term of civil society at that time as “a mode of overcoming 
and synthesizing the emergent contradictions between public and private existence in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.” This specifically European and historical origin of 
the term is worth noting, since its applicability to other (especially Arab) cultures must 
take it into account, as the later sections of this chapter will demonstrate. 
 
2.1.2 Civil Society in the 17th and 18th Centuries 
The problem was raised by late seventeenth and eighteenth century thinkers who 
witnessed the end of the feudal system and the establishment of the bourgeois nation-
state. The industrial revolution with its increased mechanisation, increased 
communication fuelled by newly invented transport systems, and the Protestant reform 
movement, paved the way for the emergence of new social layers and categories (See 
Becker (1994), Chambers and Kymlicka (ed) (2002), Carapico (1998) and Cohen and 
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Arato (1990)). Colonialism moreover had led to an expansion of markets. Miyoshi 
(1993:713) states that: 
The high cost paid for such a social change is to be expected. 
Industrialization and colonization converge in this development. And 
thus all industrialized nations are former colonizers. 
 
The emerging bourgeois class demanded rights and privileges they had not enjoyed under 
the former religious-feudal order (Edwards, 2010; Israel, 2011) and attempted to break 
down absolute and despotic monarchies, which derived their ‘legitimacy’ from God. The 
traditional order was put into question (De Condorcet, 1955). Israel (2011:8) says that 
“an underground literature of clandestine manuscripts rejecting all the most basic and 
sacred suppositions of existing authority and religion” evolved. They saw the need to 
carve out a social and political space between, on the one hand, secular, public (working) 
lives, and private (family) lives on the other, and sought to reduce state control in all areas 
of life in order to defend their growing interests.  
 
‘Civil’ became a counterpoint to the twin framework of religion and state. It countered 
the religious ideology which was also the culture of feudal social membership (Edwards, 
2010) and introduced the concept of the public good. The new authority derived its 
legitimacy from society and individualism (Edwards, 2010; Israel, 2011). The doors were 
opened to new regulations which have served emergent classes ever since (Israel, 2006). 
Hall (1995:5-6) highlights the central element to the formation of European civil society 
in his statement: ‘‘[…] civil society gained in self-consciousness from the experience of 
fighting against politico-religious unification drives''. However Seligman (1995:15) gives 
another reason for its emergence, stating that it was the result of a crisis in social order 
which came from the commercialisation of land, labour and capital, the growth of market 
economies, the age of discovery and revolutions in Europe and North America. Edwards 
(2011:7) agrees that civil society was “a response to a perceived crisis in the ruling social 
order.” However it is important to note that, at the time, there was no clear definition of 
civil society.  
 
In the following section, I will address the differences in scholars’ definitions of the 
concept of civil society and their contributions to its development.  
 
 
37 
 
 
2.1.3 Locke and Liberalism 
Locke is one of the foremost philosophers to address the idea of civil society. His 
theorising is based largely on his consideration of the atrocities of the civil war in England 
(Aaron, 1955), on Renaissance thinking and on the effects of the scientific revolution. He 
was the first thinker to use the term in his book In the Civil Rule in 1691. In true 
Enlightenment tradition, Locke believed humans to be naturally rational and good. 
Society is a space into which individuals enter naturally and voluntarily and in which they 
are guaranteed the same rights as they enjoyed under natural law. Being fully capable of 
self-regulating there is no need for absolute authority in a society, which he 
interchangeably calls ‘civil’ and ‘natural’. The emergence of absolute power, such as the 
divine right of kings or totalitarian dictatorship, threatens the pursuit of individual 
interests and the practice of individual rights and must be curbed (Karen Vaughn, 1980).  
 
However Locke did note that people are sometimes led to “an unpeaceful life in the State 
of Nature” (quoted in Pangle, 1988:209). They therefore agreed to form a civil society in 
order to protect their respective self-interests and private property (Connolly, 1993). 
Locke’s civil society is consensual and democratic, with a parliament that passes 
legislation which benefits the people who make up the society. The aim of its power is 
limited by law and social contract, and its function is not to organise society, but to deal 
with any shortcomings and flaws resulting from war, crime or violation of natural law 
(Seligman, 1995). Locke’s State is a seamless extension of the civil society from which 
it is derived, so that he does not clearly differentiate between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society 
(Pelczynski, 1984).  
 
Throughout his discussion of civil society, the individual remains at the centre of Locke’s 
analysis. Individual rights of person, labour and property are central to civil society and 
at the same time are free from State intervention (Plamenatz, 1981). Although Locke 
provided no actual framework for the formation of a civil society, he was the first thinker 
to divide the private citizen from the State, creating two arenas and the potential for a 
third to emerge, as a mediator, between them. His emphasis on individualism, rationality 
and the social contract had a great impact on other thinkers of the Enlightenment period. 
Seligman (2002:21-22) argues that “it is with John Locke that we must begin our 
understanding of the modern concept of civil society.” 
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2.1.4 Scottish Enlightenment  
Whereas Locke had arrived at his concept of a civil and political society from 
philosophical premises regarding human nature, philosophers of the Scottish 
Enlightenment regarded civil society more in the nature of a planned project. The same 
ideas regarding essential goodness, rationality and innate sociability underpinned both 
strands of thinking. Israel (2011:3) says:  
It is largely valid to say that the Enlightenment began, not as a definite 
thing or even as a chronological period, but as processes concerned with 
the central place of reason and experience and experiment in 
understanding and improving human society. 
 
In his An Essay on the History of Civil Society of 1767, Adam Ferguson emphasises 
neither individual interest, nor the social contract. Instead he states that “innate sentiment” 
toward doing good and love of humankind led to the formation of society, without 
purpose or planning and this can lead to unexpected outcomes. However the Scottish 
philosophers (for example Hume, Hutcheson and Smith) took a more material approach 
with their concern about the defence against unwarranted intrusion by the State and called 
for the establishment of actual social organisations to prevent this. Edwards (2010:7) 
points out that “… in this school of thought, civil society was a self-regulating universe 
of associations committed to the same ideal that needed, at all costs, to be protected from 
the state.’’  
 
The Scottish thinkers ‘‘[…] were more concerned than Locke about the role of 
manufacture and commerce'' (Oz-Salzberger, 2001: 59). They placed more emphasis on 
economic factors and their impact on the emergence of mutual interest. More importantly 
''both [David Hume and Adam Smith] innovated arguments on traditional theories, 
[and] … envisaged a civil society where economic and social transaction mattered as 
much as political institutions'' (Oz-Salzberger, 2001:58). 
 
At this point in history, civil society was regarded largely as an economic sphere. The 
social nature of NGOs was yet to emerge.  
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2.1.5 Hegel and the Separation of the State and Civil Society  
Half a century later, Hegel presented the first concrete definition of civil society as the 
space between the family and the State (Pelczynski, 1984). However, unlike others he 
does not see its role as beyond State control. On the contrary, he argues that a civil society 
cannot stand alone free from the influence of the State, as the latter is necessary in shaping it.  
 
To Hegel, the State is a ‘spirit’; a divine idea reflected on earth; the ‘rational 
representation’ of the development of a spiritual element in civilization (Connolly, 1993). 
Civil society gains its stability and unity from the existence of the State which gives it 
moral character and leads it toward morally specific ends. Ultimately the goal of civil 
society is to strengthen the State or in Keane's (1988:35) words “the task of the State is 
to conserve and transcend civil society”. Connolly (1993:116) summarises it thus:  
The members will recognize more fully the freedom which is theirs, the 
limitation they must accept to protect this freedom, and the ethical life 
they must endorse to enable the State to achieve its highest level of 
existence. And this recognition will infuse the life of the individual, the 
family, corporate association, the market, the civil service and the 
relation all these entities bear to the state. 
  
Civil society is a “system of needs” which aims to meet the individual’s interests and 
protect his/her possessions. Hegel has channelled the meaning of ‘civil society’ into a 
form of market society, a set of social practices created by the capitalist economy, which 
explains why it emerged as capitalism blossomed, matching its interests to individual 
rights to private property (Dhanagare, 2001). Given the likelihood of tension and conflict 
in a market society that affords a spectacle of extravagance and want, as well as of the 
physical and ethical degeneration common to both (Wood: 1991), the State is necessary 
to keep ethical order in society and therefore stands apart from it, with the power to correct 
its flaws and setbacks. 
 
Civil society also stands separate from the family. The family is based on self-denial and 
unity whereas civil society is a moral life embodied in competition, where individuals 
pursue their own interests. It goes beyond individuals and the relations between 
individuals to encompass the life of the community as a whole. It is a process of mediation 
– integration and conflict at the same time:  
The 'concrete person' of civil society differs from the isolated subject of 
the sphere of morality (Moralitat) in that he gradually comes to recognise 
himself as a member of society and realizes that to attain his ends he must 
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work with and through others. Through working with others, his 
particularity is mediated. He ceases to be a mere unit and eventually 
becomes so socially conscious, as a result of the educative force of the 
institutions of civil society, that he wills his own ends only in willing 
universal ends and so has passed beyond civil society into the state. 
(Kumar, 1993:378)  
 
According to Kumar (1993:378), civil society as Hegel argues is "[…] part of ethical life, 
the part that provides the middle term between the family and the state.” He argues that 
this status developed in two phases or ‘monuments’. In the first, the feudal system 
changed to private ownership and property. With the accompanying shift in the economic 
system, social groups emerged as also did family and individuals’ rights, rights to private 
property and constitutions and civil law to protect these rights. The second monument 
occurred when civil society developed in the space between the family and the State. It 
was expressed in civil unions, political parties, religious organisations and educational 
services such as schools and universities.  
 
To summarise, Hegel views civil society as the area of conflicting individuals’ interests. 
The problems of civil society are resolved in a State which encompasses it (Keane, 1988; 
Pelczynski (ed.), 1984; Cohen and Arato, 1990; and Kaviraj and Khilnani (ed.), 2001). 
His definition of civil society as the space between the family and the State has become 
the basis for modern analysis, including this study, and was expanded on by writers who 
followed him. 
 
2.1.6 Civil Society in the 19th and 20th Centuries Marx and Class 
One of the later writers who built on the Hegelian idea was Karl Marx. He adopted the 
concepts underpinning the ‘Hegelian dialectic’ and applied them in his own theory. For 
example, the term ‘burgerliche Gesellschaft', ('bourgeois society') is a Hegelian term 
adopted by Marx and used in his social theory (Pelczynski, 1984). However Marx broke 
with Hegel in his book A Critique of Political Economy. (1859) He theorised society as 
fundamentally divided in terms of economic relations between two classes: the 
bourgeoisie, whose ownership of the means of production is an effective tool for 
controlling the proletariat, and the proletariat who work within this system. In this way, 
Marx deconstructed Hegel’s highly structured and complex concept of ‘civil society’ and 
placed it firmly in the economic sphere, which he regarded as fundamental to all other 
spheres of social relations (Pelczynski, 1984). 
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Therefore, in Marx’s thinking the bourgeoisie hold more than economic control in society 
(see for example, Cohen and Arato, 1990; Femia, 2001). According to Marx, civil society 
is a bourgeois concept which, like all elements of social relations, is imposed on the 
proletariat. The cross-class unity it falsely suggests hinders discussion of the conflict 
between them. The role of the State in civil society merely strengthens bourgeois control 
as a tool used to maintain hegemony over the proletariat. In this way, Marx emphasises 
the negative characteristics of civil society (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987; Connolly, 
1993). 
 
Whilst Hegel emphasised the unity of civil and political society and the positive role of 
the State, Marx differentiated between them. For him, civil society was the ‘base’ over 
which the ‘superstructure’ of political society reigns, always representing the interests of 
the dominant or ruling class and enacting laws to protect their interests. The close 
relationship between civil society and the pursuit of individual interests under capitalism 
further emphasises bourgeois interest in maintaining the illusion of unitary interest in 
maintaining civility (Femia, 2001; Edwards, 2004). 
  
Separation of the proletariat from the products of their labour produces a ‘process of 
atomization’ which ultimately causes alienation (Femia, 2001:135). In this way the 
proletariat become unaware of their distance from the decision-making which controls 
their lives and the economic benefits of their labour. Marx theorised that the end of history 
will take place when revolutionary action brings about the elimination of the bourgeoisie 
and the withering away of the State (Brown, 2001). Under such conditions there will be 
no need for intermediate institutions to act as channels for individuals and their goals, and 
they will be able to live a truly human or democratic life, referred to by others as 
‘Communism’. 
 
Marxist theory implies that the predicted progression applies only to a technologically 
advanced society with a well-developed capitalist economic system. In developing or 
‘traditional’ societies the demise of the State is not necessarily a precondition for the 
emergence of a prosperous and successful society because the proletariat in such societies 
is not completely alienated from the products of its labour. Moreover, Marx also believed 
that whilst it is important to prevent the inhibition of individual freedom by a State with 
too much power, it can equally be argued that it is important for the State to be sufficiently 
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strong to protect individual rights. Marx warns of the danger of NGOs closely tied to the 
state, as they can operate to isolate individuals for each other, in the service of the 
dominant class. This raises important questions about the conditions necessary for the 
formation and successful (non-oppressive) organization of civil society. However, Marx's 
theory is limited by the supposedly universal character of the social conditions he 
describes, which do not take into account alternative social models, as might apply in the 
Libyan context. While the Marxist attention to large-scale forces and historical 
development is valuable, attention to particular case studies makes it difficult to apply his 
ideas directly. 
 
2.1.7 De Tocqueville  
Alexis De Tocqueville, a French philosopher and historian of the mid19th century, is 
considered one of the most prominent theorists of civil society. In his writings he analysed 
the rising living standards and social conditions of individuals and their relationship to 
the market and State in Western societies. Unlike Hegel and Marx he saw civil society as 
a field lying outside the political system and its laws beyond the framework of 
government. This idea is consistent with and has influenced the current definition of civil 
society as an arena that lies between the individual and the state.  
 
De Tocqueville arrived at this conclusion through his analysis of European states and the 
newly-formed American state. He saw in the emerging United States a strong society with 
a weak State, and in Europe, strong states with weak societies. His concept of civil society 
is based on the American model where deeply individualistic people promote public 
welfare under conditions of broad social equality (Woldring, 1998; Pope, 1985). It can be 
argued that De Tocqueville’s concept of the link between the State and civil society is a 
reversion to the idea of State power combined with the weakness of civil society. 
However, his view of civic associations as the heart of civil society is his principal 
contribution to contemporary understanding.  
 
In his book Democracy in America, he focuses on ‘associational life’. De Tocqueville 
saw the potential for a strongly protective State with a powerful governmental apparatus 
becoming a barrier to individual freedom and argued that “[…] mechanisms for 
preventing monopolies of power must be strengthened within the spheres of the State and 
civil society’’ (Keane, 1987:50). Within a balanced framework “[…] free local and 
43 
 
provincial institutions and free associations could serve as buffers between State and 
citizens” (Woldring, 1998:367).  
 
Through his analysis of American society in the 1830s, De Tocqueville saw political 
associations as the ‘great free schools’ of democracy within which members of the 
community can learn the general theory of association. One lesson is to “[…] realise that 
self-interest is best served by considering the needs of others as well” (O’Brien: 1999). 
He concluded that civil society “puts special emphasis on the ability of associational life 
in general and the habits of association in particular to foster patterns of civility in the 
actions of citizens in a democratic polity’’ (Foley and Edwards, 1996:38). 
 
Therefore De Tocqueville saw civil society as a powerful check on political power, as 
Robert Cox states: 
Tocqueville saw this proliferation of associations as a guarantee against 
a tyranny of the majority that might result from an electoral sweep in an 
era of populist politics. (1999:6) 
 
This view of associations as a potential counterweight to the potentially tyrannical and 
despotic nature of the state is still an appropriate model for analysing the role of NGOs 
(Shawa, 2005:213). Seligman somewhat undermined De Tocqueville’s analysis by 
arguing that the “USA lacked a coherent concept of state” (1992:8). However, De 
Tocqueville; ideas have been highly influential on modern studies of NGOs and their role 
in building a civil society. 
 
2.1.8 Gramsci and Cultural Hegemony 
Bratton states that:  
De Tocqueville's emphasis is on the importance of voluntary associations 
in promoting democratic citizenship, while Gramsci's emphasis is on the 
role of social institutions in either buttressing or challenging State power. 
(Bratton, 1994:1) 
 
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian who wrote mainly between the two World Wars. 
Although a Marxist, Gramsci’s ideas differed somewhat from Marx. Though he agreed 
that the function of the State is control and coercion, he did not see civil society as existing 
simply to serve its interests. Instead he divided the State into two societies; the political, 
which consists of political institutions such as the army and police; and the non-political  
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often called ‘private’ which consists of family, unions, the education system and other 
elements. Although these two levels often function in unity with the dominant group 
exercising power throughout society, they do not necessarily correlate, and between them 
is a space of ideological and political competition where the uniting factor is culture 
(Hoare and Smith (ed.) and translated, 1971:12). The space occupied by civil society is a 
field of struggle for intellectual, cultural and political ‘hegemony’.  
 
Gramsci defined civil society as a set of regulations related to the superstructure, which 
dominates through culture and ideology, domination and coercion (Bobbio in Keane (ed.) 
1988). However cultural leadership is not mere economic or political coercion. Bobbio 
(1988:93) argues that ''Gramsci’s hegemony includes both the factor of political 
leadership and the factor of cultural leadership.'' Though the bourgeoisie can dominate 
ideology in its own interests, the working class can equally attain power through cultural 
hegemony through intellectual and moral leadership. Cox (1999:38) summarised his 
thinking as follows: 
Antonio Gramsci's thought embraced both meanings: civil society was 
the ground that sustained the hegemony of the bourgeoisie but also that 
on which an emancipatory counter-hegemony could be constructed. 
 
Because Gramsci’s analysis of civil society is premised more on the superstructure of 
society than its economic relations – a broader character than a narrowly capitalistic 
meaning - Keane (1988:83) argues that “Gramsci is openly indebted to Hegel”. However, 
unlike Hegel, Gramsci does not see civil society as an ethical sphere, but as an institution 
of domination and power. Gramsci located civil society within the political 
superstructure (Edwards, 2004). However he also underlined the central role of civil 
society as a contributor to the cultural and ideological capital required for the survival of 
the hegemony of capitalism (Ehrenberg, 1999). He claims that the bourgeoisie can protect 
its economic interests by enabling the political sphere to meet some of the demands of 
civil society represented by its associations or unions. In this case, the bourgeoisie 
willingly participates in what he named 'passive revolution' by going beyond some of its 
economic interests.  
 
Gramsci further highlighted civil society’s key role in defending people against the State 
and the market, and in emphasising the democratic will to influence the State (Ehrenberg, 
1999). In other words, Gramsci, unlike Marx, viewed civil society as the site for problem-
45 
 
solving. Education and revolution are the forces that will enable the proletariat or the 
working-class to create an alternative hegemony and dominate civil society. For Gramsci, 
those forces are the means to undermine bourgeois domination. They open the door to 
change and to reformist movements. Ultimately the proletariat's task is to create a 
'regulated society' which is capable of undertaking bureaucratic responsibilities for the 
collective administration of society following the withering away of the state after a 
Marxist revolution.  
  
Gramsci’s central theme of ‘hegemony’ removes civil society from the purely political 
sphere. In the use of this term he expands the space of civil society, giving the social, 
including traditional forms, a larger role to play. His analysis is supported by events in 
Libya following the uprising of 2011, when the State was initially largely absent and civic 
associations filled all the gaps necessary for society to continue to function.  
 
2.2 Civil Society: Defining the Concept 
In this study the researcher has adopted the World Bank's definition of civil society. This 
is given as:  
the term civil society is refer to the wide array of non-governmental and 
not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing 
the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, 
cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of 
organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, 
faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations. 
(World Bank, 2013) 
 
The value of this definition can be explained in three points: 
1- It is culturally unspecific while well-known on a global scale. It is acceptable to 
those of all cultures, and can not be accused of being applicable only in western 
societies. 
2- It is used internationally: almost all countries are members of the World Bank, 
and they have to relate to its polices.  
3- It has come about as a result of the collective efforts of many research centres.  
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2.3 The Interaction Relationship between the State, the Market, the Private Sphere 
and Civil Society 
This sub-section will briefly discuss the interaction or overlapping of different social 
spheres and civil society.  
 
In Citizenship and Civil Society, Janoski (1998) argues that society can be divided into 
four spheres. They are the State (with its legislative, executive and judicial organisations), 
the private sphere (consisting of family life, friends, acquaintances and personal 
property), the market (including private firms, corporations and institutions directly 
involved in business such as stock markets and employers) and the public sphere. The 
latter includes civil society. The public sphere contains at least five categories of 
associations: political parties, welfare associations, interest groups, religious bodies and 
social movements. 
 
Each sphere occupies its own social space. However they also interact in distinctive ways. 
Each of the other three overlaps with the public sphere and Janoski (ibid) asserts that this 
overlap is crucial to any theory of civil society. In modern times the State, the market, 
and the public sphere have invaded the private sphere. For instance, the State has the 
power to remove children from families under child protection legislation, and regulates 
divorces through the courts. It can therefore be argued that the private sphere has lost its 
privacy (also though the media, and the market. 
 
Janoski (1998) analysed three models from three regime types to provide a theoretical 
framework for analysing civil society. Under liberal regimes, ideally, using pluralist 
principles neatly avoids overlap between the public, the State and the market. Yet in 
reality, these three spheres inevitably overlap. The United States is an example of this 
model, where political parties overlap with the State, and labour unions and employer 
federations overlap with the market sector. However in social democratic regimes such 
as Sweden, overlap between all spheres is maximised. Religion often receives public 
subsidies through taxes; labour and capital organisations overlap with State 
administration; part of the media are subsidised by the State and public sectors (unlike 
most liberal regimes where the market controls the media) and voluntary associations 
often operate on full or partial State subsidies. Finally, the dynamics of traditional regimes 
are often quite mixed, similar to those of social democracies, though there is often much 
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less overlap between unions, employers, and religious and/or voluntary associations. 
Here, either the State or business will have more overall influence, pluralist and social 
democratic countries having larger public spheres than traditional countries.  
 
Cohen and Arato (1990: ix) highlight how the correlation between these spheres is 
substantial in a civil society. They say:  
 
It would be misleading to identify civil society with all social life outside 
the administrative State and economic processes in the narrow sense 
[ … ] In fact liberalism presupposed and could not survive without a State, 
or without the dualistic coexistence of State and society. 
 
In his article on Freund’s work, Sales (1991: 297) however, argues that, “[…] in fact, 
Freund makes a clear distinction between the political sphere and other social spheres”. 
By this he means that Freund's model (see Figure 1) has divided society into only two 
spheres – the politic (synonymous with 'public' and political relations) and the non-politic 
(synonymous with 'private' in all other social senses). For Freund, the private sphere 
contains the individual, their personal relations with others, and with a variety of 
associations. Sales (1991:299) however argues that the boundaries of the political:  
[…] can also appear more blurred because areas traditionally considered 
to be part of the private (e.g., physical and mental health, consumption, 
training, identity, social assistance, the many undertakings and 
evaluations) are subjected to a process of politicization and 
bureaucratization caused by massive intervention of the large public 
agencies managing the social. 
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From this discussion perhaps the most important point to emerge is that made by Cohen 
and Arato, (1990: X) when they say, “under liberal democracies, it would be a mistake to 
see civil society in opposition to the economy and State by definition”. In my view the 
relation between civil society and both the State and the market, shifts and overlaps, 
depending on its role and function. As Cohen and Arato (1990: X) argue, when the State 
sees civil society promoting positive behaviour in its citizens and improving their lives 
by meeting their needs, it is supportive. However, when it attempts or succeeds in taking 
over what are or have been State roles, it confronts and tries to restrict its activities.  
 
Similarly, when civil society limits poverty through programmes of social care and 
development, the market supports it. However, when the third sector trains people to 
and services and threatens to lower prices or reduce consumption, the  produce goods
market perceives it as a threat. 
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2.4 Normative Prescription: Models of How State- Society Relations Should Be.  
The relationship between the State and civil society is a topic of rising concern across the 
world. This section will summarise several models and theories that address this 
relationship and will also explore the models of civil society–State relationships. 
 
2.4.1 Relations between Government and Non-Government Organizations  
Because of its regulatory dimension, relations with the State are important to NGOs - 
often more than relations with any other sectors or stakeholders. The State is capable of 
supporting or promoting the work of NGOs, or of hindering their ability to fulfil their 
functions. Over time, NGO relations with the State have emerged as a key issue and 
favourite topic for debate in the study of civil society.  
 
There are a variety of theories that address the relationship between State and civil 
society. Some argue that the State and civil society are polar opposites. This, however, 
shows a lack of understanding of the role and function of each of these social spheres, 
even in so-called ‘traditional’ societies. If civil society is an intermediary between the 
individual and the State then the deterioration of the State will limit the scope for a civil 
society. Similarly we cannot say that having a weak State means NGOs will succeed or 
prosper. The separation of these two spheres overlooks the importance of balance. Neither 
is concerned solely with the provision of services. As social problems become globally 
more complex and multi-faceted, there is a growing consensus that they cannot be solved 
by governments alone and an ever more diverse range of solutions are required.  
 
At the same time it is almost universally accepted that markets cannot be the sole 
alternative to the State. The role of NGOs in filling the gap between the government and 
the free market has grown significantly over the past thirty or forty years (Hansmann, 
1987), so that they have become an important political and social actor – sometimes 
referred to as the ‘third sector’. NGOs are more efficient because they face fewer 
requirements for equality and accountability than government service providers and are 
hence less bureaucratic and more flexible (Douglas 1987). According to Kandil (2007: 
15) “In 1985 the term good governance [...] emerged within the vocabulary the World 
Bank”. This demonstrates that the market came to see civil society as a partner in political 
processes. It acknowledges that change in one dimension of a system affects the whole 
system. 
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The focus on the relationship between the State and NGOs has emerged from the 
involvement of NGOs in service delivery, a prominent role in many countries and 
societies. The change of term from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, suggests that the nation 
State has become a facilitator or a partner, rather than a sole actor in government. The 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCOP) 
clarifies the difference between these terms as follows: “Government is one of the actors 
in governance. Other actors involved in good governance vary depending on the level of 
government that is under discussion.” As shown in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: Characteristics of Good Governance 
Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, (UNESCOP), What is 
Good Governance? p.3. [Online]. Available at: 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp.(Accessed: 5 September 
2009).  
 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002), emphasise that it makes increasingly less sense to 
talk about NGOs and the State as operating in completely different spheres. They argue 
that it is significant and useful to analyse the ways in which the State and NGOs interact, 
particularly when the NGOs play a role in advocacy, policy-making, human rights and 
other forms of civil participation which go beyond service provision. Rather, unless 
advocacy is taken into account, the relationship between the State and NGOs is likely to 
be confrontational. The expansion of this relationship has been the result of political 
failure in many countries, underpinning the earlier point that NGOs are more than mere 
service providers. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff also claim that the relationship has been 
further strengthened by the failure of markets and contracts so that NGOs are highly 
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helpful to citizens as well. Hence NGOs satisfy the definition of civil society adopted in 
this study as being comprised of intermediary organisations between the 
individual/society and the State. However, the most important factor is as stated above, 
i.e. the relationship of both State and NGOs while delivering their services to society, 
regardless of whether these take the form of service delivery or advocacy.  
 
2.4.2 The Advantage and Disadvantage of Service Provision 
A positive aspect of NGO activity is where service delivery provides greater diversity and 
better quality than government provision (Weisbord, 1975). The lower demand for equity 
and accountability in NGO service provision makes them more effective and less 
bureaucratic. However there can also be weakness when they work closely with 
government in service delivery. Economic models suggest that non-profit organisations 
filled gaps left by standardised service packages (Weisbord, ibid), and encourage 
competition (which lowers prices) and efficiency (leading to unemployment) (Hansmann, 
1987). NGOs are also more trusted than governmental and private sector providers 
(Mansbridge, 1998 and Smith, 1989-1990) both factors which have contributed to the 
evolution of governance models.  
 
2.4.3 Models of State-Civil Society Interaction 
Coston (1998) identified two possible models of the State/NGO relationship, one negative 
and one positive. The first is defined broadly by repression, contest and competition; the 
second by cooperation, collaboration, and complementarily. When relations are of the 
first type, determined by domination and opposition, the opportunity for policy advocacy by 
NGOs will be extremely limited, and the space for them to occupy very narrow. 
 
Gidron et al. (1992) have devised four models of interaction: where government is 
dominant; where NGOs are dominant; the double model where they operate in distinct 
spheres with little interaction; and the collaborative model where they work closely 
together with positive regard for each other’s methods. 
 
Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002:8) argue that a partnership model differs from other 
relationships  
[… ] according to two defining dimensions: the maintenance of 
government’s and the nonprofit organization identity, and mutuality 
(e.g., in decision making, resource and responsibility sharing and 
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accountability)[ …] both pragmatic and normative mean and ends are 
believed to produce a value-added beyond that which each actor could 
produce alone. 
 
As interpreted by the ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ paradigm in places such as 
New Labour Britain or among African business associations, such examples almost never 
explain the full extent of a particular relationship. 
 
This discussion shows there have been a number of attempts to model the State/NGO 
relationship. However the question remains whether it is possible to use these models to 
understand processes ‘on the ground’. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002) summarise the 
current understanding through frameworks which establish the difficulties inherent in a 
range of contexts and enhance our understanding of options and possibilities. These are 
evolving governance models; theories on sector failures, and comparative frameworks. 
 
In his triangular model, Young (2000) identifies three types of relationship between the 
State and civil society: supplementary, complementary or adversarial. A supplementary 
relationship is where NGOs fulfil the demand for the public good that is left unsatisfied 
by government. In the complementary relationship, the State and civil society have a 
direct relationship as partners in delivering the public good. As government expenditure 
increases, it finances increasing levels of activity in NGOs, and may even incorporate the 
most important into the State framework. An adversarial relationship is where both State 
and NGOs hold the other accountable. Young bases his model on a comparative study of 
the US, the UK, Japan and Israel, showing that as the non-governmental sector develops, 
the State and NGOs can work together. However he concludes that no single model gives 
a complete understanding of the state/NGO relationship in any particular country. 
 
Najam (2003:383) argues that the relationship is determined by the strategic interests of 
both the State and the NGOs, and identifies four ways in which they interact. He calls his 
model the ‘Four Cs’. As shown in figure 3 per the table below, they are: 
- Cooperative: If goals and means of attaining them are similar, then 
State and NGOs work together 
- Complementary: If the goals are similar but the means dissimilar the 
State and NGOs work side by side but separately 
- Co-optive: If the goals are dissimilar and means are similar, the State 
tries to take the NGO under its umbrella 
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- Confrontational: If the goals and means are both dissimilar, then the 
State and NGO come into conflict.  
 
Type Goals Means 
Cooperative Similar Similar 
Complementary Similar Dissimilar 
Co-optive Dissimilar Similar 
Confrontational Dissimilar Dissimilar 
Figure 3: Najam’s Theory of Four C’s 
Najam’s Four C’s (2003:383) 
 
Similar ideas regarding the positive or negative nature of the State/NGO relationship 
underpin the models of all three scholars - Coston, Young and Najam. However Najam 
considers the additional dimensions of the ‘strategic interests’ of the State and NGOs 
through ‘goals’ and ‘means’. 
 
Although these models may be considered incomplete or over-simplistic, it is important 
to understand them, so that challenges to these ideas help to build new models and 
theories. These models represent approaches which may be difficult to achieve in their 
totality in the context of the Arab world, for example with regard to participation, 
transparency and the rule of law. Incorporating State dominance as a dimension, Gidron’s 
model (1992) may be the most appropriate here, including the case of Libya.  
 
In the context of this study, it is difficult to avoid generalisations, identify an inclusive 
model and decide how it should be applied to State/NGO relations in the Arab World. 
This will be addressed in the chapters which follow. The study will investigate the Libyan 
legal framework, examining whether NGO activity is promoted or restricted, and whether 
its former dominance of the public sphere has permitted a space for civil society to 
emerge. This will be analysed in the context of recent problems and a possible role for 
NGOs alongside the State. 
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2.5 Defining the Dividing Line between Civil Society and the State  
The previous section has examined the range of scholarship, terminology and context in 
discussions of civil society. To develop the discussion further it is necessary to address 
the dividing line between civil society and other social spheres, particularly the State, 
because of its relevance to this study. This discussion is approached from a political and 
sociological, rather than a philosophical perspective. A central question is whether and to 
what extent these spheres overlap, whilst acknowledging that clarity will be difficult to 
achieve. 
 
2.5.1 Differences in Terms of Objectives, Belonging, and Function  
Weiner (1991:127) describe the bases of the State and of civil society as follows: 
We find that the State makes its decisions on the basis that it seeks to 
achieve the public interest of the whole of society, while in civil society 
each special interest unit of civil society seeks to achieve its own ends 
for itself. 
 
Fried (cited in Bannazizi and Weiner, 1991) argues that the State needs a formal 
organisation of power including but going beyond the social control functions of kinship. 
This organisation has as its central task the protection (and often extension) of the order 
of stratification. 
 
In terms of belonging, the concept of civil society differs from that of the State in a 
number of ways. Whereas association membership is optional, a person is forced through 
birth into State membership. State membership is compulsory: social group membership 
freely chosen. The loyalty of citizens to the State seems comprehensive, universal, and 
general, whereas civil groups have no special bonds and reflect special interests. Loyalty 
to the State is stable since nationality seldom changes over a lifetime, whereas social 
group membership changes with fluctuations in personal circumstances such as 
occupation, locality etc. The State is singular, whereas the individual can belong 
simultaneously to a range of organisations and move between them as interests change. 
 
In terms of function both the political and civil sectors provide social functions such as 
service provision. However only the State can use physical power to enforce law on its 
citizens and impose sanctions for contraventions. Equally, only the State is responsible 
for organising public authorities when managing the concerns of society as a whole. Civil 
society is directed towards the interests of particular groups within the society, which may 
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entail defending them against government intervention. Jansski (1978) describes the 
State’s functions as legislative (law-making), executive (law-implementing), and judicial 
(law and constitution-evaluating). 
 
Scholars have identified a range of elements of civil society. Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 
(2002) focus on economic elements, where non-profit associations fill gaps left by 
standardised services and market competition. They argue that non-profit organisations 
are seen as more trustworthy than both government and private service-providers, and 
solve problems related to contract failure. 
 
As for the State, Muller (2006) argues that the state’s basic function is the existence of a 
restricted and responsible public authority. In a democratic State this has four dimensions: 
legitimisation (validating the authority of the State); participation (disseminating 
information and knowledge); integration (coordinating society and the State into a 
cohesive whole); and protection (of the citizen from centralised power). These 
dimensions are inter-linked each within the other. Whilst the legitimising function is the 
cornerstone of democracy, depending on the trust of citizens, and whilst integration is 
key to a functioning society, “the main value of civil society is its independence from 
State power, and the ability to maintain independence”. Civil society is the tool whereby 
the State and society agree on social priorities. Muller says:  
The legitimizing function of civil society is based on the fact that it, 
through its independence and autonomy […] gives the state and its 
government legitimacy [...] To form public opinion, civil society must 
constitute a relatively large structure within which social interests […] 
are consistently articulated, agreed upon and verified. (2006:319) 
 
Cohen (1978) sums up the notion that the centralised government has a monopoly over 
the use of force, by emphasising that the State refers to any and all variations in power, 
authority structure, and values by which the organisational framework of society is 
supported.  
 
It is clear that some theorists find it difficult to separate the State from civil society. 
Norton (1995:8) emphasises that “[i]t is meaningless to speak of civil society in the 
absence of the State”, as there are so many threads linking different spheres of society 
(state, political society, market, civil society) in complex ways. Cohen and Arato (1990: 
ix) assert that it is deceptive to identify civil society with all social life outside the 
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administrative State and economic processes. They say that “[i]It is necessary and 
meaningful to distinguish civil society from both a political society, and political publics 
of parties, political organisation, and political publics”. This notion is important for this 
thesis specifically political organizations are not seen as NGOs. However Cohen and 
Arato acknowledge that there are overlapping and common areas such as, citizenship 
rights, trade unions and consumer associations. 
 
Keane (1998: 24) has analysed the discourse regarding civil society that has resurfaced 
over the last two decades or more. He sees the language used in campaigns by citizens in 
Latin America as a theoretical weapon against bureaucratic-authoritarian dictatorships. 
He calls these movements ‘revolution from below’, and maintains that ‘civil society’ has 
also become a mass ideology against one-party systems in ‘the forgotten half of Europe’ 
such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland. His analysis is based on Tesar (1981) 
arguments that civil society was encouraged by the evident failure of Communist attempts 
at reform from the top downwards.  
 
Some theorists argue, that it is obvious there are differences between the State and civil 
society. Here, nonetheless, the researcher has highlighted certain elements as a way of 
helping to define civil society and understand its complexities as an independent sphere.  
 
2.6 Contemporary Discussion of the Concept of Arab Civil Society  
2.6.1 Factors Affecting the Development of CSOs in the Arab World  
This section explores recent theoretical debate within the Arab world. It will address and 
analyse several issues which have arisen regarding civil society in the region, such as how 
this concept has been understood by different scholars and the accompanying debates on 
the types of groups which constitute civil society. In particular, this section asks whether 
the Arab world has or had these kinds of organisations, or their equivalent, historically or 
in the present.  
 
The contexts of the Arab states’ emergence are worth keeping in mind in this discussion. 
Following the end of the Second World War, governments and State structures in Arab 
countries became the main or only actors in political life. These governments used 
‘development planning’ to create what Ayubi (1995:3) called “all-consuming and over-
stretched” states. In his view, these states were trying to pursue both developmentalist 
57 
 
and welfare policies simultaneously. This could be justified because the State retained the 
existing colonial structures and was automatically accepted as responsible for 
development programmes, particularly for the impoverished. For this reason, scholars of 
civil society have prioritised the State, its role, structure, and political bodies in studies, 
described as the ‘vertical axes’. 
 
Also important to Arab discussion of civil society has been the growing use of the term 
in the wider world.  Following a gap of some half a century, interest in the term ‘civil 
society’ re-emerged amongst Western writers in the latter part of the 20th century. 
Seligman (1995) gives three reasons for this: the re-organisation of the European 
Economic Community, the revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989, and the rising tide of 
national consciousness. The latter contributed to the active role of civil organisations 
(such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and the 
Hungarian National Forum) in overthrowing formerly Marxist regimes. As more writers 
analysed the concept, a number of issues emerged which serve as the theoretical 
framework for this study. From the Arab researchers’ perspectives, some of the preceding 
discussion can be described as decidedly Eurocentric. The Arab analysis of civil society 
is strongly based on the particular nature and characteristics of Arab experience. 
Hamzawy (2002) claims that the term was the outcome of three significant events during 
the 1980s and 90s, namely the crisis of the nation-state, the heightened strength of radical 
Islam, and the global transition that occurred following the Cold War. 
 
Whatever the key causes of the development of civil society are deemed to be, NGOs 
have certainly increased over the past two decades, and this section investigates reasons 
for this increase. It also classifies Arab regimes in terms of their attitudes toward civil 
society, and considers the impact of political systems of Arab countries on the status of 
civil society. 
 
This will be discussed in reference to the World Bank definition of civil organisations 
quoted earlier; it will be shown that a broadly understood definition that captures the long 
history of civil organisations in Arab society is compatible with this definition. 
 
This increase of Arab NGOs may be due to many political and economic factors. Some 
of these stem from within the Arab states; others have their origin in external forces. 
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Amongst them are external and internal support; global and international changes; an 
enormous increase in NGOs internationally; changes in the role of the nation-state from 
the public sector (nationalisation) to the private sector (privatisation) for example in 
Egypt; increasing levels of education; and escalating social problems such as 
unemployment, lack of housing, and poverty which highlight the State’s inability to meet 
all societal needs, especially amongst the poor and marginalised. The growth of NGOs in 
the Middle East indicates that the region is not unique but shares a common discourse 
with countries around the world.  
 
Schwedler (1995) argues that the Middle East is not immune to the global trend towards 
democracy. She believes this is firstly because there have been various examples of 
controlled political reform where citizens have shared in political processes both through 
civil society and legitimate elections, for example in Algeria in 1992. Secondly, she 
believes Middle Easterners are not comfortable living under authoritarianism and that 
there are many indications that its citizens are politically aware and motivated to play a 
direct role in their government, for example the emergence of a wide range of civil society 
organisations and political parties. Thirdly, she argues that, despite the impediment to 
political reform that can exist in traditional cultures such as those of the Middle East, 
there is actually no particular obstacle to any country or area modernising or developing 
in the same way as any other.  
 
Ibrahim has noted that: 
[A] new civil formation is emerging. Hundreds of Private Voluntary 
Organizations (PVOs) and Community Development Associations 
(CDAs) have mushroomed in the last two decades. The number of Arab 
NGOs is estimated to have grown from less than 20,000 in the mid-1960s 
to about 70,000 in the late 1980s. (1995:39) 
 
Although NGOs have increased in the Arab world, their numbers are still modest 
compared with other societies. The researcher now discusses the motives behind civil 
work. The motive or the reasons for the emergence of NGOs which underpin the growing 
number of these associations. They can be divided into two groups: internal and external 
factors.  
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A. Internal factors: Social, Culture and Economic 
One reason given by writers such as Norton (1993) for the emergence of civil society has 
been as a response to people’s demands. Norton argues that there is little doubt that 
regimes in the Middle East are under pressure from their citizens. 
 
Some researchers (Hamzawy, 2000; Ibrahim, 1995) argue that the failure of State-centred 
developmental and modernisation projects in Arab countries, together with the shift to 
privatisation, meant that the State was no longer able or willing to provide such mainly 
socio-economic services as housing, health, quality education, and food supplies. This 
led to increasing prices of basic commodities, unemployment and marginalisation of 
groups. These increasingly unmet needs of Arab individuals and communities legitimised 
the establishment of civil organisations to provide services such as health, education, and 
welfare. Similarly, in war situations (e.g., in Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon and Somalia) there 
was a need for such organisations to provide relief (Kandil, 1994).  
 
Over recent decades, the Arab region has witnessed the growth of education, creating 
higher levels of consciousness and organisational skills. Professional groups such as 
journalists, lawyers, doctors, professors and engineers have become more active and 
involved through their provision of services, which contribute to the balance of power, 
social development and social practice. Kandil (1995) argues that the Arab intelligentsia 
have played an important role through their work in establishing a reform movement 
aimed at modernising the Arab regimes.  
 
Other researchers mention the growing margins of cultural, expressive and associative 
freedoms. These increased gradually in many Arab countries, due to State incompetence. 
This pushed many citizens to move to countries where opportunities were greater and 
many Arab civil organisations were first established abroad before their activities were 
transferred to their home countries where participation on different levels became more 
accepted (Ibrahim, 1995: 40). 
 
Three trends dominated the Arab civil society movement: the liberalist, the Islamic and 
the progressive socialist trend. As a response to the diverse population needs, political 
parties, professional associations, and professional syndicates were created across the 
region. These groups appealed for assistance in facing rising social problems such as 
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poverty, unemployment and lack of housing, believing that civil society would offer a 
solution through sharing resources. 
 
B. Political Systems of Arab Countries and their Impact on Civil Society 
The character of the political system inevitably impacts the nature and activities of CSOs.  
As noted above, Kandil (1995) identifies three categories of the Arab political system, 
which relate to Arab countries as follows: 
1. The pluralistic system with limited democracy through votes, a 
multi-party system, interest groups, and NGOs with a margin of 
freedom depending on their relationship with the state. Civil society 
develops more rapidly in such countries, including organisations for 
human and women’s rights. Arab countries in this category include 
Egypt, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen and Mauritania 
(before the Arab spring). 
2. The traditional system, which is pragmatic and introduced with the 
intention of achieving limited popular participation in government. 
In these countries, civil organisations are mainly charitable with little 
or no human rights and women’s rights agenda. The GCC states are 
the main example in this category within the Arab world.  
3. The authoritarian-popular system which permits the establishment of 
organisations under government control. Examples are Libya and 
Syria.  
 
Niblock (2005:497) classifies Arab countries according to “whether the State is willing 
to allow organizations which are critical of key aspects of government policy to operate”. 
He explains that such tolerance indicates acceptance of the limitations of governmental 
power. He divides Arab countries into four categories. The first category contains 
countries – Jordan, Morocco and Lebanon - with a range of political parties, and a notable 
number of civil associations with direct access to social activities. Civil society in this 
category can turn against key elements of government policy. The second category 
contains countries with civil associations which are heavily restricted by government if 
they criticise the State. Civil associations only access areas that do not conflict with 
government policy, though some groups may play significant roles. These include Egypt, 
Kuwait, Tunisia and Yemen. The third category contains countries which have civil 
associations only “where the State permits such activity”. The only country in this 
category is Saudi Arabia. The fourth category includes countries with limited civil 
associations, which exist under the control of the State. This category includes Syria and 
Libya.  
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Niblock (2005:501) concludes that the main factor determining how civil society 
develops is the political structure and its “preparedness to relinquish power”. This may 
offer a kind of guarantee that change towards a strong civil society will continue to be 
made but at present “the room for civil associations critical of government policy is 
narrow”. Though both Kandil and Niblock argue that the main factor shaping and 
supporting civil society development in the Arab world is the political system, they 
interpret that influence somewhat differently. 
 
The discussion above demonstrates that civil society in the Arab world is ‘shaky’ because 
its existence and operation depends largely on government policy. This demonstrates the 
need for a legal framework to give civil associations the right and protection to operate, 
rather than each programme being separately dependent on State approval. As current 
cases show, the Arab public does not always have access to civil associations. The legal 
regulation of such associations would enable the public perception of civil work to be one 
of sympathetic aid from the state, create more positive regard, and broaden the space of 
operation. This constitutes the earth which nourishes the seeds for positive and voluntary 
participation by individuals. 
 
It is worth noting that many of the Arab frameworks have been changed by the events of 
the Arab Spring. However, these events are still very recent, and it is too early to say what 
the various long or even short-term developments will be. For this reason this chapter 
does not attempt to cover such changes; no doubt further research into these areas will 
prove fruitful in the future.  
 
C. The Rise of the Islamists 
The rise of Islamism, in theory or practice, is an independent element neither internal nor 
external to Arab States. As a major political operator, the Islamist movement is an 
essential element to any discourse about civil society and the Arab State. As in any 
religion, Islamic doctrine is susceptible to multiple interpretations and since there is no 
centralising religious authority. There are multiple understandings of its tenets, especially 
its social and political teachings, including within Islamist movements themselves. 
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In 1979, the Iranian revolution instigated the mission to spread Islamic society, linking 
religion and politics at both the theoretical and practical levels. Over the past few decades, 
Islamist movements have made electoral gains in many Arab countries such as Egypt, 
Algeria, Sudan and Palestine. The rise of ‘fundamentalist Islam’ has been described by 
the media and some liberalist groups as a return to the pre-modern stage. Political Islam 
has been extensively studied and not only in Muslim countries. Kandil (1995:21) for 
example, considers the relationship between Islamist movements and civil society, 
arguing that: 
[T]he interaction between the Islamic reformist movement and the third 
sector began in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. The 
relationship was built on the rationale that organizations within this 
sector were one of the main channels for access to the public and its 
mobilization. In certain Arab countries, PVOs, which were highly related 
to the Islamic reformist movement, were in many ways an expression of 
the social applications of the Islam that augments its political 
applications. The Islamic movement has interacted effectively with 
PVOs. 
 
She also notes that some Islamist political groups have been banned from 
functioning as political parties, but operate clandestinely as social associations 
(Kandil, 1994). This explains why Islamist movements have become a key factor 
in the growth of civil associations and may constitute a majority within them. In 
Egypt they make up 34 percent of the total number of associations. 
 
As the rise of Islamism accelerates the operation of different types of civil 
organisation, sometimes even those contrary to the agenda of an Islamist 
movement, many states across the region permit and support other movements, 
such as liberalism, in an attempt to provide a counter-balance and limit their 
impact on the people 
 
The extended role of Islamist movements in the politics of a civil society stems from their 
criticism of their state’s plans, policy and foreign policy, especially any alliance with the 
United States of America. The most important confrontation between Islamism and many 
of the region’s governments is in the arenas of democracy and public liberty, which 
challenges State oppression. This controversy opens the door to debate about democracy, 
social development and human rights and about the role of civil society in these 
transformations. 
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It is important to note that the relationship between Islam and civil society is not merely 
a modern trend. It is rooted in religious principles and the charitable organisations which 
provide social services such as education and health care. This will be discussed further 
in Chapter Three. Islamist organisations do not suffer from a lack of funding as they rely 
on support from zakāt, and waqf and also from the Islamist banks. Islamist organisations 
can communicate widely with the masses and mobilise a broad range of the population to 
support their programmes.  
 
D. External impact  
Changes can also be attributed to external causes. With the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and the idea of strong State control, states in Arab countries have become more tolerant 
of civil society. The downfall of many regimes in Eastern Europe was widely attributed 
to the absence of democracy and civil society in those countries. The culture of 
unilateralism (one party, one ideology, one leadership) has become outdated so that new 
structures do not have to be based on traditional forms of absolute control. This 
ideological change provided the motivation for many human rights, women’s rights and 
religious movements to play a role in public life. The United States and the United 
Nations have also attributed the failure of development to the absence of civil society and 
political participation. 
 
Howthorne (2004:4) argues that the United States of America (USA) and other donors 
have also been assisting Arab civil society groups for more than a decade. This has been 
part of low-level efforts which began during the George H. W. Bush administration, and 
following the events of 11 September 2001, continued under the US democracy-
promotion strategy in the Middle East. 
 
2.6.2 Parameters of Civil Society in the Contemporary Arab World: The 
Academic Debate. 
The debate (analysis) about civil society within Arab context revolves mainly around the 
question of whether civil society exists in this region and in the case of existence what 
are its components and could be define. In responding to this question there are two 
approaches. One stresses the existence of civil society and its capacity to included 
traditional organizations, while the other emphasizes the difficulty ( non-acceptance ) of 
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'stretching' political or social terms that come from western experience to suit situations 
where there is a different experience. 
 
The first approach is taken by a range of scholars, both western and Arabs. Within the 
Middle Eastern context, Norton (ed.) in his Civil Society in The Middle East (1995) 
characterised civil society as the place where a mix of groups, associations, clubs, guilds, 
syndicates, federations and unions come together to provide a buffer between the State 
and the citizen. In this definition Norton separates political parties from civil society. 
Contributors to his book, amongst them Göle, and Carapico, conclude that civil society 
in the Middle East can be found without formal political organisations 
Kawtharānī (1992) argues that the term ‘civil society’ is, by its very nature, imbued with 
religious ideas. Religion has in a variety of different national contexts played a significant 
role in the past, and has continued to do so into the present. For example, the Catholic 
Church mobilised its adherents against Marxism and Marxist governments in Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s. In Muslim society, charitable embodiment through the principle of 
zakāt and ṣadaqah, are undertaken by the mosque, or zāwiyā, which links donor/s and 
recipient/s. Above these bodies is the endowment (waqf or aḥbās) system, which has been 
in operation since the second Hijra century (Kandil, 2000).5 These organisations were led 
by the educated classes and the traditional elite, and “they covered a wide range of social, 
cultural and political aspects and activities” (Kandil, 2000:32). They also played a 
significant role in education, as with kuttāb (Qur’anic elementary schools), demonstrating 
that human rights and social solidarity are not limited to Western liberal democracy but 
were a fundamental part of Muslim society. Under Islam, politics is a human activity; 
citizens must be accountable to the State, but the State also serves its citizens as the keeper 
of justice and safety and must balance the requirements of different social groups (al-
Ghannouchi, 1999). In this way, Islamic social analysts such as al-Ghannouchi (1999) 
argue that human rights are acknowledged in Muslim society.  
 
Other scholars stress its feasibility and indeed existence. For example, Norton (1995) 
contends social formations based on blood and marriage ties should not be include from 
civil society, and that many types of civil organisations exist in the region. His approach 
                                                 
5 All these forms and their various roles will be elaborated and discussed in the study context in Chapter 
Three. 
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is shared by others such as Hadenius and Uggla (1996) who argue that a broad definition 
of civil society would cover a wide range of organisations (e.g., fraternal orders, sports 
clubs, and cultural activities such as theatre and dance), including idealistic groupings 
such as trade unions, religious congregations, environmental organisations and others. 
They see civil society as a ‘multifaceted phenomenon’ including political parties, social 
groups and associated social networks which fluidly occupy the space between the State 
and the citizen.  
 
Moussalli (1995:81) provides a similarly broad  definition, asserting that civil society is : 
part of society that is a distinct sphere from the state, and is composed of 
a network of political, economic, social, educational, professional, and 
religious institutions, that lobby governments for their own interests, 
rather than the interests of state. The hallmark of civil society is the 
autonomy of private associations and institutions.  
 
He remains silent about how traditional organisations can integrate with modern 
organisations in order for both to become elements of a coherent civil society. 
 
Brand (1996) also includes political parties, as a form of associational life between the 
State and citizen, in the definition of a civil society. Schwedler (1995) concludes that the 
question of including Islamist organisations in a definition of civil society remains a 
sensitive and central question for debates throughout the region.  
 
Some argue that there cannot be cultural neutrality in the human and cultural concepts of 
civil society. Each culture will have its own expression and understanding through its 
ideas, beliefs and history and this is just as true in the Middle Eastern or Muslim world 
as elsewhere. As Sadiki suggests in his book Rethinking Arab Democratization (2009), 
different criteria and approaches may be used to address different societies. Sadiki argues 
that Euro-American interpretive frameworks cannot be expected to fit comfortably when 
being transplanted into a new milieu. Any attempts to import terms or to style them as 
general social science terms will fail, especially when they are used to understand 
radically different societal cultures or history. 
 
Al-Ghannouchi ( 1999) claims that the main target of the modern Islamic movements is 
not to build the Islamic State but to rebuild al-Mujtama‘ al-’Ahlī, even in such cases as 
the absence or collapse of the state, e.g. by war. It is important to continue to protect 
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society and its interests; for example, to establish that Muslims pay zakāt directly to a 
recipient or to an organisation instead of to the State.  
 
The second approach stresses that civil society should not be taken to include traditional 
associations; for example Ibrahim (1995) sees civil society as a vehicle for development 
and for democracy. It is composed of non-state actors or NGOs such as political parties, 
trade unions, professional associations, community development associations and other 
interest groups, but excludes all traditional structures such as tribes and religious 
movements. He emphasises the behavioural code of at least tolerating ‘different others’ 
together with either a tacit or explicit commitment to the peaceful management of 
differences among individuals and collectives amongst the polity. He considers these to 
be the necessary conditions for modern social forms to emerge. 
 
Gellner (1995) argues that the term demands autonomy from the State, most importantly 
to guarantee individual rights. Civil society is therefore firmly rooted in Western liberal 
democracy and is either weak or absent from Muslim cultures, based as they are on 
family, kinship and religion. However Niblock (2005) argues that the Western tradition 
has not always been dominated by individual rights, citing examples from fascism, 
National Socialism and communism, where political dreams have focused on ideologies 
which promote the group rather than the individual, and he stresses the relevance of the 
bitter experience of colonial occupation for Middle Eastern thinking and social action. 
Gellner argues that a Middle Eastern civil society is less likely than a Western one. 
 
Keane (1998) also disagrees with Gellner, citing example of Muslim countries such as 
Malaysia, Iran and Turkey, where Islam is actually a motivating factor in the emergence 
of a strong civil society. Anheier (2004) stresses this is grounded in religious text (the 
Quran), pointing out that charity (Sadaqah – helping the poor and destitute) is 
fundamental to Islamic faith and one of the five pillars on which Islam is based. Although 
Islamist movements may use Islamic precepts to reject democracy, Schwedler (1995: 14) 
argues that Islam is not, in itself, an obstacle to democracy; the obstacle lie in the 
movements themselves. She also notes that: 
Any analysis of social movements in the Middle East – whether or not 
conducted under civil society paradigm – must pay careful attention to the 
nature of each individual organisation and avoid characterising all groups on 
the basis of the activities of a few. 
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The researcher’s conclusion to the varying analyses is that with a focus on only modern 
or formal organisations, the study of civil society may be erroneously truncated. Formal 
structures are little more than the outer shell of a civil society and the deeper layers, 
though less accessible or easy to analyse, are no less crucial. Ultimately the wellbeing, 
size and nature of civil society depend on the willingness of citizens to play a role in 
sharing and shaping political and public life.  
 
2.6.3 Arab Researchers’ Understanding of term Civil Society 
This section discusses the various ways that specifically Arab researchers have viewed 
and used the term ‘civil society’. 
 
Hamzawy (2000) has provided an examination of the literature published between 1986 
and 1992 by Arab social scientists on state-society relations. From this review, scholars 
can be classified into two groups.  
 
The first group adopts the concept of civil society as applied by Western thinkers in 
Western contexts and ties it to West-related concepts such as democracy, human rights, 
political pluralism, the right to participate, and the separation of religion and state, treating 
them as universal principles. Amongst others, this group includes Ibrāhīm, al-Azmeh, 
Kandil and al-‘Alawī, who see the Western experience as a product of the segregation of 
Church and State and the secularisation of life in Europe. Al-Sayyid accepts this concept 
but argues that Western norms and values are a remnant of the colonial period which, 
therefore, has had a lasting effect on social life in the Arab world. Within this group, there 
is some differentiation in their interpretation of the concept, which can lead to confusion 
amongst scholars who use different terms to describe the same phenomenon, thereby 
obstructing the development of epistemological paradigms. For this group, in both the 
Western and Arab context, civil society is the buffer between the citizen and the 
government, responding to religious tribal calls to be a counterbalance to the State. It is 
important to note, however, that this relationship is regarded as a partnership. 
 
The second group questions and denies the relevance of a Western understanding of civil 
society to the Arab world. Supporters of this approach argue that the concept reflects the 
West’s initial hegemony over Middle Eastern studies. There are different reasons for their 
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rejection. One stream maintains that the traditional European understanding represents an 
‘unneutered’ sociological term. For example Saif al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ ’Ismā‘īl (1992) 
describes it as a fashionable, ambiguous and highly ideological term which lends itself to 
being adopted even where it might not be appropriate. He does not reject the value of 
studying such terms as terms, but notes that the more important question is how Arab 
researchers apply it to Arab culture and history. He links the definition of the term to the 
purpose of its use, describing five ways in which the term ‘civil society’ may be used to 
achieve a purpose, whether political, economic, social or cultural, which is independent 
from the State: (a) political purposes such as political parties; (b) advocator purposes, for 
example guilds; (c) professional purposes, such as doctors’ or engineers’ syndicates; (d) 
societal purposes, like social work and development organisations; and (e) cultural 
purposes, such as cultural clubs and writers’ unions.  
 
‘Īsa (1992) also draws attention to the ideological nature of the term and how it stems 
from philosophical ideas ranged against the feudal system, and is therefore accompanied 
by a parcel of concepts and ideas such as political freedom, human rights, the market 
economy and democracy. He sees it as a paradigm to legitimise the emerging and 
struggling capitalist system. To Isa, civil society is the public face of the market in which 
everyone is free. The popularity of civil society in modern Arab settings is a manifestation 
of the abandonment of the nation-state and the selling-off of the public sector. 
 
Kawtharānī (1992) asks what the term means in the light of the end of the Cold War, and 
the information and communication revolutions sweeping the Arab world. He suggests 
that the classical Arab concept al-Mujtama‘ al-’Ahlī is an equivalent to the ‘civil society’ 
of European thought. He argues that it is necessary to look beyond the view that civil 
society is an anti-religious philosophy, and that the objective of Islamic movements is to 
integrate the State with Islam under Islamic law (Sharī‘a). Kawtharānī uses the term 
al-’Ahlī not only as a translation of concept of civil society into the Arabic language, but 
also to refer to a definition that views traditional forms such as family and tribe, as part of 
civil society.  
 
This second group contests the idea of civil society as a mission for universal values. It 
sees it as an imported product which cannot be transplanted from one environment to 
another alien setting (Kawtharānī, 1992). It is the product of a particular era of European 
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history which has matured over time but bears no relationship to the cultural and historical 
traditions of the Arab and Middle Eastern worlds. For example, Christians (particularly 
Roman Catholics) see the priest as mediator between the individual and God; in Islam, 
such mediators do not exist. Jesus is reputed to have said “Render unto Caesar that which 
is Caesar’s and unto God, that which is God’s” (The Bible, Luke 21:25), thereby 
separating religious and civil affairs, whereas it is almost impossible to separate religion 
from social life in Arab or Islamic societies where religion is a basic element of public 
life and a constituent part of the State, continually affirmed through the mosque, the 
school and the media. As an analytical tool, the European concept cannot be usefully 
applied in the Arab context. 
 
Some in this group has developed an intermediary, adapted concept, derived from the 
West but tailored to suit Arab societies. It asserts that civil society is capable of 
incorporating religious groups which successfully input services to their communities, as 
well as the existing familial and tribal bodies. Researchers, for example, Burhān Ghalyūn 
and al-Ghannouchi shows that the concept can and has been applied to an Islamic State. 
Their emphasis is on the ideological nature of the term. 
 
The debate between these groups is not one of being for or against civil society in 
principle, but of understanding the European roots of the term, the Arab context to which 
it is applied, and of debating which socio-economic and political models may be 
accurately transplanted from one social context to another. For such an endeavour to 
succeed all groups need to agree that a definite understanding of the individual’s 
relationship to the State in the Arab context must be reached. Much of the debate concerns 
whether Islamic movements constitute a part of civil society or whether they stand 
opposed to it. This study assumes that religious movements are a part of civil society 
because they play a significant role in the Arab World and have the ability to meet 
people's needs. However, the principle of tolerance towards others presents a problem in 
a religious context. 
 
A prominent example of traditional organization is the debate over whether tribes form 
part of civil society is ongoing. Some researchers argue that traditional social formations 
such as tribes do form part of civil society because they mediate between the individual 
and the State. Indeed, loyalty to traditional institutions is often very important in defining 
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political attitudes since tribal loyalty can be stronger than loyalty to the State. Some 
writers describe tribes as ‘channels to redistribute resources’ (al-Naqeeb, 1990:152). 
Where the public space - economic and political – is occupied by the State, the tribe can 
shield the individual from the tyranny of a despot (al-Naqeeb, 1990:152). Tribal and 
sectarian systems provide protection and economic help for large groups in the Arab 
World, and act as a framework for determining rights and duties. Tribes provide a space 
where individuals find familiarity, kindness and virtue and act as channels for individuals 
to make demands on the ruler (Sabihi, 2000).  
 
Khoury and Kostiner (1990) argue that monarchs, military officers, and other elites who 
came to power in the twentieth century Arab world, have faced difficulty in building 
monopolies of coercive authority and control, largely because they been unsuccessful in 
developing forms of popular legitimacy. Consequently, they have faced opposition and 
resistance from a range of social forces including tribes. Tapper (1991) suggests that as a 
rule tribes do not usually relate directly to the top of the State, but rather through such 
intermediate structures as social associations. Some researchers (e.g., Al-Harmasi, 2000) 
assert that the emergence of the latter leads to discrimination, where people are divided 
on the basis of kinship and descent in which loyalty to the State is seen as a weakness. 
Sabihi (2000:87) addresses the issue from a quasi-psychological perspective, claiming 
that: 
… identification with nature, and with the tribe with religion give the 
individual a deep sense of security … because he feels he has roots and 
he is known to have a certain place; he may feel hunger or deprivation 
but will not be plagued by the worse aches of foreignness and the 
suspicion of the community. 
 
When the political system becomes incapable of performing its functions, this increases 
the risk of identity crisis. We can describe this experience as alienation, which individuals 
are motivated to avoid. 
 
Other researchers argue that traditional formations are not part of civil society (Thamer, 
1985) because of their negative aspects. For example, inter-tribal ‘intolerance’ can lead 
to constraints on individual behaviour. Where the tribe is the individual’s only 
association, such intolerance limits social development and diminishes the importance of 
the clans of other social groups. Other researchers, such as Ibrahim, consider that 
sectarian, ethnic, tribal, regional and family loyalties are antithetical to the modern State. 
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The dilemma which this issue poses can be seen from two angles: first the term ‘civil 
society’ lacks precision and is broad and vague; and second, much depends on the 
researchers’ theoretical framework as this shapes their own understanding.  
 
This study adopted the broad definition of civil society which included traditional 
associations and believe that what suitable the Libyan case as traditional society.  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the theoretical frameworks of the term ‘civil society’ and 
highlighted different interpretations of the term, including its traditions and institutions. 
The complexity of the concept and the history of its development have enabled different 
understandings by different theorists across time and place. Broadly speaking, the 
development of the term is in line with philosophies of social contract and political and 
economic changes in European societies during the period of the Enlightenment, which 
included the fall of monarchism, the rise of democracy and of the free market.  
 
The relationship of civil society to various social spheres such as the political and 
economic has been highlighted and a number of models to describe these relationships 
have been considered. Further development of the concept has been analysed in terms of 
recent historical events such as the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe and revolutions 
in Latin America.  
 
This chapter has also considered the relevance of European theories of civil society to 
traditional societies and in particular to the Arab and Middle Eastern contexts. Theories 
of Arab scholars have been considered, placed in the context of both European and Arab 
analyses of Middle Eastern political systems and events. This chapter has also considered 
the role of Islam and of Islamist movements in the development and practice of civil 
society.  
 
The definition, development and elements of a civil society are central to the framework 
of the research which follows. This discussion suggests that several aspects of the concept 
could apply in the Libyan case if a broad definition of ‘traditional’ organisations is 
accepted. This is possible within the framework of the definition given by the World 
Bank. 
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As noted, I have adopted the World Bank definition of civil society, as it is able to cover 
a range of activities, cultures and its diversity. This is crucial to the overall approach taken 
in this thesis. It is vital to recognise that other definitions carry different implication. To 
quote the World Bank: 
The civil society sector is not only emerging as a clear societal actor in 
many parts of the world, it is also quite varied in its nature and 
composition. For this reason definitions of civil society vary considerably 
based on differing conceptual paradigms, historic origins, and country 
context. (World Bank, 2013) 
 
Western definitions of civil society often do not take into account the wide range of ways 
in which other societies organize themselves, thus their application to those societies is 
limited. Despite the problems of the transfer of Western concepts and terminology to Arab 
culture, nonetheless, this cannot be an excuse to close the doors on discussion. While 
ambiguity may remain around the best definition of the term civil society when applied 
to countries like Libya, it is undeniable that certain universal human patterns of behaviour 
are in play (collective action etc) which ought to be studied appropriately.  
 
Civil society, then, is a concept which needs to be used in a manner which recognises the 
context, and in non-western countries (Arab countries among them) this means that it 
needs to be inclusive of traditional social formations which have fulfilled a similar 
function to modern sector associations.  
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Chapter Three 
Historical Development of Civil Society in Libya (1835-1969) 
  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the development of civil society in Libya during the period 1835-
1969. It sheds light on different types of organisations and institutions that have existed 
during this period of time in an attempt to understand the relevance of the term ‘civil 
society’ (as defined in Chapter two, following the World Bank definition) to Libya. It will 
address what are known as ‘traditional’ organisations which have contributed to the 
development of a civil society in Libya’s past and present, and currently act as mediators 
between the State and the individual. It will also consider their potential to do so in the 
future. Through historical analysis, this chapter is intended to provide a better 
understanding of, firstly, the roots of civil society in Libya, and secondly, the different 
ways in which the public sphere has been analysed and conceptualised. Islam has played 
a large role in shaping Libyan social organizations through public affairs and opinion. 
During the Ottoman era, religious institutions formed a counterbalance to State power 
prior to the rise of the Libyan nation state.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. The first discusses the place of the zawāyā in 
civil society. The second focuses on the endowments system, discussing its definition and 
purposes. Section three outlines the importance of the Qu’ranic schools (kuttābs) and 
tribes. Section four makes it clear that Libyan people were aware of civil society prior to 
the emergence of the State. The fifth section focuses on the roles played by political 
parties in the past; and the sixth examines tribal organizations which have played, and 
continue to play, significant roles in Libyan society. 
 
Drawing on the detailed analysis of the term in the previous chapter, this study has 
adopted a broad definition of the term ‘civil society’, in order to encompass the civil 
organizations which have been a feature of Libyan society since the pre-modern era. This 
chapter will provide further context to support the use of this term, while noting the 
advantages and limitations of the particular definition adopted.  
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The previous chapter briefly mentioned how traditional organisations brought together 
donors and recipients in a charitable system. The foremost of these is waqf (public 
endowment). Others are the zawāyā (lodges) of the mystic Sufī Order, the kuttābs 
(Qur'anic Schools) and tribal organisations. It is my contention that religion has been the 
main factor influencing the development of traditional organisations, giving them their 
purpose: i.e.to act as charities, providers of services and perhaps to exert political 
influence.  
 
Because of their socio-religious prominence, public awareness of the traditional 
institutions is widespread. Ibrahim (1995:31) argues:  
[The] central authority collected taxes and administered justice through 
the sharī'ah, maintained public order and defiance; and occasionally 
patronized arts and sciences. Social services and direct economic 
functions were not expected obligations of the ‘state’ but mostly left to 
local communities. In this sense, traditional Arab society not only knew 
the equivalent forms of civil society but also survived through them. 
 
Local communities “covered a wide range of social, cultural and political activities” 
(Kandil, 2000:32) and played a significant role in indigenous education through 
institutions such as the kuttābs (Qur’anic schools). Although these institutions engaged 
in political activities, they were considered a civil mission between families and the 
authorities at that time when the State was not fully formed Kandil stated that: 
They were led by the educated classes as well as by the traditional elite 
and it should be noted that during the European occupation of the Arab 
world they played a key role in social provision including during the 
Italian colonisation of Libya (Kandil 2000:32). 
 
3.2 Sufi Orders 
‘Sufism’ is an umbrella term to describe a range of philosophical, social, and literary 
phenomena in the Islamic world. In its narrowest sense it refers to schools of Islamic 
mystical philosophy and theology, religious orders and guilds (tarīqah), which have 
exerted considerable influence over the development of Islamic politics and society and 
to expressions of popular piety and devotion to shrines (Jamal J. Elias, 1998:59). This 
section examines Sufi orders, discusses one of the most popular movements amongst 
them [the Sanūsī order (tarīqah)] together with some other orders. The final part discusses 
the activities of the zawāyā (Lodge) and how they may be regarded as civil institutions. 
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3.2.1 Background 
The zawāyā were both centres for Sufi turuq leaders and places where people could meet 
to pray and worship. Because of their religious associations, they were lodgings for 
students of the Qur’an and for the poor, though they were also open to visitors who visited 
them to resolve problems or to vote. They served as collection points for donations to 
their maintenance (Bai bel‘ālim, 2000:01). 
 
Historical resources show that zawāyā were established in Libya in the tenth Hijrī 
century, and that since that time they have played a significant role in promoting Islam 
and Sufism (Kandil, 2000:31). Some studies suggest that geographical and economic 
factors promoted their acceptance amongst Libyan people (Obeidi, 2001:38).Libya is a 
very large country, almost half of which is desert and for much of its history prior to the 
discovery of oil in 1950, it has been very poor (Obeidi, 2001:39). Long years of drought 
frequently led to the failure of crops and the death of the grazing animals upon which 
people depended. Historically, Libya’s poverty suited the austere Sufi emphasis on 
depriving the self of pleasures in order to build stamina and patience, leading to serenity 
and self-purification.  
 
The Sufi order spread across the country, especially near oases. One of the most popular 
traditional institutions, Abd al-Salām al- ̕Asmar’s zāwiyā in Zlīṭin, played a major role in 
educating individuals and had a cultural influence so profound that some scholars regard 
it as a “university of the arts and knowledge” (al-Basher, 2005:551). The same can be 
said of al-Zarrūq in Misurata and the Sanūsī in al-Bayḍa’. Sufi organisations had, and 
continue to have, a large membership and constitute a significant part of Libyan civil 
society (al-Basher, 2005:557).  
 
3.2.2 The Sanūsī Order (Tarīqah) 
This Sanūsī is one of the most popular Sufi movements in Africa. It was founded by 
Mohammed Ben Ali al-Sanūsī (Grand Sanūsī 1787-1859), an Algerian scholar who 
travelled to Hijāz in Morocco in 1846 (Abd al-Mālik Bin ‘Alī, 1966:5; Wright, 1969:109-
110) to study theology, jurisprudence, and the exegesis of the Qur'an. He was influenced 
by the Moroccan order of the Tījāniya (St John, 2008:47) and subsequently travelled to 
Libya, arriving in Cyrenaica (Barqa) in 1840. He established the first zāwiyā at al-Bayḍa’ 
in 1843 which served as the Mother Lodge of the Order (Evans-Pritchard, 1949:14). In 
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1856, he moved to Jaghbūb, a desert location, which became the centre of his Order. 
Evans-Pritchard (1949:14) states that, in choosing a remote location, al-Sanūsī wished, 
“…to place a wide stretch of desert between himself and the Turkish authorities”. Jaghbūb 
was outside Turkish, French and Egyptian control. This suggests that the Sanūsī were 
pursuing a political agenda as much as a religious one. For example, Mahdī6 refused a 
request by the Ottomans to assist in their war with Russia (1876-1878), as he believed 
that the Order should not become involved in international conflicts (Niqolā 
Ziyādah,1966:69). 
 
The Sanūsī order made its influence felt, defining itself as a civil and reform movement. 
Peters (1987:27) has stated, “… anywhere in the vast territory between the Atlantic and 
Iran the religious purposes of lodges, would be familiar to any Muslim”. The movement 
gave the Cyrenaica tribal people a religious attachment and feelings of unity and purpose 
what Evans-Peters (1990:22) called a ‘system of values’. Obiede describes it as “… a 
religious revivalist movement whose ascribed purpose was to purge Islam of the 
impurities that had accrued over previous centuries” (Obiede, 2001:40), and St John 
(2008:48) describes it as “… a revivalist rather than a reformist movement”. 
 
Wright (1969:230) argues that although some the Sanūsī family associated with the 
political functions of monarchy, they remained two separate institutions. However, 
Anderson (1987:229-230) states that, “[…] the installation of the head of the Sanūsī as 
king was a result of the promise the British made him during the war, not widespread 
enthusiasm for the person of the king or the institution of the state”. The movement’s 
ideology was later adopted by the political elites of Libya, and in 1851, established the 
monarchical regime. Libya’s only king -`Idris I - came from this Order and was grandson 
of the founder.  
 
                                                 
6
Sayyid al-Mahdī (1859-1902) was the son of Mohamed Ben Ali al-Sanusi, the founder of the Sanūsī order 
and King Idris’s father. Following the death of his father, al-Mahdī succeeded to the leadership of the Sanūsī 
order and was pledged allegiance by the seniors of the ulama and Sheikhs. During this time, the movement 
shifted its efforts towards education, industry, agriculture, trade and land reclamation in Libya with the aim 
of establishing an ‘Amirate’. Furthermore, al-Mahdī transferred the headquarters of the Sanūsī order from 
al-Jaghbūb to al-Kufrah (Muftāḥ al-Sharīf, 2008:193-215). 
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The Sanūsī was not the only Order (Ṭuruq) in Libya. The Ṭarīqā al-‘Ῑsawiyyā (named 
after Sheikh Muḥammad Bin ‘Isā) has followers across the Maghreb (the area spanning 
from Morocco to Libya). al-‘Arūsiyyā, founded by Sheikh ‘Abd al-Salām al- ̓Asmar is 
also a popular movement, as are the Ṭarīqat al-Qādiriyyā Order of Tripoli and the al-
Madaniyya of Muṣrātā, established by Sheikh Muḥammad Ẓāfir al-Madanī, and the al-
Zarrūqiyya, founded by Sheikh Ahmad Zarrūq. Finally, al-Shādhiliyyā was named after 
Sheikh Ḥasan al-Shādhilī whose most famous follower, Abū al-‘Abbās al-Mursī, is now 
buried in Alexandria.  
 
3.2.3 The Role the Zawāyā 
Whereas the Ottoman (1551-1911) authorities had a limited role in Libya, the tribes and 
the zawāyā played a major social role, parallel to that of the central authority. Ottoman 
authorities showed little interest in people’s affairs, focusing mainly on collecting taxes 
which were sent to Constantinople rather than used to develop Libya. Both education and 
health lacked funding and provision (Basher, 2005:335). 
 
Zawāyā are not only centres of worship. From the outset, Sheikh Mohammed Ben Ali 
insisted that followers of the order helped to construct their zawāyā’s building. Zawāyā 
also acted in agriculture and trade as there was a constant urge to not rely solely on Zakāt 
funds- money derived from observance of the third pillar of Islam, which requires all 
Muslims to give part of their income to poor people. In its orientation, the order is 
comparable to NGOs with a mission of empowerment. The zawāyā also helped resolve 
conflicts between tribes and supported and helped to consolidate relations between other 
social groups. It sheltered refugees, fed the poor, provided minimum levels of education 
for marginalized groups and assisted pilgrims undertaking the hajj. It also provided refuge 
for those being pursued by the State.  
 
al-Jarari (2005: 357) states that the order was recognised by the Ottoman Emperor when 
the Imam of the Sanūsī Movement, Muhammad bin Ali al-Sanūsī, sent his assistant, 
Sheikh Abd al-Raḥīm al-Maḥjūb of the zawiyā of Benghazi, to Istanbul in 1856. al-
Maḥjūb met with Sultan Abd al-Ḥamīd and won a decree exempting the movement’s 
properties from taxes whilst nonetheless allowing it to tax its followers and supporters 
(al-Jarari, 2005:352). Istanbul granted these privileges because it recognized the order as 
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an autonomous public and civil organization. When the Ottoman Empire fell, the order 
was relatively unaffected (St John 2008: 48-49). 
 
3.3 The Waqf 
The Islamic principle of waqf - supporting people in need – is widely practiced in the 
Muslim world. To understand how it works in Libya it is necessary to understand the 
influence Islam has had on Libyan society. The first part of this section defines the term 
waqf and discusses its religious and philosophical origins. The second part examines its 
civil functions. The last part provides an example of its independence from Libyan State 
control. 
 
3.3.1 Defining the Term Waqf 
The waqf can be described as:  
[A]n endowment or a charitable trust set up for Islamic purposes (usually 
for education, mosques, or for the poor). It involves tying up a property 
in perpetuity so that it cannot be sold, inherited, or donated to anyone 
(Euromoney Training, 2009).  
In Arabic, it is al-Waqf ṣadaqah Jāriyah fī Sabīl ̕ Allāh (ceaseless charity). 
 
The ‘ulama (Islamic Scholars) attribute the reasoning behind Waqf to the Qur’an. Verse 
92 of chapter 3 reads: “Never will you attain the good (reward) until you spend (in the 
cause of Allah) from that which you love. And whatever you spend - indeed, Allah is 
knowing of it”7 [al-‘Asqalānī, (n.d)]. According to this verse, spending, particularly the 
giving away of something dearly loved, is a way of showing devotion to Allah and 
seeking His reward. hadīth adds:  
When a man dies, his deeds come to an end except for three things: 
sadaqah jāriyah (ceaseless charity); knowledge which is beneficial; or a 
virtuous descendant who prays for him (the deceased)8 Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim.  
 
However, other ‘ulama ascribe waqf to an incident involving the prophet, peace be upon 
him, and Omar Ibn al-Khattab. After gaining a plot of land in Khaibar (near al-Madina), 
                                                 
7The Noble Qur’an, verse 92, chapter 3 (Sūrat al-‘Umrān) 
8It is signified that when a person dies s/he is not able to perform any deeds (that merit reward) anymore. 
But there are three kinds of deed for which s/he can be rewarded even after death. One of these actions is 
sadaqah jāriyah, which means any good deed done (by the one who perished) from which people continue 
to benefit: for instance, establishing a mosque, donating a property or any assets, having a well dug to 
provide water, setting a shade, planting a fruit tree or emancipating a slave. 
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Omar approached the prophet for advice claiming the land was the dearest thing he 
possessed. The prophet recommended that he dedicate it to charity, whereupon Omar 
made it waqf, that is to say, subject neither to purchase nor sale (Raḍwān al-Ssayid, 2003: 
45).  
 
3.3.2 The Role of Waqf 
The waqf has played a historical role in organised charity and voluntarism. It is a system 
of religious endowment, whereby real estate is bequeathed for specific purposes. Funds, 
agricultural land, buildings and sometimes books may be consecrated under the waqf 
system to help the poor and needy. For example, the zāwiyā of ‘Abd al-Salam al- ̕Asmar 
donated five hundred books to public libraries (Soiuse 2005:550). Resources from waqf 
are used to build schools, hospitals, mosques, and institutions for homeless children, the 
aged, disabled people and animals (Afifi, 1991:15-20). Even during the occupation, Italy 
respected the importance and independence of the waqf and did not seek to control it. 
 
Hoexter (2002:128) argues that, “the waqf served as a vehicle for the crystallization of 
various autonomous groups in the space between the private individual and the ruling 
authority.” She also states that, “the idea of charity was defined in Islam in a much broader 
and more flexible manner than in other cultures” (2002:122). It can be construed as the 
best example of the institutionalisation of Islamic principles and a bridge between theory 
and practice. It is the framework for individual duty within society (’umma), supporting 
the view that Islam is not just a religion, but a way of life (discussed in Chapter Two). 
 
Hoexter (2002:128) identifies the three key roles and influences of the waqf system as:  
1. Providing support for mosques, madaris (schools), towns’ water 
supplies or zāwiyā and local administration; 
2. Providing resources to finance the activities of family guest houses; 
3. Providing resources to pay for teachers and officiating preachers.  
 
The waqf also serves as a focus of group autonomy within different communities and may 
incorporate the guild leader (’imām), local representatives of the descendents of the 
Prophet (Naqīb al-̕’Ashrāf) or other representatives chosen locally (ibid. 128).  
 
The waqf, therefore, has both a religious and an economic function. “[I]t was one of the 
ways for the rich to protect their money from nationalism by the state” (Kalil, 2006:111). 
Hoexter (2002:132) also identified that the rich seek to ensure that their properties are 
80 
 
protected from state authority by waqf. The waqf also helps autonomous groups, such as 
scholars, to remain outside government control, giving them a freedom of speech which 
permits criticism of government rules or policies. 
 
3.3.3 Waqf Institutions and the State 
An event of the 1990s demonstrates this freedom from government control, showing that 
the authority of the waqf is not derived from law but from cultural hegemony (the theory 
developed by Gramsci) beyond government.  
 
Throughout Islamic history endowments were immune from government interference. 
They were administered by beneficiaries or inspectors according to terms and conditions 
set by the endower. The Islamic State was not able to directly intervene in waqf affairs 
because income received from private donors made it economically independent. This 
situation changed, however, following the formation of Islamic ‘nation states’. To extend 
their power, these states nationalised all institutions, including endowments and the 
sizeable resources they had accumulated. Waqf came under state supervision and 
individuals within them became government employees receiving income from the State. 
Although this move was met with resistance and some victories were won, State control 
has continued until the present day. Despite this, the waqf have on occasion been able to 
exercise independent judgement. The following case is an illustration of this, highlighting 
how efforts by corrupt State officials to confiscate or expropriate endowments have been 
resisted. 
 
The case occurred in Libya, administrative appeal No.46/58, dated 27th July 2003, at the 
supreme court of Tripoli, headed by Judge Dr. Khalife Sa'id al-Qadhi (Head of the 
administrative department of the court). The appeal was submitted by the Secretary of the 
General Institution of Endowments Committee, against the following: first, the Secretary 
of the General People’s Committee (the prime minister); second, the Secretary of the 
General People’s Committee of Housing and Utilities; third, the Secretary of the People’s 
Committee of Housing and Utilities of Zliṭin; and fourth, the Secretary of the Popular 
Conferences of Zliṭin. 
 
The appeal was against a verdict issued by the Misurata Court of Appeal dated 20th April 
1999. The waqf found that a number of its properties had been unlawfully looted, 
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including a plot of land in the district of Misurata in the town of Zlīṭin. A verdict was 
issued by the council of al-Mirqib County claiming that the land was for public benefit 
and could be used to build a tourist hotel for Social Security provision. This decision was 
made according to an agreement between the two parts and after securing consent from 
the General People’s Committee (the government). An appeal against the case took place 
in Misurata where it was initially accepted, but later rejected according to the fact that 
law No. 124 of 1972 does not outlaw expropriation of the waqf estate for the public 
benefit.  
 
The court’s verdict was that expropriation contradicts the basic premise of waqf. 
Ownership of waqf property cannot be transferred, and to do so is an immoral act. The 
madhhab (doctrine) of Imam Malik, to which law No. 124/1972 referred, does not permit 
compromising waqf property except for very good reasons, such as extending mosque 
space or building a road for the benefit of the people. Waqf property is not intended for 
the benefit of investment bodies. On the basis of the fact that expropriation contradicts 
the essential premise of waqf, the court upheld the appeal. 
 
3.4 Kuttāb (The Qur’anic School) 
The kuttāb demonstrates how local people can manage and fund their needs without 
government control. It is the practical application of the principles of Islam, creating 
images of popular solidarity in educational services, with minimal government spending. 
Education in Libya has followed the kuttāb system (there are not even approximate 
figures for their number). They are funded by Zakāt money or by contributions from local 
communities (Basher, 2005:550). 
 
According to Mohamed Said Mohamed (2010:4), the first kuttāb was established in the 
year 100 AH by Ismail Abu al-Muhajer, an African wali (ruler), beside his residence in 
Kairouan. His example was followed by other Arabs. Kuttāb teach reading and writing, 
the Quran, Arabic and Mathematics. They are equivalent to the modern day elementary 
school. They are large enough to include many students.  
 
Al-Abrashy distinguishes three types of kuttāb. The first are primary level where children 
learn to read, write, to memorise the Qur’an, religious principles and the basics of 
mathematics. The second are legal kuttāb where children and young people study 
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linguistics and literature. These two types are primarily concerned with expanding 
religion and science. The third type provides education for orphans, the poor and the 
children of soldiers. This provides scientific education and social care for the poor, thus 
enabling poor children to enjoy the same care and education as those of richer classes. 
 
In the second AH century, the number of kuttāb increased, as did the number of teachers, 
until one or more were found in every village. Many Muslims contributed to the 
establishment and funding of kuttāb and undertook building in order to bring them closer 
to God and to enable both the rich and poor to be educated. Kuttāb were sometimes 
attached to mosques and sometimes separate. Some teachers worked without pay in order 
to please God, and some accepted a small salary for the basics in life (Attia, 1975:70-90) 
these schools are separate from government control, and are integrated into the culture 
and tradition 
 
3.5 Civil Associations 
This section focuses on civil associations in Libya. Although there have been very few, it 
will shown that they are historically linked with traditional institutions. It will also outline 
how they have worked in Tripoli, and consider the most famous NGOs in Barqa 
(Cyrenaica). 
 
3.5.1 Profile 
Civil association history in Libya began with the movement of Ibrahim Sirāj al-Dīn (al-
Muṣrātī 2000:8 and al-Jarari, 2005:471). It developed during the reign of Sultan Abd al- 
Ḥamīd II (1876-1908) and although it did not long survive the Ottoman era, it was the 
first nationally-conscious organisational structure of its kind in the Arab world (al-
Muṣrātī, 2000:8 and al-Jarari, 2005:471).  
 
The movement was an underground association and to disguise its actual activities, its 
internal law was called “charitable benefits and advice’’. At a time when the country had 
limited natural and human resources, its existence contradicts the claim by al-Mughairbī 
(1995:137), that civic society institutions were not established in Libya prior to 1943.  
 
The structure of the Sirāj al-Dīn movement showed a trend toward democratic principles 
and practice, tolerated and accepted openness towards global culture and thought. Article 
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11 of its byelaws stated that the society should consider and accept foreigners (Emmesh, 
2008:25). Act 16 stated that societies should increase in both numbers and activities as 
more societies would lead to greater competition and more good deeds. These Acts 
demonstrate a good understanding of the value of intellectual and political pluralism 
(Emmesh, 2008:25-26).This association also stated that Libyan society should treat 
Bedouin tribes as communities which have strayed from becoming civic beings, and that 
it was the duty of its members to guide the Bedouin and consider them within its law 
(Emmesh, 2008:27). 
 
3.5.2 Civil Association in Tripoli 
In 1944 a hospital was established through anonymous contributions from a civil 
association, with 54 beds for general medical services (Abu Shawareb, 2005:876). At that 
time, there was no state and no notional government in Libya; here the civil associations 
offered significant service.  
 
3.5.3 ‘Umar al-Mukhtār Association1943. 
Since the British colonial administration forbade the formation of associations and 
parties, the Umar al-Mukhtār society was initially founded as a sports club in Benghazi 
(Maghairbi, 1995:137). The Umar al-Mukhtār association had two branches; one in 
Benghazi and the other in Derna. Each worked independently from the other except with 
regard to the general policy of the association. The membership of each branch was 
almost 1,000 (al-Sharef, 2010: 104), with each member paying a fee. The branches had 
the ability to raise funds to finance their activities. The association organised significant 
political, social and sporting activities and was also publically critical of the British 
administration and more indirectly of some of the king's policies. It went on to call for 
full independence for Libya (Emmesh, 2008:183). The association began issuing a 
weekly newspaper, entitled al-Watan, on 1st April 1944. It was shut down on 11th July 
1951 by the government of Cyrenaica. 
 
3.6 Tribal Associations in Libya 
This section considers tribal associations to be part of traditional civil institutions in Libya 
and a key facet of civil society in the Maghreb. It involves tribal leaders (shaikhs) 
defending the interests of their group against other tribes and also against the government. 
Shaikhs are also responsible for protecting members of their tribes from problems or 
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obstacles and the respect paid by tribes to each other’s customs and traditions has fostered 
a solidarity amongst them, which has frequently acted as a barrier to violations of their 
rights. Accordingly, they have played an important role in protecting parts of society from 
central tyrannies, as I discussed in Chapter Two [al-Naqeeb, (1990); Sabihi, (2000); 
Khoury and Kostiner (1990)]. Tribes provide a social function which is crucial where 
modern forms of civil society have not been developed. 
 
In the case of Libya, some studies emphasise that: 
There is an inter-relationship between tribalism, tribal structure and 
religion (Islam) which together have played a vital role in socio-
economic, cultural and political development. This inter-relationship has 
undergone some development since the mid-nineteenth century 
following the emergence of the Sanusī order, which was initially a 
religious movement and later a political one (Obeidi, 2001:43). 
 
Within societies such as Libya, traditional institutions such as tribes play an important 
role in maintaining customs and cultural values whilst at the same time acting as 
deterrents against violations of their members’ rights by outsiders. In this sense the tribe 
is part of civil society rather than a substitute for it, especially where the institutions of 
modern civil society are still under construction. In times of development, the tribal 
system has become a means of social and economic support for individuals.  
 
Libyan tribes have played a significant role in the country’s politics (Khadduri, 1963:77), 
but not in terms of forming political parties. An Electoral Law issued in April 1950 
divided Barqa into three electoral districts with the number of seats allocated on tribal 
lines (Khadduri, 1963:77). The official distribution of power reflected level of influence 
wielded by three tribes, as opposed to overtly political groupings such as the 'Mukhtar 
group'. 
 
Tribal influence is also demonstrated in the succession of King Idris. In 1956 there were 
suggestions that the monarchy be abolished. Mustafa Bin Ḥalim was proposed to replace 
the federal state with a united republic, but this was opposed by Cyrenaican (Barqa) tribal 
leaders who encouraged the king to reject it (Wright, 1969:231). During his reign, with 
the prohibition of political parties and in the absence of any political programme, the only 
involvement in political life and elections was through tribal or family routes (John 
Wright, 1969). The shaikhs held such power that different administrations, including the 
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Turkish, Italians and British, used their powerful influence, albeit mainly for the purposes 
of collecting taxes (Peters, 1949:112).  
 
To conclude, it seems reasonable to agree with Ahmida’s (2005:83) view that: 
[In] theories of the state, analyzing the region's history, and exploring 
alternative perspectives to explain social and political development 
knowledge is often circumstantial and constrained within institutional 
and social boundaries. Modern social science, however, was developed 
in response to European problems at a point in history when Europe 
dominated the world. 
 
3.7 Political Parties 
This section considers political parties. The first part focuses on parties active during the 
Italian occupation, the second discusses these parties under British Administration in pre-
independence Libya. It should be noted that political parties are not included in my 
definition of civil society. However, they are discussed here because of their importance 
during the early period of Libya’s independence. They did not form government and 
existed outside any legal framework but played an important civic role. Political parties 
after the 2011 uprising will not be considered because they are very recent and their most 
important objective is to form a government and become part of the political process. 
 
3.7.1 During the Italian Occupation - The National Tripolitania Reform 
Party 30-09-1919 
The first political party in Libya was The National Tripolitania Reform Party. Ramaḍān 
al-Suwīḥlī and his colleagues observed that internal and international conditions, together 
with the military stance of Italian occupying authorities, were obstructing the decisions 
and actions of the national government in Tripoli. This necessitated the foundation of a 
political party to maintain their duties and keep pace with the development of political 
and intellectual methods useful in the struggle for national liberation (Emmesh, 
2005:183). The party was formed on 30th September 1919 and announced on the front 
page of the Tripolitanian Banner newspaper which became the voice of the party. 
Ramaḍān al-Suwīḥlī was nominated as the honorary president and its agenda included 
providing support to a national political movement; mediating in political disputes; 
addressing national and international institutions, involving them in the Libyan question; 
and resistance to the Italianization of the country (Emmesh, 2008:78).  
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3.7.2 Political Parties in Libya during the British Administration 
Following the defeat of Italy in World War II and their withdrawal from Libya, the 
country fell under British administrative rule in November 1942. The British liberated the 
Libyans from Italian colonialism and helped them build their own country. The British 
government supported Idris al-Sanusī as ruler of Barqā (Cyrenaica). A request was 
submitted to the British administration in Tripolitania “[…] to grant permission for 
organizing political parties on January 25, 1943” (Khadduri, 1963:81). However, the 
British turned down the request, because the war was not yet over (Khadduri, 1963:83). 
British administration permitted a Literary Club to exist, which functioned as a political 
party. Following the end of the World War II in 1945, there was a mushrooming of 
political parties as outlined below: 
 
(a) The National Tripolitania Party 
The National Tripolitania Party was founded on 8th April, 1946. Article 10 of its charter 
committed the party to the establishment of cooperative associations for the development 
of the country's resources; the expansion of agriculture, industry and trade on the basis of 
modern methods; and the establishment of civil schools to curb unemployment (Emmesh, 
2008:78). The Party was dissolved following the turmoil which accompanied the first 
legislative elections following independence in 1952, and its leader Bashīr al-Sa̔dāwī was 
exiled on the pretext that he was a non-Libyan national (because he held it at the time 
Libyan passport were not been issued). From that time, political parties of any form 
were banned in Libya.  
 
(b) The United National Front (al- Jabhā al- Waṭaniyyā al- Mutaḥidā) 1946 
The United National Front was formed on 10th May, 1946, as a ‘Defence Committee’ 
(Emmesh, 2008:202). It was a representative coalition of people from across the political 
spectrum, including both Arabs and Jews, who opposed the French plan for an Italian 
trusteeship in Tripolitania under the United Nations (Khalaf, 1993:236). Its original aim 
was the creation of a united and independent Libya as a member of the Arab League, 
under the constitutional rule of Idris al-Sanusī, in alliance with Britain (Khalaf, 
1993:236). However, “[T]he immediate purpose of the creation of the al-Jabhā was to 
present the Cyrenaican case to the international commission.”The party made its first 
declaration on November 1946 which included the following demands (Khadduri, 
1963:62):  
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1- Recognition of the Sanusī Emirate under Idris;  
2- Permission to form a national government to administer the country 
in preparation for complete independence.  
 
(c) The Free National Bloc party (al-Kutla al-Waṭaniya al-Ḥurra) 1946 
The Free National Bloc party was founded on 26th May, 1946, as a splinter group from 
the Nationalist Party (Khalaf, 1993:236). It opposed British administrative control, the 
Sanusī leadership and Italian immigration, and was also critical of French activities in 
Fezzan (Khalaf, 1993:245). The party’s membership grew to 70,000 and it formed two 
new wings: a youth group and a trade union (Khalaf, 1993:247).  
 
(d) The Party of the Egyptian Tripolitania Federation of Libya 1947 
The Party of the Egyptian Tripolitania Federation of Libya was founded with the aim of 
bringing about the union of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan under the Egyptian crown. 
Later, in May 1948, the party supported the Sanusī Emirate against a united Libya 
(Khalaf, 1993:249).  
 
(e) The Tripolitanian Labour Party 1947 
The Tripolitanian Labour party was a very small group whose aim was to achieve a 
united, independent Libya with Arab League membership (Khalaf, 1993:249).  
 
(f) The Liberal Party [Ḥizb al-`Aḥrār] 1948 
The Liberal Party was authorized by the British Administration in March 1948 (Emmesh, 
2008:237), and revolved largely around the personality of its leader, Sadek Bin Zara. It 
represented the middle classes, especially in the education sector, and advocated that all 
people have the right to establish and join associations (Emmesh, 2008:238). 
 
(g) The Muslim Brotherhood  
The Muslim Brotherhood’s ideas and organization came to Benghazi in the late 1940s 
when three young members of the movement escaped from Egypt. All three had been 
accused of involvement in the assassination of the Egyptian Prime Minister, Nuqrqshi 
Pasha. Among them was Dr. `Izz al-Dīn Ibrāhīm who later worked as a consultant in the 
United Arab Emirates. Prince Idris al-Sanusī, the Emir of Cyrenaica, granted 
them political asylum. They preached sermons in mosques, gave religious lessons and 
public lectures which influenced many young people in Benghazi. Since that time, the 
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ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood became a prominent feature of the religious, cultural 
and political landscape of Benghazi. This ideology soon spread to every city and region 
in Libya without, however, being reflected within the country’s regulatory or 
organizational framework due to its being prohibited by the Libyan authorities. 
 
The Islamist movement was an essential component of the political scene during the years 
of monarchy. It manifested as the Muslim Brotherhood movement – at the time, the only 
major voice stemming from Islamic principles. Other organized Islamic political 
movements did not develop until the 1970s. 
 
(h) Arab Nationalist Movements 
During the Libyan monarchy, nationalist movements including the Nasserites, the al-
Ba’th and the Movement of Arab Nationalists, were a major component of the political 
landscape. Their ideology spread for several reasons. The most prominent figure of the 
Nasserites, Abdel Nasser, was strongly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist, which was 
attractive to Libyan. The al-Ba’th and the Movement of Arab Nationalists both maintained 
influential presences in Libyan cultural and political arenas during the 1950s and 1960s. 
In 1960, the Libyan authorities arrested a group of intellectuals and young people from 
cities across Libya, accusing them of forming a secret organisation which followed the 
prohibited Syrian Arab al-Ba’th Party. The judiciary sentenced the defendants to 
imprisonment ranging from a few months to several years. The third element consisted of 
groups whose members had been influenced by Marxist ideologies, either through 
Marxist literature available within the country, or while studying outside Libya (Emmesh, 
2008). 
 
In 1967 the Libyan government announced the discovery of a secret branch of the Arab 
Nationalist Movement whose members were tried and sentenced under a similar 
regulation to that used against the al-Ba’th party. In both cases, amongst the defendants 
were Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanians working in Libya as teachers and other 
professionals. According to Emmesh, these parties were those of the Libyan elite 
(Emmesh, 2008:282).  
 
During this period the role of the zawāyā was strengthened because, unlike political 
parties, it had not been prohibited. This is possibly because loyalty to the zawāyā was 
89 
 
guaranteed by its origins lying in the Sanusī. The king banned political parties for two 
reasons: firstly, to avoid foreign ideas and ideologies impacting on the political and social 
life of Libya under a conservative government; and secondly because in his Islamic 
training, he could have interpreted Islam as being incompatible with the party system. 
This depends on an understanding of the term ‘party’ (hizb). In the Qur’an it has a 
negative connotation as a segment of society. However, the Quran does not link this word 
with the term ‘political’. Wright (1969:16) claims that “… overt political activity in the 
1950s was limited to the trade unions.” 
 
It can be seen that almost all the political parties were located in Tripolitania rather than 
Cyrenaica. This is thought to be because: firstly, the public space in Cyrenaica was 
dominated by the Sufi order (especially the Sanusī order), and; secondly, under the 
formation of the Ottoman State, Tripolitania had moved away from the old trading and 
tributary political economy to a more advanced form of capitalism (Ahmida 1994:67). 
These parties also emerged as channels of communication and forums for nationalist 
expression during a period of national struggle against colonialists. Their aims were the 
liberalization and independence of Libya. Nevertheless, these parties and movements 
existed in the absence of a pluralistic political system. The period of British 
administration was a transitional phase characterized by the formation of political 
movements promoting the establishment and development of a Libyan State. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced different types of associations that were developed in 
the pre- and post-independence periods. An analysis of the role of traditional associations 
has revealed that these acted as tools of resistance against colonialism, and preserved 
Libyan identity. These associations became sources of political mobilization.   
   
It can be seen that a specific and established culture of participation is embedded within 
Libyan political culture, and that the Libyan people have historically believed in their 
ability to help shape the conditions facing their lives. Islam has not only been a religion, 
but also a political theory, a major source of identity, a means of legitimisation of political 
power and a provider of social services. Even the resistance to Italian colonialism had 
strongly religious components which provided a dynamic driving force.  
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The structure of Arab society of which Libya is a part of it is not a feudalist structure, and 
also is not capitalism in the classic European sense. It is a structure that is controlled by 
the traditional structures of pre-bourgeois revolution and capitalist development, which 
are not characterized by class polarization, but dominated by the patriarchal system. 
 
The ability to understand the dynamic of the Libyan case is bolstered by the broad 
definition of civil society, used in this thesis, which include traditional organizations and 
how these were a way of organizing people outside the scope of the state. I have discussed 
civil society from the perspective of the way in which the term of civil society has been 
used in the World Bank definition and in Libyan society. This study is not put within the 
context of democracy in the western political theory which came as a result of the 
industrial revolution. As Beckman, (1997:2) suggests: ''It is more useful if such contested 
positions and ambiguities are  addressed as the complexities of civil society itself rather 
than as an awkward way for determining what civil society is at any particular time'' 
 
I will to conclude this chapter by stating that the need in the Muslim World is to establish 
a theory of civil society appropriate to an Islamic context, but at the same time cognisant, 
that we are living in global world where we can contribute to human civilization. It is an 
example of the value of ''cultural diversity''. 
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Chapter Four 
The Political System under the Qadhafi Regime in Libya 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the interplay of power structures and 
social/political organisation under the Qadhafi regime, in order to understand the context 
in which civil association operated at this time. Specifically, this chapter will explain the 
dynamics and institutions of the Libyan political system under Qadhafi, as a precursor to 
detailed information on Libyan NGOs, provided in Chapters Six and Seven. The chapter 
will discuss the nature of the Libyan state, not just the formal institutions of government, 
since the latter narrow view might be misleading. It will also examine how the structure 
of the Libyan political system influenced the shape of society, considering whether within 
this system there was room for civil association independent of the state, or whether the 
structure dominated all public activities. It asks whether or not there can be a strong civil 
society (as defined by the World Bank) in a strong and fierce state, as Libya was under 
Qadhafi. 
  
Many scholars emphasise the importance of the political atmosphere surrounding civil 
society, especially whether it offers resources and support, or creates restrictions. For 
example, Denoeux (2005:79-80) points out that civil society is “unlikely to sustain its 
role.” Without a supportive state environment. He interprets the dynamics of Moroccan 
civil society, considered the most active within the Arab World, as stemming not from 
the leaders of civil society or the pressure of civil society exerts on government, but from 
the “political context in which it operates” (al-Sayyid Sa’id, 2005:63).  
 
4.2 The Nature of the Libyan State during the Qadhafi Era. 
The state is much more than a set of formal government institutions. In discussing the 
character of the Libyan state during the Qadhafi era, it is important to note the ways in 
which civil society was limited and controlled through methods of manipulation, coercion 
and fear. This section addresses the question of how the leader (Qadhafi) maintained his 
rule, and what the mechanisms and levers of power were. It will be shown that the formal 
institutions were hollow, but that complex networks of participation helped maintain the 
status quo. 
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The researcher will discuss this question by applying Hisham Sharabi's concept of the 
‘neo-patriarchal state’ to the Libyan case. The term "neo-patriarchy'' seeks to define a 
distinct form of social organization found in the Arab World. This form of social 
organisation arose from the era of European penetration, when a process of modernization 
imposed by Western colonialism within the framework of the colonial project lead to a 
hybridization and distortion of traditional structures. This process produced a situation 
where "the past did not end yet the present had not been born." The neo-patriarchy 
argument thus derives its significance, according to Sharabi, from two sides: first, it 
captures a history different from the traditional social system known as the medieval 
Islamic civilization, and secondly it differs from the pattern of social 
evolution/development that prevailed in Europe after the French Revolution and the rise 
of the bourgeois class. More specifically, Sharabi (1988:3) uses the concept of the neo-
patrimonial state as a: “universal form of traditional society, which assumes a different 
character in each society,” without depending on Western Europe’s first historical break 
with traditional society as its model. Where modernity has not been able to throw away 
patriarchy, but patriarchal systems have interacted with the modernist tide and produced 
a hybrid system (caused by making an arbitrary reference between traditional and modern 
looks), this situation creates what Sharabi called neo-patriarchy. 
 
The patriarchal system at the level of the mental or intellectual is characterized by a 
holistic system and tyranny, where there is a refusal to engage with criticism or dialogue. 
One of the features on this system is the claim to possess absolute truth: a belief that the 
patriarchy’s claims cannot be doubted or opened to review and critique. There is one 
absolute truth possessed by the 'father' (at the level of the family/household), or men 
versus women in general, or the father as a political representative in the person of the 
ruler. In all cases, arguments of force prevail over the power of argument.  
 
This hierarchy of vertical relationships classifies individuals and groups in the social 
order, and therefore in the priorities that determine rates of access, rights and privileges. 
These are not subject to standards of intellectual, scientific practical effectiveness, or the 
level of productivity, but just to one’s belonging to a certain category or group, or one’s 
affiliation to a clan or class or family. Sharabi came to important conclusions through this 
analysis regarding the social phenomena in which power, represented by the father in the 
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family, finds its extension into other institutions: the power of the party leader, the 
Shaikh’s authority in the tribe and the absolute authority of the governor of the State. 
 
We can analyse how Qadhafi led Libya according to this concept. He started his rule as a 
''national'' project, but this was not borne out through the building of institutions, but 
rather as a state-level form of patriarchy. Qadhafi broke traditional loyalties or patterns, 
and introduced "revolutionary" legislation. That the leader succeeded in the 
implementation of this during the first years of the rule was in part due to his charismatic 
manner, but also his cultivation of political clients, whose personal loyalty to the leader 
(rather than the state) presented them with certain privileges. 
 
Qadhafi’s parental style shared many aspects with that of other leaders in the Arab and 
Muslim world. There, patriarchy also constitutes a symbolic order, based on the idea of 
an inspirational leader, who is necessary to lead people/peoples (still children or not 
mature) and to carry out their affairs responsibly. This concentration of power in a single 
individual can transfer to other social and political levels. However, the similarity with 
established Arab and Muslim forms of society should not blind us to two special 
characteristics which are essential to the form of Qadhafi’s rule: his penetration into the 
religious sphere, and into the family institution. 
 
As to the religious sphere, here Qadhafi had a prominent role, contributing numerous 
interpretations of religious texts and doctrines that ran contrary to more widespread views 
in the Muslim world. He espoused a set of opinions on the doctrines of all the various 
currents of Islam and declared his intention to fight against the Wahhabi doctrine, which 
created enmity between himself and Saudi Arabia. His expression of these views was not 
confined to Libya, but was broadcast all over the Arab and Muslim world; he dedicated 
himself to serving the issues of Arabism and Islam, seeing it as his task to explain the key 
elements of Islam to all Muslims. He built many mosques in different countries, and his 
international role was promoted through the Islamic Dawa Association (Jam‘iyat al-
Da‘wa al-'Islamiah). In addition, in 1989 he gave himself the title of the “Muslim's 
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Imam”; this name carried an even greater status than that of al-Faqih,9 giving him 
responsibility for the interpretation and determination of many aspects of religious life. 
 
In the family institution, Qadhafi made many contributions. For example he put 
restrictions on polygamy. This did not represent religious concerns only, but also 
addressed social phenomena reflecting male dominance. This was considered as a breach 
from traditional patriarchal models of the family institution. Another example was the 
establishment of the military college for girls, and his use of an all-female guard; these 
would not previously have been considered acceptable social roles for women. 
 
The weakness of the state’s structure and its institutions mean that the contemporary state 
in the Arab world is often unable to fulfil its fundamental role in the modern world, both 
in terms of building the institutional infrastructure, and establishing an identity separate 
from the person ruling (whatever the method by which he came to power).  This limitation 
has played an important role in distorting the notion of the State in the social 
consciousness, and in diminishing political awareness, and awareness of the law. What 
happened in Libya was that the Libyan State had an informal character with shadowy 
“institutions” such as the Social People's Leadership Committees, the Revolutionary 
Committees Movement, the Forum of the Companions of Qadhafi and the Free Unionist 
Officers Movement. All those “institutions” were formed outside of the official 
Jamahiriya system (the people’s authority) and were not subject to election. 
 
Libyan state institutions under Qadhafi were therefore accountable only to the leadership 
that formed them. Mattes (2011:55) explains that the regime used “some” institutions, 
organizations and political groups to keep itself in power or when faced with challenges. 
He adds that the unofficial institutions have not been constitutionally defined and are 
beholden only to the leadership. This fits one of the themes covered in Chapter Five, that 
which relates to ‘Revolutionary Legitimacy’. Held power outside the official channels.  
                                                 
9Imam: Imam literally means "the president" but it also a title of those who are excel in reading the 
Qur'an, well acquainted with Islamic teachings or who hold ranks in jurisprudence. Scholars of Islamic 
studies and law hold this rank. 
Faqih (fə'kɪəh): is a scholar who studies religious rulings derived from Islamic law and the sources of 
legislation relate to acts and behaviours. Text is the basic source of the Faqih in analysing literary Islamic 
sources in order to deduce Islamic rulings into; obligatory, prohibited, recommended, undesirable and 
allowed. 
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The view that for various reasons the institution of the state in Libya did not exist fully 
within frameworks whereby it could become properly representative and act for the 
benefit of society in all its variations is not only a theoretical assumption. Support for this 
appears in the Declaration of the Popular Revolution or what known as (Five Points of 
Zwāra), also known as the “Cultural Revolution”, in April 1973. The third paragraph of 
this document states that “[t]he revolutionary administration is to eliminate bureaucratic 
management”, where the meaning of bureaucracy here is not the complexity of 
administrative routines, which actually increased, but rather the administrative structures.  
 
The authorities in Libya have used the circumstances of statelessness to justify their 
constant interference, by claiming that the state is still at the so-called stage of 
revolutionary transition, never having moved on to that of the state. Accordingly, the 
prime focus for any reform in Libya must be to move from the stage of the revolution to 
that of the state. 
 
The absence of a state institution provides an explanation for why civil society in Libya 
is still so weak. Whether under Qadhafi or under King Idris, the state institutions were 
not strong, not only as a result of legal constraints, but also because of the inherent 
difficulty in building a civil society that is active and strong in a country lacking a fully-
fledged state. This is because civil society, as defined here, occupies the space between 
society and the state, and it is precisely this space which is lacking or at least poorly-
defined in Libya. 
 
A key example of the effect of this lack of strong, continuous institutions is Qadhafi's 
official political position as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, when he left 
the Revolutionary Command Council. Because this meant that the army revolved around 
a single person rather than the institutions of the state, the Libyan army was in effect 
dismantled, because its loyalty was bent towards its supreme commander instead of its 
homeland. Another problem facing Libya is the issue of reduction of the army’s number, 
which, in fact, is not limited to it: there are many countries in the so-called Third World 
that also have this difficulty in building their armies. 
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The Libyan army was subject to reorganization several times; Qadhafi's speech in April 
1979 suggested an alternative programme for the national army, which he described as 
being a ”classic army". The alternative was the "armed people”, a programme that 
included military training for civilians and women. Also, revolutionary committees were 
set up, comprised of Gaddafi loyalists  . In August 1988 Qadhhafi announced plans to 
dismantle the "classic army” and police, and replace them officially with “armed people”. 
It meant a significant reduction in the size of the army and its services being dispensed 
with. In 1989, the Qadhhafi regime abolished military ranks and the General Command 
of the Armed Forces Committee, replacing the latter with a Temporary People's 
Committee of Defence. Many of the leaders of the army were dispensed with, and turned 
most of them into business .Then Qadhhafi created security battalions under his son’s 
leadership, consisting of loyal and certain tribes. These battalions were trained to the 
highest levels, and tasked with protecting the regime. These battalions become a parallel 
or alternative to the national army (Sergei Balmasov, 2012).   
 
Qadhafi’s authority for his second unofficial position came from the issuance of a 
document called “Revolutionary Legitimacy”, under which even the spoken word of 
Qadhafi became the rule of law, and at times superseded it. 
  
Most interviewees from Libyan associations considered that the discourse on civil society 
within Libya amounted to involvement in the political arena. Therefore, most 
interviewees tried to show their disinterest in politics. At the same time, however, the 
associations (represented by the interviewees) faced impediments placed on their 
structures, administration and funding, which prevented them from realizing their goals 
and taking part in the building a civil society. These impediments included both internal 
and external limiting factors. In this respect, I can borrow the words of Shawa (2005:210) 
who emphasises that civil society is problematic in the context of Libya. 
 
Even though the Libyan state is a neo-patriarchy, as this section has explained, it did leave 
a small amount of room for some associations with limited activities, as I will illustrate 
in Chapter Six.  It is important to understand these spaces, in order to reveal the specific 
and complex characteristics of the Libyan context, and avoid unquestioned application of 
ready-made labels for the situation, as discussed in earlier chapters. 
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4.3 The People’s Authority Declaration 
On March 2, 1977 the Libyan government declared the “People’s Authority” and the 
Republic of Libya became the “Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya”, a newly 
created term. Colonel Qadhafi considered this as a world historic change compared to the 
introduction of the term “Republic” in the French revolution. He added that this was only 
the starting point for the world, which would be moved steadily in the same direction. 
 
This change was not only in the names and terms, but was a fundamentally radical one. 
It eliminated the governmental institutions along with their legal frameworks and 
traditional bureaucracy, which were replaced by structures that were completely different. 
The declaration of the power of the people stated that, "power is to the people with no 
power to others. The people are to exercise their power by the People's Conferences and 
People's Committees, unions and professional associations, and the General People's 
Conference” (Declaration Document of the Power of the People: Sabha, 1977). As a result 
of this declaration, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Council of Ministers 
were dissolved, and Colonel Muammar Qadhafi became the first general secretary of the 
General People's Conference. The remaining members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council were appointed as members of the General Secretariat of the General People's 
Congress. However, all these individuals resigned later in 1979. This resignation was a 
turning point, when a division of authority began. The Colonel declared that power would 
be divided into revolutionary power (de facto authority), and the power of the people (the 
official form of the government, whose function was to carry out the administration of 
the state). (Libya's Revolution in Twenty Years, 1989: 123-126). of the revolutionary 
power was under the supervision and "guidance" of Colonel Qadhafi, and this was given 
formal status in 1990 with the issuance of the "Statement of Revolutionary Legitimacy" 
which outlined guidelines and instructions which became superior to the force of law. 
 
The researcher will present a summary of this political system, which can be seen as an 
attempt by Muammar  Qadhafi to apply the thoughts that he developed in the Green Book 
and in his in many speeches. He conveyed it as a third way between Marxism and 
capitalism: Marxism, he said made the state the owner of everything, including the effort 
and sweat of the people who became the state’s slaves, while, capitalism is brutal, stealing 
the efforts of workers and allowing the rich classes to become richer. The Colonel 
believed that neither system considered the rights of the people. 
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The Green Book was composed of three parts: the first part covered politics, and was 
entitled "Solving the Problem of Governance" -through direct democracy. The system 
was based on People's Basic Conferences as a basis of legislation and People's 
Committees as a means of implementation. The second part was entitled “Solving the 
Economic Problem "- of communism, and the third part focused on the social side of the 
Third Universal Theory, dealing with topics such as nationalism, women and minorities. 
 
The analysis here will focus on the political system, to understand if it allowed for the 
existence of civil society organisations and how the system perceived those organisations.  
 
4.4 The Structure of the Political System (People's Authority) 
The organisational structure of the power of the people consisted of two main pillars, 
which were the People's Conferences of all levels representing the legislature, (the 
consideration of draft laws and recommendations to the General People's Conference), 
and the People's Committees at all levels representing the executive authority. This 
section will address this structure thoroughly and examine in detail the role of each part 
of it. 
 
4.4.1 People’s Conferences 
The People's Conferences formed the legislative body, and were divided into three levels. 
The first was the People's Basic Conferences, which were located in every locality. The 
second was the non-basic conferences, which were based in branches of the municipalities 
and the third was the General People's Conference, which was equivalent to parliaments 
in other countries. There were also vocational and professional conferences, which were 
equivalent to professional unions.  
 
4.4.1.1 Basic People’s Conferences 
These Conferences were forums for local people to discuss the impact of state policy 
(political, economic, social and security) on local and national issues. The conferences 
were arranged at specific times, dictated by law and were managed by a special 
Committee The Basic People's Conferences were not limited to a specific number of 
people, hence the number of attendees varied. 
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The Basic People's Conferences were considered a tool of legislation, for consideration 
of resolutions before passing them to the People's Conferences for approval and 
ratification. According to the first chapter of the Green Book “the people are distributed 
to basic popular Conferences, where each Conference selects a secretariat to run its 
meetings”. Basic People's Conferences were held 3 times a year. The first meeting was 
usually devoted to develop a detailed agenda for the next two meetings, and the second 
was used to discuss local issues, while the third meeting was dedicated to both domestic 
and international topics. The members of the committee drafted resolutions and then 
voted by show of hands.  
 
The Basic People's Conferences were the backbone of the political system and the vehicle, 
through which people exercised authority, power, and control over the affairs of state and 
society, from local issues to conflict resolution with other nations and the negotiation of 
International agreements and alliances, etc. The Basic People's Conferences were 
considered to be the supreme sole political reference (See letters, speeches and 
explanations of Muammar Qadhafi: national record: issued 1986). 
 
This theoretical concept had two objectives for Muammar Qadhafi. The first objective 
was to establish democracy through the conferences and the second was to replace 
centralised decision-making with a process of decision- making carried through multiple 
levels.  
 
However, the application of Qadhafi’s theory fell far short of the democratic participation 
it had envisaged. The fragmentation of political decision making between the different 
departments of authority created a state of administrative chaos that lacked the minimum 
requirements of institutionalisation; therefore theoretically it moved away the centrality 
of decision-making at the same time as moving away from the decentralisation of 
management. This was considered one of the most important structural factors in the 
Libyan regime that put the country in a state of administrative chaos. There were 
manoeuvres to bypass this theoretical framework on the ground. Although Qadhafi did 
not have any role in the selection of trustees or in discussions of the agenda, those who 
lead the secretariats were keen to please him. This made people lose their trust in the 
conferences and attendance declined. This was most noticeable in the last session of the 
People’s Conferences in December 2010, as only the secretariats attended. In other 
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conferences even the secretariats were absent. (Libya al-Youm newspaper and al-Manara 
newspaper 22-12-2010). 
 
Muammar Qadhafi persisted in explaining this decline by saying that it was a result of 
the non-cooperation of the Libyan people, who lacked the required level of revolutionary 
spirit, rather than the obvious imbalance in the theoretical construction drafted by him. In 
Chapter 7 of this study, the researcher criticises the theoretical basis of the Green Book, 
which was based upon the concept of the power of the people. 
 
In 1992 the number of Basic People's Conferences was 1500, in 1993 it was 375 and in 
1995 it was 336. It rose again by the year 2000 to 450 (Periodic Report of the Secretariat 
of the General People's Conference for the year 2001:17). There is in 2000 may have 
reflected Qadhafi’s attempt to re-engage people in the political process. 
 
Figure 4: Basic People conferences 
 
Source: Secretariat of G.P.C report 2001 
 
4.4.1.2 Municipal People's Conferences 
These conferences consisted of all popular contiguous conferences within a specific 
geographical area. They were specified by the General People's Conference, and their 
popular committees consisted of the total chosen members for each sector, for example, 
health, education, utilities... etc. People chosen from the People's Basic Conferences of a 
specific geographical area, and the Non Basic Conferences of the main municipal 
branches selected a secretary or minister for each popular committee (health, 
education ...etc). The committees which represented the executive authority then chose a 
secretary-general. (Masses Dictionary, 1989: 274). In the first chapter of the Green Book 
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it states that "out of the secretariats of the People’s conferences, the popular non-basic 
conferences emerge". 
 
In 1979, Libya was divided to 174 municipal branches, and in 1980 the number was 
revised to 173. However, in 1990 the number was reduced to 40. In late 1992, these 
branches were totally abolished (al-Mīghīrbī 1995:67). 
 
Figure 5: Municpal People’s Conferences 
 
Source: (al-Mīghīrbī 1995) 
 
4.4.1.3 People’s Conferences of the Municipality 
Libya, which has a population of about 6 million inhabitants, was divided into 22 
branches (province or municipality) and this number changed frequently as a result of 
mergers or further divisions; for example, in 1977, Libya was divided into ten provinces 
consisting of 46 municipalities. In 1979, the provinces were annulled and Libya was 
divided into 46 municipalities, which fell to 25 in 1980, 13 in 1986 and 7 in 1990 (the 
lowest recorded number). In 1992, the municipal system was abolished in Libya and 
power transferred into the hands of the basic conferences and the General People's 
Conference.  
 
In 1995, Libya was divided into 13 “districts”, rather than municipalities or provinces. 
This re-naming lasted until 1998 when the districts became “branches” (Shaabat), and 
their number increased to 27. In 2000, the number increased again to 30 (Periodic report 
of the General People's Congress 2001) and finally to 22(the website of the General 
People's Committee. These branches had legal status and were publicly accountable, and 
many powers that were granted to the General People's Committee and its general sub-
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committees to provide public services, Within those powers was the power to permit the 
establishment of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at the level of their branches. 
 
Figure 6: The Number of the Municpality 
 
Source: Secretariat of G.P.C report 2001 
 
4.4.1.4 The General People's Conference 
The General People’s Conference corresponds to parliaments in other systems and was a 
legislative power. It was composed of the secretariats of the popular conferences, 
committees, unions and professional associations. The conference selected a secretariat 
that chaired the meetings and signed laws and endorsed the credentials of the 
representatives of foreign countries. The secretariat consisted of five members including: 
Secretary General, Secretary of Women's Affairs, Secretary of the affairs of the People's 
Conferences, and the Secretary for unions and professional and vocational associations. 
 
Theoretically, the General People's Conference held the political power in the masses 
system in Libya. As stated in the first chapter of the Green Book (P7) "The General 
People's Conference is not the total of persons or members such as parliaments, it is a 
forum that gathers both the People's Conferences and People's Committees”.  
 
The General People’s Conference was the melting pot in which the decisions of the 
People's Basic Conferences were formulated and applied in practical ways. The General 
People's Conference published and implemented legislation. According to Article (1) of 
the People's Conferences and People's Committees 2001, the General People's 
Conference had extensive powers (pp. 17-19). 
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Under this jurisdiction, the General People's Conference was not the representative of the 
public and its members were not deputised by the people to make laws and decisions, as 
is the case of parliaments and assemblies in other countries. The General People's 
Conference members were representative of the Basic People's Conferences, associations, 
unions, and professional associations. Therefore they were responsible for drafting the 
final wording of the decisions that they conveyed from the conferences of the people, in 
an honest and responsible way without the right to modify. 
 
4.4.1.5 Professional People's Conferences 
Those conferences represented another form of the people’s power which differed 
completely from patterns of associations in other political systems. It was stated in the 
first chapter of the Green Book that: “All citizens who are members of these Popular 
Conferences belong, vocationally and functionally, to various sectors and have, therefore, 
to form themselves into their own professional Popular Conferences’’(p.12). 
 
Professional People's Conferences included unions which belonged to the people of 
specific professions. These conferences also included professional associations which 
were popular gatherings for people with artistic or scientific talents. They also included 
the unions which were the forum of professional unions and associations.  
 
4.4.2 People’s Committees 
The People's Committees represented the executive power in the country at all levels, 
thus for every People's Conference there was a corresponding People’s Committee that 
was responsible for implementing its decisions. The committee members were chosen by 
the conferences. It is worth noting that the People's Committees corresponded to 
ministries in other systems. In this section, the researcher will present the different levels 
of People's Committees. 
 
4.4.2.1 People’s Committee for the Basic People's Conferences 
(Locality or Mahalah) 
The Basic People's Committee for locality consisted of a secretary and four members. 
These committees were responsible for handling local affairs and for implementing the 
decisions of the Conference at the local level. All committee members were elected 
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through complicated and changeable procedures by the Conferences, for a period of 3 
years. 
 
4.4.2.2 People's Committee of the Municipal Branch 
The People's Committees of the Municipal Branches were made up of a secretary-
general and a group of trustees responsible for various sectors. 
 
4.4.2.3 Municipal People's Committee 
The Municipa l People's Committees consisted of a secretary-general and a group of 
trustees, each heading a Sectoral People’s Committee (health, education, housing, etc.).  
 
4.4.2.4 General People's Committee (The Cabinet) 
This committee was the supreme administrative body in the pyramid structure of the 
power of the people as it was in charge of overseeing and monitoring the implementation 
of public policy. It was the highest executive body in the country and it was equivalent to 
the cabinet (or council of ministers) in other countries. The General People's Committee 
was responsible for the issuance of regulations and decisions, which were regarded as 
second legal ranks following the laws of the General People's Conference, had a 
Secretariat and among the tasks that were given to the General People's Committee by the 
legislator was that of endorsing NGOs throughout the country. 
 
The most important functions and specialisations of the General People's Committee were 
as follows: 
1. Implementing laws and decisions of the Basic People's Conferences that were 
formulated in the General People's Conference. 
2. Proposing a draft operational budget and draft budget of the developmental 
programme and submitting them to the General Planning Council. 
3. Preparing transformation plan projects and public projects and submitting them 
to the General Planning Council. 
4. Proposing draft laws, as well as other issues that it wished to present to the 
Basic People's Conferences. 
5. Managing and implementing public strategic projects.  
6. Following-up the work of the General People's Committees of the sectors, the 
Sectoral People's Committees and the People's Committees of agencies, 
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institutions, public companies and related bodies. Supervising these entities to 
ensure that they were functioning in accordance with the resolutions of the 
Basic People's Conferences. 
7. Supervising and following-up on Libya's Great Man-Made River Project and 
its investments. 
8. Making decisions on the organisational structures of the General People's 
Committees of the sectors. 
9. Encouraging foreign investment in Libya and following-up on Libyan 
investments abroad. 
10. Putting controls on the dispatch of work, study, training, medical treatment, or 
for missions abroad. 
11. Adopting educational curricula. 
12. Issuing governing regulations to contracts for the implementation of works and 
services that were financed from the public budget. 
13. Issuing executive regulations for laws that were related to their jurisdiction. 
14. Establishing, resolving, integrating, organising, reorganising, and specifying 
the respective mandates of: institutions; bodies and agencies; interests and 
public companies; and public administrations. 
15. Carrying out any other assigned tasks issued by the General People's 
Conferences or the General Secretariat of the Basic People's Conferences. 
 
The General People's Committee had a Secretariat that consisted of a secretary, trustee's 
assistants, secretaries of the General People's Committees of the sectors and inspectors 
general. was The Secretariat was responsible for monitoring the work of the following: 
the trustees of the General People's Committees of the sectors and inspectors general; 
secretaries of the People's Committees of branches; Trustees of the People's Committees 
of the branches, institutions, departments, agencies and public bodies that belonged to the 
General People's Committee to perform, for example, the central bank and the high court. 
 
The most important functions and specialisations of the Secretariat of the General 
People's Committee were the following:  
1. Implement laws and decisions of the Basic People's Conferences that were 
formulated in the General People's Conferences. 
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2. Call for meetings of the General People's Committee and the General People's 
Committee of branches, and follow up on the implementation of their 
decisions. 
3. Propose draft laws, and other topics that it wished to present to the Basic 
People's Conferences, presenting these to the General People's Committee for 
approval, then forwarding these to the Secretariat of General People's 
Conference. 
4. Conclude treaties, conventions, and submit them to the Basic People's 
Conferences for approval. 
5. Adopt minutes of meetings of joint committees, and follow-up on international 
cooperation affairs. 
6. Nominate trustees and members of the People's Committees for the branches, 
institutions, agencies, interests, and public companies, as well as members of 
the general assembly of public companies. Nominations were carried out in 
coordination with the Secretariat of the General People's Conference, and as 
determined by the executive regulations of the law. 
7. Provide permission to the People's Committees of the branches, institutions and 
public companies to contract with foreign companies and agencies for the 
implementation of projects. 
8. Provide study scholarship, training, work and placements abroad. 
9. Investigate the Trustees and members of the People's Committees, and put 
penalties on them according to the applied legislation and controls specified in 
the executive regulations of this law. 
10. Carry out any other assigned tasks issued by the General People's Conference 
or its Secretariat, the General People's Committee, or the General People's 
Committee of the branches. 
 
We can conclude from the description of the political system in Libya that this 
construction fulfils the concept of the power of the people, as it included all people, males 
and females from the age of 18 years starting at a local level, which made room for civil 
society. In practice, however, it did not fulfil this purpose. 
 
In reality, the escalation process of nominating people to occupy the executive positions 
in the "secretariat" became as time passed a tool for incorporating the worst types of 
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corruption, where bargaining on those positions among individuals, tribes, and clusters 
became commonplace, as those positions allowed them the opportunity to steal public 
money, access various benefits and gain personal prestige.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the Libyan political system during the Qadhafi era, raising 
the question of whether there was indeed room for civil associations under this regime. 
Ever since March 1977, Qadhafi did not hesitate to disregard these structures as a whole 
and make decisions according to his own wishes and advantage, when he so chose. 
Perhaps the most extreme case was his decision to pay huge financial compensation for 
two incidents involving French and American planes, and his announcement that the 
nuclear weapons development programme in Libya would be closed down. These issues 
did not go through the approval process of the political system. The system had turned 
into a sacred doctrine which no one dared to criticise, but which Qadhafi felt free to use 
or not use according to his wishes. It did not, therefore provide the clear sound stable 
legal and political structures in which civil associations can flourish. 
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Chapter Five 
The Legal Framework for State - Civil Society Relations 
in the Qadhafi Era 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the legal framework which developed for civil society 
organisations during the time when Qadhafi held power in Libya. This links with the key 
role played by Qadhafi, whether in the formulation of laws or in their application. The 
chapter deals with the question of how the change in political context, which was the main 
concern of the previous chapter, impacted on the legal context. It assesses whether Libyan 
law promoted or restricted NGO's activities, with particular attention to Law 19 of 2001. 
This law is still in effect because a government has yet to be established with the power 
to issue new laws (this will be explained later in the thesis). The chapter addresses the 
relationship between law and civil society as a framework regulating the relationship 
between the State and NGOs. It will be argued that NGOs should have the right to operate 
and not be constrained by the State nor seek its permission for these operation, and that 
this provision was effectively missing under law 19. 
 
It is worth noting that under the laws described below there is no protection for NGOs as 
autonomous entities. This is clearly a severe shortcoming in the Libyan code, especially 
when the laws themselves, as we will observe, are flawed. 
 
The contribution of civil society organisations to the political process, and patterns of 
interaction between them and the State is one of the main debates concerning civil society. 
There are three reasons why it is worthwhile studying the legal structures which regulate 
NGOs and determine the relationship between them and the State. Firstly, it highlights 
the distinction between the functions, duties and roles of the State on the one hand and 
civil society on the other; secondly, it enables understanding of the points of conflict and 
areas of cooperation, interaction and integration between them; and thirdly, it provides a 
basis for comparing Libyan law on NGOs with those of other countries, from which 
theoretical conclusions may be drawn. 
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5.2 The Law and the Qadhafi State 
This section takes up one of the threads of analysis of Chapter Four, concerned with 
changes that happened in the power structures, which had impacts on the legal framework 
and the position of the leader within it. 
 
Despite the fundamental change Libya witnessed since the coup d'état of Colonel Qadhafi 
in 1969, the legal system initially retained remarkable continuity. Article 34 of the Libyan 
constitutional declaration of 1969 read "all existing provisions of laws, decrees, and 
regulations which are not in conflict with the provisions set forth in this constitutional 
proclamation remain in effect. References to the King and Parliament in these laws shall 
be regarded as references to the Revolutionary Command Council and reference to the 
kingdom shall be regarded as reference to the Republic.”10 This means that commercial 
and civil affairs retained continuity and remained active. Family law was put under a 
separate Shariah system during the reign of King Idris, and remained so in the early years 
after the coup. However, both Islamic and secular courts were integrated into one court 
system in 1973 after the colonel's speech in the city of Zwara, where he declared the 
suspension of all active laws.  However, some laws remained active; new laws have been 
added without nullifying previous and potentially contradictory ones. In practice, 
however the most recent law would overrule the older one. 
 
Following the declaration of what was known as the "People’s Authority" in 1977, the 
Green Book invoked the Quran as the basis of law, but Libya’s legal system continued to 
be a twin system of both elements, Islamic as well as secular. The Criminal Code of 1973, 
for example, refrains from full application of Shariah punishments such as limb 
amputation and flogging. 
 
The second turning point in the relationship between the law and the Qadhafi government 
was when Qadhafi made the change in Libya’s official name. This change was not merely 
cosmetic, but was fundamental and radical. At a stroke it eliminated the governmental 
institutions of the status quo, along with their legal frameworks and traditional 
                                                 
10Constitution of Libya 1969, available at: <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/  
public/documents/cafrad/unpan004643.pdf 
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bureaucracy, replacing them with structures that were completely different. The 
declaration of the power of the people stated that 
"Power is to the people with no power to others. The people are to 
exercise their power by the People's Conferences and People's 
Committees, unions and professional associations, and the General 
People's Conference” (Declaration Document of the Power of the People: 
Sabha, 1977).  
 
As a result of this declaration, the Revolutionary Command Council and the Council of 
Ministers were dissolved, and Colonel Muammar Qadhafi became the first general 
secretary of the General People's Conference. The remaining members of the 
Revolutionary Command Council were appointed as members of the General Secretariat 
of the General People's Conference. However, all these individuals resigned later in 1979. 
These resignations were a turning point, marking a new distribution of authority. 
However, the declaration of the People’s Authority ''continue revolution led by Colonel 
Muammar Qadhafi.''  
 
The Colonel declared that power would be divided into revolutionary power (de facto 
authority) and the power of the people (the official form of the government, whose 
function was to carry out the administration of the state) (Libya's Revolution in Twenty 
Years, 1989: 123-126).  The revolutionary power was under the supervision and 
"guidance" of Colonel Qadhafi, and this was given formal status in 1990 with the issuance 
of the "Statement of Revolutionary Legitimacy" which outlined guidelines and 
instructions which became superior to the force of law. 
 
Qadhafi used to interfere in the process of legal enactments by pressuring the General 
People’s Conferences to adopt a particular matter and legalise or outlaw it, and in doing 
so, he resorted to what he called the revolutionary legitimacy. Al-Werfalli (2011:39) 
explains that: 
 His authority is absolute and is based on the revolutionary legitimacy 
charter, which justifies his remaining in power indefinitely and his 
interfering in people’s authority. It also gives him the right to have the 
final say. His decisions are irrevocable and they overrule the BPCs 
decisions. 
Another element he used was the proposal of laws, which was partly monopolised by 
Qadhafi, since he played a crucial role as the guide of the People’s Conference. As a 
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consequence of this role, the official institutions become effectively hollow structures, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
In the previous chapter I presented a summary of this political system, which can be seen 
as an attempt by Muammar Qadhafi to apply the thoughts that he developed in the Green 
Book and in his many speeches. He conveyed it as a third way between Marxism and 
capitalism: Marxism, he said made the state the owner of everything, including the effort 
and sweat of the people who became the state’s slaves, while capitalism is brutal, stealing 
the efforts of workers and allowing the rich classes to become richer. Qadhafi believed 
that neither system respected the rights of the people. In his new system the decision-
making institution was putatively the People’s Conference, as a formal legislative body, 
but in practice, Qadhafi was the key figure of the decision-making process.  
 
The Green Book, which provided the theoretical underpinning for the new system, was 
composed of three parts: the first covered politics, and was entitled "Solving the Problem 
of Governance", to be achieved through direct democracy. The system was based on 
People's Basic Conferences as a basis of legislation and People's Committees as a means 
of implementation. The second part was entitled “Solving the Economic Problem”, and 
the third focused on the social side of the Third Universal Theory, dealing with topics 
such as nationalism, women and minorities. 
 
On this basis of this thinking, Qadhafi claimed that he had restored and handed over 
power to the people, but he installed himself as the leader of the revolution, which position 
was directly imposed and perpetuated via the so-called "document of revolutionary 
legitimacy", issued in March 1990, which says in its first item: "The guidance issued by 
the leader of the revolution is binding and enforceable.'. 
Also, on March 05, 2006, the General People's Conference emphasized the need to 
expedite the implementation of the directives of the Leader of the Revolution as the 
Platform for Action of the people's and People's Conferences. The General People’s 
committee (the cabinet) made these ''guidance'' superior to their own decisions and the 
accountability of committees. This formed the basis for the transformation plans 
"commissioned" by the secretariat of the General People's Conference to form committees 
to review existing laws, and make sure they did not conflict with the directives of the 
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Leader of the Revolution, "and" consider the failure to implement the directives of the 
Leader of the Revolution points accountable to the people's committees.  
I can conclude by saying that this period was characterized by a foggy and confused 
picture. Almost as soon as a decision had been made, it was susceptible to being changed 
or cancelled, and its opposite being announced. Legislation proceeded in effect by trial 
and error, leading to a lack of stability. 
 
5.3 Legal Relationship Between State and Civil Society 
5.3.1 Background 
It is useful, at the outset, to understand the international legal status of civil society 
associations. The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 
20.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.  
20.2 No one may be compelled to belong to an association (UNUDHR, 
Art. 20, 1948). 
 
In addition, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, issued according to 
the UN decision No. 2200 (1966) was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and 
accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. This 
came into force on 23 March 1976, following ratification by a number of countries, 
amongst them Libya, which ratified both agreements in 1970 (accessed 6 February, 2013). 
 
The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states: 
22.1 Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, 
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection 
of his interests. 
22.2 No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than 
those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article shall 
not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on members of the 
armed forces and of the police in their exercise of this right. 
22.3 Nothing in this article shall authorise States Parties to the 
International Labor Organisation Convention of 1948 concerning 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise to 
take legislative measures which would prejudice, or to apply the 
law in such a manner as to prejudice, the guarantees provided for 
in that Convention (UNICCPR, Art.22, 1966). 
 
113 
 
5.3.2 The Libyan Case 
The Libyan government under Qadhafi granted and regulated the right of association 
through Law No. 111 of 1970. 
 
5.3.2.1 Law No. 111 of 1970 
Law No. 111 (1970) was issued by the Revolutionary Command Council headed by 
Qadhafi. It contained seven chapters and 65 articles, which will be outlined below. 
  
Chapter I: 25 articles covered general requirements for the registration of associations. 
The chapter defined an association as a group which organised itself for non-profit-
making activity as a permanent organisation, or for temporary reasons, and consisted of 
several people (Article 1). In Articles 1 and 2 this law established the conditions for 
associations. Firstly, the association had to be consistent with the law, public interest and 
public morals. Secondly, it had to be established in writing, and signed by the founding 
members, with not less than fifty members including none who had been deprived of 
political or civil rights. The rules of procedure were as follows: 
3.1 The association’s name, purpose, location, personal details of all 
members, financial sources, and members’ rights and obligations, 
must be registered. 
3.2 The association has no legal status unless it exists according to the 
provisions of this law. The association must also be registered with 
the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
3.3 The association’s bank account, its financial matters and annual 
budget must be subject to regulation (Article 3- Law 111). 
 
Chapters II and III addressed administrative issues. They stated that each association had 
to have a Board of Directors consisting of at least five Libyan citizens elected annually 
by the General Assembly (Articles 26 and 27) who did not receive salaries or bonuses for 
carrying out their work (Article 29). The Social Affairs Ministry had to be informed of 
the decision-making process and the General Assembly had to meet with an agenda 
agreed a minimum of fifteen days before the meeting. A copy of the minutes of each 
meeting and the decisions had to be distributed within fifteen days following the meeting 
(Article 41).  
 
Chapter IV and V dealt with supervision of the association, and authorised the judiciary 
to revoke any decisions which contradicted the law. It also combined and dissolved 
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associations. The Minster of Social Affairs was warranted, in an urgent case, to overturn 
any decision made by the Board of Directors or the General Assembly if the decision 
violated the law, public interest or public morals. The Minister could appoint a temporary 
Board of Directors of any association, integrate multiple associations which shared the 
same purpose, and amend the purpose in accordance with social needs. 
 
Chapter VI consisted of one article with regard to sanctions. It stipulated the following: 
Any members of an organisation may be punishable by imprisonment for 
a term not exceeding three months and/or a fine of not more than one 
hundred Libyan Dinar (£50) for any of the following offences:  
57.2 Preventing the publication of any record or documents that have 
been requested by the law or the publication of invalid data. Also 
deliberately giving data to a non-competent person or hiding necessary data. 
57.3 Any involvement of an association in activities not in accordance 
with the provisions of this law, or any association conducting 
activity beyond the purpose for which it was created. 
57.4 Continuing to pursue the activity of an association which has been 
dissolved or integrated into other associations 
57.5 Collecting donations for the association or receiving funding for 
personal benefit, which is contrary to this law. Such funds will be 
confiscated. 
57.6 Any board members, managers and staff who fail to deliver the 
details of the assets of the charity, records and documents.  
57.7 Any other violation of the provisions of this Act or its 
implementation.  
 
However, the Penal Code contained additional sanctions with more severe penalties, thus 
rendering this chapter of the law redundant.  
 
Chapter VII dealt with further provisions such as the entitlement of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs to rearrange the sector according to Law No. 111. It excluded youth and sport 
clubs, co-cooperatives and student associations from this provision. 
 
Overall, the law focused primarily on behaviour and was obligatory for associations and 
their members. It did not mention nor provide rights for these associations and was clearly 
not formed in the spirit of encouraging them. Because of the narrow opportunities for 
their activities and the lack of enthusiasm and encouragement for this sector, its 
limitations and weaknesses are obvious. Under Qadhafi there were few associations – 
only thirty in total - and of these, half were for women's activities (Committee of the 
General People's Social Affairs, 2009:326). Subsequently, women's associations were 
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replaced by the Revolutionary Nuns movement and the Revolutionary Committees of 
Women. This was consistent with the ideology of the revolutionary system. 
 
Law no.111 was suspended following the people’s revolution launched in April 1973. 
Without exaggeration, it can be said that between 1973 and 1989 NGOs were few in 
number, and existed as semi-State institutions. Their role was limited to working in 
conjunction with official institutions. They were subject to strict regulations in the 
selection of their leadership, in financial matters and in all their activities. 
 
5.3.2.2 Substantial Laws 
After the issuing of Law No. 111 of 1970, the Revolutionary Command Council issued 
the following decisions, which related to public freedoms and freedom of speech. Many 
of these laws, such as Act No. 45 of 1972, prohibited strikes, sit-ins and demonstrations.  
 
Act No. 75 of 1973 nationalised independent newspapers and journals so that the State 
controlled all printed media. The law muzzled the press and was in contravention of both 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, both of which treat freedom of speech as a basic human right.  
 
Act No. 71 of 1972 criminalised political parties. One of its Articles stated that to join 
any party was treason against the fatherland. The third and fourth articles mandated either 
the death penalty or imprisonment for not less than ten years for anyone calling for the 
establishment of a prohibited group. Act No. 52 of 1974 made defamation, slander and 
aspersion criminal offences, for which the punishment was eighty lashes of the whip. 
 
At this time Qadhafi declared his Third Universal Theory, embodied in the Green Book, 
which became official State ideology. According to this book, members of professions 
across the country were to form their own unions and syndicates which were to be called 
Professional Congresses. 
 
5.3.2.3 Civil Society in Qadhafi’s Political Discourse 
When we say civil society, we mean the opposite of the military. Who is 
not a civilian? All right [...] In Libyan society, what body does not consist 
of civilians? (Qadhafi speech: 28.01.2010). 
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Here Qadhafi argued that because the government had been dissolved and its entire 
apparatus replaced by the People’s Authority, all of Libyan society was now civil. ‘Civil 
society’ was described as a ’Western bourgeois idea’ because the Western political model 
(party parliamentary democracy) required civil institutions in order to counterbalance 
State power and improve the lives of needy people. Since this was not required under the 
People’s Authority, calls for civic institutions in Libya were therefore inappropriate 
imitations of the West and demonstrated a failure to understand this deeper meaning.  
 
Qadhafi emphasised this theme, together with closely related ideas, on many occasions. 
For example, in an address to the General People’s Conference on 8 October 1992, he 
maintained that if society did indeed need associations, then they should exist only as 
charitable institutions serving widows, orphans, the blind, disabled, etc. He argued that 
associations provided a social umbrella for people who were disadvantaged, and that they 
substituted political shortcomings, serving as a lobby to influence elections. He claimed 
that all Libyan people belonged to tribes and families which met their social needs, and 
also to Conferences where they could voice their opinions about any domestic or 
international issue which concerned them. Thus, Libyan society did not require civil 
associations. 
 
This has some resonance with Ibrahim's argument (1995) that in the West, the processes 
of capitalisation, industrialisation, urbanisation and citizenship are all connected. Both 
Ibrahim and Qadhafi start from the same perspective, but their conclusions are divergent. 
While Qadhafi argued that civil society is a Western construct which some Arab people 
have borrowed, Ibrahim argues that the Western values relating to urbanisation, 
citizenship, modernity and democracy must be promoted. Ibrahim further argues that civil 
society is a precondition for democracy, and ''the linkage between civil society and 
democratisation should be obvious.''  
 
Paradoxically, in another session of the General People’s Conference (1 September 
2001), Qadhafi emphasised the importance of civil associations because they employed a 
significant number of people in a ‘third sector’, providing social services, as exemplified 
in the United States of America (USA) and Europe. He called for the initiation of planning 
by the Basic People’s Conferences in order to establish such a third sector, promoting this 
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view as a step toward settlement with the West. Together, these speeches reflect his 
narrow understanding of civil society and demonstrate great inconsistency.  
 
5.3.2.4 Law No. 19 of 2001 on the Reorganisation of Civil Associations 
This law, combined with Qadhafi’s newly-stated views on civil society, reflected ideas 
not far from a Western perspective. It could be argued that it was a law based purely on 
international pressure to 'reform' and that this generates associations without real purpose 
which are unlikely to establish a strong and effective legal framework to meet their needs. 
The Law Committee of the People's Conferences drafted the law, regulating already-
existing associations and opening the door to the establishment of new organisations. 
 
With growing international pressure, and to keep in step with globalisation, the General 
People's Conferences thus issued Law No. 19 of 2001. This law replaced the previous 
Law No. 111 of 1970 and reorganised NGOs. It consisted of 51 articles in six chapters 
which covered the issues indicated below. 
Chapter I contained 19 articles dealing with general requirements, 
including: 
Article 1: Definition of the Association and its internal order. An 
association is ''Any group of people seeking to provide social, cultural, 
sporting, charitable and humanitarian activities. These associations can 
serve the whole country or specific regions and are non profit-seeking.”  
Article 2: Procedure to be followed to approve the establishment of an 
association. 
Article 3: Accounts and records of the association, including registration 
of sources of funding. 
Article 11: Annual budget 
Article 12: Bank details 
Article 14: Status of forbidden activities. 
Article 15: Donation regulations 
Article 16: Branches of the Association. 
Article 17: The right to form sub-confederations of similar activities. 
Chapters II and III dealt with the management of associations, such as 
the nature and organisation of meetings, including how decisions are 
made, and the management of the daily work of the Association. Article 
26 of Chapter II states that ‘Any association must have a Board of 
Directors of five members and be elected by a General Assembly of the 
Association’. 
Chapter IV dealt with the supervision of the Association, its relationship 
to the judiciary, the justification of and the procedure for dissolving the 
association, integration with other associations, and the rationale for 
integration. 
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Chapter V dealt with sanctions applicable when associations break the 
law, eg, obtaining funding from outside of Libya, or making profit from 
their activities. 
Chapter VI dealt with final requirements, including transitional 
exemptions such as for tax. 
 
This legislation shows a lack of confidence in NGOs in general and a deep mistrust of 
their agendas. 
 
The differences between this and the former law (Law No. 111 of 1970) are insignificant 
and only a few differences can be identified. Law No.19 replaced the Board of Directors 
of Law No. 111 by a People's Committee of the Qadhafi foundation and adopted the 
Conference of the Association instead of a General Assembly. Law No. 19 assigns 
oversight of the Associations to either the Secretariat of the People's General Conference 
(Parliament) or the General People's Committee (Cabinet), whereas the previous law 
assigned oversight to the General People's Committee for Social Affairs. This was a 
legitimate change, as it is not valid for an overseeing body to have no legal prerogative to 
grant licenses. At State level, the appropriate authority was the General People's 
Committee, and at local level, the Secretary of the People's Committee. 
 
As in many legal systems, under Law 111 the government had to respond to applications 
within a specified period (often sixty days); not to do so was interpreted as acceptance. 
Law No. 19 does not require the government to respond. 
 
This shows that little progress was made toward the establishment of a civil society in 
Libya under Qadhafi: State domination is retained. 
 
5.3.2.5 Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi Seeks to Issue a New Law 
Because of the failings in Law No.19 of 2001, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Chairman of the 
Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation, proposed a law consisting 
of 26 Articles, and launched a campaign among civil society associations and the media 
to discuss it. He expected this to lead to changes in the status of civil society. I will briefly 
highlight some contradictions in this objective. 
 
Most importantly, Saif al-Islam draft law did not actively promote the idea of civil 
society. For example, Article 2 of the draft Law relates to the objectives of NGOs but 
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insisted that the State continues to play the main role in shaping them. This did not 
constitute a significant change to Law No. 19 where the State controls and dominates 
these organisations. 
 
Article 15 of the draft Law prevents associations from running business activities for 
commercial purposes, but it also allows large-scale investment activities for profit. Since 
both types of activity commercial and investment result in profit-making to finance the 
organisation’s activities, this draft article lacked consistency in outlining the types of 
activity which are permissible.  
 
Article 24 of the draft law permits the establishment of relations with organisations or 
clubs outside of Libya. However the organisations are not permitted to receive funding 
from them.  
 
Article 25 of the draft law guarantees that such organisations be eligible for self-
governance. There are four criteria needed for such independence: transparency, allowing 
people and state accessibility to these associations, subscription, the complaint 
mechanism of submission, and evaluation. Yet the existence of such criteria means that 
information is provided to both public and official authorities, which leads to another 
form of domination and control. Since civil society organisations would be guaranteed 
their independence, it is inconsistent that they be required to submit reports to official 
bodies, such as unspecified security agencies. 
 
Article 14 of the draft law sets out the requirements and necessary commitments of those 
who join civil society organisations. It also sets out how these accord with the 
Constitution when, in fact, Libya had no constitution. This Article also seems contrary to 
Article 4 of the same draft which gave the right of membership without regard to religion, 
ethnicity or doctrine. 
 
The proposed law explicitly sought to redress the inadequacies of the current law, and to 
create an adequate environment for the establishment of civil society. The proposed law 
used the term “civil society organisations'' unlike the existing law which used the term 
“al-`Ahli Associations”. This change may have reflected Saif al Islam awareness and the 
need to meet standards required of social actors and the responsibility for promoting civil 
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society. The draft also provided that a civil association should be organised and operate 
primarily in line with international requirements, such as transparency, participation, 
respect for freedom of speech, democracy in decision-making, and equality of 
opportunity regardless of gender, religion, ethnicity or nationality. 
 
The proposed law envisaged a reduction in the number of founder members from fifty to 
twenty, it emphasised the accountability of Boards of Directors, which would consist of 
at least five members, re-elected on a four-yearly basis, and allowed for the evaluation of 
their activities. It provided for an Executive Council instead of the General People’s 
Committee as the body with responsibility for permitting formation of associations and 
allowed for a right of complaint if the Council failed to reply within sixty days. The draft 
law assured the independence of civil society from the State. However, the law was not 
enacted.  
 
5.4 General Requirements for Civil Society Associations to be Recognised as 
Organisations in Law 
This section covers the core principals of international law regarding NGOs and examines 
how these principals apply in the context of Libyan law. It then discusses the main 
findings of the first round of fieldwork conducted for this study in April 2010.  
 
Salamon and Anheier conducted a project under the auspices of Johns Hopkins 
University, which with regard to the core principals, established a framework and 
identified three legal requirements which must be met by organisations in order for them 
to constitute proper NGOs.11 They divided them into main issues and sub-issues, each of 
these requirements will be discussed below. 
 
5.4.1 Requirements of Organisational Eligibility 
5.4.1.1 Background: Requirements on the Legal Status of Organisations 
Legal recognition by the law as a non-governmental body means that the organisation has 
a legal ‘personality’. It must also have an institutional presence and be administered by a 
group of people. The number of people in this group must be sufficient to allow the 
                                                 
11Working paper of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project: The Nonprofit Sector: For 
what and for whom. Nonprofit Law: Ten Issues in Search of Resolution (1996) 
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establishment of the organisation or group of organisations. As Salamon and Flaherty 
state: ''In other words, some act must be undertaken that transforms the group of 
individuals into a formally constituted organisation distinct from those individuals'' 
(2000:5). 
 
Business Dictionary defines the legal personality as an:  
...entity (such as a firm) other than a natural person (human being) created 
by law and recognised as a legal entity having distinct identity, legal 
personality, and duties and rights. Also called juridical entity, or legal 
person. (Business Directory, accessed 26 February 2012). 
 
The term ‘legal person’ is sometimes referred to as a ‘juristic person’ or body wherein an 
entity is regarded by law to be like a person with such status being granted legal rights to 
protection and/or privileges under law. 
 
5.4.1.2 The Libyan Case 
According to Libyan law, in order to formally register an organisation it must have a 
building for the exercise of its activities, and a statute signed by the founding members. 
The minimum number of founders must be not less than fifty (Law No. 19, Article 2, 
2001). This requirement for such a large number of founding members does not fit with 
the current global trend amongst non-governmental organisations to reduce the number 
of founders. 
 
5.4.1.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
As a result of the numerical requirement, many NGOs are compelled to make up the 
number of fifty, without care or concern for the motives of the people with respect to the 
work of the association. For this reason, many of those who work in or lead associations 
believe that this condition should be changed and be made more flexible. 
 
5.4.2 The Requirements of Purpose 
5.4.2.1 Background 
These requirements are related to the definition of purposes of non-profit organisations. 
Under the English Charities Act of 2006, there is no determination of purposes. However, 
the Act makes a distinction between charitable and non-charitable purposes in pursuing 
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common goals. Under the criterion of public benefit, an organisation can be considered 
an NGO only if it benefits the whole community or an appreciable section of it. 
 
The Act contains guidance as to the meaning of 'charity' - Act 2006, Chapter 50, Part 1 - 
and lists a number of charitable purposes, including the following:  
The prevention or relief of poverty, the advancement of education, 
religion, health or the saving of lives, citizenship or community 
development, the arts, culture, heritage, science, amateur sport, human 
rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation, or the promotion of religious 
or racial harmony or equality and diversity, environmental protection or 
improvement, the relief of those in need by reason of youth, age, ill-
heath, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage, the promotion 
of efficiency of the armed forces of the Crown, or of the efficiency of 
police, fire and rescue services or ambulance services and animal 
welfare(part 1-p.2).  
 
Under Indian law (No. 186) areas of activity include literacy, science, and charitable 
purposes. Amendments to this law have expanded to include small-scale industries, rural 
development, the development of industry and agriculture and religious purposes. The 
law also indicates that NGOs in India should adopt a broad concept of charity law to 
include not only helping poor people, but also education, health and many other public 
issues, such as civil and political rights (Kalil, 2006:60). 
 
5.4.2.2 The Libyan Case 
Libyan law also lists purposes for NGOs. Any group seeking to provide social services 
and cultural, sports, charitable, or humanitarian services can form an NGO (Law No. 19, 
Article 1, 2001). Notably this law does not mention human rights as one of these 
activities. 
 
5.4.2.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
In reality, Libyan associations include a greater variety of activities and purposes than we 
find in the law itself. For example, there are human rights associations with many 
branches. I was told that women’s rights associations are considered to be a type of 
humanitarian service. 
 
The weakness of effective advocacy associations, such as those dealing with women's 
rights reflects the lacking of awareness of women's rights. The same applies to wider 
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human rights concerns. A notable exception to this is the Qadhafi Foundation for 
Development and Charity, which dealt with difficult and complex aspects of human 
rights, such as torture in prison and compensation to the families of those who died in 
prison or under torture. 
 
In general, there is a lack of associational activity relative to population size, both in terms 
of numbers of organisations and the range of their activities. During interviews, all 
participants emphasised this, together with the need to extend every aspect of 
associational activity. However some NGOs are remarkably successful in providing 
services to meet the needs of particular groups (e.g. the disabled, blind, orphans, those 
suffering from incurable diseases etc). Furthermore, this role increased following the 
withdrawal of the State from spending on social services. Philanthropic work, acceptable 
to founders, beneficiaries and donors, is a dominant form of NGO activity in Libya. 
Interviewees commented that this was due to religious motivation which has a historical 
foundation (as discussed in Chapter Three). Some associations offer their services to 
groups such as children, the disabled and the blind, while others provide public services 
such as health, aid and cultural activities. Explaining civil work in terms of religious 
principles reflects the idea that NGOs in Libya are returning to traditional solutions 
where, rather than facing the causes of poverty and the origins of the need for charity, 
they focus on the responsibility of the rich to be generous to the poor. 
 
The majority of participants stressed that the legal and procedural constraints on civil 
work are too heavy. This contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
states that such legal procedures must be minimised. 
 
5.4.3 Requirements of Registration Procedure 
5.4.3.1 Background 
The third set of requirements relate to legal recognition of an organisation, together with 
its benefits, prerogatives and rights. In the modern world, the procedure of registration is 
simplified and not time-consuming. In the United Kingdom, associations seeking to 
benefit from tax privileges and donations find it in their interest to register as charities 
with the Charity Commission (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:10). The register contains: 
(a) The name of every charity registered in accordance with section 3A 
(which deals with registration), and 
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(b) Such other particulars of, and such other information relating to 
charity, as the Commission thinks fit (Charities act 20). 
 
In the Arab world things are more complicated. There are two systems for incorporating 
associations. One is the notification system, where a charity already exists and informs 
the State of its existence. This is also known as the declaration system and has been 
adopted by some countries such as the Lebanon. The other is the registration system, also 
known as the acknowledgment system, where permission must be sought from the State 
prior to formation. This has been adopted by the majority of Arab States including Libya. 
There are long procedures for disclosure. If the Administrative Committee considers that 
there is no need for the proposed association’s services, or if its activities contradict the 
law or public morals, then it refuses the application. The Secretariat of Justice in Libya 
can also refuse its request, and the organisation must also obtain clearance from each of 
the security apparatuses in the country. 
 
5.4.3.2 The Libyan Case 
A range of governmental bodies oversee civil society organisations and their 
responsibilities are vague. In many legal systems governments must respond to 
applications within a specified period - often sixty days - and if they fail to do so this is 
interpreted as acceptance (as was the case under Law No. 111 of 1970). The Law No 19 
does not require the government to respond to an application. 
 
5.4.3.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
As a result of this complex system, associations found great difficulty in opening new 
branches; one participant said it took him three years. Some participants complained 
about registration procedures and the number of documents required of associations. One 
participant stated: 
The system as adopted by the government does not develop associations. 
The law requires obligations for associations even before declaration 
which is itself against the law, and compared with the previous law, is 
much better. This law gives the government greater control over each 
step that stifles the civil work. (My interview with the head of al-
Jam’īyyah al-’Arabīyah li Ḥuqūq al-Insān Tripoli April 2010) 
 
Another participant regarded this law as more penal than associative in its orientation. 
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5.5 General Characteristics of Non-Governmental Organisations 
5.5.1 Requirements of Non-Profit Seeking 
5.5.1.1 Background 
One of the most important legal concepts related to NGOs is their non-profit making 
status. This is included in all legislation, including Libyan law. ‘Non-profit making’ 
means that the organisation is not primarily commercial and does not distribute any 
money made to Boards of Directors, stockholders, or managers. NGOs can generate 
profits in the course of their operations, but they must be ploughed back into the 
organisation. This serves as a proxy for the ‘public purpose’ criterion used in some 
definitions of civil society (Brody, 2006:243). 
 
The criterion differentiates between civil society organisations and commercial 
businesses. As West states: “It is commonly argued that the most important characteristic 
of the not-for-profit organization is that it is barred from distributing its net earnings, if 
there are any” (1989:1). Libyan Law No. 19 stipulated this in Article 1. Hansmann calls 
it the 'no distribution constraint' which means that the distribution of profits is prohibited 
(1980:838). Anheier argues that a correct reference would be 'non-profit-distributing' 
rather than 'non-profit-making' (2004:115). 
 
5.5.1.2 The Libyan Case 
Law No. 19 prevents associations from seeking profit. This is not only a matter of a 
particular Article of law, but also constitutes part of the definition of an NGO under the 
same law.  
 
5.5.1.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
Findings from the fieldwork contradict the law. Many associations conduct investment 
projects and I was told that the profits from these are used to cover the costs of the 
association’s activities and allow the continued successful operation of the NGOs. 
However this can be problematic for the State which may interpret this kind of activity as 
profit-making, and thus a violation of Law No 19.  
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5.5.2 Requirements Regarding Political Activities 
5.5.2.1 Background 
Salamon and Flaherty argue that the rule of law must govern the work of any NGO no 
matter where it operates. Legal restrictions should be imposed on NGOs if their activities 
can be construed as involvement in political debate (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:30). 
They also propose that these organisations must not in any way support the campaign for 
a political party or candidate. It enforces rules on NGO spending, though these rules may 
conflict with any advocacy function such as supporting public issues or involvement in 
peaceful assembly. This is the case in many countries.  
 
5.5.2.2 The Libyan Case 
The Libyan government prevents all associations from involvement in political activity. 
Article 13 of Law No.19 states that, "It is not permitted for any association to involve 
itself in any activity other than the purpose for which it was established".  
 
5.5.2.3 Findings from the fieldwork 
Many interviewees state that because the Libyan government is afraid that NGOs may 
shift from being civil organisations to political parties, and may be penetrated by foreign 
agendas or politically manipulated, they are suspicious and mistrusting of NGO activity 
generally. Because of this, the General Forum of NGOs meeting in Tripoli in 2005, which 
was organised by the General Federation of NGOs, issued a ‘National Charter for the 
work of al-Ahli’ as a guarantee to the State that they would not violate the political 
system, would not have hidden agendas, would work within the law, and would support 
the People’s Authority.  
 
For instance, the sixth article of the Charter pledges non-participation in political 
activities, stating that: 
Civil associations work independently to achieve the objectives 
established for them without political or ideological, partisan or 
sectarian, or regional expediency that is contrary to the Authority of the 
People, and any attempt at infraction of this system is considered a 
violation of this charter. 
 
While the issuance of the National Charter is explicitly non-political and concurs with 
associations’ pronouncements that their work is only charitable, the same Charter in more 
than one Article (Articles 5, 8, 9, 10, 12 and 13) supports the political ideology of the 
127 
 
state. Moreover, it considers these associations as an integral part of the political system 
a form of ‘direct democracy’. Furthermore, it declares that organisations will organise 
their structures and management using the same model as the Authority of the People. 
There is therefore a paradox at the heart of the Charter.  
 
5.5.3 Requirements of Self- Government 
5.5.3.1 Background 
One of the key features of civil society organisations is autonomy. This means being self-
governed, which is one of the main indicators of the relationship between the State and 
NGOs. This term is associated with good governance, a concept which has become 
widespread especially since 1997 when the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) adopted it as part of management reform. The UNDP aimed to recognise the 
contribution of organisations outside the government in facing the challenges of social 
development. It is worth recalling that the term had previously been used, by the World 
Bank in 1985, as a mechanism of reform and to establish partnership between various 
actors. Thus it is important to consider the question of what is meant by 'good governance' 
and what it consists of. 
 
Carter and Man (2003) define ‘governance’ as “[…] the processes and structures that an 
organisation uses to direct and manage its general operations and programme activities.’ 
By extension, ‘good’ governance means this governance is ‘good’ in two ways: firstly, 
by achieving, or working towards achieving, desired results; and secondly, by achieving 
them in an ethically or morally sound way, especially one which is consistent with values 
such as democracy or social justice. Governance comprises the “… structures, functions 
(responsibilities), processes (practices) and organisational traditions that the board of an 
organisation uses to ensure accomplishment of the organisational mission”.  
 
According to Carter and Man the key factor in the achievement of good governance is the 
exercise of due diligence by directors who recognise and act within the statutes, 
regulations and policies under which the organisation operates. Firstly, directors must 
draw up and implement a mission statement which complies with the law, and carry out 
a periodic review to ensure this continues. Secondly, directors are responsible for 
communicating effectively with members, stakeholders and the public, including using 
minuted meetings and a code of ethics. Thirdly, directors should build up a documented 
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structure with proper legal procedures. Fourthly, directors must develop a Board 
governance strategy with a code of conduct, a conflict of interest policy and continuing 
education of Board members. Fifthly, they must establish and maintain a budget, 
including proper accounting and auditing. Sixthly, they must ensure an effective 
management, including that of volunteers. Seventhly, they must establish internal 
regulation and policies, with periodic review. Finally they must appoint new Directors 
with diverse abilities which are useful to the organisation, and provide orientation, 
training and monitoring. 
 
Carter and Man (3003) believe that the importance of good governance requires more 
care in the third sector than in the private sector. They say that 'in the for-profit sector, 
corporations are primarily accountable to their shareholders for the ability of the 
corporation to return a profit. In the not-for-profit and charitable sector, however, 
organisations are accountable to their members as well as to the general public.’  
 
In practice, a literature review reveals that there is significant ambiguity in the use of this 
term due to its multiplicity, diversity and remarkably widespread use, particularly in Arab 
literature.  
 
Salamon and Flaherty argue that a strong case can be made for matters of internal 
governance to be left wholly to the non-profit organisations themselves (Salamon and 
Flaherty, 2000:12). He identifies three reasons for this:  
1. In the meaning of the law, the status of non-profit organisations is 
"legal person". 
2. As a consequence of being non- profit organisations, these 
organisations often enjoy privileges related to their public character 
tax and some other privileges. 
3. To preserve their voluntary character, non-profit organisations must 
have internal governance. 
 
According to Salmon and Flaherty (2000) the law should establish a broad spectrum of 
requirements such as defining the role of directors and Board membership, emphasising 
the major aspect of these organisations and procedures, and then leaving the details of 
how and when operations should be done to the internal governors. This offers flexibility 
for organisations to form their own internal management. Plans and aims should be 
consistent with the law and public order. However, it can be argued that public order, 
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public morality, national security and public safety are relative concepts, and that they 
change and develop according to time and place. These are ‘elastic’ ideas which narrow 
or expand depending on society and its level of development. 
 
Some scholars wonder to what extent organisations must be autonomous in order to be 
‘authentic’. In a study about China, Yijiang (Karina) Qian (June 2010) writes that, ‘… 
research suggests that one must use a tailored approach to deal with the autonomy 
question in China, originating in China and sensitive to the unique nuances of CSOs’ 
‘Civil Society Associations] social and political environment’ (p.10). 
 
5.5.3.2 The Libyan Case 
Law No. 19 of 2001 did not address this matter. 
 
5.5.3.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
Although those questioned were already workers in grassroots organisations, their 
answers reflect a lack of awareness and understanding of civic or Ahli work in general. 
When asked about their relationship to the State, they are clear that they are opposed to 
being restricted by the State, but work within the framework of law and permitted 
activities and in accordance with the People's Authority. 
The associations have suffered from a lack of skills and training necessary to increase 
their capacity and improve their performance. Though many insist on their freedom from 
State interference, their answers reveal that this was far from a genuine response. This 
explains the consensus among respondents on the need to change the law governing 
associations. 
 
5.5.4 Requirement of Business Activity 
5.5.4.1 Background 
Because NGOs are non-profit organisations, the question is not whether they are entitled 
to engage in business activities, but a matter of how this activity serves the purpose of the 
association in achieving its goals. Salamon and Flaherty distinguished between two types 
of business activities, calling them 'related’ business and ‘unrelated’ business (2000:26). 
‘Related’ business is closely related to the purposes of an organisation, for example where 
a non-profit making school charges some users for lessons. An 'unrelated' business is one 
not closely related to fulfilment of the purposes of a non-profit organisation, or perhaps 
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not related at all, for example where the school opens a restaurant (Salamon and Flaherty, 
2000:27).  
 
In international law, there are two approaches to dealing with the business activity of 
NGOs. The first focuses on the source of income - whether it derives from related or 
unrelated businesses. For example, in American law related incomes are dealt with under 
the same beneficial tax regulation (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:28). The second approach 
focuses on the 'ultimate destination' of the income (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:27) – i.e. 
whether it is used for NGOs’ purposes or not. Most national laws, for example Australian 
and UK law, employ this approach. When a government exempts business activity from 
taxation, the main issue is the destination of the income. 
 
5.5.4.2 The Libyan Case 
Libyan law prevents NGO business activity because it seeks to maximise profits and these 
associations, by definition, are non-profit-making organisations.  
 
5.5.4.3 Findings from the Fieldwork. 
Results from the fieldwork show that, in fact, many associations are running their own 
business activities. One example is the al-Nour Association for the Blind in Tripoli where 
the NGO invests in rental buildings in a shopping centre. According to the leaders of this 
organisation - the Secretary of the General Federation of Associations - this investment 
only became a problem for the local authority because the latter wanted to expropriate the 
property for its own benefit using the pretext that this investment was contrary to the law. 
The case went to Court. Another example is the Association of Youth Welfare, which 
runs training courses in computing and English language for young people as a part of 
the preparation for future leaders. Yet there is no data available to show what income, if 
any, is generated from such business activities.  
 
5.5.5 Requirements of Personal Benefit Restrictions 
5.5.5.1 Background 
With their voluntary and public service ethos, the distinguishing characteristic of NGOs 
is their not-for-profit orientation and restrictions on personal benefit. Any income from 
business activities or the sale of goods and services must not go to members but to benefit 
the public, or put back into the activities of the organisations themselves. Some scholars 
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state that any profit must be used to advance the purposes for which the organisation was 
created (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:23). Elsewhere, some laws states that it is sufficient 
for profits to benefit public rather than private interest for example the Australian law 
(Khalīl, 2006:77). Salamon and Flaherty say this is necessary ‘… in order to maintain 
public confidence in, and support for, the non-profit sector’ (2000:23). For example, the 
English Charities Act deals with this as follows: (b) '… prohibiting the charity trustees or 
trustees for the charity receiving any personal benefit out of the funds of the charity. 'This 
avoids ‘conflict of interest’ where Board members are prohibited from taking advantage 
of their position in NGOs in order to benefit their own business. This prohibition is 
necessary in order to avoid corruption, and is one of the main pillars of good governance. 
 
Anheier (2007:234-235) argues that there is '… loss of public confidence in the 
organization resulting from conflict of interest situations.' He provides suggestions for 
helping NGOs prevent self-harm through conflicts of interest. These require the adoption 
of specific policies taking account of: 
- Limitations on business transactions with Board members and the 
requirement that Board members disclose potential conflicts; 
- Disclosure of conflicts when they occur so that Board members who 
are voting on a decision are aware that another member's interests are 
being affected;  
- Requesting Board members to withdraw from decisions involving 
any potential conflict; 
- Establishing procedures (competitive bids, asking external agencies 
to carry out contracting, etc.) to ensure fair value in transactions.  
 
Some suggest that a Board can avoid this conflict by establishing a clear policy on conflict 
of interest applying to both Board members and management staff. He adds that “many 
NGOs require Board members to commit in writing that they do not have any conflict of 
interest arising from their membership of the Board'' (Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, 2002).  
 
A Code of Conduct for Arab Civil Society Organisations prepared by the Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation with its Arab partners in Beirut in June 2008 (2008:9), states that 
conflict of interest is relevant when a person or group is in a powerful position or holds 
high status in an organisation which authorises him [sic] to use his position to promote 
personal, familial, partisan interests or those of other organisations which he has relations 
with. To prevent this occurring, the Code states: 
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- Procedures should be implemented (by the staff and Boards) with full 
transparency. 
- All Board members should declare all financial or personal interests 
when discussing any related issue. They should withdraw from any 
decision-making process where these interests are involved. 
- Board members shall not work for the institution in return for a salary 
during their term. 
- The Board shall not have members with first or second degree kinship 
relations. 
- No privileges shall be obtained in services as a result of Board 
membership. This includes research, training and paid consultation.  
 
5.5.5.2 The Libyan Case 
Article IV of Act 19 of 2001 states that ‘… it is not permitted in the internal regulation of 
the association that moveable and immoveable funds and assets are provided to members 
or to their heirs or their families when the association has been dissolved.’ Article V states 
that ‘… the member withdrawing or dismissed from an association has no right to money 
and assets moveable and immoveable.’ This is also the subject of Article 26 which states 
that ‘… it is prohibited for the member of an Association's Conference to attend any 
meeting that discusses matters where that member has any personal interests, or when 
kinship relationships of the first until fourth degree are involved.' In addition, Law No. 
19, by definition, does not regard civil associations as entities seeking profit. 
 
5.5.5.3 Findings from the Fieldwork 
This is a true challenge for these associations. Many seek to benefit from tax privileges 
for personal business. This is widely suspected to be the case (by the state and the donors 
too). In one of the most successful associations which supports many families, for 
example, the Chief Executive is running his own business under the name of the 
association and thinks that this is acceptable because he tries to help the beneficiaries, and 
claims that his business is not affecting their interests. However, the reality is that in these 
cases there is often a detrimental affect on the support provided to the people for whom 
the Association was established.  
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5.5.6 Requirements of Tax Treatment 
5.5.6.1 Background 
Beneficial tax treatment is a great advantage for NGOs, as indeed for all organisations 
everywhere. In the USA NGOs are helped greatly by exemption from taxes (Salamon and 
Flaherty, 2000:16). Regarding the question of why NGOs should be offered the support 
of beneficial tax status, Salamon and Flaherty 2000:16 give two reasons. Firstly,  
[B]ecause they perform functions that are supportive of central values 
that a government wishes to encourage, or at least avoid discouraging. 
For example, it is often said that non-profit organisations foster 
democracy, voluntarism and pluralism and that these are values that 
should be promoted through a supportive tax policy.  
 
Secondly, because NGOs relieve the government of burdens, providing 'collective goods' 
which meet societal needs in fields such as health, education, care for the disadvantaged 
and culture. One way to encourage such activity and further reduce the burden of 
government is to provide tax advantages.  
 
Brown and Korten (1989:3) state that:  
Tax exemptions provide non-profit organisations with a competitive 
advantage in market situations and this advantage in itself motivates their 
formation. Government are often understandably concerned that many 
non-profit [organizations] are nothing more than commercial enterprises 
that use the legal form of the non-profit [organisation] to avoid the tax 
collector. 
 
According to USA law, to receive tax-exempt status, organisations must be operated 
exclusively for one or more of the following purposes: charity, religion, education, 
science, the arts, public safety, sports and the prevention of cruelty to children or animals 
(Welytok 2007:13). 
 
The criteria on which tax subsidies are based varies from country to country. In England, 
it is public benefit; in the USA it is mutual benefit (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:.17-18). 
In the USA, almost all types of NGO are exempted from income tax, while, in the UK 
many special taxes and other advantages are only available to persons or organisations 
which serve exclusively charitable purposes.  
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5.5.6.2 The Libyan Case 
Libyan law also exempts NGOs from taxation. This has led to some private businesses 
using them, even in areas such as the importation of goods. In some cases imaginary 
associations have been created specifically for this purpose. This has been pointed out by 
many, including the head of the Association Unit in the Social Affairs Ministry. 
 
5.5.6.3 Findings from the Fieldwork. 
During interviews, it was commonly agreed that many associations exist exclusively to 
benefit from the tax advantages accorded to non-profit-making organisations. In my 
interview with the coordinator of associations in Misurata, he emphasised that this was 
the reason for the emergence of most associations. This is consistent with the perspective 
of Brown and Korten, 1989. In fact, many participants agreed that NGOs are ‘commercial 
entities’ under a non-profit title.  
 
5.6 Administrative Organisation 
5.6.1 Background 
NGOs are an important part of the economy which makes their administration an 
important topic for study. In the USA, there are more than one million non-profit 
organisations. They employ more than 10 percent of the workforce and account for 6 
percent of Gross National Product (Hallock, 2001:1). Seen from this perspective, NGOs 
should attract the same attention as firms in the private sector. It is also important for 
attention to be paid to management theory in the NGO sector and to legislation 
surrounding it. Many writers (Hallok and Van Horn and Wedig, 2002) note a lack of 
studies in this area. Anheier (2007) claims there have been significant changes in NGO 
organisational environments, and the recognition they receive. However, these factors 
have not attracted a corresponding amount of study of non-specific NGO management 
approaches. According to Anheier the debate is limited to whether NGO management is 
a variation of private or public sector management. There is clearly a need for a specific 
paradigm. 
 
Anheier (2007: 243) accepts that any NGO administration model requires firstly, a degree 
of distinctiveness from the private sector, and secondly, the need for rules separating 
political and managerial decision-making to establish and preserve a buffer between 
politics and service provision. He claims (2007: 244) that the lack of clear separation 
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between NGO management on the one hand and private and public management on the 
other, has until now disallowed the development of comprehensive management models 
for NGOs and wonders whether there could be a third option with aspects of management 
which relate only to this sector. 
 
Although this thesis drew a distinction between the public, private and civil society 
spheres in Chapter Two, it seems that aspects of NGO management fall into an area of 
overlap. Administrative matters play a central role. Anheier (2004 244-245) states that 
NGO management ‘is the process of planning, organising, and controlling activities to 
accomplish the stated organisational objectives of organisations and their members.’ He 
states that NGO management consists of eight activities: planning, controlling, 
monitoring, supervising, coordinating, marketing, external relations and consulting with 
professionals.  
 
Hudson (2002: xvii) agrees that there is confusion as to whether third sector management 
is different to public and private sector management. He points out that ‘[…] until the 
middle of the 1970s, management was not a word many people used when talking about 
third sector organisations. It is seen to be part of the culture of business and was not felt 
to be appropriate in third sector organisation.’ 
 
The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region argues that '… one of the most vital roles 
of the NGO’s Board is the appointment, training and evaluation of its members, both 
individually and as a group.' Harris and Rochester (1996:31) point out that '… in British 
Charity law the key duty of the Board is to ensure that the organisation pursues the aims 
for which it was established.’ Ideal Board members, they state: 
- are carefully chosen for the skills and connections they can offer 
- play an active part in long-range strategic planning  
- actively promote the agency in the community and open doors to 
possible funding sources 
- prepare for meeting by reading the material sent to them beforehand, 
and 
- review financial statements carefully, asking questions if there is 
anything they do not understand (Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, 2002). 
 
The Code of Conduct for Arab Civil Society Organisations (2008) lists the following 
descriptors of good administration: 
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- to enhance the principle of participatory management in order to 
develop a sense of ownership among employees and beneficiaries  
- to encourage the emergence of new leadership and the development 
of the capacities of the existing one 
- to allow the staff of NGOs to participate in the strategic planning 
process 
- to clarify means of communications between governing bodies and 
employees  
- to critically review the institution culture and its procedural methods 
in order to encourage self-responsibility, renewal, and respect for 
pluralism 
- to establish clear performance standards as part of follow-up and 
assessment methods  
- to encourage democracy by participation 
- to encourage the spirit of initiative-taking  
- to create a Code of Conduct for employees 
- to create policies related to employees and volunteers which are set 
out in writing and within the existing laws.  
 
 
5.6.2 The Libyan Case 
Law No. 19 of 2001 regulates the administration of associations using the same form and 
substance as the political system where the People’s Conferences correspond to the 
‘assembly’ in Western organisations, and the People's Committee of the association to 
the Board of Directors Trustees of Western organisations. Management is selected by the 
General Conference choosing the members of the General People's Committee. Libyan 
law does not therefore appear to contain what Anheier (2007) calls a ‘buffer’ between the 
political system and service provision, and there is a confusion of roles. The question 
arises as to how we can explain the gap between theory and reality. 
 
5.6.3 Findings from the Fieldwork. 
There are more men than women on the People's Committees and there are almost no 
women interested in women’s issues. In the sample only one assembly (in Benghazi) was 
led by women. There is, therefore a considerable gender gap.  
 
This can be explained by the interaction of two factors. Firstly it is linked to the status of 
women in Arab society. Despite progress in the status and roles of women and their entry 
into the public domain in all disciplines including the military, the prevailing social 
culture is still based on divided gender roles. Secondly it relates to the nature of civil 
society itself in both present and historical forms. At present, the weakness of these 
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Associations and their inability to attract diverse membership has led to their inability to 
achieve goals related to women’s issues, as women feel unable to express their needs. 
Historically civil society has been linked to the public sphere, which has been historically 
linked to organisations, trade unions and parties, which are run by men. 
 
Associations as part of civil society are generally seen as organisations which enhance 
democratic participation, which is reflected in: 
- the way in which the Board is chosen  
- the number of meetings convened by the General Assembly and how 
decisions are made (Shoukr,2004). 
 
By these measures, Libyan associations have not developed democratic participation. The 
General Conference chooses (or selects) the members of the General People's Committee. 
According to interviewees, meetings are held regularly, but this does not mean the 
meetings are accountable. 
 
5.7 Fund-Raising 
5.7.1 Background 
Funding is central to civil action at all levels, from the establishment of the organisation 
to its life and activity. Without financial resources, NGOs can not pay employees or 
expenses, nor provide, fund or maintain projects and services. In short, funding is 
necessary in order to achieve objectives. NGO funding is linked to the State, both at the 
level of support and in the development of laws that govern NGO operation. In the last 
20 years corporate fundraising for charities has been established as an essential facet of 
strategic planning (Elischer,T. ‘Sources of funding of NGOs’, Journal of Non-profit and 
Voluntary Sector Marketing Vol. 1, No. 1, p.63). 
 
NGO funding sources are of three types: 
1. Donations and profits: Funding from members' contributions, the sale of 
products, services offered by the organisation, unconditional contributions and 
donations from non-members, and campaigns organised to raise finance. 
 
2. Government sources: Subsidies granted by the government according to the 
rules of each country. These include government projects or the government 
giving the responsibility for implementation of projects it has created, to 
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organisations. The government may also support organisations by paying 
wages and experts (al-Baz, 1997:163). Anheier emphasises that government 
funds still play an important role in the financial stability of non-profit 
organisations (2004:291). Ulrich Vogt (1999:99) states that ‘Nowadays, 
perhaps around 10% of the government budget for development cooperation in 
EU member countries is granted to NGOs.' 
 
3- Foreign sources of funding: This is often the most important source of funding 
for organisations in the Third World, where profits, donations and government 
funding are deficient. These sources become more attractive with growing 
global interest in the role played by NGOs outside the traditional framework of 
charity (al-Baz, 1997 and Kalil, 2006). With attention focused on the economic, 
political and cultural development of countries in the South, the North has 
begun financing new projects and activities, either directly or through financial 
aid for NGOs. Accordingly, the amount of funds that have been devoted to 
NGOs increased from $1 billion in 1970 to $7.2 billion in 1990 (al-Baz, 
1997:162). The majority of the £150 million aid in the USA Democracy 
Promotion Programme for the Middle East from 1991 to 2001 went to projects 
classified as ‘civil society strengthening' (Hawthorne, p26). These projects 
were targeted almost exclusively toward service and pro-democracy NGOs 
(Hawthorne, p.15). NGOs have become key players in development and 
agencies have increasingly become oriented toward them.  
 
On these grounds, it is difficult to be sure of the independence of NGO activities. Fouad, 
Ref'at and Murcos (2005:177) explain that there are two points of view on this. The first 
argues against foreign funding and is suspicious of all activities which receive foreign 
support, especially those related to human rights, as they are accused of undermining 
national unity. The second supports foreign funding, refusing to evaluate the NGO 
activity solely on the basis of financial aspects, regardless of whether the finances are 
local or international. They propose criteria which relate only to the objectives and core 
of the activities and the priorities of the national agenda.  
 
The problematic nature of the funding issue led to the drawing up of the Code of Conduct 
for Arab Civil Society Organisations. This stipulates the following requirements:  
139 
 
To ensure that programmes developed respond to the needs of the society 
and [are] not restricted to the directives of donors. To ensure that these 
programmes do not have a negative impact on the local communities, are 
sustainable and economically feasible. 
 
5.7.2 The Libyan Case 
In Article 11 of Law No. 19 of 2001, each association’s annual budget is deemed to 
consist of members’ contributions, dividend activity, investments, and unconditional 
donations. The budget must be presented to members at the annual conference, at least 
two weeks prior to the conference for ratification, along with final accounts, reports of 
the General People's Committee, and reports from the Auditor-General. 
 
Article 15 (Law 19 of 2001) states that:  
The Associations are not allowed to raise funds in any way except for the 
purposes they are aiming at/working towards and only after obtaining 
permission from the General People's Committee or the People's 
Committee of the Municipality, depending on the case. Also any 
amendments to the purpose of fund raising or to the arrangements or the 
ways in which these are spent cannot be made without the approval of 
the Authority that had granted permission to collect donations. These 
authorities should verify/ check the source of the donations and how they 
are obtained and spend.  
 
Libyan law strictly prohibits campaigns by the association to collect donations and grants, 
possibly due to fear that they will be exploited for personal business purposes. 
 
5.7.3 Findings from Fieldwork. 
In Libya the private business sector does not significantly contribute to the funding of 
these associations as happens in developed countries. This may be because developed 
countries have reached a higher level of structure and finance, with clear rules and 
stability. When asked about the role of the private sector as a funder of such associations, 
interviewees answered that it depends on its personal relationships with businessmen 
whether they trust the association and whether they are members of it. However, this 
relationship differs with the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation 
(GICDF). In developed countries, the private sector appears to have formed a sense of 
social responsibility which is not shared in less developed countries. However, since the 
private sector enjoys many economic benefits, it could be argued that it should play a 
significant role in funding NGOs, particularly following the opening-up of Libya and the 
negative impact change has had on some groups in Libyan society.  
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The researcher previously thought that the State provided significant funding to NGOs. 
However, research showed that this funding is limited to the payment of the salaries of 
the staff of these associations. At the same time, the law prevents them from campaigning 
to collect donations. There are exceptions to this rule, one being the GICDF which 
receives huge governmental funding (To be explained further in Chapter Seven). 
Comparable foreign statistics show that in France the State contributes 59% of NGO 
funding, and in Germany, 68% (al-Baz, 1997: 165). There is consensus amongst 
respondents on the need to change the law regulating NGOs as it is highly restrictive and 
permits little free movement. Associations were not supposed to accept funding sources 
which they believed to be unreliable or unsafe. Despite this, a few associations are headed 
by figures close to government, who gain unconditional and unlimited support from the 
State and, as a matter of courtesy, also from the private sector. They can in practice link 
with foreign agencies. Examples are the GICDF and the Waatasemu Charity Association, 
which is headed by Aisha Qadhafi. 
 
Findings from the fieldwork demonstrate the inability of Libyan NGOs to mobilise funds. 
The only exceptions are the GICDF, Anwar Charity Association in Misurata and the al-
Nour for Blind Association in Tripoli. Human Rights associations are rare, and there is 
little support for them, largely because of the widespread belief that their development 
conflicts with the State ideology, especially in a culture of non-participation amongst 
citizens. This is why zakāt and ṣadaqah funds are allocated mostly to the building of 
mosques and not to NGOs. Membership fees are very low (only 12 Libyan dinars = £6 
per year), and most respondents said that members do not pay their contributions anyway.  
 
Most participants attribute NGO activity to long-held religious motives encouraging good 
works and the helping of others, especially the needy. In my view this approach to civil 
work from the religious standpoint has led to the promotion of such work being limited 
to charity. Libyan NGOs attract contributions mainly by seeking to emotionally influence 
potential donors, not on the basis of a clear, long-term policy to attract funding for 
projects.  
 
Finally, some scholars emphasise that laws must add clear enforcement mechanisms 
(Salamon and Flaherty, 2000: 29). This researcher agrees that it is not sufficient to simply 
impose rules without demonstrating their application, as has happened in Libya. 
141 
 
 
5.8 Critical Issues 
Transparency and accountability are considered to be basic elements of civic culture, 
especially in building civil institutions. 
 
5.8.1 Background 
Accountability and transparency are central to the relationship between State law and 
NGO administration. Together they enable the NGO to demonstrate to the State that it is 
compliant with regulations and provides a mechanism for the evaluation of their 
functioning. This is an important focus in the light of the rapid increase in the number of 
NGOs, their growing public role, and their shift from purely charitable activities to 
becoming the developers and providers of essential public services. 
 
Transparency and accountability are useful to help to avoid wasting scarce resources and 
promote consolidation in parts of the sector' so that NGOs can learn from each other's 
mistakes’ so that money is ‘used with the utmost care to ensure that it will make a real 
difference. Overall, transparency and accountability measure how NGOs fulfil their 
objectives, and how they spend donor’s money. One way to develop and extend this sector 
and its capacity is to adopt some features from the private sector. (Walecki, 2007) 
 
Transparency and accountability are among the eight characteristics of good governance 
in the UN framework of requirements for NGOs (see above). They will be further 
investigated below. 
 
5.8.1.1 Transparency 
The emphasis on transparency is increasing in large part because of globalisation. As the 
world becomes more closely integrated and many international and national organisations 
pay global norms closer attention, it has become a key factor of credibility. The United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) defines 
transparency as follows:  
…decisions [are] taken and their enforcement [is] done in a manner that 
follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely 
available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such 
decisions and their enforcement. It also means that enough information 
is provided and that it is provided in easily understandable forms and 
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media. (UNESCAP, Macroeconomic Policy and Analysis, Poverty and 
Development Division, What is Good Governance? p.2, 2012) 
 
The key elements of rules, information and accessibility make transparency the opposite 
of secrecy in many fields such as politics and science, ethics and business, management, 
law, economics, sociology, etc. To be transparent, actions and activity must be open and 
clear. Florini (1999:2) notes that ‘increased transparency would frequently be beneficial, 
often indispensable, and is sometimes a ‘moral imperative.' However, Florini (p.8) 
acknowledges that transparency alone does not necessarily redistribute power from the 
strong to the weak. Rather, secrecy can be the refuge of the weak against the strong, as in 
the case of human rights organisations working in repressive countries.  
 
The outcome of the absence of transparency and the prevalence of secrecy will be a lack 
of public trust in government, and civil society organisations will lose public credibility. 
In such an atmosphere, conspiracies find fertile soil and rumours spread. Rational political 
debate becomes impossible and people become susceptible to irrational and even 
dangerous beliefs. The spread of such a culture impedes the capability and potential for 
sustainable development. No progress can be made on economic, political and social 
issues. Such a culture can only be changed through transparency. 
 
5.8.1.2 Accountability 
Accountability affects the credibility of civil institutions to the public, governments, the 
private sector and international organisations. It can be achieved through honesty and 
transparency, advertising widely both objectives and activities, and through openness 
regarding sources of funding and expenditure. Associations should both be open to and 
involve the public and the media. ESCAPE emphasises that ‘Accountability is a key 
requirement of good governance. Not only governmental institutions but also the private 
sector and civil society organisations must be accountable to the public and to their 
institutional stakeholders.’ According to Gray et al ‘The nature of this relationship allows 
us to infer much about the necessary formality and the channels of accountability 
(2006:319). 
 
All types of organisation -governmental, private sector and NGOs- must be accountable 
to the public and to their stakeholders. Precise patterns of accountability depend on 
whether decisions or actions are internal or external. In general an organisation is 
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accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. ‘Accountability 
cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law' (UNESCAP, ibid, p.3).  
 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter showed the need for NGOs to have the right to work and inform the public 
of their right to access NGO services, rather than being dependent on State permission as 
has been the case in Libya. More independent legal regulation of NGOs would enable 
NGOs to change the public perception of civic work as based on sympathetic support 
from the State, and would enable positive and voluntary participation by citizens. 
 
In Libya, NGOs are seen as part of the revolutionary system which appropriated and 
nationalised all aspects of life and society, and as having been coercively integrated into 
revolutionary political experience. 
 
There is a lack of an adequate legal framework required for NGO growth. Such a 
framework requires flexibility, clarity of legal texts and incentives and training for civic 
action. During fieldwork the researcher has noted that this needed to be addressed 
particularly in marginal associations lacking sufficient funding to establish a 
headquarters. 
 
Civil society in Libya under the Qadhafi regime did not emerge from below and does not 
represent common concerns. Rather it reflects the vision and attitude of revolutionary 
leadership. Generally speaking, laws relating to civil society are blurred and stretched. 
They do not reflect an understanding of the significance of NGOs as social actors. Civil 
associations are therefore incapable of promoting the concept of civil society and cannot 
consolidate their positions. 
 
The lack of clarity has damaged public trust in the sector. The aim of the law is to provide 
a clear legal framework for this sector, to promote the role of associations in the public 
interest and to demonstrate that they benefit people. However this chapter shows that 
there is no evidence that Libyan law can create a suitable environment for a viable civil 
society. All laws have come about as a response to political circumstances and not for the 
promotion of civil society. For example, Law No. 111 followed immediately after the 
Revolution as part of the package of laws. The findings of this chapter serve as an example 
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of the way in which governmental control of public spaces results in the inability of 
associations to perform their roles.  
 
Law No. 19 of 2001 was nothing more than a response to international pressure for reform 
of the political system in order to change Libya’s image on the international stage, no 
more than an attempt to put a new face on the old system. It uses different forms of speech 
with the aim of resonating both internally and externally particularly the latter. As part of 
its new face, it sought to legitimate the aspirations of leaders in a world where the 
language of civil society dominates global discourse. In so doing, it sought to cover the 
militaristic and ideological language of the old face. 
 
The call for civil society in Libya, under the Qadhafi regime was driven by the State and 
disregarded the views of people who demanded serious changes in the law. The latter do 
not have the power to influence; nor did they have access to channels that might help to 
capture public opinion. The associations’ demands became an internal monologue rather 
than a public debate. 
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Chapter Six 
Functions and Impediments of Libyan NGOs 
under the Qadhafi Regime 
 
6.1 Introduction: Milieu Preceding the Establishment of NGOs 
This chapter deals with NGOs in terms of their performance and the obstacles they faced 
during the Qadhafi era. Considerable attention has been given to NGOs in recent years. 
The attention has come from scholars, governments, and many international organisations 
such as the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation, Human Rights organisations and 
the UN. NGOs play a substantial role in this transformative environment, wherein they 
appear to emerge as new political actors. Some academics argue that we are witnessing 
what has been called a ‘global associational revolution’ which has led to a redefining of 
the role of these associations within development discourse (Abdelrahman, 2004; 40; 
David Moore, 2007).  
 
Recent research on civil society and NGOs in the Arab world has tended to focus on the 
relationship between the state and civil society: that is to say, where civil institutions are, 
by the simplest definition, intermediaries which operate in the space between the state 
and family12. In the case of Libya, I believe that while the state can play an important 
part in establishing and empowering these institutions, it has also been one of the major 
constraints and thus a challenge to them.  
 
In Libya from 2001 to 2011 the debates on civil society were associated with demands 
for it to be strengthened since it would form the soil from which the seeds of democracy 
would grow. The political milieu in Libya in this decade made this demand not only 
legitimate but also urgent. In the search for democracy, reformists in Libya believed that 
establishing independent and effective institutions was a necessity.  
 
In the debate on civil society in the Arab world, three significant questions have emerged, 
the first asking what kind of relationship there is between the institutions of civil society 
and the state, and the second focusing on whether the Islamic movements are components 
of civil society or not. This discussion has been dealt with extensively in Arab studies. 
                                                 
The difficulties in this simple definition are12 
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The most significant question is: could a genuine civil society have come to exist in pre-
intifada Libya. 
 
This chapter pays attention to the background and environment in which the need for 
NGOs in Libyan pre-2011 society developed. Furthermore, it profiles the various 
associations in Libya and discusses issues relating to their structure and how they may be 
defined. The analysis then moves on to deal with the performance of these organisations 
in several sectors such as education, health and social relief services, while the section 
that follows attempts to identify the relationship between NGOs and the state, with the 
aim of determining whether these NGOs had the potential to contribute to the process of 
developing civil society in a highly centralised country. The last section sheds light on 
the principal constraints on NGOs in Libya, seen as being cultural, legal, financial, 
administrative and structural. 
 
Since the creation of NGOs in Libya was part of the reform project, it is clear that those 
organisations could not have been established without securing approval from the regime 
and particularly its head, Qadhafi, who designated the performers and the agencies that 
were to carry out political reform in the county. 
 
6.2 The Settings Studied 
6.2.1 Fieldwork Experience 
The first stage of my research fieldwork aimed at mapping the sector and understanding 
its reality and main issues. This was necessary due to the lack of statistical data. This 
stage included two initial meetings. The first was with the General Federation of 
Associations of the Ministry of Social Affairs, the body that is responsible for the 
licensing of civil society associations and represents the state. This meeting took place in 
Tripoli on 4 January 2010. One of the employees in the General Federation of 
Associations of the Ministry of Social Affairs informed me that I should confirm that this 
study would not serve the purpose of any foreign interest and the research would not 
conflict with the interests of the state and its political system. They also asked for a formal 
letter from my university and preferably also one of the national Universities in Libya, as 
well as a copy of the scholarship letter from the Libyan Ministry of Higher Education.  
The second meeting was conducted with the Executive Director of the Second General 
Federation of Associations, Dr Abd al-Qādir al-Lamūshī, who was very helpful. He 
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provided me with some publications and briefed me about their tasks and activities. The 
interview took around three hours. It was mainly about the establishment of the 
Federation, its aims and its relationship with the state, which he described as cooperative 
and supplementary most of the time, but conflictive in some cases. He talked about the 
obstacles facing civil work in general. He focused particularly on two dimensions. The 
first was the lack of civil culture, and the second was the Ministry of Social Affairs, which 
was supposed to facilitate and support their work, whereas in realty the relationship was 
semi-hostile. He also talked about the law governing the activities of associations, which 
had become a significant barrier to them. The Federation was at the point of proposing a 
new law that would avoid the shortcomings and flaws in that which was current. This 
proposal would be presented to the people's conferences at the next meeting. 
 
 It is useful here to make two observations. First, it is confusing that two Federations have 
the same name, the "General Federation of Associations''. Second, even though Dr al-
Lamūshī said that the second Federation was independent from the state, this Federation 
was closely related to the state through Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, president of this Federation. 
These meetings helped to raise issues, at the heart of them the relation between the state 
and the law, which were included in the research. 
 
I gathered information about 10 associations which represent a broad spectrum of social 
work and activities. These associations were classified according to the association's field 
of activity. The associations operated in different regions in Libya; east, west, and south. 
Therefore, one of the research obstacles was the distance between where I live in Libya 
and the locations of these associations. 
 
6.2.2 A Profile of Libyan Associations 
Associations in Libya had to be registered with the Secretary of Social Affairs and were 
(after 2001) subject to Law No.19 of 2001 regardless of whether they provided their 
services to any particular group, such as the elderly or poor families, or to the whole 
community. According to official statistics, by the year 2009 there were over 430 
registered associations in Libya. The difficulty with this figure rests on the fact that the 
number of registered associations is not commensurate with the extent of their activities, 
such as might be expected of such a large number. The researcher, therefore, believes that 
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the actual number of operational NGOs in Libya is far less than the figures given by 
government sources. 
 
It is noteworthy that the accuracy of data on the number of associations is a common issue 
in this field. It is difficult to determine how many NGOs there are, but the World Bank 
for example has commented on a significant increase in both the developed and the 
developing world: 
According to the Yearbook of International Organisations, the number of 
international NGOs was reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 
to more than 50,000 in 2006. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have 
also become significant players in global development assistance, with 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
estimating that, as of 2006, CSOs provided approximately US$15 billion 
in international assistance (World Bank,2010). 
 
The concern over inadequate data is shared by Kandil (1999:116).The lack or 
unavailability of data on various aspects of Libyan associations makes it difficult to paint 
a complete picture of them.  
 
In Chapter Two, the relationship between the two spheres of civil society and the state 
within the theoretical framework provided by the literature on civil society was discussed. 
One especially important element of that discussion concerned the existence of vital or 
weak forms of civil society. I also briefly discussed the political systems presence in Arab 
countries and their impact on civil society; whether they share similar characteristics; and 
how the differences between them affect the characters and activities of civil 
organisations.  
 
Niblock’s (2005) analysis of civil society in the Middle East highlights the significance 
of two factors, first population size, and second whether there is a substantial industrial 
sector. By applying the first hypothesis to the case of Libya, it may be concluded that 
civil associations are not likely to be as powerful or active in the face of the state, because 
Libya does not have a large population. Ali Layla (2002:56) has also pointed out the 
correlation between the growth of civil society and population size. For him, this factor 
has two key effects. The first is that larger populations coupled with limited resources 
make the state unable to spend enough on its citizens’ basic needs. This situation tends to 
create a surplus population whose basic needs are not met, especially among people under 
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the age of fifteen who constitute40% percent of the population of the Arab World. This 
prompts the establishment of different kinds of NGOs to help such marginalised groups. 
The second effect that tends to promote the development of NGOs is linked to population 
size and the level of heterogeneity there in Salamon and Anheier (1997:7-1998:220) sum 
up this link in terms of a theory of relations between the degree of heterogeneity in a 
population and the extent to which non-profit organisations operate: 
[T]he greater the diversity of a population, the larger the non-profit 
sector. The different population subgroups consequently fall to non-
profit organisations. (Salamon and Anheier, 1997:7) 
 
The data shows that there are some additional factors that need to be taken into account 
when studying civil society in a hyper-autocratic regime such that of Colonel Qadhafi. 
The second factor put forward by Niblock hypothesizes that civil associations are more 
active in countries with significant industrial sectors. The examples given by Niblock 
(2005:497) are Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon. Questions may reasonably be 
asked about how applicable this model is to Libya, a rentier state where the economy is 
based solely on oil and the public sector.13 It can be argued that the economies of rentier 
states have impacted negatively on the course of democracy since access to large amounts 
of externally generated economic resources have frequently served to strengthen state 
authority. Indeed, since rentier states are dependent on international markets to generate 
revenues, state decision- makers are much less constrained by the interests of domestic 
actors. (Brynen, Bahgat, and Paul, 1995). In such cases, it may be considered very likely 
that economic factors will weaken civil society associations. Furthermore, rentier 
economies often strengthen the state by helping it to support needy groups through 
government-sponsored charitable organisations or so-called GONGOs (government 
organised non-governmental organisations), such those catering for the blind, orphans, 
the disabled, and women. Such organisations are highly active in societies governed by 
rentier states like Libya. The existence of GONGOs makes it extremely difficult to 
establish independent NGOs, and undermines the activities of those that already exist. 
What follows is intended to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of civil society (as 
defined by the World Bank) in Libya, and to identify the reasons for these strengths and 
weaknesses. 
                                                 
13Oil resources account for approximately 95 % of export earnings and an estimated 23 % of Libya’s GDP 
(gross domestic product), which give a clear idea about the Libyan economy where there is no space for 
any other sector except oil. 
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The data shows that there are a limited number of associations in Libya, and that the 
activities they perform are limited even relative to the size of the population. NGOs in 
Libya tend to be fairly new, and most have a narrow social base and demographical 
coverage. Surprisingly most NGOs are concentrated in Darna and Misurata, while Tripoli 
and Benghazi come second and third respectively. A similar number of associations are 
registered in al-Jufra which is located in the heart of the Sahara and has a very low 
population density. This could be due to the growing activities of the Islamically-
motivated; in fact, religious and ethnic groups in Arab countries have contributed 
significantly to the formation of organisations, as can be seen in the cases of Lebanon, 
Egypt and Libya. Despite the comparative lack of demographic diversity, the strongly 
religious and ethnic community in Libya can be regarded as a source of improvement and 
fortification of NGOs. 
 
Figure 7: Geographic Location of Libyan Associations in 2010  
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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From Figure 7, it can be seen that the largest number of associations were in Darna (20) 
while the smallest numbers were in al-Wahat, Ghat, Ejdabia and Sirt, all having only two 
associations. 
 
The researcher has noted that all the activities of these associations have an impact on the 
possibilities available to them and also go towards determining the type of people who 
work for them. For example, there are important differences between associations 
working in the domains of philanthropy and development. 
 
As we can see from the graph below, the year 2003 marked the highest point in the number 
of new associations established in Libya, while the lowest points were in 2001 and 2006.  
 
Figure 8: The Number of Libyan Associations 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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note a marked increase in the number and diversity of activities, due to a decline in the 
state's distributional role, because of the reduction in oil revenues, reduced overheads and 
the government pursuing to austerity measures. According to Mighirbi (1995:138) oil 
revenues fell from $26 billion in 1983 to $10 billion in 1986. According to many 
interviewees the other reason for the increase in the number of associations from 2001 
was the issuing of law No. 19 which called on associations established before 2001 (which 
had long been neglected and marginalised) to obtain legality for their existence by 
registering. Accordingly, a good number of these hidden associations came forward to 
register their names and thus become lawful entities. However, the number of associates 
cast doubt on the authenticity of some of the associations coming forward, saying ''These 
numbers are not correct and they only register to get funds from government or use the 
associations as private businesses. ''Some associations were money- making project 
disguise, benefiting from tax exemption."  
 
6.2.3 Associations’ Structures  
As mentioned above and in Chapter Four, Libyan Law No. 19 of 2001 regulated 
associations in line with the political system so that each registered association was 
obliged to form a people’s conference (general assembly) and a people’s committee 
(board of directors). This section will investigate the structural dimensions of 
associations: namely, the people’s conference, the people’s committee. The composition 
of each of these bodies will now be examined separately, with the aim of showing the 
main characteristics of the managerial styles of associations. In order to do so, light will 
be shed on whether associations operated relatively democratically and independently of 
the state, and whether they were able to find ways of meeting people’s demands primarily 
catered for and the needs of their beneficiaries. 
 
A) People’s Conference (General Assembly): 
The first component of the association is the people’s conference. Law No. 19 of 
2001 stipulates that “every association should form a people’s conference as a 
precondition for its recognition by the authorities”. According to Article 20, the 
conference must include all members of the association who must number no less 
than fifty. Article 21 gives more details about the responsibilities of a people’s 
conference, stating “the conference of the association should hold an annual 
meeting during the first three months of the fiscal year to review the association 
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activities, its budget and final accounts”. In this meeting, the election of the 
people’s committee of the association, consisting of a chair and two assistants, 
and its secretary was supposed to take place. The law also required that the 
(national) General People’s Conference be informed about the meetings and their 
agendas at least 15 days in advance. 
 
B) People’s Committee (Managing Committee) 
According to Article 28 of law No.19, each association should have a people 
committee’s which is the body responsible for appointing an executive director, 
carrying out executive tasks and managing the day-to-day administration and 
work of the association. It should consist of a chair and four members of the 
committee. In practice, however, this style of management did not exist on the 
ground. As I found in my fieldwork, the chair of the people’s committee (the 
Libyan term is secretary), who was its principle member, was the only person who 
knows everything about the association. He was responsible for the association’s 
external relationships, and implementing its plans and policies. 
 
C) Federations of Associations 
According to Article17 of Law No. 19, “all associations which have the same 
range of activities are part of wider specialised federations which represent them 
at the national level. However, each association has all legal status”. The boards 
of the federations were composed of the board members of associations, although 
only members favoured by the government were chosen in this respect. In fact, as 
noted by Abdelrahman (2004: 172), these federations did not play an active role 
in strengthening the NGO sector in Libya. 
 
One interviewee argued that: 
if we do not accept this structure, that is means we are against the 
government and we cannot register our association and moreover we 
will come under suspicion 
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Another interviewee said that: 
Without exaggeration, this structure confirms that the associations are 
under pressure, even when they are in the form of official institutions and 
subject to the laws and regulations. Thus we have to deal with the 
situation and try to get around it and use it. 
 
This reflects the difficulty of the situation, there was a lack of trust between the 
associations and the government, and the associations were hyper-aware of government 
policies and its priorities in reproducing its political model.  
 
One interviewee emphasised the inconsistency in the law. He pointed out that it allowed 
for “specialised federations’’, but it also forbade associations sharing the same activities 
from establishing more than one association. This was seem as a contradiction in the law 
[the researcher interviewed the executive director of al-Jam’īyah al-’Arabīyah li 
Ḥuqūq al-’Insān (Human Rights Association) in Tripoli: April 2010]. 
 
Most interviewees emphasised the need to change the law. One stated: 
Under this law the association does not have legal status; only when it 
has officially registered does it have permission to carry out its role and 
take the actions needed to achieve its goals and objectives, according to 
the terms and conditions set forth in the law, regulations and instructions 
issued. However, in the case of a delayed response, the association does 
not exist. 
 
The research interviews of this thesis reveal mixed views among the interviewees with 
regard to how they perceived their mission in civic work. The interviewees had different 
attitudes towards state interference. Despite their awareness of the extent of intervention 
in their activities and how this could lead to limits being placed on them, some believed 
in the importance of their role in society, and viewed positively in some government 
decisions.  For example, when Ramadhan (interview of 10 April 2010) was asked if he 
was involved in some activities that he saw as important without permit from the 
government, he said, shocked: “Why? If the government did not agree to this activity, it 
means the government sees it as being against the social interest. In that case I am not 
going to challenge it.” He argued that, “our association is not a political group or a 
political party or anything else. It is formed for the development of young people, to help 
them to get skills.” He went further, and accused the researcher of having an agenda (like 
most of those studying in Western universities) and wanting to use these associations to 
achieve this agenda. On the other hand, when Salame (interview of April 2010) was asked 
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about the same point, he said: "our existence is a challenge to the government, because 
we work in the area of human rights, which by definition is against the government.” 
 
In a third case, Abd al-Qader (interview of April 2010) argued that he tried to avoid 
clashes with government, but that at the same time he had to navigate through a system 
dominated by distrust, state interference and domination. He provided the example of his 
association’s relationship with some African organizations, where the law did not 
authorise such activity. 
 
In general, it may say that the interviewees had a sense of their important role, but that 
the law and a relationship with the state characterised by distrust limited their negotiating 
power. 
 
6.3 Civil Associations Services 
The literature on NGOs suggests that they have an advantage over the state due to their 
flexibility, the relative cheapness of what they offer adaptability to local conditions, 
freedom from political constraints and small scale (Brown and Korten, 1989: i). These 
advantages perhaps were behind their role in filling the gap after the economic crises of 
the 1980s, when the state withdrew from some of its functions. As Devine (1996:6) has 
stated: 
the economic crises of the 1980s coupled with [a]structural adjustment 
programmes designed to address macro-economic problems has created 
a political vacuum in which the state is no longer encouraged or capable 
of providing services to its citizens. NGOs, it is argued, are well 
positioned to fill this gap. 
 
Others see these organisations as “possible alternatives to government in addressing the 
needs of populations” (Brown and Korten, 1989:1). 
 
Through interviews and observations, this researcher has taken note of changing state 
policies in Libya affected by the activities of the civil sector. The percentage of services 
contributed by the state dropped as a result of the economic liberalisation policy, and in 
a number of sectors state services were replaced by NGO services. This was seen in 
healthcare provision. Additionally, NGOs seem to have filled gaps left by the state early 
in 1999 (when number of the ministries were reduced), such as in the education of the 
blind and the care of women with disabilities. From the interviews conducted, the 
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researcher found that some associations focused on providing services for certain groups 
in society such as children, the disabled and the blind, while others provided public 
services for the whole community in the areas of healthcare, charitable work and cultural 
provision according to needs on the ground. In this section I will try to illustrate the 
various services provided by these associations. It should be noted, however, that in 
reality it is often difficult to distinguish between different categories of associations, and 
for this reason I have grouped them according to their function. 
 
In an interview with the executive director of al-Jam’īyah al-’Arabīyah li Ḥuqūq al-’Insān 
(Human Rights Association) in Tripoli; April 2010, the executive director revealed that 
the 2001 law has not improved an association's activities:  
Article 27 of the law states that the association must inform the secretariat 
of the General People's Conference or the Secretariat of the People's 
Conference of all meetings of the Conference and the issues to be 
discussed, at last one week before meeting .Also, it is allowed for 
delegates of the General People's Conference to attend the meetings and 
the association must submit a copy of the minutes of the meeting and 
decisions issued to the Secretariat of the General People's Conference. 
This without a doubt, shows to what extent the state intervenes in the work 
of these associations and therefore we can say that any action by us can 
become a violation of the law, and the state uses this to control us. How 
can we develop our activities? 
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6.3.1 Services Provided 
Libyan NGOs pursue a variety of activities, as shown the graph below. 
 
Figure 9: The Number of Associations According to the Type of Associations’ Activities 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
 
The above graph shows that service associations represent the largest group, possibly 
because they do not face the state and its policies. In contrast, the advocator category, 
meaning those associations which protect groups like women, children and prisoners, is 
the smallest. 
 
Civil society encompasses not only charitable bodies and service associations, but also 
NGOs, which seek to represent social movements and development associations which 
serve communities as well as the whole of society (Carapico, 1998:2). Nevertheless, it is 
not surprising that the largest number of associations in Libya fall into the service and 
charity categories. 
 
Libyan NGOs provide a range of services such as healthcare and education. Young 
(2000:149) sees NGOs as helping to carry out the delivery of public goods, and in this 
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respect they have a direct relationship with one another. Some associations in Libya 
providing social and economic services to help satisfy the needs of various groups in 
society (e.g. the disabled, visually impaired, orphans and the terminally ill) have achieved 
remarkable success. The roles played by these associations increased after the withdrawal 
of state support. For example, the association that provided support to patients with renal 
failure in Misurata, provided all kinds of medical care for those patients who could not to 
finance the cost of treatment. The executive director of al-’Ikhwah al-Khayrīyyah said 
that they would provide more help if they got more funding, and that they target people 
most in need. He was concerned that the number of people with this disease was 
increasing by the day, and stressed that the “gap-filling” role of the associations was 
growing in importance.  
 
An example of the same role is the “Association of Women with Disabilities” in Tripoli, 
which was established because there was perceived to be a particular gap in this area. As 
one staff member described it:   
The idea of establishing such an association started with my observation 
of a handicapped female relative. She struggled to cope with her living 
needs. I thought of women like her; how many women out there need 
support? Thus, we tried to raise awareness among society regarding the 
needs of these people. From my observation, it seems that both the family 
and the state have ignored these unfortunate people. 
 
Another successful example of “gap-filling” can be seen in the focus on orphans, in 
Misurata. As the director of the al-’Anwār association for orphans has confirmed: 
We see that the state has withdrawn from this group and left them on the 
street and to the rich people if they are willing to help them. Therefore, 
our role is to help people to stand up for their rights and to live with 
dignity.  
 
The al-’Anwār association aims to improve the lives of orphans. It can be seen from its 
reports between 2001 and 2009 that the association provided donations worth 245,000 
LYD for the families registered with it; it distributed stationery to orphan students to the 
value of 32,000 LYD, furnished orphans’ homes to the sum of 49,500 LYD and undertook 
maintenance of some houses worth 28,000 LYD. Expenses for the outstanding orphan 
students amounted to 36,000 LYD. 
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The al-Nūr Association for the visually impaired in Tripoli and a similar association in 
Benghazi focussed attention on providing education. During my interview with this 
association, I was told that their approach to rehabilitating visually impaired people was 
aimed at enabling them to integrate as useful members of society and to help them to 
engage in economic activities whereby they could support themselves and their families. 
I interviewed an IT (Information Technology) engineer who graduated from this 
association, and is recognised as one of the most notable qualified engineers in the 
country. 
 
6.3.2 Charitable Aid 
Philanthropic work is the second largest field of activity for the various NGOs in Libya. 
Many derive their income from properties held as waqf Islamic charitable endowments. 
NGOs are favoured by both the founders of the associations and beneficiaries, as well as 
the donors. When asked why this is the case, most participants mentioned religious 
motives that encourage people to do good things and help others, especially the needy. It 
can perhaps be traced historically to the start of civic work and its association with 
religion. It is considered a part of Islamic values and thought. Muslims believe that they 
should contribute positively to their society, regardless of whether such activities are 
viewed as an aspect of civil society or not. Their purpose is to improve the societies in 
which they live. In my view, it is the limiting of civil work to a religious principle which 
has led to the promotion of charitable work, and this is reflected in the idea of a return to 
traditional solutions which rely on the generosity of the rich and their giving to the poor, 
rather than facing the causes of the phenomenon and its association to the distribution of 
wealth among all social classes. Most associations with the principles of charity at their 
core do not use the word charity in their titles, with the exception of the Hanā’ and 
Wa‘taṣīmū charitable associations.  
 
Some findings from the data which highlight the role of religious motives in encouraging 
civil works find interesting support in a comparative study undertaken by the Johns 
Hopkins Comparative Non-profit Sector Project, this was entitled as The Third World's 
Third Sector in Comparative Perspective'' and was carried out by Salamon and Anheier 
(1997:6). The project concluded that:  
religions differ in the emphasis they place on building formal 
institutional structures for religious worship and other purposes. 
Religions that place a premium on institutionalisation will likely 
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contribute more to the development of non-profit organisations than 
those that do not. 
 
As shown above waqf (discussed in Chapter Three) are charitable endowments 
which have management and governmental departments, and are therefore, 
according to the above theory, in a good position to receive support.  
 
6.3.3 Development 
Brown and Korten (1989:10) have suggested a model that defines development 
organisations. They comprise of the following activities: 
 Provision of services such as healthcare, family planning and agricultural 
extension 
 Community organisation, including providing technical and educational 
assistance to enable local groups to organise themselves and solve local 
problems 
 Training and technical assistance support to other organisations performing 
development functions 
 Development education to increase public opinion and leader understanding of 
key development issues 
 
By considering these associations as participants in the development process, they can be 
seen to reflect the desire not to depend on the state for development. Among a list of 
reasons for this, according to Brown and Korten (1989:1), place emphasis on what they 
call “a sharp decline in public development resources”, leading to a search for alternatives 
to conventional public services. Lewis (2003:327) distinguishes NGOs from other types 
of organisations because, as he states, “NGOs are distinctive in the sense that they are 
third sector organisations which are focused on ‘development’ tasks and purposes (which 
can broadly be taken to mean efforts towards poverty reduction)”. Perhaps the dominant 
perspective in this sector is that NGOs fill the gaps left by governments. Many researchers 
support this view: (Bebbington and Farrigon,1992:55); (Clark,1992), ‘services 
substitution’, ‘public service contractors’; (Clark,1992:152) ‘agents of democratization’, 
‘helping people to help themselves’, ‘change and development’ and so on. These views 
reflect the theory, believed by many that the failures of governments and markets are 
behind the growth in this sector, as was shown in Chapter Two. These are the images 
which these organisations are trying to project to communities and societies. 
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In brief, the mushrooming of the NGO movement has been caused and affected by the 
challenges that have occurred in the theory and practice of what is broadly termed 
“development”: that is, the process of improving the conditions and prospects of people 
and nations.14 
 
The prominence of the role given to NGOs in development since the early 1980s is often 
explained as a reaction to the crisis facing state-sponsored development strategies and the 
failure of Third World government to face the challenges of development (Abdelrahman, 
2004). 
 
Brown and Korten (1989:6) believe that even though the voluntary sector has a greater 
potential for mobilising voluntary workers and novel problem-solving, development is 
difficult to achieve in societies where the state has total control over civil society. When 
they were asked whether they participate in the course of development, the majority of 
interviewees in this researcher’s fieldwork seemed startled. This was because none of 
them saw themselves or the associations in which they were active as being entitled to 
play any role in development. By contrast, they genuinely believed that this should be a 
task of government. 
 
In my fieldwork, I noticed that development associations are basically limited to only 
three main areas where they can significantly participate in development. For example, 
of the 4,000 blind students who have graduated from the al-Nūr Association for the blind, 
a number of them gained PhD degrees. At the time when I was conducting my interviews, 
this association offered education to 187 students at primary and secondary schools and 
42 students at universities (interview with executive director of the association in April 
2010). The executive director claimed that some public universities would not enrol blind 
students. Another example of what could be considered a development association is al-
Nūr’s twin in Benghazi, the Blind Association, which has been helping blind people to 
achieve their educational and academic ambitions for more than forty years. It also 
improves its students’ skills by providing training in certain crafts from which they can 
                                                 
14http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/222/historical-evolution-of-ngos-ngo-proliferation-in-the-post-
cold-war-era-.html (Last accessed 20.04.2010). 
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earn a living. A third example is the Libyan Association for the Disabled which aimed to 
empower this group through rehabilitation, and to shift them from a position of 
powerlessness to one of normality and equality as citizens with all the same rights enjoyed 
by other Libyans. As the Secretary of the association points out:  
Our aim is to deal with the person not on an emotional basis, because this 
would negatively affect his or her self-confidence, ability and skills. This 
association does not only work to provide services and medical 
instruments but also to build up self-confidence in these people and 
increase awareness of playing a positive role in society regardless of their 
disability. We try to achieve equality in society for them, like any human 
being without discrimination; old or young, woman or man and black or 
white. We have a role in development, we address our target and we have 
transferred our ‘support’ to a development concept to change how these 
people are perceived by others and how they see themselves.  
 
The Libyan Association for the Disabled interviewees stated that this segment of the 
population went through three stages in terms of their relationship with the state. The first 
stage had its roots in 1969, as shortly after the coup the new political system began to 
take shape. This was what we can describe as a “golden time”. The second stage was from 
1971 to 1989, during which the state met the major needs of this group showing sympathy 
but without clear program. The third stage started from the 1990s and has continued up 
to the present date, and has been characterised by a lack of state support. The target group 
is subject to change to meet new needs. For instance, road accidents leave more people, 
from various professional backgrounds disabled and thus in need of rehabilitation in order 
to continue their lives normally.  
 
6.3.4 Advocacy 
Advocacy associations are different to other kinds of NGOs because of the nature of their 
activities, which are most likely to intersect with state tasks and to involve political issues.  
 
Kandil (2005:116) gives a procedural definition of the concept of “advocacy’’ as a set of 
continuous and planned efforts by an organisation to cause change in attitudes, policies, 
decisions and trends in public opinion. In this way, society achieves a collective benefit 
and marginalised groups are defended. 
 
The Arab Network for NGOs (2008:121) defines advocacy organisations as those 
voluntary organisations that adopt the international covenants of human rights, gaining 
“international legitimacy” and engaging in advocacy to protect human rights. This 
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includes respect for and awareness of these rights, monitoring and controlling them; 
exposing violations of them, and working to stop any violations by monitoring 
government behaviour and legislation on human rights issues. The question that arises 
here is why has interest in this type of organisation increased over the last two decades 
and become more widespread. The Arab Network for NGOs points out the variables that 
have led to the proliferation of interest in NGOs for several reasons. First, the 
democratisation process in various countries around the world after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of nationalism in Eastern Europe. Second, the spread of 
globalisation, which has led to further marginalisation and social exclusion of the poor. 
Additionally, the central political values that have accompanied globalisation, the most 
prominent being democracy and respect for human rights, have stimulated the growth of 
social and political movements around the world and the development of quantitative and 
qualitative discussions in civil society organisations. Third, the technological revolution 
has facilitated demands for human rights and, accompanied by globalisation, has 
contributed to the collapse of barriers between countries and different entities. 
Furthermore, it has increased the speed of interaction between activists through electronic 
and other means of global communication. These developments have allowed for a much 
faster and greater flow of knowledge which has helped activists to become better 
organised. A major effect of this process has been to challenge the concept of state 
sovereignty. Fourth, an increase in interest in the establishment of networks of regional 
and international defence which has in turn given support to advocacy organisations 
financially, politically and in the media. Fifth, is the increased effectiveness in the demand 
for legal rights for women. Sixth, the importance of human rights organisations, 
especially in monitoring and focusing on human rights violations, as one aspect of 
political reform in the world.  
 
The role of NGOs has expanded and developed since the beginning of the 1980s in 
response to neoliberal ideology and thought on democracy (Turkish Weekly, 2003).The 
findings from my fieldwork suggest that the activities of advocacy associations for 
women can be divided into two types. The first are those which provide services for 
women who are disabled, blind, poor or widowed. These activities are intended to 
improve these women’s standards of living by providing healthcare, education and 
childcare, and to help them to earn a living by providing relevant skills and training.  
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Despite the importance of these activities, these associations have still not done enough 
work to promote the status of women in Libyan society by challenging prejudice and 
established gender roles. 
 
The second type of advocacy association for women covers those which focus on gender 
issues. Their goal is to improve the status of women, to eliminate all kinds of gender 
discrimination and to improve gender relations in society in order to achieve equal 
opportunities in the workplace and to allow women to participate in decision-making. 
There are very few organisations of this type. 
 
It is important to note that the Libyan law does not discriminate against women. There 
are many resolutions and decisions that support the participation of women in political 
life and engagement in the public sphere. For example, there is equality in income and 
position depending on qualifications rather than gender. Another example is the right to 
attend and be elected to the People's Conferences at any level. Even though there has been 
remarkable progress in this area, there are still some issues related to women rights that 
need more lobbying in order to be solved. One example is that a Libyan woman who 
marries a non-Libyan man cannot pass on her nationality to her children, unlike men 
marrying non-Libyan women. Another example is that children do not benefit from their 
mother’s salary after her death even though both men and women pay the same 
percentage of their incomes in social security. Accordingly, advocacy associations should 
work to improve people’s awareness of gender issues, and take advantage of the 
opportunities already available to fight the dominant patriarchal culture. 
 
The existing associations do nothing to promote women’s demands and actually 
undermine the idea of women’s rights because they tend to encourage the idea that the 
only issues of importance to women are poverty and disability as opposed to their rights 
in society. As shown in Figure 9, there is currently a lack of advocacy associations in 
Libya focusing on the issues of human rights, women's rights and gender. What is more, 
those which do exist are not effective and reflect a total lack of awareness of women's 
rights. Nevertheless, when I interviewed the executive director of the Arab Association 
for Human Rights in Tripoli (this association has three branches), he stressed “checking 
on the state” as a way to achieve justice and influence the state by pursuing it through the 
media and the law, as well offering advice to prevent it from deviating from its function. 
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Moreover, he argued that the main role for these associations and civil society can be 
found in the roots of our religion and our culture: 
We work with the people to help them strengthen their knowledge of 
their rights and protect people who have been subject to injustice, torture 
or imprisonment, or who have not had their rights, or who have been 
affected by abuse of authority: we are opening the way for citizens to 
take their rights. 
 
Another interviewee argued that: 
 
The phrase "or to achieve any political goals," in the 2001 law is broad 
and open to interpretation. By the existence of such a phrase the 
government can restrict the activities of associations working in the field 
of human rights, and in defence of the rights and freedoms of citizens. 
The existence of such a phrase makes associations easily accountable if 
they make a study of reality or the laws governing political life and the 
results are not acceptable to the government or not in its interests. It could 
be claimed to be political activity, making associations subject to 
sanctions, such as closure or abolition. 
 
A notable exception here is the Gaddafi International Charity and Development 
Foundation (GICDF), which made significant contributions in this area and dealt with 
difficult and complex matters such as torture in prisons and compensation for the families 
of those who have died in prison or under torture in the hands of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups. The GICDF derived its power from its founder, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Seven of this study.  
 
The interviews conducted for this study show that there is limited awareness of the roles 
of advocacy associations in Libyan society even among workers in civil associations. The 
responses I received reflect a lack of awareness of civil work in general in that the 
interviewees did not understand the roles they played in terms of making changes to social 
and political life. Additionally, when I asked about the relationship of associations with 
the state, interviewees were only able to point out the state’s role in constraining their 
work in as far as it had to be done within the framework of the law. This response may 
be because of the novelty of civil work in Libya and also because most of the activities 
of associations involve charitable work. This means that associations mainly focus on the 
traditional domain of charity rather than providing channels for social development and 
political participation. This may be accounted for by the prevailing rule under Qadhafi 
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that the only channel of social and political participation was through the Basic People's 
Conferences. 
 
The measures and limitations in Section 2 of Article 22 of The United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights are often used by governments to undermine this right, even 
in democratic societies. Here, the governments use terms such as public order or national 
security or public morals, changing and evolving practise in accordance with the 
circumstances of time and place. For example the idea of social order is flexible; 
sometimes it is narrowing and sometimes widening; also the public interest is here 
equated to the political system.  
 
In Article 14 of law No 19, no one may not be associated with any association or 
participate or join the association or a club based outside Libya without the approval of 
the Secretariat of the General People's Committee. This is explicitly contrary to the global 
trend towards networking and relationship building between the associations in different 
countries, for the exchange of experiences and the block support on some issues. At the 
same time, Article (1) prohibits the registration of the association in cases of the violation 
of law and public order. 
 
6.4 Obstacles of Development of NGOs 
The purpose in the section is to explore the main obstacles facing the development of civil 
society in Libya. Al-Sayyid Sa'id (2005:56) points out that “the development of civil 
society in Arab nations requires four basic elements: volunteerism, administration skills, 
economic resources and a culture of peaceful conflict-resolution”. 
 
The most important data collection method used for the purposes of this chapter is the in-
depth interview, many of which were conducted by the researcher with activists working 
for NGOs in the field, with the aim of uncovering the opinions of the active elites within 
these associations. All interviews were recorded mostly after the participants had given 
their approval. Questions focused on a set of core issues: cultural impediments, finances, 
organisation, management and relationship with the state. 
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6.4.1 Volunteering 
In Chapter Four, reference was made to the view of Salamon and Anheier (1999) that, 
among other things, one of the key characteristics of associations is that “they are 
voluntary such that they involve a degree of voluntary participation at the level of activity 
or governance”. In a similar vein, al-Sayyid Sa'id (2005:56) considers voluntary work to 
be a fundamental element in civil society: he states that, “undoubtedly, the culture of 
voluntary work is the dividing line between an independent civil society and dependent 
one, between the existence and non-existence of a civil society”. According to 
Volunteering England (Volunteering England, 2009), “[g]enerally, volunteering is 
described as an unpaid activity where someone gives their time to help an organisation or 
an individual who they are not related to”.  
 
Karajah (2007) offers the following definition of volunteerism: “Volunteerism means 
providing moral and financial support by free will and without seeking profit or 
distributing profit among participants in the civil society organisations”.  
 
The roots of voluntary work may be found in religions which encourage people to help 
others, especially the poor and needy. This type of voluntary work can be referred to as 
the philanthropy principle. People volunteer for many different reasons. They may choose 
to volunteer to develop skills or gain experience, to socialise or to give something back 
to society. They may also volunteer because they feel a moral duty, or that they have 
compelling reasons to take part in voluntary action or to support a particular cause. The 
key element is that it is freely undertaken. During my fieldwork, when I asked the 
participants why they joined the organisations they were working for and what they hoped 
to get out of doing so, a majority of them responded along the lines that, by taking part in 
the said organisations, they were able to participate in developing their society and 
promoting a culture of civil work and society (Conn, 2012). 
 
From the findings of my fieldwork, it was expected that men would account for most of 
the volunteers working for associations. From interview data, however, it was clear that 
women make up a greater number of the volunteers. In fact, this can be counted as one of 
the most important reasons why most associations provide social services (in the parts of 
society) where women are normally active. It was also observed that the volunteers, both 
men and women, were generally highly educated and included people such as doctors and 
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social workers. Strong links could also be seen between volunteering and religion. Indeed, 
religion provided a strong driving force behind participation in civil work thanks to the 
religious principles of helping the poor and supporting the needy. 
 
The culture of voluntary civil work has not occupied much space or done much to improve 
civil society in the Arab World as many scholars have claimed, particularly in the case of 
Libya. The main reason behind this lack of impact is the kind of social structure dominant 
in Arab countries, which is based on the family, local community and tribal loyalties. 
These links encourage individuals to support the interests of these groups rather than those 
of the general public which can be better supported by NGOs. However, the latter sector 
needs to transform itself from being based on individual and informal contributions to 
institutions that are able to organise volunteering through volunteer networks. In this way, 
NGOs can extend volunteer work to the areas of development and advocacy.  
 
6.4.2 Administrative Skills 
The administrative aspects of NGOs were discussed extensively in Chapter Four of this 
study. Chapter Four also discussed the ways in which the Libyan law No. 19 regulated 
the administration of associations in line with the Libyan political system: hence 
associations were required to form counterparts to state institutions including the People’s 
Conferences, the People’s Assembly and the Board of Directors corresponding to the 
People's Committee of the Association. 
 
In this section, I will investigate how a statement by al-Sayyid’s (2005:56) applies to the 
Libyan associations. Al-Sayyid states: managerial skills could be understood as abilities 
that are capable of building institutions and developing those institutions capacity to 
achieve and to cope with problems, seize opportunities and achieve the best results. He 
argues that Arab civil society suffers from a shortage of managerial skills and thus people 
capable of building institutions and developing their capabilities to achieve goals, face 
problems and seize opportunities. Furthermore, he notes that this lack of managerial skills 
has a negative impact on how associations work with and gain the confidence of the 
public, and cope with the demand for their services. 
 
One interviewee reported that he did not have knowledge or awareness of civil work. 
Most people involved in such work do so to make money and corruption is widespread. 
169 
 
He cited as an example of mismanagement the fact that the board of his association gained 
its recognition after just a year and four months (April, 2010). 
 
The interviews reveal the absence of managerial skills in associations. In addition, most 
of them revolved around a single person who had led their organisations being assimilated 
into the structure of state decision-making processes. This finding supports al-Sayyid’s 
view that poor managerial skills have had a negative impact on the capacity of 
associations to achieve their goals. However, among the associations, there are examples 
of successful management such as, in the al-Nūr Association in Tripoli. In this case, 
although two thirds of administrative staff have very little experience, the remaining third 
are knowledgeable about the organisation and the needs of its members. At the same time, 
this association is considered to be one of the older (established in 1962) and more 
successful of its kind. 
 
Finally, the interviews showed that associations are dealing with problems and attracting 
contributions on the basis of their emotional influence over donors rather than their 
knowledge of how social, economic and cultural factors can help to raise funds and attract 
donors. This way of dealing with issues also highlights the lack of managerial skills and 
economic resources available to associations. 
 
6.4.3 Economic Resources 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there can be no doubt as to the importance of economic 
resources for civil associations. As al-Sayyid (2005:56) states, […] “for civil 
organisations to fulfil their role, they need economic and financial resources”, to which 
he adds “we can note the fragile economic foundation of civil society in Arab countries”. 
Accordingly, in this subsection I will discuss the economic and financial burdens on 
Libyan associations.  
 
Before my fieldwork I had the impression that the Libyan state, as a dominant actor, 
controlled all associations. However, it turned out that these associations do not receive 
any support or funding from the state. Indeed, in interviews most associations stressed 
the lack of funding from the state. At the same time, the law forbids campaigning for 
donations and the government only pays the salaries of staff who are assigned to work in 
these associations. Associations expect to receive state funding. One interviewee said that 
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the state does not have a constant vision or direction toward this sector, and that this has 
resulted in cuts to state funding for associations. By contrast, most states provide some 
funding for this sector both in the West and in some Arab countries (interview in Tripoli 
with the Director of Federation of Youth Associations, April 2010). Another participant 
added that: 
If the state leaves associations without funding, the associations may 
resort to foreign funding which is dangerous and risky; at the same time 
we do not want this kind of funding (interview in Tripoli with the 
Director of Arab Association for Human Rights). 
 
The associations’ code strictly prohibits them from campaigning to collect donations or 
grants from the public, possibly as a result of the fear that collected funds will be exploited 
for personal gains. However, some interviewees confirmed that ‘‘it is true some 
associations use the funding for personal purposes”. Moreover, one of the directors of the 
regional federations went further, pointing out that “establishing an association is a quick 
way to make money’’ (interview in Misruata April, 2010). In my view, the problem of 
corruption undermines development and builds up a sense of distrust in NGOs. In regard 
to foreign funding, associations were prohibited by law from receiving funding from any 
foreign donors. This situation changed after 2011 as I will explain in Chapter Nine. 
 
Sources of self-funding for Libyan associations included members’ contributions in the 
forms of zakāt and waqf. From the findings of my fieldwork, it can be observed that there 
was no awareness among the interviewees of the advantages of these two resources. 
However, when the researcher asked whether the participants had considered these 
legacies as sources of funding, they responded with surprise and stated that they never 
had considered them. Many of the members of associations who were interviewed during 
my fieldwork complained their associations had been refused permits to collect donations 
or accept foreign funding.. 
 
Regarding my question about the role of mosques in encouraging people to support 
associations, one interviewee agreed with me and responded: “If our association co-
operates with mosques as places which have an influence among the people, it will 
improve our capacity to serve a larger community in general” (interview with the 
Executive Director of one association). 
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6.5 Conclusion 
A fundamental feature of civil work is that it is neither an extension of state bureaucracy 
nor motivated by profit, as is the case in the private sector. The non-profit sector is usually 
based on new and creative work initiatives, and driven by a dynamic and expressive 
culture of civil work which allows it to interact flexibly with its target groups. In contrast, 
as this chapter has demonstrated, the Libyan associations have suffered from a lack of 
essential skills and training, which would have enabled them to increase their capacity 
and improve their performance. 
 
One of the main features of Libyan associations (NGOs) under the Qadhafi regime was 
the inconsistency between their image as organisations and the reality of their operations, 
which were based on clientele and family relations. In other words, the conditions under 
which they operated determined their character, which was therefore different to what 
would be expected of such organisations in other societies (including those on which 
some of the definitions of civil society discussed in earlier chapters are based.)  
Nonetheless, Libyans continued a degree of activism and volunteerism, despite the legal 
and institutional problems faced by NGOs. 
 
This is a reflection of the way government, rather than society, characterised these 
associations, with the exception of the few capable of serving their beneficiaries, for 
example the al-Nūr association for the visually impaired. The findings of this chapter 
bring into focus a number of different kinds of Libyan association and the impediments 
facing them. With the state system extending heavy control over the public sphere, these 
obstacles shaped the available modes of operation. Despite this, Libyans were able to 
continue a culture of activism and volunteerism throughout the Qadhafi era through the 
various NGOs, though in family and client based forms, rather than as extra-political 
institutions or organisations. 
 
As such, one of the main points discussed above is the lack of associations acting as 
advocacy groups. The majority of them are active simply as charity groups. This apparent 
lack of certain types of associations can be seen as being partly the result of a tendency 
of the state (prior to 2011) to inhibit any social activities falling outside the official 
channels. An advocacy group is by definition in a form of conflict with the government 
while a service group can be dependent on the state for funding. As was discussed in 
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Chapter Four and will be discussed further in the next chapter, the (pre-2011) state 
fiercely opposed views contrary to its own official ideology.  
 
The role given to NGOs was limited and constrained, and therefore it was not feasible for 
these associations to participate in the building of civil society. The fieldwork conducted 
for this study shows that Libyan associations are still fragile and unable to fill the vacuum 
left by the state or the market. In their meeting on 12th and 13th December 2010, the Libyan 
civil associations themselves declared that “they are supplementary to the state” (see the 
statement of this meeting in 2010). Therefore the existing NGOs were only able to operate 
in a quite limited way with at least as many connections with the government as with the 
public. 
 
It cannot be claimed that political and economic reform in Libya came as a result of public 
demands or pressure. Libya’s return to the international community supposedly presaged 
radical domestic reform. The founding of civil society organisations, was more or less a 
response to this return. There were no public demands for civil society (in pre-2011 
Libya) and the only individual who managed to do so and get away with it was Saif al-
Islam. The main why calls for reform did not arise from the bottom up, can be summarised 
as follows: State-building in Libya was not linked to internal processes of generating 
revenue, and the primary internal economic function was to divide among citizens 
revenue that had accrued directly from the marketing of a natural resource or asset under 
state control (Vandewalle, 1998:21). 
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Chapter Seven 
Gaddafi15Foundation 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter will focus on the Gaddafi International Charity and Development 
Foundation (GICDF), which was founded in 2003, and the association organised under 
it. The Foundation played a prominent role in the political life of Libyans in the 
subsequent period up to 2011. It was a unique case as a non-governmental organisation 
because its role went beyond that which is typical of such organisations: acting as a 
mediating body between the state and society, taking responsibility for many projects, 
and engaging in many political issues. It is of key significance that this was an unusual 
‘NGO’- given that, due to its leadership, it was in many ways part of the ruling system. 
The Foundation needs to be examined to ascertain how exactly it related to civil society 
in Libya. 
 
One of the major obstacles that faced the researcher, particularly in writing the first draft, 
is that many resources, especially those related to Chapter Seven, disappeared from the 
internet after the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011. One example is the al-Qadhafi 
Foundation website, which was my primary online source, as well as websites of the 
Libyan newspapers connected with this Foundation.This had a huge effect on some of the 
material and it became difficult for the researcher to review some quotations, which led 
to the deletion of some material from the thesis. 
 
The data presented in this chapter stems from observations and suppositions based on 
examples taken from the Foundation’s activities: the speeches of its chairman at different 
events and interviews - especially those with the Foundation’s executive director, and 
Professor Richard J Robert, a member of the Foundation’s council of trustees. The first 
section will provide an overview of the GICDF as it represents itself in its literature. I 
believe that this should be the first step for studying the Foundation, as it provides 
important ideas concerning the Foundation’s self-conception and basic information for 
the reader. At present this literature is the only source available about the Foundation. In 
                                                 
15 In this chapter I will use “Gaddafi” as the official name when referring to the Gaddafi Foundation, but 
in general I will use “Qadhafi” which is linguistically a more correct spelling.  
174 
 
the second section, I shall study the political character of the GICDF with a view to seeing 
how this differs from that of the NGOs I discussed in Chapter Four. In the third section, 
I will discuss the sustainable development programmes which were adopted by the 
GICDF in fulfilment of the “Millennium Development Goals”. In the fourth section I will 
discuss the contribution of the Foundation in stimulating public debate and examine its 
influence on the development of political awareness. In the fifth section, I shall try to 
answer the following question: what is the relationship between the GICDF and civil 
society (as defined by the World Bank) in Libya? I will focus on the extent to which the 
GICDF can be seen as a contribution. In the sixth section, I will discuss what was perhaps 
the principal achievement of the GICDF, namely the reconciliation of previous opposition 
movements, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group. In the 
seventh section I will cover the GICDF’s efforts to promote human rights in Libya. 
Finally I will briefly examine its apparent role in political and economical reform to see 
to what extent this Foundation played a political role. 
 
7.2 Overview of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation 
According to Anheier (2007:304) a foundation is:  
a non-governmental, non-profit organisation with its own funds (usually 
from a single source - an individual, a family, or a corporation) and 
programme managed by its own trustees and directors; established to 
maintain or aid educational, social, charitable, religious, or other 
activities serving the common welfare, primarily by giving grants to 
other non-profit organisations.  
 
The GICDF will be assessed in the light of this definition. The Foundation defines itself 
in the following way: “The Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation 
(GICDF) is an international non-governmental organisation, which carries out 
developmental and humanitarian activities in the social, economic, cultural and human 
rights fields'' (GICDF Report, 2006). 
 
Although the Foundation had a Libyan name and chairman, it was registered in 2003 in 
Geneva, Switzerland. This does not detract from its Libyan identity because most of its 
funds came from Libyan sources. Although some of its activities are international, some 
elements are based on Libyan policy. Its chairman was Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. The 
Foundation was composed of an executive director who was chosen by its council of 
trustees: 
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1. Professor Benjamin R. Barber. Barker is a theorist and the founder and 
president of the Interdependence movement. He was a consultant in the US and 
other countries such as the UK and Libya. He was a member of the 
International Board of the GICDF until 22 February 2012. He has written 17 
books, one of which is Jihad vs McWorld. He has won several prizes such as 
the Berlin Prize of the American Academy in 2001 (Interdependence 
movement, 2010). 
2. Professor Richard J. Roberts. Roberts was made a Nobel Prize winner in 
physiology or medicine in 1993 and was a member of the GICDF until 24 
February 2012. In 2006 Professor Richard J. Roberts delivered a letter from 
114 Nobel Laureates to the leader of the Libyan mission to the UN, to prevent 
the prosecution of 5 Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor (Nobel Prize, 
2013). 
3. Giulio Andreotti. Andreotti served seven times as the prime minister of Italy 
from 1972 to 1992 (The World Political Forum, 2010). 
4. Jose Claveria de Venecia. De Venecia is a former Speaker of the House of 
Representatives of the Philippines, serving from 1992 to 1998 and from 2001 
to 2008. As Speaker, he was the fourth highest ranking official of 
the Philippines. He was the former president of the Philippines' dominant 
party, LAKAS-CMD. He ran for president in the 1998 election but lost (Books 
Google, 2009). 
5. Dr. ‘Alī Muḥammad al-Ṣalābī. Dr. al-Ṣalābī is an Islamic cleric who spent 8 
years in one of Qadhafi’s prison in Tripoli. He played a significant political 
role in the 2011 Libyan uprising, and is now an important figure in the Libyan 
Brotherhood Movement. (The Telegraph, 2011) 
6. George Papandreou. George Papendreou is the former prime minister of 
Greece and was the president of Socialist International (Sipa, 2010). 
 
7.2.1 GICDF Objectives 
According to its literature, the GICDF set objectives that covered a wide range of 
activities. It emphasised that its mission was made up of two specific aims: development 
and charity. The first of the GICDF's four main goals was to start to foster the emergence, 
creation and support of civil society and to contribute to the development of these aims 
by using volunteers. The GICDF's second goal was to promote practical programmes and 
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initiatives to accelerate comprehensive development. The third goal of the GICDF was to 
protect human rights as a precondition of development, civilisation and prosperity. The 
fourth goal was to offer relief and aid to the victims of disasters. According to the 
executive director Dr.Yūsif Ṣawānī, these objectives were met. He argues that: 
The idea, as publically announced, was to fulfil the objectives of 
development in Libya in addition to carrying out humanitarian and 
charitable activities worldwide. The Foundation indeed played its roles 
in such domains. (The researcher’s interview with Dr.Ṣawānī on 3 
December 2012.) 
 
7.2.2 Financial Resources 
According to its report, the Foundation funded its local and foreign activities from the 
following resources: 
- Contributions from member societies  
- Unconditional grants from the Libyan state  
- Donations from institutions, companies, and societies in Libya and abroad 
- Donations from individuals  
- Revenues from investing the assets of the Foundation through its affiliated 
businesses, which are as follows: 
- First of September Company for International Trade, established in 2002, 
which specialised in importing goods to the local market.  
- First of September Company for Aviation, established in 2002, which 
organised domestic air flights. 
- First of September Company for Investment, established in 2002. 
- First of September Company for Media, established in 1999, as a service 
company working in the field of publication, advertising and exhibitions  
(GICDF report 2005). 
 
In response to a questionnaire written by the researcher, Dr.Yūsif Ṣawānī (the executive 
director of GICDF) referred to other sources of funding: 
we had donations from individual businessmen who wanted to support 
Saif initiatives; international companies working in Libya who adhered 
to the principle of social corporate responsibility; the Jihad Fund, which 
Libya set up in the 1970s to promote good causes; and government 
indirect funding that was earmarked for projects of developmental 
assistance in developing countries (Interview with Dr Yūsif Ṣawānī on 3 
December 2012). 
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7.3 Debate over the GICDF 
The nature of the GICDF16 needs to be understood by placing it in a wider context. Arab 
countries have not experienced the sorts of fundamental democratic changes which have 
occurred in many countries in Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, and even some 
African countries. What they have achieved in the best cases has been a type of partial 
political openness. This openness has provided (before and after 2011) a limited margin 
of democracy. Even that margin of democracy however has been  narrowed this margin 
gradually through the use a variety of justifications, which has infected the process of 
democratic development with a state of inertia and stuttering, and even decline in some 
cases. Thus, the process of transition towards political pluralism that took place prior to 
2011 in several Arab countries for example Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Yemen, 
Mauritania and others, did not lead to a fundamental change in the nature of power and 
methods of governance practiced, where the ruling elites put a set of political, 
administrative, legal and operational practices restrictions in place to control the process, 
making it meaningless and with little real content. In some cases pluralisation was even 
used as a mechanism for updating the nature of the authoritarian ruling regimes. Despite 
the existence of multi-party systems in many Arab countries, political parties were mostly 
ineffective, playing a marginal role in the political process. This was due to the great 
number of restrictions imposed by the ruling regimes on the opposition parties on the one 
hand, and the dominance of the party headed by the head of State over the reins of political 
life, as was the case in Egypt, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Yemen. In addition, the weakness 
of the possibilities for cooperation and coordination between the opposition parties, and 
the lack of grass-roots political parties in the Arab world further hampered change. 
 
There are several other factors that hindered the process of democratization in these 
countries, such as the continued dominance of the executive branch over the legislative 
authority, the weakness of the independence of the judiciary, and the multiplicity of 
human rights violations. All of these practices occurred in the light of legal frameworks 
that included special laws imposing restrictions on the rights and freedoms of citizens. 
 
                                                 
16The GICDF was often known as the Gadhafi Foundation. , as will be stated later, the foundation started 
as the ''The Gaddafi International Foundation for Charity” and then changed to' The Gaddafi International 
Charity and Development Foundation''. 
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There is no doubt, then, that there was only a hesitant process of development of 
democracy in the Arab world. The initiatives towards political pluralism of some Arab 
regimes did not come as a result of those regimes being convinced of the value of 
democracy, or in a belief in the importance and usefulness of the representation of 
competing interests in society through peaceful means, on the desire to establish a new 
social contract between the state and society. Rather, it came as a result of the dynamics 
affecting the ruling regimes, and were intended  to ensure their own continuity, employing 
the rhetoric of political pluralism as a source of political legitimacy .This was particularly 
so where earlier sources of legitimacy for these regimes had become eroded. Regimes 
considered political pluralism as a mechanism that would enable some political and social 
forces to give vent to their political feeling facilitating the task of passing the policies of 
economic stabilization and structural adjustment pursued due to pressure from the IMF 
and the World Bank .Adverse public reactions as a result of continued application of these 
policies could thereby be avoided, lessening the threats to political stability resulting from 
negative economic and social development mainly on the lower and middle classes. 
 
Furthermore, the desire of these regimes was to obtain economic aid and facilities from 
international financial institutions and some Western countries, and this was behind the 
move towards political pluralism to gain a new image and face in the view of the West 
(as ''democratic'' developing countries).In the light of this, one can understand the 
political, legal and administrative constraints imposed by the ''political pluralism'' 
introduced by regimes. Some researchers (Glenn E ـ Robinson, 1998) have called this 
phenomenon the concept of ''defence democracy'', because the actions taken by these 
regimes toward democratic procedures are designed to ensure the continuation of the 
systems, without any fundamental change in the existing autocracy and monopoly. Thus, 
the limited margin of political openness depends on the authority’s views, not on legal or 
democratic framework, and effective and independent civil society organizations.  
  
Part of the explanation for this may be found in the writing of Eva Bellin(2002), where 
the analysis seeks to show that the lack of democracy in the Arab world is linked to the 
limited role played politically by the bourgeoisie. Also, the failure of democratisation, or 
the acceptance of authoritarian regime has been attributed to some factors, such as the 
rentier state paradigm and the lack of independence of civil society from the state. 
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Thus autocratic Arab regimes perceived civil society associations as threats to their 
stability and longevity. They therefore place restrictions on those associations, to limit 
their independence. Elagati states (2012): 
following the emergence of the first independent civic associations 
outside of political parties in the 1980s, Arab states sought to quickly 
oppress, co-opt and control these organizations by imposing restrictive 
laws that provided the state with extensive oversight rights and by 
offering rewards to those organizations willing to comply with 
government restrictions.  
 
Some regimes resorted to installing their own organizations, giving rise to the acronym 
GONGO (Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations), in order to co-opt 
civil society. These organizations seldom represented the true relationship between the 
state and the populace. CSOs in the Arab world lacked protection, autonomy, and 
freedom of action. Sometimes they were merely extensions of the state apparatus.  
 
GICDF can be considered as a Libyan example of a GONGO. The regime inaugurated 
the Foundation to be the vehicle for some political liberalisation and transformation. The 
particular significance of the GICDF was that it involved in the issue of human rights. 
 
The GICDF, to some extent was proclaimed as a non-political instrument, actually served 
to make Qadhafi’s grip on power more secure. It had the name and professed role of an 
NGO but was registered abroad and had political connections. It hid or hindered more 
meaningful change that could have occurred if Libya had independent association in the 
legal and political fields.  
 
The GICDF occupied an uncertain space between an NGO and an overtly political 
organization. This section will show some of the inconsistencies in its identity and 
operations, including the changes that it went through in response to political and 
operational developments.The GICDF stands out as atypical in comparison to other 
NGOs due to its political nature, which will be examined in this section. One of the main 
characteristics of NGOs in Libya was that the legal restrictions (Article No.2) imposed 
upon them prevented involvement in political debate or activity, or in a campaign for a 
particular political party or specific candidate (Salamon and Flaherty, 2000:30). It is 
difficult for the researcher to categorise this Foundation because, at the same time as being 
registered as an NGO in Switzerland, it existed as a political entity in Libya and therefore 
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had the power to engage in activities that went beyond the restrictions imposed on Libyan 
NGOs. There are three further factors making categorisation of the GICDF problematic. 
First, it has never been registered in Libya, because Saif al-Islam was critical of the laws 
governing NGOs and did not want the Foundation to be restricted by them. Second, its 
funds initially came from the Libyan government in a lump sum, although later the 
government mainly funded it through support for projects, such as the $50 million 
reconstruction project to rebuild 1,250 refugee homes in Gaza (from interviews with ex- 
members in the projects departments). Third, the GICDF chairman - the driving force in 
the organization domestic and international affairs- was Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, the son of 
Colonel Muammar Qadhafi, the leader of the revolution. Saif al-Islam became the 
coordinator of the Libyan Socialist Popular Leadership organisation. This position was 
established on 6 October 2009 after Colonel Qadhafi, while attending a commemoration 
for the Union of Free Officers (the movement that planned and executed the 1969 
revolution), called on Libyans to create a formal position for his son so that he could 
properly serve them. As George Joffe (2010:1) points out, this was “a position that made 
Saif al-Islam the second most powerful person in the Libyan hierarchy after his father’’. 
It would, therefore, be misleading to discuss the GICDF in isolation from Saif’s political 
ambitions.  
 
In fact, we can only understand the GICDF dilemma within an Arab world context where 
there is an overlap between the political regime and the family of the country’s leader, 
regardless of his title. Libya is not an exception. In Yemen for example, Ahmed Saleh, 
son of a leader of the Republic, held the presidency of the broad council of the al-Saleh 
Social Foundation for Development. The traditional (western) paradigm (mentioned 
above) the researcher classify Arab institutions such as the GICDF. The paradigm and 
approach are products of western civilisation in terms of a conceptual perspective, and 
are distinct from the question of whether civil society exists or not. This was discussed in 
Chapter Two, from the perspective of Arab scholars. Roca (2005:42) emphasises the 
difficulty of applying the western approaches adapted to individualistic societies to the 
Middle East and the Third World. 
 
In 2005 The GICDF transformed itself from ''The Gaddafi International Foundation for 
Charity” into ''The Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation''. This 
came as a result of the change in the nature of its activities to those which were mainly 
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developmental (Activities Report, 2005/2006:8). It could be said that the GICDF was 
posing as an NGO, playing a political role. The transfer revealed more than a mere change 
in name to a shift in its role and its function; it was an attempt to spread emphasise a more 
political vision, while continuing to engage in charitable functions. The slogan of Saif al-
Islam in his GICDF vision was the transformation of Libya from a Revolution to a State. 
How could this proposal of comprehensive renaissance fit with the mission or role of a 
non-governmental organisation? The following points illustrate how the GICDF assumed 
roles not associated with the aims or attributes of NGOs.  
 
Firstly, that which represents the view of many people opposed to the regime, was that 
this project served as an election campaign; it concerned the “succession of power’’ rather 
than political reform and development. Saif was the most important figure in many 
political activities and decisions, and there was a gradual shift of these responsibilities in 
government tasks, although not officially. Consequently his presence in government 
became a reality. These steps paved the way and gave the programme legitimacy, so that 
he could assume authority. The father, Muammar Qadhafi played a waiting game to fill 
the gap between the previous era and its end. In addition these efforts become associated 
with international campaigns to support steps to improve the country’s image abroad: to 
rid it of its association with terrorism.  
 
Secondly, Saif al-Islam, in addressing the new generation’s aspirations, was 
acknowledging the influence of global changes, especially the information revolution, 
and the suffering caused to Libya by international sanctions; further, he wished to 
demonstrate that Libya had learned important lessons from its past. The conflicting 
aspects of the GICDF's identity make it difficult to classify, but do shed light on the 
internal conflicts of the structures of Libyan power 
 
In conclusion, the GICDF had some aspects of NGOs through the associations belonging 
to it which operated in the field of charities, and its efforts to open the stage for freedom 
of speech and the most essential one that its involvement of human rights issue 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
7.4 Human Rights 
Human rights are at the centre of and an invariable principle of humanity on the global 
agenda. Libya tried to integrate into international society by adapting its profile. However, 
the steps which had been taken by Qadhafi’s regime did not meet the minimum 
international standards. The Libyan Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that: 
over the past decade Libya dramatically transformed its international 
status from a pariah state under UN, EU and US sanctions to a country 
that, in 2009 alone, held the Presidency of the UN Security Council, the 
chair of the African Union and the Presidency of the UN General 
Assembly. But this transformation in Libya’s foreign policy has not 
galvanised an equivalent transformation of Libya’s human rights record 
which remains poor, despite some limited progress in recent years 
(Human Rights Watch Report, December 2009:1). 
 
It is indisputable that human rights have become one of the factors of concern in domestic 
and international policy. It has also become a significant element of international 
relationships between states and international organisations such as the United Nations.  
 
On 10 December 2009, The Human Rights Society of the GICDF issued its first annual 
report which included seven topics: civil society; information and the press; state security; 
Abūsilīm  prison; torture in detention and arrest locations; women’s issues; illegal 
immigration; and international organisations. In its introduction it states that “our efforts 
make a clear difference on the map of human rights work and humanitarian action within 
Libya over the past years’’ (GICDF: 2010). 
 
The above report was the subject of The Secretariat of General People's Conference in 
2010. A letter to all the secretariats of the federations, trade unions and professional 
associations asked them to study the report issued by the GICDF. The letter stressed the 
need to fill the gaps and correct imbalances, as well as acknowledging the positive points 
in the report. The letter emphasised the use of facts and documents to refute the fabricated 
information which existed in the report. It also asked those concerned to address the 
themes which were not consistent with the Jamahiri community's ideas, such as 
community ownership of public information. The letter called for this to be done in a 
democratic manner transcending the visions of individuals rather than the will of the 
society. The implication in Qadhafi’s request was to ask for radical solutions to the 
problems of humanity as contained in the Green Book. The letter concluded by requesting 
them to be patient and objective in dealing with all views, especially those that 
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undermined well-established principles. The homeland is for all and is based on diversity 
(Almanara, July 2010). 
 
In response to the contents of a speech by a member of the Secretariat of the General 
People's Conference, the Human Rights Association issued a statement which clarified 
several points related to the report, claiming that:  
The contents of the Association’s report pertaining to the freedom of 
press and civil society, and the freedom of trade unions, is in fact a claim 
that the Libyan State meets its obligations resulting from its adherence to 
international legitimacy represented in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the two International Covenants on Human Rights, 
particularly that the State has already taken a positive step in this regard 
by publishing these documents in the Legislation Code in the special 
issue of May 20, 2009, and thus the provisions of these documents have 
become part of the Libyan national legislation corpus which makes it 
incumbent on all parties and public authorities, including the judiciary to 
act according to their provisions and to accord them priority over 
domestic legislations in case of disagreement. (Human Rights 
Association, 7.1.2010) 
 
The statement emphasised that: 
The association believes that the point which dissatisfied the member of 
the Secretariat is the question of civil society, and particularly the 
statement concerning trade unions whose affairs are entrusted to this very 
member; the Association emphasises each letter and word it included in 
its report regarding civil society, and calls upon the said member of the 
General People's Conference to refute the argument with a counter-
argument, and evidence with counter- evidence. The memory of trade 
unions is still full of lots of tragedies that accompanied their performance, 
including direct intervention in the most exclusive of its private affairs 
and particularly setting forth the rules for (choosing) selecting against the 
law, and the lack of respect for the Trade Union law and executive 
regulations, as well as their statutes. (Human Rights Association, 
7.1.2010) 
 
On 12 December 2010, the Human Rights Association of the GICDF issued its second 
annual report for the year 2010. The report included many issues: civil society 
organisations, the state security court, missing people, those blocked from travel, state 
prisons, Libyan prisoners, and returnees from abroad, non-implementation of judicial 
decisions, Libyan nationality, media and journalists. The report noted significant 
improvement on some issues and failures in others. Therefore, the secretariat of the 
General People’s Conference continued to intervene in the affairs of trade unions, 
federations and professional Conference. In regard to NGO associations, the Human 
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Rights Association called for the abolition or amendment of law No. 19 which restricted 
their role in matters such as funding and dealing with political affairs, which were to be 
practised only through the official channels (Basic People’s Conferences) as required by 
the rules of public order.  
 
The Human Rights Association demanded the cancellation of the state security court 
because it replaced the people’s court which was established as a result of exceptional 
circumstances and conditions, but the legislator did not abolish it. The Association did 
not give sufficient attention to the issues surrounding Abūsilīm  Prison, but it praised the 
open direct dialogue that the administrative body conducted with victims’ families.  
 
The report addressed one of the painful issues in Libya’s human rights record, at both 
national and international levels: that of the missing. These people had disappeared 
without their kin knowing their places of detention, or whether they were alive or dead. 
Thus, the Association called on all state institutions to take responsibility for detection 
and di   sclosure in this issue, which had created legal and administrative difficulties 
resulting from the lack of knowledge of the fate of missing people. 
 
The Association received many complaints from citizens who had been prevented from 
travelling, which is against all laws, including the law of The Promotion of Freedom. The 
Association emphasised that the freedom of movement inside and outside Libya is a 
constitutional right confirmed by Libyan and international laws.  
 
As for the state of prisons, the Association noted that some prisons were not subject to 
judicial scrutiny, specifically those detaining political prisoners, since a large number of 
these prisoners had been arrested without a warrant from the prosecution. There were also 
a number of prisoners who had finished their sentence but had not been released. It was 
noted that Libyan prisons did not reach basic international standards. 
 
The difficulty in attributing responsibility for crimes and outrages in the prison system 
was due to the lack of certainty and information about the numbers involved and the 
circumstances. It is difficult to speculate about how successful the GICDF would have 
been in implementing reforms, given the violent course of the regime in its final days. 
The Association expressed surprise that several public bodies had stalled in taking the 
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necessary administrative procedures to support returnees from abroad and released 
prisoners back into work. The Association also called upon the General People's 
Committee to carry out all procedures to ensure their integration economically and 
socially.  
 
The report emphasised the issue of Libyan nationality. The Association had received a 
number of petitions from people for Libyan nationality, some of whom have been resident 
for more than thirty years and some with Libyan roots. This humanitarian issue is very 
important because stateless people and their families faced many problems (GICDF 
Report, 2010). I followed the general course of events relating to the Libya Press Agency 
and the Oea newspaper, specifically: the fate of their workers, the way in which the 
authority dealt with the incident and the arrest of journalists, which was contrary to the 
law. At the end of its report, the Society called upon the Libyan legislators to expedite the 
issuing of the Constitution as a reference which defined the rights and duties of 
individuals; which set guidelines for determining the work of state institutions, in order 
to prevent conflict and overlap; and identified the legal and political position of all public 
utilities. It stated that the absence of a constitution facilitated the adoption of contradictory 
legislation, and undermined protection against human rights violations. In the absence of 
a clear constitution that defined the branches of government and regulated the relationship 
between them, i.e. stipulating the separation of power, security agencies operated with 
impunity. 
 
However, the Association emanated positive signals towards the GICDF’s efforts in the 
field of human rights. They gave examples of these efforts, such as the release of hundreds 
of political prisoners and prisoners of conscience. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi initiated a 
dialogue with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). 
 
According to the UN’s reports and principals, human rights should be considered a 
fundamental and democratic right which allows individuals to fully participate in the 
decision-making process with the authority, and to determine rights and duties without 
fear of the state. These rights and freedoms should not be seen as gift from the state as a 
separate entity from society, in which the people fear its authority and hope for its mercy 
(UN, 2004.2005.2012). The GICDF played a significant role in improving human rights, 
and reduced the number of violations, but did not abolish them. The evidence of this 
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failure is found in the criticism by international organisations of Libya's record in this 
field. The Association’s role was limited only to denunciation and condemnation, such as 
that of an external organisation, whose mission is only to draw attention to the violation 
of human rights. 
 
On 15 December 2010, the GICDF announced that it would no longer include advocacy 
for political and human rights reform among its activities. This will be discussed in 
another section of this chapter; here we will see how this decision affected the Human 
Rights Association and the issue of human rights in Libya.  
 
On 17 December 2010 the Human Rights Association surprised everyone by announcing 
its independence from the GICDF and issued a short statement which said that: 
Following the annual meeting of the Board of Trustees in Londonon14-
16 December 2010, the Association reviewed its report which included 
the focus on activity in the field of philanthropy and development. On 
this occasion, the Human Rights Association, which had already 
established its founding organisation, and was then joined to the GICDF 
like the other associations, would like to emphasise the continuation of 
its activities and its mission according to its implementation of 
regulations as an independent human rights association. 
 
Consequently, the Secretary-General of the Libyan Human Rights Society of the GICDF, 
Muḥammad al-‘Alāqī, resigned from his post for health and social reasons. It is worth 
noting that Muḥammad held the presidency for two years after the resignation of the 
previous head, Dr.Jum‘ah ‘Atayqa. At the end of each year he issued an annual report on 
the state of human rights in Libya (Libya Alyoum, 2010).  
 
There were significant concerns about being targeted by law No. 19 (2001), because the 
Human Rights Association was operating under the protection of the name of the GICDF, 
which had been established in Switzerland and was subject to the law of NGOs, with Saif 
al-Islam as its head. This was the case for any association operating in Libya. Thus, this 
association found itself subject to the restrictions of law No 19, and not only were its 
activities restricted, but it feared that it would find it difficult to continue its work, or at 
least the impetus for it would become very difficult. In practice the first test was when 
the government arrested Jamāl al-Hajjī in January, 2011. 
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The GICDF has in fact done very much to help the human rights situation in Libya and 
has played a significant role in breaking the barrier of silence. However, the way in which 
the GICDF adapted to improve human rights and how it justified violations, were 
questionable. It addressed violations within a framework of forgetfulness rather than 
accountability and justice. For example, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi stated that: 
Many of these assassinations and these violations are not justified and 
they have been carried out by individuals who blamed the revolutionary 
system and Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi. However this is not right; these 
people decided to do such things themselves, but everything is blamed 
on Muammar Qadhafi and the revolution (Al- Jazeera, 2005). 
 
7.5 GICDF Activities Aimed at Motivating Public Debate 
Perhaps one of the greatest successes of the GICDF is that it exhibited a strong tendency 
in motivating public debate through its focus on the media; it established two newspapers 
and two satellite channels. This reflected the GICDF’s efforts to challenge the stagnancy 
of debate due to the lack of freedom of speech. It created spaces for people, especially 
intellectuals and journalists to interact with each other and engage in issues that concerned 
them and the public. Before the establishment of the GICDF, the government did little to 
address the neglect of social issues and public opinion. 
 
I will discuss the contribution of the GICDF in stimulating public debate in two ways. 
First, in its role in opening a door to mass media such as the press, satellite channels and 
radio, and also the kinds of issues that arose in discussions through these media. Second, 
the GICDF encouraged qualitative change that emerged after it opened up files and 
addressed thorny issues affecting people in all walks of life. In fact, it was difficult to 
approach or even mention issues, such as human rights, because they were seen as taboo. 
I shall also examine the influence of the GICDF on the development of civil society, as 
well as the view that corruption is a result of the absence of civil society organisations 
and transparency. 
 
I will discuss whether or not this has helped to promote and strengthen public awareness 
of the need for civil society. I shall also trace the development of the approaches taken by 
the GICDF towards specific issues, such as Islamic groups. By following this course, it 
is possible to see how the GICDF has shaped the discourse about these issues in the 
Libyan context. This chapter reveals the vital role played by the GICDF in the political 
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life of Libya, and discusses the idea of civil society in terms of the language in which it 
has been framed in Libyan political discourse by the GICDF.  
 
7.5.1 Newspapers and TV Channels 
Following the emergence of the GICDF, speech became freer as the media started to 
disclose information about critical issues such as corruption and poverty. In addition, the 
GICDF went further by talking about the need for a constitution, which had previously 
been a major taboo for the government. The number of electronic newspapers also 
increased as well as the range of subjects discussed in them. The press law issued by the 
Revolutionary Command Council in 1972 nationalised all the mass media, thus placing 
TV and radio stations totally under the control of the government. This censorship 
resulted in the suppression of public debate. By 2007 however, a new language began to 
emerge in the media, with words such as “reform”, “democracy”, “elections”, “human 
rights” and a “booming economy” (see for example Almanara, Oya, Cyrene and Libya 
Alyom). In 2005 the GICDF launched the Libyan Satellite Channel, Allibiya, and Allibiya 
Radio. These stations played a notable role in relation to many social, economic and 
political issues, which were neglected in the past. However, it was still forbidden to 
discuss certain issues: for example, a poor health service; delays in salary payments; low 
educational levels and a lack of basic necessities in schools; nepotism in employment; 
cartels in the marketplace, providing property for members of the conference secretariats 
and popular committees; and corruption in general. These channels were for the general 
public rather than just the elite. 
Two newspapers, Oea in Tripoli and Quryna (Cyrene) in Benghazi, were established on 
the 20 August 2007 (Almanara, 2010). However, their set-up did not lead to free speech, 
especially since the Penal Code, which imposed restrictions on the freedom of expression, 
was still in effect. Nevertheless, a 2009 Human Rights Watch Report admitted that, “the 
two new private newspapers and the internet have created a new limited space for freedom 
of expression” (Human Rights Developments in Libya: Truth and Justice Can’t Wait). 
 
On 4 November 2010, the print version of the Oea newspaper was suspended again on 
the order of the Prime Minister, al-Baghdādī ‘Alī al-Maḥmūdī. No official reason for this 
decision was ever given (see all news agencies, November 4, 2010). However, it did come 
after Oea published an article on 28 October 2010 entitled, “Libya; where to this time?” 
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which focused on the high level of corruption in Libya at that time. The newspaper 
stressed that Libya had reached a crisis in “the practice of the Authority of the People” 
and the administration of the State because of what it described as “thieves”, “corruption” 
and “traffickers”. However, it proposed that the solution to these problems would be the 
fulfilment of the idea of a “final assault” on the government as referred to in Qadhafi’s 
speech in Misurata (August, 2008). It called on members of the Revolutionary Command 
Council to assume leadership positions in the country. In particular, the newspaper stated: 
“Thus, what if the leader requested his comrades, whom he released from the burden of 
four thousand days of underground work, to rise up on 1st September 1969”. The 
newspaper listed the names and suggested tasks for each:  
1. Major ‘Abd al-Salām Jallūd: Secretariat of the General People’s 
Committee (the Prime Minister); 
2. Major General Musṭafā al-Kharūbī: Secretary of the General People's 
Conference (the President of Parliament); 
3. General al-Khuwwīldī al-Hamīdī: to oversee the Security Services 
(Minister of Interior Affairs); 
4. Marshal Abū Bakir Yūnis Jābir: Head of the People's Committee for 
Defence (Commander of the Army), (Oea, 2010). 
 
These men, working as a team with Qadhafi as their leader, would take collective 
responsibility for the fulfilment of the idea of the “final assault”, which would no longer 
tolerate delays in restoring the “revolution’s purity”, and would take swift action to 
eradicate the evil trinity of bribery, nepotism and corruption. In this way, they would 
confront the conspiracy against the People’s Authority, including tampering with the 
decisions of the masses and administrative corruption.  
 
The article in Oea became a sensation, especially for Major ‘Abd al-Salām Jallūd. The 
newspaper proposed that he should take the position of Head of the General People's 
Committee which is equivalent to Prime Minister. This came in spite of Jallūd having 
retired from political life 17 years earlier. Jallūd was somewhat different from Qadhafi, 
in that he believed that projects, programmes and policies should be based on strategy 
and meticulous planning rather than dreams and ideology. With this in mind, he tried to 
build a strong bureaucratic state. However, Qadhafi saw this kind of state as dictatorial 
and instead tried to create a new kind of state which he called the “mass state” (al-
Jamāhīriya). In fact, the relationship between Jallūd and Qadhafi was often in conflict. 
Jallūd was reluctant to endorse some of Qadhafi’s ideas, such as The Great Man-Made 
River Project, in collaboration with Morocco and the situation whereby Egypt became a 
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broker between Libya and the Western countries, in what was known as the Lockerbie 
Case.  
 
Since the newspaper was not completely independent from the state, many thought that 
this article was in line with the leadership's desire to find a way out of the congestion of 
state as was then being experienced by the country.  
 
Another article published on 21 October 2010 created significant debate about the major 
Libyan media, especially within the al-Ghad media group and the exile sites. This topic 
was published in newspapers and discussed at a meeting convened by a notable member 
of the Revolutionary Committee’s movement, namely the President of the Centre for the 
Study and Research of the Green Book. In this meeting, as reported by Oea, he called for 
the establishment of the Association’s aim to prevent Libyans who had returned from 
exile in the West from assuming any position in the future. He was directing his comments 
at the al-Ghad media group’s journalists who were living in exile, especially in the UK. 
Conservatives criticised the leadership of al-Ghad because they were living outside of 
Libya during a difficult period in the country’s confrontation with Western countries 
when sanctions were in play. The conservatives believed they were taking a hard line and 
standing up for Libya in the confrontation. 
 
Subsequently on 7 November 2010, ten journalists from the al-Ghad media group (which 
included Quryna weekly, a radio station, and the Libya Press news agency) were arrested 
by Libyan’s internal security agency. Then on 9 November 2010, the number of 
journalists arrested increased to twenty with no reasons given. The next day Qadhafi 
issued an instruction for the release of all the journalists and ordered an investigation into 
who was behind the decision to arrest them. 
 
On 10 November 2010 Sulaymān Dūghah, the head of the al-Ghad Media Group, 
resigned. He justified his actions by stating that “he was unable to do anything to help his 
colleagues”, adding that “it seemed that society was not tolerant of other opinions”. The 
following day Oea took on the new title, Sabah Oea (Oea Morning), under a new editor. 
At this time, questions emerged over whether, as Reuters (2010:8) pointed out, the Libyan 
leader’s son had been involved in a “turf war with [the] old guard”, and whether there had 
been “an apparent escalation of a power struggle inside the country’s ruling elite”. Oea, 
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which was still available online, had helped spearhead a limited opening up of freedom 
of speech in Libya by printing articles alleging official corruption and incompetence that 
would have been unthinkable a few years earlier. ‘Ashūr Shāmis, editor of akhbar-
libyaonline.com (17 November 2010), said that “Quadafi is trying to make himself the 
‘referee.’ He is also, I think, enjoying the fight.”  
 
Some Libyan writers such as, Jum‘ah al-Qmāṭī, have wondered whether this was “a blow 
to the Muslim Brotherhood”, because almost all of the al-Ghad journalists belonged to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. This included Sulaymān Dūghah, the head of the al-Ghad 
media group who took this position in 2009, when he faced denunciations from so-called 
conservatives. Furthermore, Dūghah added that Saif al-Islam was inconsistent in his 
support of the media. It was a very short honeymoon and ended quickly between him and 
the Muslim Brotherhood (Libya al-Mostakbbal, 2010).  
 
The Deputy Programme Director for Amnesty International in the Middle East and North 
Africa, Ḥassība Ḥadj Sahraoui, said that “nice words about freedom of expression are 
meaningless when the government rejects calls to amend penal code provisions that 
criminalise peaceful dissent”. At the same time, the director of HRW and Amnesty 
International pointed out that: 
Libya's refusal to consider amending those provisions came in the same 
week in which its Internal Security Agency (ISA) arbitrarily detained 20 
journalists for three days. Security forces frequently harass journalists 
and overly broad provisions of the penal code serve as the basis for 
frequent charges of criminal defamation when they exercise their right to 
freedom of expression (hrw, 2010).  
 
The result of these escalations in the action taken by the Libyan state against the 
journalists in 2010 ended in ‘stalemate’, according to a Reuters report (17November 
2010) published at the time: 
A new round in a power struggle between reformers and defenders of the 
status quo in Libya showed that Muammar Qadhafi alone will decide 
which path the country will take, and he is not yet ready to give his 
verdict. The latest row which pitted a pro-reform son of the Libyan leader 
against powerful conservatives in the government ended with no outright 
winner, just stalemate and prolonged uncertainty about the oil exporter's 
future direction (Christian Lowe, Reuters: 2010). 
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What is interesting about this was that during all of the events described above, Saif al-
Islam and the GICDF were completely silenced. Even the Oea newspaper, which had 
shown itself to be in favour of reform when it published an article about corruption in 
Libya, recommended the army as the solution rather than democratic action involving 
civil society organisations. The fact that the Oea took this position is strong evidence for 
the absence of civil society institutions in Libyan society as well as within the reform 
camp itself. 
 
It is difficult to draw conclusions from these events because the decision-making 
processes were highly personal. However, the question as to the nature of the problem 
remains wholly ambiguous. This experience was not a rich one and we cannot benefit 
from comparisons in the future because the journalists were neither arrested for any clear 
reasons, nor prosecuted. Furthermore, they were arrested by the authorities in charge of 
the judiciary, and while they were not released as a direct result of legal challenges to 
their detention, they did ultimately gain their freedom. In this way, their cases helped to 
develop the effectiveness of institutions such as the judiciary, as well as contributing to 
the struggle for press freedom in Libya. Nevertheless, it also ended in a vague 
paternalistic manner which conformed with the traditional methods for dealing with 
issues in Libya. Indeed, this provides further evidence of the weakness and fragility of 
freedom of speech in Libya, as discussed above. 
 
On 7 December 2010, the Libya Press agency decided to close its office in Tripoli because 
of “security harassment”. According to them, the decision was taken after security 
agencies told the leadership of the al-Ghad Corporation that the “presence” of the Libya 
Press agency inside Libya “was undesirable”. The Libya Press agency added that “in such 
circumstances” it was obliged to protect its correspondents in Libya. Amnesty 
International was concerned that the decision to close the Libya Press agency, the only 
privately-owned news agency in Libya, was the latest in a rising series of government 
attacks on non-state owned media in the country, which risked further narrowing the 
media landscape and scope of freedom of expression (Amnesty International, 2010). 
 
The process, however, also reflected the more general continuing need to press for laws 
to be passed within a legal framework by a legislative body commissioned to carry out 
such tasks. Despite talk about the freedom of the press and the increasing margins for free 
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speech in Libya at that time, on the ground these things were still being violated; 
Muḥammad al-Ṣirīṭī, a journalist in Benghazi was severely injured in an attack on the 
street and then withdrawn from hospital by the state authorities to investigate complaints 
against him. This attack may have been provoked by an article he published on al-Jazeera 
Net on 2 August 2010, concerning poverty in Libya in spite of the country’s wealth. The 
paradox was that the GIDCF was the first institution to issue a statement about the 
incident, claiming, “[t]he investigations did not show any violations of human rights or 
any relationship with the press, but that the attack on al-Ṣirīṭī was a criminal incident in 
the street which some journalists have taken advantage of to gain fame”. The GICDF 
went further in this statement, defending the state security apparatus by pointing out that, 
“it is a Libyan institution which has a mission to maintain the security of this country and 
to defend it according to the law” (Almanara, 2010).In addition, the Human Rights 
Association, as a civil society association, monitors the performance of this association 
and other institutions according to standing conventions (Almanara, 2010). 
 
The lack of independent press and freedom of information in Libya, were addressed by 
the Human Rights Associations in its annual report in 2009, which stressed that: “the 
society suggests that all media organisations are still state-owned, and monopolised by 
the State alone, and that restrictions and obstacles are still hindering the granting of 
licenses to issue privately-owned, independent publications, although the current press 
law allows for the private practice of journalism” (Human Rights Association, 2009). 
 
Saif al-Islam, as quoted by another newspaper, Libya Today, stated that there was a need 
for a proper environment of press freedom incorporating the right to express opinions and 
criticisms of the state, which should be protected by the institutions and laws of the latter.  
 
In 2006 the GICDF established the Publication of Information Centre in order to keep 
pace with the activities of the institution and its affiliates as well as the issue of annual 
reports. Yet, the editor of the Afāq magazine noted that at that time the Foundation’s 
activities in the field of publishing were limited to annual reports. By the end of 2009, the 
GICDF had published the first issue of its quarterly magazine, Afāq, which covered the 
GICDF’s activities.  
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There is still a shortage of laws regulating the press in Libya. It is for this reason that Saif 
al-Islam highlighted the need for a charter of the press to regulate media workers in terms 
of their rights and duties. In regard to funding such a development, he emphasised that he 
was considering a stable source of income whereby the services of the future could be 
funded. This would have involved a long-term endowment, known as waqf, which would 
provide an independent source of legal, administrative and material assistance to media 
organisations. Al-Islam claimed that this would have been the ultimate solution for 
companies facing shortfalls in funding (Libyan Press, 9 July 2010). 
 
7.6 Creating Civil Society Associations 
In this section I will attempt to answer three questions. First, what was the relationship 
between the GICDF and civil society in Libya? Second, what could the GIDCF have done 
to contribute to the “building of civil society?” Finally, in what ways did the GICDF 
contribute to building civil society? Supporting the development of civil society was 
considered by the GICDF to be its most important purpose. It stated in one of its reports 
that: “among the most important goals of the Foundation is the building and consolidation 
of civil society by promoting the creation of associations and supporting them” (GICDF 
Report, 2007:08). Accordingly, I will investigate the GIDCF’s attempts to build civil 
society and the public discourse generated as a result.  
 
The main resources for this section will be the GICDF’s annual reports and an interview 
with its executive director. In its activity report for 2007-08, the organisation stated that, 
among other things, it “participated in internal and external activities related to civil 
society, such as the Fourth NGOs Forum held in Libya between 25-27 December 2007, 
and the International Conference on Islam and Aids, which was held in South Africa 
between 26-29 November 2007”. Additionally, the GICDF hosted other kinds of 
activities in response to requests from local and international non-governmental and 
volunteering organisations (GICDF Report, 2007:8). 
 
7.6.1 Qadhafi Website for Citizens’ Complaints 
In 2004 the GICDF launched the Qadhafi Website for Citizens’ Complaints, or “Nedaa 
al-Qadhafi”, as a channel of direct communication with citizens (GICDF Report, 2005). 
According to GICDF reports, this website received: 
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[a] total of 444 complaints mostly about violations, abuses and assaults 
on rights, and claims for compensation against certain public bodies, 
including the security services, inter alia. Most of these complaints were 
forwarded to the competent authorities for consideration and elimination 
of abuses if there were any (GICDF Report, 2008-2009:12). 
 
7.6.2 Community Civil Society Bureau  
In 2005 the GICDF established the Community and Civil Society Bureau which had the 
aim of building up the capacities of civil society. The GICDF set the goals of this body 
as follows: 
- To attempt to expand civil society in various forms of volunteering and civil 
work, and to seek its development and integration in the overall development 
dynamics with a view to inculcate the values of democratic dialogue, 
partnership and collective action. 
- To oversee the work of societies affiliated with the Foundation and facilitate 
the performance of their activities. 
- To communicate with civil society organisations, to implement joint action 
activities and programmes, to achieve integration among them and to 
strengthen the role of civil action in overall community development.  
- To contribute in improving the organisational, planning and implementation 
capacities of civil society organisations, to encourage and support the 
initiatives they undertake, and to motivate their members and collaborators. 
 
In its report for the years 2005-06, the GICDF stressed that its aim was, “promoting 
volunteerism and civil society based on volunteerism”, adding that “[t]his is for the 
benefit of both the volunteer and the beneficiary”. This goal led the GICDF to establish 
five NGOs with the aim of strengthening the organisational capacities of civil society. 
The common goal of these organisations was to serve as model NGOs for Libya, by 
undertaking to support local groups such as, the poor and needy, deprived children, and 
international institutions serving humanitarian goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
196 
 
7.6.3 New Associations 
The GICDF created five different associations in order to build NGOs and support their 
activities, and thus to promote the principles of civil society. There were as follows: 
1. The Libyan National Association for Drug Control. This was 
established in 1994 in order to carry out studies and research about 
drug abuse and ways of addressing it, and also to support those 
recovering from drug problems by offering social and psychological 
support and reintegrating them into society (GICDF Report, 2005-
06:11). 
2. The Human Rights Association. This was established in 1999 to 
address, among other things, the issues of protecting, defending and 
respecting human rights and basic freedoms; it also had the aim of 
deepening the principles of human rights as set out in international 
charters and national laws, and creating awareness of these issues 
(GICDF Report, 2005-06:11). One reason for the emphasis laid upon 
these issues was the human rights dilemma in Libya at the time, 
particularly in light of political prisoners held by the state who had 
become a major focal point of international human rights 
organisations.  
3. The Association for the Vulnerable on Earth. This was established in 
2001 with the aim of defending people and groups exposed to 
oppression because of their attitudes toward rights and justice, or as a 
result of struggles against colonialism (GICDF Report, 2007-2008:3). 
According to an interview with a GICDF member this association did 
not operate on the ground.  
4. The Association of Brothers in the South. This was established in 2003 
with the objective of focusing on Africa's various issues: development, 
healthcare, education and traditional industries (GICDF Report, 2005-
06:12). It seems that this association was very active.  
5. The De-Mining Association. This was established in 2004 in order to 
remove and prevent the laying of landmines and to offer assistance to 
those who had been harmed by landmines (GICDF Report, 2005-
06:12). 
 
Nevertheless, despite the GICDF establishing these institutions, the domain of civil 
society still had many weak points, as the chairman of the GICDF revealed at the 
American University in Cairo in May 2010. He stated that one of the most important 
challenges facing Libya was how to build a strong civil society that would serve the 
country. He added that “[t]he GICDF is a Swiss foundation, not Libyan. It had registered 
in Geneva because it is difficult to establish a foundation in Libya. The GICDF is an 
independent association, which includes associations for Human Rights, the removal of 
mines and the treatment of addiction” (Saif al Islam’s speech at the American University 
in Cairo, 2010). 
197 
 
Furthermore, the Human Rights Association, in its first annual report of 2009, criticised 
the state of civil society in Libya: 
Trade unions, federations and vocational associations are still under full 
control of Trade Union Affairs at the General People's Conference that 
interfered wantonly in the selection of their secretariats and in the 
drafting of their statutes, and thus deprived them of any form of 
autonomy, and we do not need to recall here the experiences suffered by 
the Bar Association, the Authors’ and Writers’ Associations and other 
unions (Human Rights Association Report, 2009: 2). 
 
In the same report the association emphasised that: 
[w]ith regard to law (19) on associations, which is still suffocating all 
thoughts or intentions to establish an association, it is urgently required 
to repeal this law, and we do not believe that anyone would consider 
establishing an association under its unjust provisions. The experiences 
of the Centre for Democracy, and the Justice Society for Human Rights, 
which were cancelled after their promulgation, are still fresh in our minds 
(Human Rights Association Report, 2009: 2-3). 
 
The report called upon the legislator to review these laws and to consider whether there 
was a need for them to be changed or amended to guarantee that civil society associations 
were able to serve the needs of society. 
 
7.6.4 The Rise of Public Debate about Civil Society 
(a) The Debate on Civil Society in Libya  
The GICDF tried to engage Libyan society in many ways through its activities and it 
motivated public debate. One could say that the GICDF opened the door for the public 
on many issues, such as the constitution and the change of laws, and for the first time, the 
civil society and the legitimacy of the revolutionary committees were discussed in public. 
On 7 September 2010, the Lawyer Syndicate in Tripoli in conjunction with The Human 
Rights Association of the GICDF held a symposium entitled, “Civil Society 
Organisations, the Reality and Expectations”. This conference was witness to calls for the 
active role of civil institutions in Libyan society to be allowed to emerge. Furthermore, 
there were criticisms of Law No.19 which governed associations in Libya: it was 
described as the “notorious law”. 
 
This conference was followed by many articles on various sites covering civil society in 
Libya. The main question that arose from these discussions was whether Libya needed 
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such institutions, with the supporters and opponents of associations clashing over the 
matter.  
 
The most important result to come out of the aforesaid symposium was the argument of 
“the illegality of the Revolutionary Committees Movement” in accordance with Law 
No.71 (issued in 1972), which criminalised all political parties. This argument was based 
on a paper written by the lawyer, ‘Umar al-Ḥabāssī, who classified the Revolutionary 
Committees Movement as a political party for several reasons including the following: 
- It deals with political affairs and interacts with them in order to gain the upper 
hand;  
- It has a headquarters in each city district and in rural areas; 
- It is required to take any position from the main conference so that the General 
People's Committee and the General People's Conference belong to the 
membership;  
- The membership can report or identify internal and external policies of the 
State; 
- All the current and the former trustees (ministers) are members of this 
movement. 
 
Although the Revolutionary Committees Movement had the same qualities as political 
parties, it possessed an additional characteristic which separated it from the party system: 
the freedom to become or cease to be a member of the Revolutionary Committee at any 
time. In response to the symposium mentioned above, the al-Zaḥf al-’Akhḍar newspaper, 
which came under the supervision of the Liaison Office, published an article entitled, 
“The failures of the Revolutionary Committees Movement” (No5936, 03.10.2010). In 
fact, this article is considered to mark a radical change in the movement’s discourse. The 
writer ‘Ali Būjāzyah argued that the Revolutionary Committees Movement did not differ 
a great deal from other political movements in terms of swinging between success and 
failure.  
 
There is a need to criticise political movements, particularly with regard to how they 
attempt to overcome setbacks and failures in achieving their goals. Therefore, it became 
legitimate to question the fairness of the Revolutionary Committees as well as their 
supposed successes in achieving their goals. 
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According to Būjāzyah, a prominent member of the Revolutionary Committee 
Movement, the movement had been more effective in the early stages of the establishment 
of the People’s Authority. He argued that the growing passivity and carelessness of the 
Revolutionary Committees (RCs) towards the level of abstention from political 
participation in the People’s Authority, had given rise to a diffuse belief that the 
movement was old-fashioned and out of place. Būjāzyah warned that the derailing of the 
RCs was taking the country to an uncertain future and finished his article with a call for 
an immediate act of reform before it was too late (al-Zaḥf al-Akhḍar, 2010). 
 
While the above article can be described as moderate, using acceptable and discursive 
language, it was the first time that the Revolutionary Committees Movement was 
described as having similarities to political movements, and as such, it should have been 
open to challenge and criticism. This may be considered a turning point for the 
Movement. Saif al-Islam, in an interview with al-Jazeera, noted that, “the Revolutionary 
Committees have to become part of civil society, and that this will help them to get rid of 
the negative elements in them” (al-Jazeera, 2007). 
 
During mid-December 2010, the Revolutionary Committee Liaison Office investigated a 
number of human rights activists, including ‘Azza al-Maqhūr and Muḥammad al-‘Alāqī, 
because they had written essays discussing civil society institutions and calling for real 
civil society in Libya. The investigation also targeted ‘Abd al-Salām Diqīmish, Secretary 
of the Tripoli Bar Association, Muḥammad Salīm and ‘Umar al-Ḥabāsī, due to their 
participation in the symposium, “Civil Society Organisations, the Reality and 
Expectations”, and called for the repeal of the Revolutionary Committees as a party.  
 
(b) Benghazi Lawyer’s Syndicate Crisis 
The second important issue which raised public debate was the GICDF’s concern about 
the Benghazi Lawyers Syndicate Crisis. On 23 September 2010 the Lawyers Syndicate 
in Benghazi held a meeting to choose a new board, one year after the period of tenure of 
the previous board of directors had expired. However, the previous board refused to step 
down and blocked the selection of its successor. This being the case, the meeting was 
held in the street where a new board was elected to represent those present. A statement 
was also issued at the meeting which states in the introduction:  
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The continued legal absence of the lawyers’ union and its transformation 
into a de facto unit limits its ability to serve its members and creates a 
situation which allows others to intervene in and cause harm to lawyers’ 
work.  
 
 This situation damaged the ability of lawyers to carry out their duties as partners in 
judiciary processes, and also had a negative impact on the values of justice and the rights 
and freedoms of the whole of society (Almanara, 2010). 
 
On 30 September 2010, Libyan websites reported that an emergency meeting had been 
held by the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Benghazi following an instruction 
from their Liaison Office. As a result of this meeting, a stern statement was issued 
insisting that the meeting of the Lawyers Syndicate was illegal, emphasising in particular 
that those present at the meeting wanted to implement the western agenda of instability 
in Libyan society. They concluded their statement by stressing that the Revolutionary 
Committees would have the right to respond decisively and strongly.  
 
Subsequently, in a meeting held in Tripoli on 6 October 2010, members of the General 
Union of Lawyers condemned a speech made by the Secretary of the Federation of the 
Unions and Professions in the General People's Conference, for the way in which he had 
described them (Cyrene, 2010). In response, the Secretary of the General People's 
Conference also insisted on investigating those who had contravened the regulations of 
Law No.10 of 1990 which governed the professions; in Article 3 of the secretary’s 
response, the lawyers who had attended the meeting were labelled as “pariahs”. 
Therefore, it was confirmed that the offending lawyers were subject to the provisions of 
Law No.10 on the reorganisation of the legal profession, and in particular Article 3, which 
referred them to the Disciplinary Board. Furthermore, the secretary considered the 
outcome of the lawyer’s meeting in Benghazi to be invalid (Quryna, 2010). 
 
On 13 October 2010, the GICDF intervened in a dialogue begun by the Secretary of the 
Human Rights Association, Muḥammad al-‘Alāqī, who issued a statement condemning 
the circular issued by the Secretary of General Unions in the General People’s 
Conference. The document in question concerned the selection of the Board of the 
General Conference of Lawyers of Benghazi. In his statement, al-‘Alāqī stressed that the 
new board and the meeting held by those who had selected it were both legal. He 
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mentioned the difficulties faced by the Benghazi Lawyers Syndicate under pressure to 
choose a new board. Furthermore, he argued that the associations should be independent 
and have the right to make their own schedules, adding that the administrative body 
should only attend as an observer. He went further, criticising the Secretary of General 
Unions in the General People’s Conference, by decrying the latter’s speech as something 
from the past: “such words as these have disappeared from the Libyan political dictionary 
and we have replaced them with other terms such as “social peace”, “national 
reconciliation” and “Libya tomorrow’’. Indeed, al-‘Alāqī claimed that such language 
should be considered offensive to the Libyan state, the Libyan political experience and 
the Libyan people (Libya Press, 2010). 
 
Despite continuing pressure from the union, the Lawyers Syndicate held an emergency 
meeting on 11 October 2010 to select a new board. A consensus was reached in this 
meeting on the lawyers’ right to choose a new board (secretariat) after what they 
described as the previous secretariat’s total disregard of their demands. The attendees also 
discussed a range of difficulties, obstacles and charges levelled at them by both the 
previous Secretary and the General People’s Conference. A majority of lawyers approved 
the new board chosen at the meeting. Many observers saw the action taken by the Lawyers 
Syndicate as a challenge to a memorandum issued by the General People’s Conference 
declaring the former group’s meeting as illegal and its results invalid. Additionally, the 
General People’s Conference had the right to abrogate any decisions made by this meeting 
(LibyaAlyom, 2010). 
 
7.6.5 Political and Cultural Platforms 
Saif al-Islam Qadhafi attended a youth event in Benghazi on 20 August 2007, as a 
representative of the GICDF. At this event he expressed his views about political and 
cultural platforms which helped to create a new environment in which public debate was 
encouraged (GICDF Web). As a result of the increase in electronic media, especially 
academic websites, many subjects began to be discussed. These cultural and news 
platforms acted as forums for both the educated elite and the uneducated to express their 
views and criticise government policies. Although there was some controversy over the 
feasibility and effectiveness of these platforms, they were nevertheless welcome 
developments and marked a step forward; they allowed observers to express their 
opinions about the political process and economic changes in Libya, civil peace and 
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national reconciliation. These platforms helped to promote a culture of awareness of 
human rights, by encouraging people to demand the return of, or compensation for houses 
and other property nationalised during 1979. This reflected the role of the GICDF in 
creating a climate for discussion and for challenging the political regime.  
 
However, prior to 2011 the regime saw this kind of activity as a way of planting the seeds 
of political parties, which were then forbidden under Libyan law - Act No. 71 (1972), as 
was discussed in Chapter Four. Indeed, this act stated in one of its articles that to join any 
party amounted to treason against the fatherland. In addition, its third and fourth articles 
stated that the death penalty or imprisonment for not less than ten years would apply to 
anyone calling for the establishment of any group, organisation or prohibited gathering. 
 
Some called for the termination of political groups because they feared they would 
undermine the idea of the People’s Authority. At the youth event in Benghazi, which was 
mentioned earlier, Saif al-Islam stated: 
It is necessary that decision-making in the Basic People's Conferences is 
preceded by a dialogue in clubs and political forums and in the 
institutions of civil society, in order to crystallise the ideas and develop 
them as a prelude to the decision-making later in the Basic People's 
Conferences (Almanara and GICDF, 2007). 
 
As a result of the above statement, meetings were held in 2008 by the following groups 
and organisations: the National Planning Council, the International Centre for Studies and 
Research of the Green Book, the People's Committees for Universities, Research Centres 
and Scientific Institutions, the Media, the Lawyer’s Syndicate and Academia (Almanara, 
2008). 
 
In these meetings there was an emphasis placed on the role of platforms in creating a type 
of political movement, through discussions on public affairs. Furthermore, it was 
discussed how the platforms could be set up in practice and used as means of shaping 
public opinion. The meetings were considered a kind of expansion of popular 
participation (Almanara, 2008). 
 
Two observations can be made about platforms: first, although they are similar to the idea 
of intellectual and political associations, and therefore they are not a new idea, they are 
novel in as much as they presented the first opportunity for the discussion of political 
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affairs outside of the People's Conferences; second, these platforms should be 
accompanied by media to assist them in transferring their ideas to and receiving feedback 
from the public. It is noteworthy that many of the channels of communication ascribed to 
these platforms could have been established in thirteen universities in Libya. The Cyrene 
and Oea newspapers announced their own platforms (Network of Arab Media, 2008). The 
GICDF had therefore raised concerns about the need for discussion about societal issues, 
by different segments of society, such as academics and lawyers. People were able to 
discuss issues beyond their family, creating awareness of their community which is at the 
heart of our understanding of the idea of civil society. 
 
7.6.6 Debate about Laws 
In 2006 the GICDF put forward for discussion the review and change of several laws: 
- The law on Freedom of the Press 
- The Penal Code 
- The law governing civil associations  
- The drafting of a constitution to define the rights and duties of citizens 
 
(a) The Law on Freedom of the Press 
Libya’s basic legal system granted the right of everyone to freedom of expression as 
supported by Articles 19-26 of the 1988 Green Charter on Human Rights, and Law No. 
20 of 1991 on Enhancing Freedom, which enshrined these rights. However, the reality on 
the ground was very different since the law was used to curb these principles. For 
example, Law 76 of 1972 restricted freedom of expression by imposing the condition that 
it must not “contradict the values and goals of society” (Libyan Official Gazette, 1972, 
1991).  
 
In his meeting with efficiencies media Jamahiriya on 5 September 2010, Saif al-Islam 
stressed the importance of the law of press freedom and praised a new draft law intended 
to protect that freedom; he stressed “the need for the existence of a Charter of the Press 
governing the workers in this area in terms of their rights and duties”. The new draft was 
put forward for discussion in the People’s Conference in 2006 but was never issued. The 
press in Libya needed a suitable environment in which their freedom as well as acceptance 
of all opinions and criticisms would be protected by the institutions and laws of the state. 
Saif al-Islam believed that funding would make the press more independent and he 
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stressed that he would consider a stable source of financing, so that the organisation of 
legal and administrative material be a source of independent funding (Index: 2010). 
 
(b) Penal Code 
In a speech on 24 July 2008, under the title of The Truth of All, Saif al-Islam stated: “I 
would like to stress this idea: tomorrow and after tomorrow; there must be a national 
dialogue and deep debate everywhere on all these laws, especially the penal code, because 
this affects each one of us”. In another meeting he praised a drafting of the Penal Code, 
saying that it represented a major achievement in the field of rights and freedoms, which 
was a big leap in the direction of openness. Saif al-Islam emphasised that because this 
law affected everyone, all should contribute to the drafting of it, which would consolidate 
Libya’s security and judicial institutions. 
 
(c) The Law Governing Civil Associations 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Saif al-Islam introduced a bill to fill the shortage in the 
area covered by Law No.19, to meet the needs of national and global demands. He also 
launched a campaign among civil society associations and the media to discuss the bill in 
the expectation that changes in civil society would take place as a result. However, this 
draft lacked clarity regarding the relationship between the state and these associations 
where it insisted that the state play the main role in shaping them. 
 
(d) Drafting of a Constitution Defining Rights and Duties 
Saif al-Islam called for a constitution on many occasions. He attributed the chaotic 
situation prevailing in Libya to “the absence of a constitution and the laws which provide 
a reference’’. He also emphasised the lack of clear planning for the future (August, 2006). 
He added that the challenge was to put into place a package of laws that could be called 
a constitution or social contract. Saif re-emphasised this point in his talk at the American 
University in Cairo on 5 May 2010, stating that, “you cannot manage the country without 
having a constitution and without basic laws. It is a necessity”. Moreover, he said that it 
was a major priority for the laws to be seriously reviewed. However, since Saif al-Islam 
was promoting the constitution from overseas rather than in Libya itself, it seemed that 
the idea of a constitution was still in exile and not acceptable within Libya.  
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Some saw Saif al-Islam’s calls for a constitution as intended to attract foreign investment 
to Libya, in which respect the existence of clear laws and a constitution was of great 
importance (Ali Abu Zekok, 2010). 
 
On 22 October 2010, ’Amāl ‘Ubīdī, a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 
told the present researcher that no one knew what had happened to the issue of the 
constitution. This included the researcher, who had sat on the set-up committee from 2008 
and the review committee until February 2009. 
 
The Human Rights Council mentioned the continuing absence of a constitution in Libya 
in its 2010 report, pointing out that:  
There is no written constitution in Libya. On 1 September 1969, a group 
of army officers led by Colonel Muammar Abu Minyar al-Qadhafi 
assumed power after a military coup. The constitution of 1951 was 
suspended and a temporary "Constitutional Declaration" was adopted by 
the Revolutionary Council on 11 December 1969, but a formal 
constitution was never adopted (HRC, 2010). 
 
7.7 Reconciliation with Previous Opposition Movements 
The most successful step taken towards reform and social integration in Libya before 
2011 was the dialogue between the government and Islamic movements, such as the 
Libyan Islamic Group and the Muslim Brotherhood. This dialogue, which was proposed 
by the GICDF, resulted in the Islamic movements begging for the “release of 90 members 
and help for them to find jobs and facilitate their reintegration into public life” (GICDF 
Report, 2-28:37). In March 2010, these efforts yielded the release of 214 members of 
these groups. At the time, Saif al-Islam stated: 
Today is indeed a very important day here in Libya, for it is a day of 
reconciliation and openness and reunification, and it is also a day for 
freedom. Today and in my capacity as Chairman of the GICDF, sponsor 
of this initiative - the initiative of dialogue with all Islamic groups in 
prison or abroad, with a view to reopen the bridges of dialogue, debate 
and re-integration of all our brothers into the community so that they 
become factors of construction not for destruction - I would like to 
announce, today and after good efforts and thanks to God, the release of 
214 prisoners. The process will continue until the release of the last 
prisoner (GICDF Report, 2010). 
 
Therefore, this group issued a review of the idea of Jihad called the “Corrective Studies 
of the Concepts of Jihad, Accountability and Governance of the People”. Saif al-Islam, 
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the chairman of the GICDF stated, “This is the most important reference work in the 
world with respect to the jihad, and the details of the subject. This work was done by our 
brothers who have long experience in this area” (24 March 2010). 
 
7.8 Sustainable Development Programmes 
NGOs have become key actors in development programmes in the new global economy. 
Accordingly, this section deals with sustainable development programmes and the role 
that the GICDF played in them in Libya. The GICDF set itself a wide range of goals in a 
variety of areas and activities in regard to sustainable development; however, there was 
considerable disparity between those goals and the reality of the GICDF's achievements. 
For example, one of the most significant goals in sustainable development is supporting 
the capacity of individual work through collective action rather than relying on capital. 
Yet while the GICDF tried to take on this responsibility, the absence of other NGOs on 
the ground in Libya meant that it effectively acted as a quasi-political agency. Thus, there 
is little evidence of consistency between the GICDF's goals and the reality of its work.  
Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development states that:  
The right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which 
every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, 
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can 
be fully realised (Ohchr, 2010). 
 
Layla (2002:88) summarises the character of sustainable development as follows:  
1. Development of a positive nature involves the participation of members of the 
targeted community in activities, such as donating resources or volunteer work, 
and helps to keep participants positive in all phases of the project.  
2. Democratic participation is where a model of equality of development needs to 
be reached, requiring the awareness and participation of everyone concerned, 
according to a common point of reference and goals. Hence sustainable 
development is a gateway to the exercise of true democracy. 
3. Sustainable development seeks to empower the marginalised, including the 
poor and minorities, who have been excluded from participation in order to 
create a society without barriers, and to empower women to become active 
participants by eliminating some of the ways in which they have had their rights 
denied.  
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4. Diversity allows several layers to exist in parallel which together lead to 
development, so that every country can choose to approach development in 
whatever ways they see fit, even though they may have the same long term 
development goals. This approach can benefit from past experience. Thus, 
local traditions, customs and usages become sources of enrichment rather than 
hindrances to development, as claimed by modernisation theory. In this model 
of development, human development, education and the strengthening of 
institutions become key foci, which lead to a further strengthening in the 
capacity of individual work through collective action rather than relying on 
capital. 
5. Social capital in sustainable development is close to civil work or volunteering, 
hence the moral obligations that constitute social capital should flow from the 
base and rise to the top. Additionally, social capital settles through agreements 
between the small groups and organisations that make up civil society. 
Sustainable development tends to start with smaller projects and works up to 
larger ones, unlike traditional models of development which usually favour 
large projects. 
6. Sustainable development takes into account the interests of future generations 
which are the backbone of social capital. 
7. The idea of social capital, upon which sustainable development is based, is 
more appropriate to the circumstances of the developing countries. Current 
development theories focus on what is found in the developed world with the 
assumption that the same conditions can be reproduced in the South, despite 
the cultural differences between the two areas. This may be what is behind the 
failure of those trying to bring about development in the developing countries 
in spite of successes in the developed countries. The model of sustainable 
development gets around this problem by recognising the impact of local 
cultures. 
8. According to the sustainable development model, NGOs are the lead actors 
rather than the state. 
 
In 2007 the GICDF issued what it called “Together for Tomorrow’s Libya” (GICDF 
Report, 2005: 25). This undoubtedly reflected a dramatic change: The report showed that 
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Saif al-Islam had derived his view from pragmatic considerations, whereas the previous 
view came from an ideological perspective.  
 
In terms of civil society, the impact of the project outlined in the report was limited and 
associated with the intervention of Saif al-Islam himself. This hampered the project from 
creating automatic mechanisms such as: laws and corrective legislation, democratic 
institutions, an active civil society, etc. 
 
I would argue that the overlap between the project “Together for Tomorrow’s Libya” and 
the country's economy was almost complete and absolute, and also that what is known in 
Arabic as the “godfather”, i.e. the project leader, is the same as the godfather of this 
development project. Bearing in mind that development programmes are one of the main 
responsibilities of any state, the fact that a foundation such as the GICDF was tasked with 
overseeing development programmes in Libya is evidence of the failure of the state.  
 
The GICDF stated that its implementation tools would be “suggestions, approaches and 
solutions” (Report, 2005: 25). The above project, according to the GICDF’s literature, 
contained the following:  
[A] comprehensive sustainable development plan which can be 
implemented during a specific period of time. This plan deals with all 
vital fields in the country like culture, education, health, food, medicine, 
social insurance, banks, land reclamation, tourism, housing, construction 
planning, investment, trade, consumer’s services, and mass media. Also, 
the plan includes suggestions for developing security, military 
institutions, and the judicial system (GICDF Report, 2005-06:25 and 
“Together for Tomorrow’s Libya”, Tripoli: 2005:3). 
 
With a view to implementing the “Millennium Development Goals” adopted by the 
Summit of Heads of Member States of the United Nations, at the end of 1999, the GICDF 
shifted the goal of development from increasing Libya’s gross national product to 
maintaining the interests of future generations (GICDF Report, 2008: 3). 
The Millennium Development Goals are as follows:  
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
2. Achieve universal primary education 
3. Promote gender equality and empower women  
4. Reduce child mortality rate  
5. Improve maternal health 
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6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases 
7. Ensure environmental sustainability 
8. Develop a global partnership for development  
(UN, 2010). 
 
Through its internal policy the GICDF played the role of an institution carrying out 
development of the country in two ways: first, by setting up some development 
programmes for the General People's Committee (Council of Ministers); and second, by 
launching a number of initiatives including: 
1- The initiative of Pilot Schools which aimed to promote education in the 
following ways: 
(a) Developing and improving existing schools: the GICDF selected six 
schools in Tripoli, Benghazi, Sirt, Zlīṭin and Zwārā to act as models 
for other schools in Libya.  
 
(b) Establishing pilot schools with modern designs adaptable to the 
various climates of different regions and meeting in cooperation with 
the General People’s Committee for Higher Education and the 
National Consultancy Bureau (GICDF Report, 2007-08:22). 
 
(c) Setting up The One Million Computers Initiative in 2006. This was 
aimed at improving the educational system in Libya by providing one 
million computers for one million school children (GICDF Report, 
2008:3) 
 
(d) Setting up The Education Advancement Initiative through which the 
GICDF intended to develop the education system in line with the 
requirements of modernisation (GICDF Report, 2008-09:3). One 
step seen as necessary to achieving this goal was to send students 
overseas in order to complete their studies and training. To this end, 
the GICDF nominated thousands of Libyan students in various 
disciplines (GICDF Reports, 2007).17 
                                                 
17
(For more details see GICDF Reports 2007-08:21 and 2007:34-38).  
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2- Launching the Health Sector Development initiative with the aim of 
establishing new hospitals in Tripoli and Jāluw (GICDF Report, 2009:4). 
In addition, the GICDF established the African Centre for Infectious 
Diseases in Tripoli for conducting research into combating infectious 
diseases (GICDF Report, 2005: 28-29). 
 
As we can see from above, the GICDF tried to achieve some elements of development 
programme goals such as: planning for future generations by providing scholarships for 
top students to study in developed countries. It was also concerned with providing 
affordable housing for the young. However, these efforts were undermined by corruption 
and lack of empowerment of civil society participation. 
 
7.9 Political and Economic Reform 
There is increasing concern that NGOs are becoming a tool for pressurising governments 
towards political reform and restructuring of the economy. This section deals with the 
political and economic reforms that were undertaken by the GICDF during 2005 -2010 
and will examine its understanding of reform, which appeared to be focused mainly on 
developing the economy, through construction projects. I do not aim to discuss the 
theories and concepts of reform because this would go beyond the remit of this chapter, 
which will focus on the GICDF. I will divide this section into three subsections: the first 
will focus on economic reform, the second will deal with political reform and the last will 
address the problem of reform in the context of Libya.  
 
It is important to highlight that five years after raising the slogan of comprehensive 
reform, it was evident that the GICDF was no longer intervening in political life in Libya. 
The global and local news agencies reported that the GICDF had abandoned its political 
activities and support for human rights, while focusing solely on charitable work in the 
poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In response to these claims, the GICDF released 
a statement saying, “[a]fter discussing various courses of action, the Board adopted a 
decision that would remove such political advocacy from the Foundation’s remit” (Oea, 
2010).  
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7.9.1 Economic Reform 
There is a perception that reform in Libya was associated with the Weapons of Mass 
Destruction programme (WMD) which was announced in 2003. This announcement 
coincided with the establishment of the GICDF, which became one of most important 
developments in Libya upon which too many expectations were placed. I have to 
emphasise here the fact that the Libyan economy depends on its petroleum sector which 
accounts for around 95 per cent of total exports. Additionally, the main funding for most 
economic programmes comes from oil resources both in development and administrative 
budgets. 
 
In 2006 the GICDF proposed an economic development plan to the value of 70 billion 
dollars. In his article on reform in Libya, Rashīd Khashāna (2010) states that Saif al-Islam 
emphasised the need for economic openness in forty percent of the statements he made, 
with the intention of attacking the bureaucratic administration of the state which was a 
stronghold of opposition to economic reforms. 
 
Yet in reality the Libyan centrally-planned economy depended primarily upon revenues 
from the petroleum sector. For example, in an interview with Oea newspaper on 15 
September 2009, the Tourism Minister pointed out that economic reform required a 
diversified economy and a decision was taken by the General People’s Committee to re-
structure the tourism sector. However, this had the effect of restricting rather than 
developing the sector and contravened Tourism Law No.7. The Secretary of the 
Commission for Tourism stated that if tourism was to be considered the second source of 
revenue in Libya after oil, then its administration should be autonomous and able to 
exercise influence over its area of responsibility (Oea Libya, 2011). This interview 
showed that the Libyan economy suffered from a lack of diversification and that the steps 
that were taken towards addressing this problem were ultimately counterproductive. 
 
In a move towards economic reform, Saif al-Islam announced details of a 104 billion 
dinar plan for the development of water sanitation, the countryside, roads and airports. 
According to this plan, an airport would be built in every Libyan city and the 
country would buy 47 aircraft. There would be new housing, grants and loans 
for Libyans to start private business ventures and, finally, every child would be granted 
at birth a sum of money, deposited into a bank account in the child’s name, to pay the 
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expenses of their future education and healthcare needs. This last measure was aimed at 
enabling children to live without total dependence upon the help of their parents. Saif al-
Islam said that the plan had begun a year prior to his speech but did not specify when its 
aims would be achieved (speech in Benghazi, August 2006). His comments exemplify 
how the discourse for economic change has consistently been driven from above. 
 
The GICDF led initiatives in cooperation with other partners such as lawyers, and 
advocates of reform inside Libya and abroad. In addition, experts from various countries 
helped in the preparation of initiatives and committees were formed to work in different 
areas and to present proposals to the government. The sectors still needed to be drastically 
improved to enable them to compete in the international market. In 2003, Libya accepted 
IMF monitoring of its economy which called for wide ranging structural reforms, 
improved macroeconomic management, and the removal of trade barriers and price 
subsidies (Pargeter, 2010:7). One of the results of this agreement was to privatise 360 
companies. However, this transfer did not mean that these companies became successful 
or met their goals. Furthermore, as Alison (2010: 7) argues, employees of some of the 
companies that were privatised were literally thrown out onto the street with minimal 
compensation for their loss. Thus, the way in which privatisation was implemented 
aggravated both economic and social problems.  
 
A remarkable step was taken in March, 2005 when a new banking law was issued 
permitting foreign banks to open up branches in Libya on the condition of having a 
minimum capital of 50 million US dollars (for more details on this law see Article 43 of 
the law No.1 of 2005, Central Bank of Libya).18 In 1997, Libya issued Law No.5 on the 
Encouragement of Foreign Capital Investment which was added to in 2002 with Law No. 
21 (Otman and Karlberg, 2007:71, 281). Although I do not believe that these initiatives 
actively promoted the banking sector, they did indicate a move away from viewing 
foreign investment as western interference, towards active steps to improve a sector which 
was still suffering from a lack of modernisation. Following the implementation of these 
                                                 
18 In 26-2-2012 the Central Bank of Libya modified law No. 1 of 2005 by issuing law No. 46 of 2012. 
The Bank justified this by saying that it would attract foreign investment in Libya. 
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new laws, Saif al-Islam announced the reorganisation and privatisation of five state banks 
(cbl, 2010). 
 
Another aspect of economic change was the remarkable development in the 
telecommunication sector, which up until 2011 was owned by Qadhafi’s son Muḥammad, 
thanks to the influence of his ex-wife, who was the chair of Libya’s General Post and 
Telecommunications Company. This company monopolised all the components of 
telecommunications, including internet products and satellites, and owned both of the 
mobile phone companies active in Libya- Libyana and al-Madar. In 2009, the Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat) sought to obtain the third mobile phone 
operating license in Libya Jamāl al-Jarwan. The chief executive of Etisalat’s international 
unit, told Reuters that, “Libya is very strategic” (Reuters, 2009). 
 
These aspects of economic reform are seen as inseparable from political reform. 
However, there was some discontinuity in the programme of economic reform adopted in 
Libya prior to 2011. Furthermore, there was a lack of a concrete association between 
political and economic reform which made efforts towards the latter goal fragile.  
 
The open-market economy or privatisation in Libya mainly benefited those who were 
close to Qadhafi and his family; when the government enabled loan facilities for people 
to establish their own businesses in accordance with the investment law, which aimed to 
support small and medium size businesses, one bank manager told the researcher that 
there was an unwritten rule that significant amounts of money should only be lent to 
members of Qadhafi’s tribe. Everybody else had to go through the endless bureaucracy 
and approval procedure with no certainty of what the outcome would be. Furthermore, 
the whole of Libyan society was affected by sudden changes without warning, for 
example, people complained about the cut in subsidies to welfare payment and food 
without any increase in salaries, which was stipulated by Law No.15 of 1981. This law 
was issued at a time when the Libyan government wanted to commit resources to its 
budget for the war in Chad in what was known as “Ouzou”. Unskilled workers were badly 
affected when privatisation led to job cuts in this sector. In addition, the concept of an 
open-market economy in Libya encompassed small businesses only. It is still difficult to 
acquire licenses for some activities without having links in some way or other to high 
ranking figures inside the political system. 
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Finally, it is worth considering whether all these changes made prior to 2011 can be 
considered as reforms or not. I am strongly in agreement with Bienen and Herbst 
(1996:33) who state “it is exceptionally hard for long-standing leaders to engage in 
dramatic economic reform precisely because reform essentially disrupts the way they 
govern and hurts those on whose support they rely”. Although Bienen and Herbst are 
referring more generally to regimes in Africa, their statement is also true of Libya. The 
problems facing the reform process in Libya before 2011 were the reduction of the state 
and its domination by Qadhafi.  
 
7.9.2 Political Reform 
In his study of reform in the Arab World, Abuoall Saafif (2008:2) classifies the Arab 
countries into four types according to their position regarding: democracy and 
democratisation; how they approach or move away from this system of government; and 
the extent of their political consistency or inconsistency in relation to it. He locates Libya 
in the third type. He argues that: 
We can distinguish at least four basic positions: 
 The first are those countries where there is a choice and a degree of 
openness for democratic change such as: Morocco, Jordan, 
Mauritania, Kuwait and Bahrain. 
 The second are those countries where change is more complex, 
combining the level of political and institutional development, the 
cultural form of the political organisation of states and the 
abundance of material wealth. In this second group the economic 
aspect of reform is emphasised at the expense of the political side. It 
contains: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and the Sultanate of 
Oman. 
3- The third are those countries which question the nature of the change 
itself, for example: Saudi Arabia, Syria, Algeria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt 
and Tunisia. In this category, reform is discussed but despotism 
remains stable. Many of these systems succeed in marketing an image 
of political change, without any disclaimer to democratise their 
societies. 
 
4- The fourth are countries such as Iraq, Palestine, Lebanon and Sudan, 
whose models raise particular questions, as they relate to strategic 
dimensions, international politics, regional balances, and especially 
the specificities of religious, ethnic and tribal dimensions (Abuoall 
Saafif, 2008:2).  
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I believe that the complexity of the issue of reform in Libya stems from what I would 
describe as the absence of the institution of the state. Reform ordinarily addresses the 
policies, plans and strategies of the state. However, in Libya reform needs to begin by 
tackling the very absence of a state. Without going too far into the history of the country, 
I shall now discuss two examples of scholars who have written about Libya and the 
formation of its state.  
 
Anderson (1987: 183) argues that: 
By the time the country became independent, there was no nationwide 
administration or broadly based political organisation, only the memory 
of the upheaval that had attended the creation and destruction of the 
short-lived bureaucratic state.  
 
Ahmida (1994: 14) adds to this argument by highlighting what she describes as 
“qualitative differences between French and Italian colonisation”. The French model of 
Capitalism included the utilisation of its colonies as markets for French goods. By 
contrast, Italy was a semi-capitalist country whose main problem was overpopulation; 
hence Italian colonisation was of the settler type. 
 
In Libya however, the notion of the state did not exist in the sense of a body which could 
provide for the common interests of all society. 
 
Although the bureaucratic state in Libya did not exist in a complete form, the third point 
of the Popular Revolution which was announced in April 1973 emphasised that an 
administrative revolution would abolish all forms of bureaucracy. Therefore, although the 
literature talks about reform in terms of how the structure of the state can be made more 
effective, reform in Libya should be focused on rebuilding or reforming specific sectors. 
The idea of the absence of the state continued in official discourse when the pre-2011 
Libyan authorities justified their intervention in most political processes, by claiming that 
Libyan society was still in the revolutionary stage, and that reform should be aimed at 
transferring the country from revolution to statehood.  
 
This helps to explain why civil society in Libya is very weak. Furthermore, it suggests 
that it is difficult to build civil society not only because of the law, but also because of 
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the absence of the entity of the state which has left a gap between the state and society 
which is too large to be easily filled by an active civil society movement.  
 
In order to address this complicated issue, it is necessary to highlight the theoretical 
framework of the Qadhafi regime. This system stemmed from what was known as the 
Third Universal Theory which appeared in the Green Book. It consisted of three parts: 
 The Solution to the Problem of Democracy: “The Authority of the People” 
 The Solution to the Economic Problem: “Socialism” 
 The Social Basis of the Third Theory 
 
I will argue here that, after decades of practice, this theory has resulted in huge problems 
and mismanagement in all sectors in Libya. The failure of the Third Universal Theory 
can be attributed to two factors. First, most of the ideas encompassed by the theory follow 
the utopian dreams of many previous thinkers and philosophers which are unworkable in 
practical terms.  
 
The theory used these utopian ides to develop an ideology without foreseeing the 
difficulties in applying it to society. The second, maybe more important factor, is that this 
theory was presented as a comprehensive and final solution for all problems connected to 
politics, economics, society and law. This position meant that the Third Universal Theory 
could not be the subject of criticism or revision because, as its author assumed, no one 
could argue with it. Any ideas or thoughts that differed from the theory, however slight, 
were considered to be critical and were not encouraged. The government went to great 
lengths to enforce this by withdrawing all books from libraries, which explored ideas and 
philosophies which differed from the Third Universal Theory. Furthermore, this ban 
extended to criticism about the application or limitations of the Theory. In my view, the 
reason behind these measures was that the Third Universal Theory was an ideology of 
power which made it uncompromising.  
 
With regard to practice, I will give an example from The People Monitoring Report from 
2010 which states that the People's General Committee issued 375 decisions, and its 
Secretary a further 81 decisions, in relation to the establishment, integration and abolition 
of public integration. These decisions have led to instability and confusion in the affected 
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administrative bodies and also show the difficulties monitoring bodies face in their checks 
on ministries (Oea Libya, 2011). 
 
There were two necessary steps for legislative reform in Libya. I would argue that the 
first step was the recognition of the need for a constitution. It was a surprise for all when 
Saif al-Islam suggested this during his speech in 2006. In support of this view, he pointed 
out that imperfections in the practice of the People’s Authority had allowed for the larger 
tribes to hold all high governmental positions at the expense of the smaller ones. 
Therefore, the solution, as proposed by Saif al-Islam, was to develop a constitution, 
national charter, or some other document that could be agreed upon by everyone.  
 
In response to Saif al-Islam’s speech, ‘Alī Abū Za‘kūk, the Executive Director of the 
Forum of Libyan Political Development and Humanitarianism stated that a return to a 
constitution “is to return to a reference which unites the country, which has been absent 
from Libyan society since 1969; this could be the focus of political reform and society 
and culture in the country”. He added that, “Libya is in urgent need of such reforms, 
especially civil society, trade unions and NGOs which are no longer effective institutions 
in society”. Additionally, Za‘kūk commented, “I think that a constitution will be 
transferred to the State of Libya, which is seeking to catch up with the twentieth-century”. 
 
In Cairo, Saif al- Islam said: 
[W]e need a constitution. You cannot run the state without a constitution 
and basic laws. It's a necessity. It will become the social contract, the 
social contract for Libyan people and we all abide by it.  
 
To this end, he demanded that the government reconsider all its administrative and 
regulatory bodies. He argued further that: 
We need the Constitution, reference and basic laws. But this topic 
involves the five and a half million Libyan people; this is not my personal 
battle, this is a battle of the whole Libyan people (15 March 2009).  
 
Saif al-Islam called for a constitution, a fortiori, in order to attract foreign investors who 
attach great importance to the existence of clear laws. It is known that businessmen 
demand transparency, governance and an independent judicial system to ensure the 
necessary guarantees for their investments. Prior to 2011, these things were all absent 
from the political system in Libya.  
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However, ’Amāl ‘Ubīdī, a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee told the 
current researcher that nobody knows what happened to the issue of the drafting of a 
constitution. This was in spite of her having been part of a setup committee from 2008 
and later a review committee until February 2009. 
 
The second step to reform was to abolish the revolutionary legitimacy which gave Colonel 
Qadhafi precedence over the law, which prevented debate. Furthermore, specific laws 
needed to be abolished, including Law No. 4 of 1978 (”A house for whomever inhabits 
it”) and Law No. 15 of 1981 covering wages and salaries.  
 
7.9.3 The Problem of Reform in the Libyan Context 
The GICDF tried to progress many reform programmes and campaigns, however this was 
constrained by the political ideology of the People’s Authority. The question of reform in 
Libya at present centres not so much on the needs of the country or the elements requiring 
reform, as on the extent of the necessity and importance of reform in itself. The researcher 
would like to stress that calls for reform have come even from among the beneficiaries of 
the status quo ante, who came to recognise the implausibility of the situation before 2011, 
which in fact threatened their own long-term interests. The researcher would also argue 
that only Colonel Qadhafi and a few members of the interest groups saw the pre-2011 
situation as optimal. However, the debate around reform in Qadhafi’s Libya gradually 
shifted towards the methods and procedures through which it could occur and where it 
should have been prioritised. The views on reform and change in Libya, as they existed 
before 2011, can be divided into three main groups as follows.  
 
The first group believed that reform should be applied through the theoretical and political 
structure of the system itself. This group thought that the need for reform stemmed from 
deviations from the application of direct popular power, and that some people benefitted 
from this. Accordingly, this group believed that the purpose of reform should be to correct 
these deviations through the application of theory, to eliminate corruption and to appoint 
the right people to take specific jobs, especially on the popular committees. Thus, in brief, 
this group favoured addressing problems through existing frameworks rather than 
departing from them. Before the events of 2011, this position represented a majority of 
219 
 
the members of the Revolutionary Committees and many of those in Qadhafi’s inner 
circle. 
 
The second group believed that reform required radical change to the ideological and 
political foundations of the system as it was up to 2011, whilst keeping the revolutionary 
authority intact. While this group may have held the ideals of the popular system, it 
considered them to be impractical on the ground. Furthermore, it believed that reform 
must be directed towards real change built on the establishment of a constitution that 
governs the country and the principles of the separation of powers, thereby defining 
jurisdictions and ensuring the freedom of opinion and assembly; of forming political 
parties and trade unions; of civil society; and the implementation of an open free market 
in the economic field. In other words, this approach was based on efforts to keep Qadhafi 
in power while also redirecting his theoretical views towards liberalism. This was seen as 
a plan for comprehensive reform meeting all the demands of reformists. 
 
The most important advocates of this approach were Saif al-Islam and those around him. 
In addition, this approach was also adopted by many intellectuals and journalists, and 
even some of the movements that were opposed to him such as the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Nevertheless, another reason for adopting this strategy may have been the absence of 
other options at this time when the need for reform was urgent. This approach has 
provided a glimmer of hope to many people over the past decade and has thus been a 
focus of political activity in Libya. Unfortunately, it was obstructed by successive blows 
and oppression from the authorities, the most recent of which was the announcement of 
the withdrawal of the GICDF from domestic issues in Libya. This turnaround led 
conservative people to request that the status quo be maintained, which in turn provided 
an opening for other options to develop for the future.  
 
The third group, which was the most extreme, saw that it was impossible to achieve 
reform while Qadhafi, his ideology and his family members were still actively involved 
in Libyan politics. This group believed that there was a fundamental conflict between 
Qadhafi’s ideas and reform. Therefore, they took the view that the first step toward reform 
was to end Qadhafi’s rule and to reject the theory and ideas that accompanied it. This 
group represented the radical Libyan opposition abroad who, despite their small size and 
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impact, held beliefs matching those of the silent majority of people inside Libya; the latter 
lacked the channels whereby they could express their views. 
 
This group believed that the Qadhafi regime rejected pluralism, whereas they believed 
the framework of direct democracy to be the ultimate and ideal solution to all problems 
everywhere. The informal position held by Qadhafi gave him unlimited and absolute rule 
which meant he could assume all roles within the political power. Meanwhile, the idea of 
reform, as entertained by the third group, leant towards the acceptance of all people 
without exclusion or marginalisation. 
 
It seems that the enthusiastic steps taken by Saif al-Islam, both in demanding reform and 
affecting it, made their impact on the street and on the educated elite who were moving 
in the direction of encouraging and even escalating the demands for transformation and 
reform. This shift continued day after day and so threatened the long-term security and 
stability of the system itself, by depriving it of absolute control over all aspects of politics 
and the economy. Indeed, Saif al-Islam’s political activities encouraged and accelerated 
the pace of the demands for reform among Libyans, including the demand that some men 
of the “old guard” be stripped of their powers and privileges and be prosecuted. The 
regime found a quick solution to these challenges by temporarily freezing certain kinds 
of political activities, much to the disappointment of the reformers. 
 
Freedom of speech was withdrawn from the media in 2010. This move indicated that the 
country was still not ready for reform because press freedom was crucial for the disclosure 
of corruption. Colonel Qadhafi blocked reform further by supporting the old Lawyer 
Secretary in Benghazi over the new one which had once received support from Saif al-
Islam (as explained earlier on in this chapter). The selection of the new secretary was 
eventually cancelled.  
 
It seems clear that the GICDF responded to increasing pressures from the old guard and 
became more aligned with governmental associations to avoid clashes with the General 
People’s Conference (GPC). St John (17 January 2011) described this move as an 
admission of defeat by Saif al-Islam. Whatever the reasons behind it, the result in the long 
term, assuming the Qadhafi regime had remained in status quo, would have been to have 
opened the door for change. Meanwhile, in the short term the Libyan people, especially 
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the youth, would have lost their only hope of reform at that time. As the events of 2011 
showed, the failure of the GICDF reform initiatives and campaigns led to an explosion of 
the situation. 
 
7.9.4 Previous Ideas of Reform (Within Revolutionary Committees) 
The appearance of reform within the Revolutionary Committees Movement, which was 
supposed to be one of the regime’s tools, demonstrates that civil society institutions were 
totally absent. These associations carried out the role of overseeing and checking the 
government since one of their purposes was to criticise the existing policies and propose 
alternatives. This development is evident in the lack of modern institutions in pre-2011 
Libya, as well as the inability of traditional institutions, such as the tribe, to challenge the 
regime, and thus strengthen the hypothesis proposed here: that the public arena between 
the family and the state were occupied by government instead of civil society 
associations.  
 
The idea of reforming the Libyan regime and making improvements to its administrative 
style is not a recent one. Neither was it initiated by the GICDF or Saif al-Islam. Reform 
was a necessity back in the early 1980s when the Revolutionary Committees Movement 
started to gain power and was assigned missions that were characterised as crucial and 
necessary steps to the reform of the People’s Authority. In 1984 some of the Movement’s 
young activists, mainly students from the University of Garyounis in Benghazi, 
formulated demands for change focused on three key points. 
 
The first point related to the 7 April 1976, when the revolutionary forces came to 
dominate the universities. On that day anyone affiliated with political parties including 
the Islamists, liberals and leftists was executed; this day become known as the “day of 
terminating the enemies of the revolution” and on its anniversary each year similar 
persecution against anyone who did not tow the official line took place in Libyan 
universities.  
 
The aim of these activists was to change the picture entirely, by celebrating the 7 April as 
a day of diversity and an opportunity to involve various parties in transforming 
universities into institutions where all ideas and opinions, including the Third Universal 
Theory, would be tolerated. The key difference was that advocacy for the Third Universal 
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Theory should be done through peaceful debate and discussion, which should not be seen 
as a sign of weakness but rather as a way of enriching the participants and testing their 
strength and cohesiveness. Some of the group members wrote articles in April 1983 
arguing for the changes they wished to see, which were to be published in a newspaper 
issued for the occasion. However, these articles were not published and the activists were 
personally and directly warned by the newspaper’s officials that the approach they had 
taken ran entirely against the purpose of the occasion, and that a lack of political maturity 
on their part had made them write the articles, which were described as romantic and with 
no foundation in political reality. 
 
The second point pursued by the activists was that it should be permissible to criticise the 
Power of the People theory, at the levels of both theory and practice, and that it should be 
modifiable without any compromises. They believed that this could help to explain the 
huge gap between theory and practice, which had led to the failure to achieve democracy 
as demanded by the people.  
 
The third point, which I believe is the most important one, is that this group expressed 
concerns about the working style of the Revolutionary Committees Movement which they 
thought was incapable of creating a movement towards direct popular democracy. They 
believed that the Movement had no intentions of transforming itself into an ideological 
party with a comprehensive character, as is the case with other parties. Therefore, the 
Revolutionary Committees Movement, had it wished to maintain the role of the leader in 
the Authority of the People, should have reviewed its programmes and ways of dealing 
with the masses. The activists believed that the Movement should not have used violence 
for any reasons whatsoever: otherwise it would have become a politically-motivated 
police force. The goal of the student movement was to raise awareness and educate people 
about democracy. Political participation as the means of achieving these goals was 
therefore based upon: dialogue, persuasion and focus on the movement’s objectives.  
 
The emergence and spread of ideas between the members of this group of activists 
resulted in an invitation to meet Colonel Qadhafi on 5 - 6 April 1984 to discuss the group’s 
ideas and demands.  
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On 7 April 1984 the researcher met with the most prominent figure from this group at the 
University of Garyounis. He was considered to be one of the leading thinkers of the group, 
and during the interview he remarked, “The meeting with the leader continued from the 
afternoon until the early hours of the next morning; he was a good listener and the youth 
were very honest with him, explaining to him in detail the contradictions between the 
theory and practice of the regime.” 
 
This activist concluded that there would be only two possible outcomes from the meeting. 
The first outcome would have been that the situation would have improved and the 
country would have witnessed developments, either in the Revolutionary Committees 
Movement or the country as a whole. 
 
The second possibility would have been that Qadhafi would have considered the matters 
discussed to be none of their business and the activists would have been imprisoned and 
possibly executed. The activist whom I interviewed added to this that intelligence knew 
how to extract confessions from prisoners under torture, often with the aim of forcing 
them to confess to being members of political parties, even when they lacked knowledge 
of the ideologies of those parties, in the belief that their confessions would guarantee their 
lives. 
 
On the night of 10 April 1984 most of the activists were arrested on the charges that they 
formed the nucleus of a cell not conforming to the Revolutionary Committees Movement, 
and that they were in the process of creating leaders to substitute Qadhafi. Furthermore, 
it was claimed that those leaders would be the points of reference for interpreting theory 
of direct democracy and practice, which was considered taboo in Libya at that time. On 
this basis, Qadhafi issued the so-called Circular Number One for the Revolutionary 
Committees Movement (RCM), which advocated the immediate execution of all 
members of the group who were not absolutely committed to the regulatory guidelines. 
This circular was endorsed at the annual meeting of the movement in Benghazi in August 
1985, as well as the establishment of the Revolutionary Court, which held trials for 
members of the movement. 
 
After less than two years, the activists were forwarded to the Revolutionary Court in 
Tripoli where they were sentenced to death by ‘Alī Mahdī al-Firjānī, who was the 
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president of the movement of the RCM, along with Muṣṭafā al-Kawāfī and Ashraf al-
Bayḍawī. One of the activists, ‘Umar al-Mahdī, was sentenced to life imprisonment 
thanks to the intervention of his cousin, Major ‘Abd al-Salām Jallūd, who was the second 
man in the government of the time and thus able to prevent the former being executed. 
The mandatory detention sentence was given to ‘Abd Allāh ‘Uthmān, since he came from 
the same tribe as Qadhafi. In addition, the membership of Zāhya Muḥammad ‘Alī and her 
colleagues in the Revolutionary Committees Movement was revoked. In August 1986, 
during the annual summit of the movement, through an interview which was not 
broadcasted, but was transmitted only in closed circuit, Qadhafi stated: “the revolution 
will not tolerate any deviation. It had to sacrifice young people, including some of the 
best and the most revolutionary ones, because we will not allow any divisions within the 
movement so as not to convert to the parties; therefore we must eliminate them early and 
baptise these attempts with blood”. Another speech given by Qadhafi in al-Bayḍā’ on the 
anniversary of the evacuation of British bases on 28 March 1988, was broadcasted on 
state television immediately after Qadhafi heard the cries of Ashraf’s mother, whose son 
was an only child and without a father, asking where her son had been taken and why 
nobody had told her that her son had been executed (National Record for the year 1989). 
 
The course of this story, which was played out at the height of the revolution and in the 
presence of many of its supporters, reveals how the Libyan leadership viewed its vision 
of change and reform. Furthermore, it shows how the opinions which opposed the 
revolution were treated as acts of rebellion and departures from the principles and ideas 
of the Third Universal Theory. These non-conformist views had no chance of being 
discussed because they opened up opportunities for making other claims, all of which, it 
was believed, would lead to great variations in people power such as were taboo at the 
time. 
 
Within the government, there was significant intent for reform, but this intent was 
perceived as challenging the regime, even if it came from Qadhafi’s son. The proposed 
reforms were strongly and brutally repulsed.  
 
7.9.5 The Response of the Regime to Demands for Reform 
Before 2011, there was an absence of any real political will to engage in reform in Libya. 
When the regime saw the recent popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, Qadhafi held 
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several meetings with bloggers and tribal leaders in the eastern area of Libya. During 
these meetings he threatened and warned the tribal leaders against allowing their sons to 
engage in any movements against the regime and held them responsible for the actions of 
their groups’ members (Libya Alyom, 2011). In this way, the regime returned to traditional 
methods of controlling the tribes. However, I would argue that this method did not work 
in the context of the 2011 uprising for two reasons. First, the role of the tribe has witnessed 
a huge change, in that members of the younger generation no longer consider their tribes 
to be the main elements of their identities. Indeed, tribal leaders are involved in their own 
businesses and have come to represent government interests more than those of their 
tribes. Second, the internet has become the main source of information, and thus has 
helped to develop points of view, knowledge and global culture. These factors have in 
turn influenced the reform of the system of values and ways of thinking in Libya from a 
time when Sheikhs could order and be obeyed. I have come to this conclusion, not only 
from my reading but also from my observations of world events, including those in the 
Arab world, and from my discussions with and observations of my students and relatives. 
It now often appears that the younger generations live in the sphere of Facebook, more so 
than with their families, and that by interacting with world issues they tend also to see 
local issues from a global perspective. This does not mean that the tribal framework no 
longer exists, but rather that its role is now more limited. However, in western Libya the 
tribal factor is still more effective than in the eastern part of the country in terms of its 
role in politics.  
 
Therefore, I would argue that even Qadhafi believed that people should have the right to 
a degree of freedom of expression, and also that he was fully aware of what was going on 
in the country and what his regime was facing. However, he never reached the conclusion 
that the country needed real reform at all levels.  
 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter shows that, despite the limitations on its activities  and  achievements,  and  
its  "compromised" status  as  an  instrument  of  the  "heir  to  the throne", the GICDF 
did offer Libyans an opportunity to expand the space open to civil activism, to develop 
their  culture  of  resistance  to  the  encroachments  of  the  state,  and  of  volunteerism  
and participation. In short, the GICDF was pursuing a practice which Libyan NGOs had 
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used more widely: finding ways around the law to pursue its desired activities, as 
explained in Chapter Six.  
 
An analysis of the chapter shows that the GICDF tried to promote Libyan NGOs, but its 
capability to do so was limited because of government interference. The first conclusion 
concerning this public debate about civil society is that the GICDF tried to place the term 
‘civil society’ within the public domain, whether in the media, academia or within the 
civil sector itself. 
 
The GICDF set a number of goals, and had a variety of areas of activity; however in 
reality did not reflect much consistency between the theoretical goals and practice. Even 
though the GICDF was an example of an NGO, it did not consider the building of civil 
society as a priority, but only one of the elements in the reform agenda. Thus, for the 
GICDF to have succeeded in strengthening civil society, it would have needed to have 
strategy and power and have interacted with other NGOs, serving as a guide for other 
associations. The method that the GICDF used to achieve its goals in some instances was 
withdrawn, because the GICDF wanted to avoid conflict with the head of the regime. 
 
The findings of this chapter have shown that the GICDF contributed to the process of 
building civil society but it did not make significant steps towards achieving this aim. The 
findings have also shown that the GICDF struggled with Qadhafi’s regime, and revealed 
that the relationship between the GICDF and the regime was paradoxical. The regime 
provided funding that facilitated the GICDF into strengthening its capacity and activities, 
whilst at the same time obstructing many of its functions, such as creating space within 
the People’s Authority system, and facilitating the freedom of expression through the 
media.  
It is possible to differentiate between two eras; an era in which institutions that provided 
education and charitable deeds enjoyed autonomy from the central government, and an 
era where the wave of liberalization and democratization necessitated the existence of 
other bodies that would exert pressure on the state and increase demands for democracy 
and transparency, and therefore showing that the institutions lacked autonomy.  
 
The GICDF was able to lead civil society institutions towards installing a new generation 
of social leaders after the phase of the revolutionary committees and revolutionary 
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violence. However, it was working in a grey area, where Muammar Qadhafi himself 
lacked clarity about the way in which he viewed the GICDF. He vacillated between the 
desire to give an opportunity to the GICDF to achieve its programmes, and the fear of 
opening the door to change, especially if this were to lead to the leadership no longer 
being under his control.  
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Chapter Eight 
The Political Changes in Libya of 2011; Impact 
on civil society organizations  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the political and social changes that took place in Libya in 2011, 
specifically in order to address the question of how those events have influenced the 
progress towards civil activities in Libya. It will be necessary, in that context, to cover 
the basic circumstances and dynamics of the changes. These events were a surprise and 
presented enormous challenges for the researcher in the new political environment. The 
chapter is based on the researcher’s understanding of the country, her observation of 
developments, and most importantly interviews. The situation remains in flux, and 
therefore only initial conclusions can be drawn. 
 
The chapter attempts to answer (in an initial manner) the following questions:  
1. How has the sudden change in the political situation in Libya affected the 
emergence of civil society associations, even though they were not 
instrumental in bringing about that change?  
2. How have these institutions been established, how are they run and how do 
they finance themselves? 
3. What does the experience indicate with regard to the Libyan population's 
aptitude for civil society organisation (World Bank definition)   
 
The specific focus is on Benghazi and Misurata, as the material is derived from interviews 
and observations which were conducted by the researcher in August and September 2011 
in these two cities. Through this the changes that have occurred in the Libyan NGO sector 
as a result of the collapse of Qadhafi’s power and the emergence of the NTC will be 
examined. The goal here is to determine what factors facilitated the emergence of NGOs, 
and how they have reacted to the surrounding circumstances.  
 
Benghazi and Misurata were the first two big cities to fall out of government control and 
thus to start developing some sort of alternative institutions. In order to present a broad 
picture of the implications of this, details will be given of the construction of 
administrative structures, organisational goals and values and channels of transmission. 
229 
 
Additionally, the following questions will be addressed: how do these organisations' 
activists pursue their goals, and what methods do they adopt to achieve them?  
 
Investigating such questions from the angle of civil society associations is not easy. The 
researcher had difficulties in acquiring relevant information and accessing the sources. 
Additionally, the researcher is aware that it is problematic to focus on the transitional 
period following the toppling of Qadhafi’s regime, given that the features of this period 
have not yet fully crystallised. 
 
Given the hollow nature of the civic institutions described in Chapter Five, characterised 
by the researcher as those of a neo-patrimonial state, it is hardly surprising that in the 
immediate aftermath of the fall of the Qadhafi regime these institutions collapsed 
alongside it. Therefore despite the greater opportunities created by the removal of state 
dominance over the public sphere, the previous civic institutions were not able to step in, 
but had to be rebuilt or reinvented. This process will take a long time. 
 
The first section of this chapter presents a brief introduction of the chapter. Section two 
examines the background and environment in which the movement for change developed 
in Libya to try to answer the questions of how and why the regime collapsed quickly. 
Section three explores the events which provoked resistance, particularly the revolutions 
in Egypt and Tunisia, and examines the circumstances that helped to mobilise resistance. 
This is followed by section four, which seeks to cast light on the actions taken by the 
former regime in Libya to counter the uprising. Section five highlights the different 
reasons for, and stages of, the rapid collapse of the Qadhafi State, which began with a 
demonstration in Benghazi. Section six focuses on the process of obtaining original 
research materials. Section seven focuses on the identities of the case study associations, 
by mapping these new associations and the motivation for creating these associations 
during and after the uprising. Section eight focuses on the activities of theses associations 
based on interviews conducted in Benghazi and Misurata. Section nine deals with the 
funding issues of theses associations. Lastly, section ten provides some conclusions 
drawn from the chapter.  
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8.2 The Background to the Uprising 
Some background on the fall of Qadhafi needs to be given so as to show how and why 
the regime collapsed quickly. There were several factors which contributed to the desire 
for political change in Libya. Some of these were deep-rooted, others emerged as events 
unfolded and gathered momentum, resulting in greater public anger and participation in 
the protests. The following points provide the background to the uprising. 
 
 At the time of the Libyan uprising Qadhafi had been the longest-serving Arab 
ruler, having first come to power through a military coup d’état in 1969. It was 
clear that a successor to Qadhafi was necessary. As Qadhafi got older, an ever-
increasing gap opened up between him, as the head of the regime, and the bulk 
of the population, of whom nearly 60% were under the age of twenty by the 
year 2000. This situation resulted in the political estrangement of Libya’s 
youth. Colonel Qadhafi had been ruling Libya for nearly 42 years. The younger 
population, born after the coup of 1969 or shortly before, did not share the 
political experience of the Colonel and his regime; nor did it see itself as having 
a heavy investment in the historical legitimacy of the post coup regime. It did 
not see the Colonel’s regime as embodying its political aspirations (al-Werfalli, 
2011:168). 
 
 There was a demand for broad political reforms, such as the drafting of a new 
constitution which would ensure the effective and meaningful participation of 
the Libyan people in their country’s political system, and allow them greater 
civil rights, including the freedom to form political parties, hold and express 
opinions.  
 
 The regime continued to overlook the relentless calls for reform from different 
political groups, for which some paid a high cost. Only the reforms headed and 
initiated by Saif al-Islam were taken into account; but this situation urged 
people to resist further, for several reasons, but mostly to prevent Saif al-Islam 
being groomed to succeed his father and, consequently, to perpetuate the same 
regime.  
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 As discussed in Chapter Four, up to 2011 the Libyan political system was based 
on a unique form of political rule. This system had alienated the people, due to 
growing corruption. This coupled with demand for political change by the 
majority of Libyans led to growing abstention from political participation 
which, in turn, highlighted the meaninglessness of the so-called People’s 
Authority. For instance, in some Basic People Conferences (BPCs), nobody 
attended except the Secretariats of the Conferences; in others even the 
Secretariats did not attend (al-Manara and Libya al-Youm Webpage, 16-01-
2011). 
 
 Exhaustion and stagnation troubled the state and the regime following years of 
isolation. 
 The sanctions imposed by the international community had taken their toll on 
Libya.  
 There was an absence of political choices available to Libyans, except for those 
allowed through the People’s Conferences, which did not go far enough 
towards meeting the need for political participation. 
 There was a continuous violation of human rights such as repression and torture 
carried out by Libya’s security agencies and state officials. 
 In spite of Libya being a very rich country, demands for economic reforms 
were not met and many Libyans complained of poor living conditions. 
 
8.3 Events which Provoked Resistance 
The roots of dissent in Libya can be traced back to the 1990s with the resurgence of 
Islamist movements across the country. However, a particularly significant year was 2006 
when Eastern Libya witnessed an outbreak of discontent following the killing of a number 
of young people who had been demonstrating against satirical cartoons of the Prophet 
Muhammad (published in Denmark). The demonstrations took place in the city of 
Benghazi, as well as throughout the Islamic world, with arrangements being made by 
Awqāf (The General Authority of Endowment) to denounce any such cartoon drawings. 
However, since demonstrations that were not guided or approved by the government were 
forbidden, the demonstrators took advantage of the situation by shouting anti-regime 
chants as well as by sabotaging and destroying some public places. These events led to 
clashes between the demonstrators and security forces, the latter of whom used live 
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ammunition on the demonstrators killing many (at the time the government only admitted 
to killing 12 people). Rioting then continued for about a week. 
 
Another significant event was the massacre at Abūsilīm  Prison on 29 June 1996, when 
Libyan Special Forces invaded the prison and opened fire on the prisoners, who were 
being detained for their involvement in Islamist groups, killing 1,200 of them. This issue 
remained taboo in Libya until 2009, when Saif al-Islam ensured that police officials and 
Abūsilīm prison personnel would be brought to trial over the incident.  
 
In 2008, the regime tried to dispose of the burden of the massacre at Abūsilīm prison by 
publicly acknowledging it. This move was prompted by the leaking of information about 
the massacre, which led some human rights organisations outside of Libya to put pressure 
on the regime to officially recognise what had happened. Additional pressure was applied 
to make the government inform the families of those who had been killed, not least by 
the families themselves. Each week, the families (especially mothers of victims) arranged 
small demonstrations, carrying pictures of their sons who had been killed in the Abūsilīm 
massacre, calling for the punishment of the killers and for the state to pay attention to the 
issue. These developments surprised people in Benghazi and the rest Libya who followed 
them via YouTube. By drawing attention to the Abūsilīm massacre in this way, human 
rights organisations and victims of regime violence helped to set off the chain of events 
that would lead to the Benghazi protests and the eventual overthrow of the regime.  
 
By way of response, the regime proposed the idea of giving so-called financial pay-offs 
(in Arabic called diya) for the families of the victims of the Abūsilīm massacre to make 
them give up their legal claims against the regime. In fact, the regime put a lot of pressure 
on the victims’ families by offering them small amounts of money in exchange for their 
silence about this crime, and handled it within a humanitarian rather than a political 
framework .In addition to stopping the families from pursuing their legal claims, the 
regime also held them accountable for its acts, and revealed the actual reasons behind the 
killings of their sons, as well as handing over their sons’ remains, or informing the 
families of where they had been buried.  
 
For the Libyan people, the demonstrations over Abūsilīm came as a shock, since the 
families of those who were murdered at Abūsilīm were protesting in the streets of 
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Benghazi, demanding revenge for their sons and, calling on Qadhafi by name, asking, 
“Qadhafi, where are the remains of our sons who had neither decent burials nor proper 
graves?” Additionally, the families declared their refusal to accept the regime’s blood 
money by chanting “It is not blood money we are after, we want the perpetrators who 
ordered and perpetrated the massacre”. To antagonise the public and have them join in 
the demonstrations, they also chanted “Grieve the mass killing of your sons” or “Woe to 
your men, Cyrenaica, who are killed in masses”. 
 
Prior to 2011, the Libyan people were not used to seeing people openly demonstrating 
and questioning the regime without being detained or imprisoned. These events 
psychologically prepared the Libyan public for uprising. From 2008, the families of the 
victims of the Abūsilīm massacre began organising a group called the “League of victims 
of Abūsilīm”, and this became the vehicle for communication with the authorities, 
representing the families of victims of Abūsilīm. The attorney Fatḥī Tirbil, led protests 
every Saturday in Benghazi which included many mothers and families and a small 
number of activists no more than five (as stated by Jalāl al-Kuwafī19). The demonstration 
represented the beginning of a public challenge to the authority of the regime coming 
from outside of the known bodies. 
 
Another notable event that preceded the uprising in Libya was the outbreak of the popular 
revolution in Tunisia on 18 December 2010, due to the deterioration of social and 
economic conditions, and government policies towards the poor. The revolutionaries 
aimed to show solidarity with Muḥammad Bū‘zīzī who had set himself on fire after his 
complaint about the confiscation of his goods had led to harassment by the police. This 
revolution was able in less than a month to overthrow the Tunisian President, Zīn al-
‘ĀbidīnBin ‘Ali (Time, 2010). 
 
On 25 January 2011, an Egyptian revolution started, spurred on by the events in Tunisia. 
The Egyptian revolutionaries also managed, after 18 days, to overthrow what was 
considered one of the strongest and most influential Arab regimes in the Middle East, that 
of Ḥusnī Mubārak. 
                                                 
as arrested in Benghazi in mysterious circumstances because of his call through Jalāl is activist, who w 19
the social networking sites for the peaceful demonstration on February 17 (Aljazeera.net, 17.02.2011). 
234 
 
 
8.4 Circumstances which Mobilised Resistance 
This section considers how far web pages and social networking sites helped to mobilise 
resistance, the uprising to spread. In order to explain how these sites were influential, I 
hypothesise that when people undergo a state of political alienation they become more 
susceptible to receiving and interacting with any message, whatever it is and whoever has 
sent it. In this case, the message of the Libyan opposition corresponded with the people’s 
demands for civil society, democracy, human rights and a state of law. The findings of 
one study (al-Werfalli, 2011:168), which assessed the political attitudes of Libyan 
citizens just before the popular uprising of 2011, supports the assumption that political 
change was a top priority among Libyans, including some of those who were involved 
with the regime. Additionally, the same study found that more than a third of the people 
it sampled were inclined towards radical change while a similar proportion preferred 
reform over radical change. In total, it concluded that 76% of Libyans supported political 
change either through reform or by dismantling the existing system altogether.  
 
This popular demand for change spurred the opposition movement to mobilise support 
from Libyans living abroad and at home via online chat rooms on “Paltalk Chat”. By 
communicating in this way, the opposition was able to provide instructions and directions 
to Libyans living in Libya, on how to continue their civil disobedience. The rioting 
subsequently developed further in Benghazi, where it seemed as if the instructions given 
through Paltalk chat rooms were being realised, as well as showing that there was 
communication between opposition members living in and outside of Libya. Part of the 
reform project initiated by Saif al-Islam involved declaring forgiveness to the opposition, 
opening up channels of communication with them and granting them safety to return 
home. Without doubt, this call was highly appealing for many individuals who had been 
living in exile for as long as half a century and many did indeed come home. This gave a 
unique chance to the opposition groups to communicate directly with the Libyan people 
and allowed the message of political change to be adopted by more and more individuals. 
 
8.5 Developments in the Events of the Uprising in Benghazi 
In 2011 Qadhafi called on Libyans to prevent the revolutions that had occurred in Egypt 
and Tunisia from spreading to his country and called on all Muslims to fight Western 
colonialism. He claimed that:  
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The white man has decided to get rid of the green colour, and that these 
countries should unite against the White Man because the White Man is, 
historically, an enemy of Islam [...]If that fails, let us blame it on Israel. 
Come on. Let us all use this anger to fight Israel. The Palestinian refugees 
should take advantage of a wave of popular revolts in the Middle East 
through gathering peacefully around the borders of Israel to voice their 
demands (BBC, 2011). 
 
The Libyan authorities sabotaged a number of websites that the Libyans used to 
communicate with each other, namely: Libya al-Mostakbal, Jeel, Manarah, Asan, Libya 
al-Youm, and Libya Watanona.  
 
The regime tried to put in place other pre-emptive measures to suppress a potential 
revolution by sending two of Qadhafi’s representatives to the Eastern Region. The first 
of these representatives was Ṭayib al-Ṣāfī who held a meeting at Darna on 31 January 
2011, with different sectors of the local population, including NGOs and youth sports 
officials, to discuss national and local issues in Libya. In particular, he talked about the 
growing difficulties faced by Libya’s youth due to unemployment, poverty and 
marginalisation; matters pertaining to the management and administration of the state, 
such as corruption; and proposed solutions to those problems. On this occasion, some of 
the attendees raised issues related to the constitution, freedom of the press, the lifting of 
restrictions on civil society organisations and the establishment of parameters around 
state law and institutions (Journal of Libya Press, 2011).20 
 
The second representative was ‘Umar ’Ishkāl who was sent to meet with the Popular 
Social Leadership (al-Qiyátát al-sha'biyah in Benghazi to deliver the following message:  
[T]he Leader is with the poor, and there will be many facilities to be 
provided for citizens, asking them in return for their loyalty to the Leader 
of the revolution and to ensure that the sons of their tribes will not 
participate in demonstrations (Libya al-Youm, 2011). 
 
For their part, many of the elders stated that they were with the al-Fātiḥ revolution and its 
leader Qadhafi. They also said that they were against damaging the country’s security by 
placing it in chaos (Libya al-Youm, 2011).  
 
                                                 
20This media agency which belonged to the GICDF took a different stance from the official one by 
reporting about both sides of the uprising in the early stages.  
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Qadhafi’s attempt to prevent revolution in Libya failed and the uprising, which started 
out as a peaceful demonstration in Benghazi, ended up as an armed revolution that spread 
across the country. The uprising began on 15 February 2011. The initial protests in 
Benghazi were triggered by the arrest of Fatḥī Tirbil and Faraj al-Sharānī. Fatḥī Tirbil 
was a prominent lawyer and activist in the field of human rights and head of the committee 
representing the families of the victims of the Abūsilīm massacre. Both individuals were 
members of the committee. These arrests were apparently the regime’s response to a press 
release issued by the aforementioned committee on the same day as the arrests were made. 
The document in question announced a set of resolutions and exhortations to the people 
to, “stop all contacts with state bodies” and to “maintain their stance, as a result of the 
failure of the meetings between the Committee and various government bodies to reach 
a satisfactory result”. The authorities were forced to release Fatḥī Tirbil on 16 February, 
who then became a member of the Council of the Revolution in Benghazi. 
 
On 17 February the uprising spread across the coastal cities of Cyrenaica. Four days later, 
the whole region was taken over by the rebels and freed from the grip of the old regime.  
 
The reaction of Qadhafi and his son to the uprising was an element which served to 
inflame matters. Due to his ignorance of the real situation in Benghazi, on 17 February 
Qadhafi sent his son al-Sa‘dī and ‘Abd Allāh al-Sunūsī (his brother in law), to bring about 
reconciliation. However, ‘Abd Allāh al-Sunūsī was detested in Cyrenaica because he was 
widely believed to have ordered and supervised the massacre of prisoners at Abūsilīm, 
most of whom were from that region. al-Sa‘dī was also unpopular, as he was associated 
with the banning of the ’Ahlī football team, the most popular team in Benghazi, which 
was closely associated with the ‘Umar al-Mukhtār Association. The banning of the ’Ahli 
team was followed by the knocking down of the shrine of ‘Umar al-Mukhtār in Benghazi. 
For these reasons, both of Qadhafi’s sons failed in their missions. According to an 
eyewitness from the Revolutionary Green Guards, who had gathered to protect the al-
Fātiḥ Revolution on 17 February, no bullets were fired at the demonstrators from the side 
of the regime. It is worth mentioning that those known as “yellow hats fighters” were 
armed only with sticks. A report in The Guardian newspaper claimed: “Witnesses said 
that security forces broke up a protest held in Jamāl ‘Abd al-Nāssir Street in central 
Benghazi a few hours ago, deploying tear gas canisters and firing live bullets into the air 
for the first time since the protests began” (The Guardian, 2011). 
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The researcher spoke to eyewitnesses from different areas of Benghazi: particularly those 
who were far away from the al-Birkah neighbourhood and outside of the firing-range of 
the al-Faḍīl Bū‘Umar barracks, and the places of the demonstrations. However, there was 
still gunfire and casualties in these remote areas: for instance, one of the staff of the 
General Authority of Endowment (Waqf), named Ḥusīn Karkāra, was shot in front of the 
al-Zakāt department in the Rās‘Bīdah neighbourhood. This event stirred the anger of his 
children, work colleagues and neighbours, pushing them into joining the demonstration. 
In another case, a citizen called “Ramzī” was shot in front of his home in ’Arḍ al-Sharīf, 
which again prompted his brothers and uncles to join the demonstration. 
 
There was shooting coming from everywhere, killing not only demonstrators but also 
bystanders. While the unarmed Revolutionary Green Guards were calling Tripoli 
relentlessly to send troops to help suppress the intifada, mourners at the funerals of 
“martyrs” were being shot from unidentified sources. This escalation in the killing of 
innocents in Benghazi antagonised people across the country whose slogan, when 
demonstrations began to appear in Tripoli and Misurata, was “soul and blood we redeem 
you, Benghazi”.  
 
In Misurata, the demonstrations which had swept through Benghazi were followed by 
similar demonstrations. Misurata was under siege from all directions except its port, 
although even this was under threat at times. This section describes how the Libyan NGOs 
took responsibility for organising the city in the absence of the state. On 19 February 
2011, a small demonstration broke out in Misurata in protest against the events in 
Benghazi, and demanding the release of a group of youths who had been arrested shortly 
before for their writing son various websites and blogs. The security forces used live 
ammunition on the demonstrators, killing one youth. This death antagonised people even 
further, and led to crowds on the street venting their anger during the funeral of the young 
man on Sunday, 20 February. It was said by eyewitnesses from Misurata that twenty 
thousand mourners gathered on the streets of the city as the funeral took place. In another 
bid to break up the demonstration, the security forces again fired live ammunition at the 
demonstrators which resulted in the killing of five more people and dozens of others being 
injured. The demonstrators reacted by attacking and sabotaging government centres and 
other buildings that symbolised the regime, including: those linked to the police and 
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security services, the “al-Mathāba” of the Revolutionary Committees in the city, and the 
school where Qadhafi studied as a student in the 1950s, which had been turned into a 
headquarters for the so-called “Leader's Comrades”. Consequently, all the employees of 
these bodies had to evacuate the buildings, which provided a chance for the protesters to 
burn the buildings down. On 21 February, the city was emptied of the institutions and 
symbols of the state. Students and teachers deserted schools out of fear, and banks, shops, 
bakeries, factories and other facilities closed. As basic services broke down, a need 
emerged to bring order back to the city and manage certain basic facilities. In the absence 
of government the NGOs took responsibility for organising and managing the city. In the 
following section I will describe how they quickly and effectively they achieved this. 
Misurata witnessed a much greater growth of spontaneous activities than Benghazi did, 
so I will first examine how this city adapted to the post-conflict situation. 
 
Information in this section is based on research and fieldwork by the writer. Between 4 
March and 20 August Misurata became almost totally isolated from the outside world, 
under besiege by forces loyal to Qadhafi. This situation left the sea as the sole route in 
and out of the city, although even this was not very safe, as it had been bombed several 
times. The shops were closed and services ground to a halt. In this situation, perhaps 
motivated by the will to survive, or in an attempt to deal with the new reality imposed on 
them, many citizens enthusiastically took responsibility for rapidly organising the city 
and providing security around the shops and public facilities, preventing any attempts 
aimed at destroying them. Misurata was therefore left relatively unscathed, except for 
attacks on some buildings, symbolic of the old regime. As one interviewee said, “We did 
not know each other before this crisis, and we found that people of all ages and social 
levels, and even those who are originally from outside the city, were cooperating with 
each other to try to serve this city”. The people of the city had to set up teams of volunteers 
to undertake the necessary work in the various areas of the city 
 
The first official response to the uprising came from Saif al-Islam who appeared on 
Libyan television on 20 February. He went on to make what has since become a widely-
renowned speech, which is so significant as to be worth quoting at length here:  
We all know that the area is being stormed with the winds of change; 
winds of democracy; winds of liberation; you name it. We all need to talk 
frankly, we need to know the truth, and I, today, will say nothing but the 
truth. There are some opponents who live abroad; they have a good deal 
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of friends and assistants inside; this is not a secret. There are opponents 
who wanted to mimic what has happened in Egypt and Tunisia; they use 
the so-called “Facebook Revolution”. Things have developed very 
rapidly; shooting has taken place, casualties have increased...Police 
stations, Police headquarters and the Benghazi brigade that belong to the 
army, have been the targets of the demonstrators’ attack. It has kept on 
progressing this way and when the angry people attacked those places; 
[they] were met by police and army troops who were defending 
themselves in the first place. This is, in short, what has happened in 
Benghazi. It has developed to become strife and a separation attempt, 
which threatens not only the nation’s cohesion but also the national unity 
of Libya as a nation and as a state. We are now in a national initiative, 
calling the General People’s Conference to meet, with a clear agenda to 
issue a chain of laws which were being agreed upon prior to this event: 
the media law, civil society, a new penal code, civil society laws, new 
laws that suit the global situation now, that enhance freedom, and 
terminate most of the existing ridiculous restrictions and penalties. 
 
The “national initiative” also includes a national dialogue concerning 
Libya's constitution, which was agreed upon. The leader has actually said 
to the press that it is time for the Libyans to set their constitution. The 
“national initiative” involves, moreover, that the system of local 
governance should be brought back in Libya; you then call them 
provinces, municipals, communes or whatever but the local governance 
system should return. The “national initiative” takes in sustaining 
development; pushing it forward and keeping going the spending of the 
200 billion that was allocated for projects across the county. The media 
is exaggerating in reporting the number of casualties; there is a well pre-
coordinated campaign of rumours. There are three groups beyond what 
is happening in Cyrenaica which is being transmitted to the rest of Libya's 
cities. 
 
The first group are the organised groups; like the civil society 
organisations; and they have no clear political plan or programme, nor do 
they have any clear political demands. This group of people does not 
really worry us as we understand their opinions and have some agreement 
with them. The second group are the Islamic organisations; they have 
taken over the city of al-Bayḍā’. This group became a military one and 
the first thing they did when they attacked the army barracks was to kill 
officers and soldiers. The third group, which is the biggest in numbers, is 
made up mainly of misled children and other adults who are taking drugs 
and hallucinogenic pills; they are being used.  
 
Although most of the speech was very reasonable, it shocked many people, because it did 
not present Saif al-Islam as the reformist they believed him to be. There was a great deal 
of apprehension among the people regarding the uncertain future awaiting Libya 
following the uprising. These concerns were expressed first by Saif al-Islam in his speech, 
when the whole region of Cyrenaica fell into the hands of the rebels. Most people, 
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especially the young, expected him to take a softer approach to the events than his father, 
and to engage in a serious dialogue with the demonstrators, making an effort to understand 
their demands and deal with them using the logic of a statesman. In this way, many 
thought he could be part of the solution rather than a driver of the conflict: somebody who 
would provide solutions to the issues and fulfil the promises of reform he had made that 
had not been reflected in realistic policies. However, some people felt that in this speech 
Saif al-Islam did not show the level of wisdom required to address the issue. Instead, he 
chose to warn the Libyan people of the possibility of serious issues such as a breakup of 
the country, civil war, foreign occupation, the burning of oil, that all the Libyan tribes 
were armed and that the final victory would be clinched by force only: that is, by armed 
resistance. This showed that Saif al-Islam had a dark, pessimistic perspective on the 
future, which came in sharp contrast to his reputation as a man of reform and 
modernisation, and promoter of democracy, human rights and civil society, especially in 
Europe.  
 
Following the above speech many were certain, even the most hesitant, that there was no 
going back. Demonstrations began all over Libya, which were almost suppressed in some 
areas, although in eastern areas they were completely outside of the regime’s control. 
Many young people claimed that their motive for fighting against the forces of Qadhafi, 
was that they had completely lost hope that the regime would listen to the people, after 
hearing Saif al-Islam's speech. Many people did not believe that Saif al-Islam could be 
trusted to act independently from his father’s views. Therefore they chose to fight, saying 
that they had nothing to lose: no jobs, no dignity and no freedom. 
 
Qadhafi’s response to this situation can be seen in his now famous speech, made on 22 
February, in which he said:  
Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi does not occupy any political post to step down 
or resign; I am a leader of revolution; and revolution means sacrificing 
to the last day of one's life. I am far more sublime than those political 
posts...I am a leader, a fighter, a Mujāhid, a rebel, and this march will 
never be impeded by a bunch of wretches. A small group of youth, high 
on drugs, is raiding police stations and army barracks just like rats. It is 
not their fault, those youth; they imitate what happened in Tunisia and 
Egypt. There is a small group of sick people tucked away in the cities 
who offer money and drugs to the youngsters and have them involved in 
such battles. I am on the side of the people's will; from tomorrow we will 
re-establish the people’s authority. We have not used force yet, but if it 
becomes necessary we are going to use it according to the international 
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law and the Libyan constitution. If I were a president, I would have 
resigned. You are confronting a hard rock upon which the American 
fleets crashed and collapsed. Never mind, you filthy bunch of lice-
infested rats. You do not represent even one percent of the Libyan people. 
From tomorrow, security will be imposed by the army, security 
organisations and by you. Wake up and come out of your homes. I built 
Benghazi brick by brick, myself. I allocated the Free Officers to lead the 
tribes; to liberate them from those rats, and to try those rats according to 
the law. I have not yet given the commands to use force. Form local 
popular security committees to safeguard all the Libyan cities. I call the 
Libyan people to go into the streets to control them and I shall lead this 
popular revolution. From tomorrow, a new administration shall begin a 
new Jamahiriya, new popular revolution and new constitution. Since you 
do not trust the popular committees any more, take your oil and manage 
it yourselves. I request that the arms that terrorised people be handed in. 
You people of Benghazi get up and save yourselves; go to freedom and 
save ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Yūnis.  
 
In this speech, he threatened the demonstrators, claiming that they were not representative 
of the people of Libya, and calling them a “filthy bunch of lice-infested rats”. In other 
parts of his speech which are not quoted above, Qadhafi referred to the Constitution, in 
listing actions which would be punishable by the death penalty. In this way, a clear 
message was given: that the demonstrators would not be tolerated, and that Qadhafi held 
a legal authority over them which included the power to authorise executions.  
 
Qadhafi also gave examples of where “the governments of China, Russia, Israel in the 
Gaza Strip and Romania had all dealt with similar situations with utter ruthlessness and 
brutality and without the interference of the international community”. He made it explicit 
that he considered such issues as “internal affairs of these countries”. That speech resulted 
in an even larger number of demonstrators going out onto the streets and more 
demonstrations, as the protesters felt that retreat would lead to their deaths. 
 
In his speech, Qadhafi did not speak like a statesman responsible for calming down the 
protestors and trying to understand and meet their demands as far as possible. Instead, 
some believed that he portrayed himself as an enemy to his people. By citing examples 
of other countries where demonstrators had been crushed, and by stressing that those 
matters were “domestic affairs”, he made it clear that he believed “the international 
community had no legitimacy whatsoever to interfere”.  
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This was an indication of his lack of awareness of the significance of external factors, 
such as the changes in international politics, and showed a shallow comprehension of 
world politics in the age of globalisation. I can argue here that if there was any of state 
institutions interested in world affairs, it was realized by what happens in the world. It 
was equipped with a different response which was not centred on the leader in particular, 
he did not have a good understanding of how the election of President Obama in the USA, 
whose election slogans emphasised “change”, had altered global influence. Neither did 
he properly understand the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, nor America’s role in that of 
Egypt. Qadhafi was not acceptable to the Western countries which had fought a long and 
bitter struggle with him. He was only reluctantly accepted after presenting Saif al-Islam 
as a reformer who could restore relations with the West. From the Western perspective, 
it would have been foolish to miss such an opportunity, especially since Qadhafi governed 
a country that sells oil which can affect European voters and taxpayers directly. Thus, 
although the situation in Libya is not a great concern for some Europeans, it nevertheless 
has a bearing on the price of fuel they pay at home. 
 
Qadhafi did not deal wisely and objectively with the events, nor showed an understanding 
of the changes that were taking place in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt. He thought that 
making concessions, as was done by Mubārak in Egypt, would lead to further loss of 
control. Instead, Qadhafi started making accusations, such as claiming that the young 
people protesting against him had been given drugs and led astray. Furthermore, he 
accused the West of deceiving those people, as well as hot-headedly blaming al-Qa‘idah 
for being behind the events in Libya. However, from the researcher’s perspective, Saif al-
Islam did offer two concessions in his speech. First, he proposed the abolition of the 
People’s Authority and second, he proposed the establishment of a local government 
system, which would manage local services efficiently and rapidly. This would have 
made a significant change to the political system.  
 
The confrontations between the opponents and supporters of Qadhafi escalated, with 
many of the former being detained. What is more, reports began to come in saying that 
there were mercenaries among the fighters loyal to Qadhafi. These reports came through 
stream media and were combined with video clip recordings. At this point, a new factor 
emerged in the reporting of events of such importance, which was perhaps the only source 
for obtaining information about what was happening in Libya: that is, the role played by 
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the media, especially al-Jazeera, in intensifying reports and news regarding the events by 
broadcasting videos taken on mobile phones. This method of reporting created a more 
complicated picture of the situation, from which it became more difficult for the outside 
observer to know what was really happening. For example, there has been suspicion 
regarding the allegations of rape, which were overstated to a large extent, because of the 
great sensitivity surrounding the issue of rape, especially in a conservative society like 
Libya. Placing stress on an issue related to the honour of all Libyans, such as the raping 
of Libyan woman, would definitely result in mass anger, especially if the perpetrators 
were foreigners. Therefore, the linking of the reported rapes to the mercenaries, by the 
media, inflamed anger and pressed more young men to join the armed uprising. The 
researcher has been told that this issue was used by the media to generate sympathy for 
the uprising in Western public opinion and to bring about a Western intervention.  
 
On 17 March, the UN Security Council imposed a no-fly zone over Libya, stating in the 
relevant resolution that “all necessary means” would be used to enforce it: flights 
providing humanitarian aid, medicine or evacuations were exempt (CNN, 2011). Ten of 
the fifteen council members voted in favour of the resolution, with Russia, China, 
Germany, India and Brazil abstaining (al-Jazeera English, 2011). The resolution itself 
appears to have given legal weight to attacks against Qadhafi's ground forces (BBC, 
2011). 
 
In the meantime, Qadhafi’s troops had begun to deploy heavy arms around Benghazi in 
an attempt to dissolve the intifada and reassert control in Eastern Libya ,including Marsā 
al-Brīqah and ’Jdābyā. A day earlier, Qadhafi made a speech on the radio urging the 
residents of Benghazi to capture the rebel fighters. He stressed that his targets were the 
rebels and defectors rather than the civilian population. However, by that time confidence 
in Qadhafi had gone, both inside Libya and internationally. Moreover, parts of were used 
by President Obamato claim that Qadhafi would “crush the population of Benghazi 
without mercy”. Qadhafi’s army arrived at the western gate of Benghazi where there were 
clashes with, killing 94 of the latter. 
 
It can be said that, regardless of whether Qadhafi intended to act on his speech or not, he 
nonetheless gave a unique opportunity for European interference led by France and 
Britain. On the European side, Vandewalle (CNN, 2011) pointed out that“[f]or four 
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decades, the [Libyan] regime withstood open confrontations with the West that included 
the US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, a series of unilateral US economic 
sanctions and multilateral diplomatic and economic sanctions”. On this point, I agree with 
Walter Fauntroy (2011) who stated “[t]he truth about all this will come out later”. 
 
These events prompted the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1973, on 
17 March 2011, which authorised NATO to carry out airstrikes in Libya. NATO hurriedly 
began its operations soon afterwards on the frontline located to the east between Marsā 
al-Brīqah and ’Jdabyā, where forces loyal to Qadhafi and the rebels were clashing.  
 
8.6. Conclusion on the Rapid Collapse of the Qadhafi State  
In Libya, can it be said that the institutions of the state were partially absent? Certainly, 
their absence could be seen in the unstructured variant of a modern state Libya 
represented, where the political power remained in all its branches – including the 
legislative, executive, military and security – concentrated in the hands of only one leader, 
who had no official political position and was , in effect, above the law. In such cases, the 
gap between an absent state and the leadership closes, to the extent that it becomes 
difficult to differentiate between them. This is problematic, because the state’s leader 
becomes the sole guarantor of the stability and unity of a country that would otherwise – 
certainly in the Libyan case – be divided by opposing tribes and hence civil war, due to 
the absence of any other political alternatives.  
 
This maintaining of power through its concentration is perhaps what the system worked 
for over the duration of Qadhafi’s rule. His absolute power emptied all aspects of political 
life to the extent that it did not allow other Libyans to enrol in the only political movement, 
the movement of the Revolutionary Committees. This movement was the only channel 
for those who wanted to play a significant role in the society. Gradually this channelling 
of activity led to amendments and the addition of more functions, duties and programmes 
to the movement, to fit ever closer the vision of its founder.  
 
Another reason behind the raped collapse of the regime is the fact that Qadhafi always 
concentrated on matters outside the Libyan borders. Qadhafi considered himself a 
universal leader, an equivalent to Mahatma Gandhi or Nelson Mandela. Libya was never 
adequate for Qadhafi to fulfil his ambitions to spread his ideology. This resulted in less 
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and less focus on the concept of building institutions in Libya. This is partly due to 
Qadhafi’s acceptance of Libya as only a part of his larger dream. At first, Qadhafi 
concentrated on the Arab world in which he clearly considered Libya such a part. After 
that, as Qadhafi did not achieve his objectives, he moved his concentration from the Arab 
world to the African continent. Using revenues from oil and gas sector, Qadhafi could 
provide financial support for many countries in the continent. Consequently, African 
leaders created the African Union in 9th September 1999.  
 
Marlowe (2014) usefully summarized some of the key factors underlining the fragility of 
the Libyan state. First, he notes the very young age of Libyan institutions as a critical 
factor. Libya gained its independence in 1951 (only six decades). At that time, it had the 
poorest economy in the world with an almost illiterate society. Second, bureaucracy was 
another critical factor. Almost three quarters of Libyans worked in the public sector (one 
of the highest percentages in the world). Bureaucracy was combined with Qadhafi's 
unpredictability. This led to severe and significant confusion. Only high officials had the 
courage to take decisions. This was reflected on and in the lives of ordinary Libyans. 
Planning and organizational deficiencies were common, as well as lack of trust in others’ 
promises. Third, the high production of oil led to a culture of laziness, irresponsibility and 
ignorance. This was observed by foreigners. Oil guaranteed salaries and money flowing 
in, so most people did not look to improve themselves. Furthermore, corruption was 
another critical factor. The very low salaries given to the public sector or government 
workers forced some Libyans to start their own private business. Some of them received 
remittances either from relatives inside Libya or abroad, while others had to take bribes. 
Marlowe claims that this not only created a culture of corruption, but also created cynical 
reactions in elections. Voters tended to vote for incompetent candidates simply because 
they had not been convicted or become infamous for corruption. Consequently, high 
officials performed badly and slowly. ‘While Marlowe has correctly noted the weakness 
of the Libyan electoral system, this description is still too functional. In reality there is no 
elections and the political system were largely for show, and there was little genuine 
participation. 
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8.7 The Sample  
I managed to identify several associations involved in the civil sector in Libya with the 
aim of conducting interviews with one or two members from each. What happened with 
each interview guided how I approached the next, and also led to my being introduced to 
other associations.  
 
The associations, and their members whom I interviewed, were selected with a view to 
create as wide and substantial a sample as possible in the circumstances, reflecting 
differences between the different types of activities carried out. Although I can make no 
claim that these interviews are exhaustive or universal in the views they share, the spread 
of viewpoints is as wide as the research allowed. The limitations of a selective gathering 
of sources are noted (e.g. certain groups will be self-selecting to a degree), so my more 
generalised comments should be taken as qualified by this consideration. However, the 
selection presented is still usefully broad, and as such I saw the associations operating in 
Benghazi and Misurata as highlighting certain issues and ways of understanding the idea 
and role of civil society.  
 
The sample consisted of 26 associations, differing in terms of their size and activities on 
the ground. Research data was collected through 26 in-depth, semi-structured interviews. 
This type of interview was selected as an essential method for this study, and was 
combined with my own participant observations of certain aspects of the associations' 
activities. The interviews gave me insights into how the members of the associations 
participated in civil activities. 
 
8.8 Mapping of Case Study Associations 
This section gives an overview of the associations that began operating during and after 
the uprising. The number of these associations boomed. The number of associations 
registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and Civil 
Society in Benghazi in September 2011 reached 392, almost equal to the number for all 
of Libya before the uprising. Eighty- five of the associations were based in Misurata. The 
section also attempts to explain the emergence of these associations, the activities they 
carry out and how they fund those activities in the extraordinary circumstances of post-
Qadhafi Libyan society. As pointed out in previous chapters, it was thought that Libya 
did not have the expertise to set up civil society institutions able to take on the duties of 
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organising people or determining what were priorities in emergency cases. Yet the 
experience showed it did. 
 
8.8.1 Motivation for Creating Civil Associations During and After the 
Uprising 
The interviews conducted for this study reveal that since the uprising, and principally 
after 19 March 2011, when NATO took action against Qadhafi’s regime, the number of 
associations increased very rapidly. It is important to discuss the motivation leading to 
the creation of the new associations. The researcher asked this question of all those who 
were interviewed for this study. Their responses and interpretations where varied.  
 
The obvious explanation was that given by a member of the board of directors of the 
Libyan Development Organisation, Benghazi, who said: 
The reason, in my view, is that the demand for having NGOs was 
previously forbidden and considered a suspicious request. The result was 
counterproductive; it created a desire among the people to know what 
civil society organisations and associations are; hence their establishment 
was accelerated (the researcher interview with him in Benghazi 8-9-
2011). 
 
Another explanation came from the person in charge of civil society in the local council 
of Misurata, who put it as follows:  
Libyan society in its structure is actually a modern and civilized one. It 
is merely a rumour that Libyan society is a tribal society. That is not true 
and it is mainly said to keep the community underdeveloped.  
 
Civil associations in Libya, in other words, developed quickly because that is what 
happens in 'modern society', and Libya is a modern society. 
 
The Director of the Nida al-Khair Foundation in Benghazi (who is also a senior member 
of the coalition of NGOs in Benghazi), Mr. ‘Abd Allāh al-Muṭardī, had another 
interpretation. In his view, the main factors driving the boom in civil society were 
external. In particular, he believed that this development is mainly due to the return of 
Libyans living abroad, many of whom have experience in civil work, especially in the 
field of relief. These people participated in the formation and emergence of strong 
associations, as well as in organising training courses to improve efficiency. They also 
provided funds to support these institutions. 
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The Chairperson of the Board of the Tawāṣul Association in Benghazi (and head of the 
Coalition of Associations in September 2011), Mrs. Amīna al-Mughīrbī21, explained the 
trend by saying:  
[I]t is due to the thirst of people and their willingness to participate in 
public work. It is also the desire for freedom, which they have been 
deprived of for a long period, which made people eager to organise, 
participate and do something. Therefore, the civil associations were the 
channels that absorbed that eagerness and enthusiasm (The researcher’s 
interview with Mrs. Amīna al-Mughīrbī n Benghazi 10-09-2011). 
 
The Chairman of the Gathering for Change Association, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd Ḥusīn, stressed 
that the ultimate reason behind the formation of his society was to serve as the nucleus of 
a political party. He added that the framework of that party would be ready once a law of 
parties was published and passed by the parliament. It would eventually form the base for 
a political party that would push for permanent change in Libya. Mr Ḥusīn stated “I 
estimate that around 10% of the associations in Misurata are intended to be the nuclei of 
political parties, even though they have not formally announced this’’. Support for this 
observation can be found by looking at the goals, objectives and even the names of these 
associations, which all clearly point to the fact that their underlying purposes are for them 
to become political parties rather than remaining associations. 
 
Three women leaders in the Muslim Forum in Misurata said that the aim of their 
association was to rationalise the role of Muslim women in Libyan society at large and 
also to push forward a commitment to Islamic ethics, especially regarding the Islamic 
headscarf and veil. 
 
One of the most prominent businessmen in Misurata and also one of the main founders 
of the ’Imdād Association (Jibrīl al-Ri‘īḍ), the best resourced association in Misurata in 
terms of capital (estimated to be in millions of Libyan dinars), said that he had not initially 
been interested in establishing an association. It was only when he realised that other 
businessmen that they were either financing or providing substantial financial assistance 
to other associations that he thought of creating an association of his own. The motivation 
                                                 
21In 2012 Mrs. Amīna al-Mughīrbīwas elected a member of the General National Congress as a 
representative from Benghazi. 
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here was prestige. The person concerned had funded the military operation in Misurata, 
and was now seeking a civilian and politician role after the end of military operations. 
 
The founders of the Jurists Association in Benghazi said that they established the 
association in order to provide legal services and advice to people. They aimed to shed 
light on negative forces at work in society and to make people aware of their rights and 
duties under the law in Libyan society. They are currently working on setting up a 
television channel to educate and interact with people. 
 
The researcher observed that many of the new associations were geared towards dealing 
with crisis issues and that, as such, they might cease to exist once conditions in Libya 
returned to normal. The ideas and goals underpinning them were not clear in the minds 
of their founders. Many of their goals did not seem to be long-term ones since the 
principal reason for their establishment was to tackle practical issues that needed 
immediate solutions. Many supporters and donors were motivated by revolutionary or 
emotional factors, in their rush to help the needy. This is known in some Arab culture as 
faz‘a, which literally means an immediate and emotional reaction to offer support and 
help, reflecting the values of nobility, bravery, generosity and chivalry to which every 
person (especially males) should adhere. It is an immediate response to any call for help22 
and it, in most cases, takes a form of collective collaborative action.  
 
Clearly the present situation is the start or initial phase in the formation or evolution of 
civil society. That is, people notice a problem, gather to help each other and participate 
in action to change the status quo. Given time, that level of participation may evolve and 
translate into goals, objectives and clear plans for these groups of people. This might be 
the real start of the emergence of civil society. Only time will judge whether these 
organisations will climb further up the ladder to the next stage of development, and in 
doing so reflect a popular desire to change and reform society through mass civil 
participation. There are some associations that do already have clear plans and objectives, 
                                                 
22Faz'a is the term used for help given to those in need. This help can take many forms, from declaring 
war against enemies to helping a person in need e.g., helping to finish house work or building work, 
helping to prepare for a celebration, such as a wedding or farewell party, greeting a person who is going 
to/coming back from Pilgrimage, lending money or supporting a person who is frightened or in trouble, 
etc. 
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and are thus well-placed to survive the present situation. Among these are the Tawāṣul 
Association and the ’Ayadīnā Association in Benghazi. The latter have plans and fully 
understand the functions and roles they can play in Libyan society.  
 
8.9 Activities 
The researcher did not apply a classification model in Chapter Six of this study because 
there was no real diversity in the activities that were carried out by the associations, and 
therefore she did not see any need for the use of such classification. Applying one in this 
chapter reflects the changing character of this sector. This section is based on interviews 
conducted in Benghazi and Misurata with around 26 associations. The activities of these 
associations have been categorised according to a framework created by Salamon and 
Anheier (1992:2). The latter reference warns that: “While classification is essential, it is 
also very difficult. No single classification system is perfect for all possible purposes”.  
 
Salamon and Anheier’s approach classifies NGOs “according to their area of primary 
economic activity” (Salamon and Anheier, 1992:11). This approach is designed to be 
applied globally, in respect of which it has been called the International Classification of 
Non-profit Organisations (ICNPO). The application of the approach is a little difficult 
because many associations are engaged in more than one activity, but it will nonetheless 
be used here, with some modifications, as a guide and indicator for the classification of 
the Libyan associations. 
 
Salamon and Anheier divide associations into 12 main groups, some of which 
encompass further sub grouping. The categories are: 
1- Culture and Recreation 
2- Education and Research 
3- Health 
4- Social Services 
5- Environment 
6- Development and Housing 
7- Law, Advocacy and Politics 
8- Philanthropic Intermediaries and Voluntarism Promotion 
9- International 
10- Religion 
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11- Business and Professional 
12- Not Elsewhere Classified 
(Salamon and Anheier, 1992:31)  
 
I have divided the associations into similar groups to apply this model; however, for the 
purposes of this study, the associations will be arranged into eleven categories. The health 
category will be located under social services instead of constituting a separate group.  
 
8.9.1 Culture and Recreation 
This category includes associations whose activities are related to the full range of cultural 
and recreational activities: cultural services, sports, recreation and social clubs, 
entertainment and sporting facilities, the publishing of books, and brochures, music, 
newspapers and journals etc. My research indicates that there are 13 associations that fall 
under this category in Benghazi and one in Misurata. 
 
8.9.2 Education and Research 
The ISIC system places a variety of educational activities under this category, including 
primary, secondary and higher education, technical and vocational education and 
different research areas (Salamon and Anheier 1992:36). In Libya the associations created 
have been for the support of schools. There are 19 such associations in Benghazi that fall 
under this category while in Misurata there are none.  
 
The further growth of NGOs in this area is likely to be limited, because there is only one 
religion in the country which contrasts with Lester and Anheier’s hypothesis: “The greater 
the level of religious competition, the larger the non-profit education sector.” (Salamon 
and Anheier, 1998:222).  
 
8.9.3 Social Services 
A broad range of services come under this category providing different kinds of services: 
the provision of healthcare, food and other goods, shelter and disaster relief for people 
caught up in wars, financial assistance, medical supplies and social welfare appliances 
and equipment etc. As a mentioned earlier, health comes under this category because 
there is some correlation between the Ministry of Health and social services associations 
in Libya. Health services cover multiple activities linked to health, such as, the running 
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of hospital services and medical and dental practices. There are 65 associations that fit 
into this category in Benghazi and a further 21 in Misurata. 
 
The provision of public goods is generally considered to be one of the main legitimate 
functions of government. In classical economics, the shortcoming of markets serves as a 
major justification for government (Lester and Anheier, 1998:220). Nevertheless, 
sometimes governments cannot offer this service for reasons such as cost, time constraints 
or a lack of resources. The World Bank explains the advantages of civil society in this 
regard as follows:  
NGOs have demonstrated substantial comparative advantages; especially 
their ability to innovate, adapt to local conditions, and to reach and work 
with poor and difficult-to-reach populations in developing countries. These 
capacities are a function of their values, special skills, small size, limited 
resources, flexibility, and freedom from political constraints (The World 
Bank, 1989). 
 
The disintegration of the government and disappearance of the market in Libya in 2011 
created an environment in which the advantages of civil society, as explained above, were 
brought to the fore. In fact, the activities of the associations in Libya went further as they 
became the only actors in the arena of development.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two and elsewhere in this study, one of the main reasons behind 
the rise of civil society in post-Qadhafi Libya is the failure of both the state and market 
to allow for its development as an alternative way of filling this gap. In addition, it is 
thought that in developing countries the informal sector of the economy tends to be 
prominent (Lewis, 1954). Taking these two theoretical suppositions together, Edwards 
(2011:29) argues that: 
[S]uch associations could have an important role to play in encouraging 
attitudes of cooperation and trust, as well as representing the interests of 
their members.  
 
8.9.4 Environment 
Perhaps the smallest area covered by the Libyan associations is that associated with the 
environment and media, which includes groups dedicated to the protection of animals. 
The number of registered associations fitting this category in Libya is very small, with 
only three in Benghazi and one in Misurata. The reason for this may be that most of the 
Libyan associations were set up quickly in response to the emergency situation brought 
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about by the war in 2011, during which the major priority was the distribution of relief 
aid.  
 
8.9.5 Development and Housing 
The World Bank describes the Development and Housing category as follows:  
A process by which the members of a society develop themselves and 
their institutions in ways that enhance their ability to mobilise and 
manage resources to produce sustainable and justly distributed 
improvements in their quality of life consistent with their own 
aspirations(World Bank, 1989:6).  
 
Associations falling into this category in Libya perform a range of activities, such as 
business and management consultancy, job training and helping the disabled to become 
involved in development activities. There are 29 development associations in Benghazi 
and 3 in Misurata. These organisations represent an important new development in Libya 
as in the recent past such activities were very limited and had a fragile existence.  
 
It is in the nature of development organisations to provide economic strength, and social 
and political integration for citizens through development. This type of association is 
significant from the perspective of the development of democracy and its aim to serve the 
whole of society. It is also important in terms of its contribution to the development 
process by suggesting plans and targets for development which take into account 
social, economic and cultural factors. Organisations in this group seek to become vehicles 
of empowerment, particularly for groups such as women and those marginalised within 
the development of local communities. In addition, they play an essential role in 
discovering and overcoming obstacles to development such as corruption and lack of 
transparency. NGOs are gaining recognition for the crucial role they play in the 
development process. 
 
8.9.6 Law, Advocacy and Politics 
The Law, Advocacy and Politics category, as Vakil (1997: 2063) states, “refers to the 
intention of influencing policy- or decision-making related to particular issues, and 
building social support, both among like-minded organisations as well as in the wider 
population around these issues”.  
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According to Salamon and Anheier’s model, this group covers organisations providing 
legal services and those which are involved in politics. The Libyan political associations, 
at the time of this research and before the government had issued the Political Parties 
Law, were working as mobilisation agencies. (The Political Parties Law was issued by 
the NTC on 2 May, 2012.) 
 
However, the World Bank assumes that NGOs involved in politics supplement political 
parties by acting as mechanisms through which citizens can define and articulate a broad 
range of interests and place demands on governments (World Bank, 1998:8). 
 
In the recent past, organisations fitting this category have been almost non-existent in 
Libya. However, many of the issues they seek to address can be related to the activities 
of the GICDF, as was shown in Chapter Seven.  
 
Prior to the 2011 uprising, there were 51 associations of this type in Benghazi and 13 in 
Misurata. These organisations play a prominent role in protecting human rights without 
taking sides, such as, the Jurists Association in Benghazi. This activity was especially 
important during the 2011 uprising when there were significant violations of human rights 
in all cities in Libya (for more on this issue see reports from HRW, 2011and 2012 and 
Amnesty International, 2011and 2012). These associations have a very significant 
responsibility in their role to protect human rights, which is recognised and supported by 
the UN. 23 
 
One of the demands that drove the uprising was for the restrictions imposed on civil 
society to be lifted. Law No.19 of 2001 nonetheless is still regulating the work of 
associations in Libya because there is still not a government or constitution in place that 
can serve as the basis for any new laws. 
 
                                                 
23 On 14 March 2013 the Security Council issued the Resolution No 2095(2013) under Chapter Seven of 
the UN Charter, regarding the human rights situation in Libya and extended the mandate of the UN 
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and that of the Panel of Experts assisting the Libya Sanctions 
Committee for 12 more 
months.http://unsmil.unmissions.org/Portals/unsmil/Documents/UNSMIL_UNSCR%202095_En.pdf 
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Although the law stipulates that an association needs 50 members to form a quorum, many 
associations have been established with less than this number of members. The 
continuation of this restriction has prompted some associations working in the field of 
social affairs to declare themselves “family associations” to gain a share of the 
international aid for associations which was held the NTC. Rather than using the aid to 
benefit the public, such groups sold it on the black market for their own benefit. This 
resulted in disputes about profit-sharing among the group members, which had led to the 
administrator shutting down twelve of these associations in Benghazi. The law in this 
sector does not reflect recent changes. After the interviews for this study had been 
conducted, the associations drew up the draft for a possible new law. In Chapter Four it 
was indicated that Saif al-Islam’s proposed changes had not made any real different to 
the limited role played by associations. Since the 2011 uprising, therefore, the 
associations decided it was right for them to take the initiative by tabling a draft of a new 
law, based on discussion among themselves. This project had a considerable impact, as 
much of it could be implemented in the almost total absence of a government. Moreover, 
it is different in terms of the mechanism of its preparation which has come as a result of 
the efforts of civil society organisations themselves, which need a law to regulate their 
work. Although a draft for a new law was considered an important step to improving civil 
work, it is still too early to say whether it will be effective. This draft makes considerable 
changes in the legal framework for civil associations. The most important articles are:  
Article 1: The Right to form Associations  
Founding, taking part in and withdrawing from associations is an essential 
citizenship right, exercised in accordance with this law to guarantee 
independence and development. The associations are committed in their 
founding system, their activities and their funding to the principles of 
democracy, civil values, equality, human rights, transparency and 
combating corruption and seeking characteristics of good governance 
according to the international laws and conventions. 
 
The change here is that the definition considers involvement in associations 'an 
essential citizenship right', so that this article links the associations with citizens 
rights. This was completely missing from the previous law. Here, value is place on 
associations’ founding and activities. The article applies the universally accepted 
standards to Libyan law.  
  
Article 3: Goals of the Associations  
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Founding an association is done in the cause of fulfilling its purposes, which 
must not include any violations of public order or morality, nor to aim at 
achieving private profits for their members. 
 
The draft states explicitly that the associations should setting their own purposes 
taken in their account exclude any violations of public order or morality, nor seek 
to profits for their members, while the previous law limits the goals only on non-
make profits.     
 
Article 5: The Associations Must Not 
5.1. Call for violence, intolerance, hatred, or discrimination on the basis of 
race, gender, religion, tribe or region. 
5.2. Undertake commercial business in order to allocate the funds and profits 
to their members.  
5.3. Take advantage of their status as associations to evade tax. 
 
This article reveals of forbidden for associations such as; call for violence, intolerance, 
hatred, or discrimination .Also, it prevents expressly any commercial business for the 
benefit of their members and enjoying from avoid the tax as a result of their status as 
associations.  
  Article 7: Rights of the Associations  
Associations have the following rights: 
7.1. The right to obtain information related to the association and its 
activities.  
7.2. The rights to assess the state's institutions and provide proposals to 
improve them. 
7.3. The rights to assemble, hold free meetings, demonstrate, and take on 
conferences and workshops and all different civil activities. 
7.4. The rights to publish reports and information and to undertake opinion 
polls. 
 
This article deals with the rights of the associations, which include; gaining access 
to information linked to the association and its activities. The second item deals 
with an absolutely new aspect, having the 'right' to oversee the state's institutions 
and evaluate them, to help them to improve their works. Also, the right to assemble, 
have free meetings, and hold demonstrations is asserted. By comparison, in the 
previous version these kinds of activities should be controlled by the government.  
 
The general authorities are forbidden from impeding the activities of associations, either 
directly or indirectly, unless they have a court order authorising this. Here, the judiciary 
is the only body has the right to impeding any issues. 
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8.9.7 Philanthropic Intermediaries and the Promotion of Voluntary Work 
The organisations falling into this group are grant-making foundations, many of which 
focus on relief work. These associations make up the largest group in Libya according to 
the categories being used here, with 55 in Benghazi, for example, Mu’assasat al-Dawḥah 
al-Lībiyyah al-Khayriyah (al-Dawḥah- Libya Charity Foundation) and Jam‘iyyat Abū al-
Barā’ li al-’A‘māl al-Khayriyah (Abū al-Barā’ for Charity Works Association) and 16 in 
Misurata for example, Jam‘iyyat Miṣrātah al-Khayriyah (Misurata Charity Association). 
 
Analysis of the interviews showed that philanthropy organisations were one of the most 
common types of association operating in Libya at the time. The literature focuses on 
volunteering as a cornerstone of civil work. Accordingly, the absence of a culture of 
voluntary work is one of the most important problems facing the philanthropy sector, as 
was mentioned in Chapter Six. Nevertheless, the data gathered from interviews 
exceeded my expectations in showing that most Libyan associations relied on volunteers 
to carry out their activities. Some associations, like al-Tawāṣul in Benghazi and Free 
Association in Misurata, complained that they lacked the resources to enable all those 
who wished to volunteer to work for them. All the associations I made contact with 
depended on volunteers to provide the services and aid, they offered on the frontline in 
areas affected by the war. 
 
8.9.8 International 
This category covers associations promoting better intercultural understanding between 
people from different countries or historical backgrounds, and thereby encouraging 
development and overseas welfare (Salamon and Anheier, 1996:19). The researcher 
questioned why the establishment of this type of association, which was aimed at 
international cultural exchange, would be of interest to the people at a time of war. It 
would seem that the reason behind the establishment was to attract foreign funding. Also, 
the researcher was not able to make contact with any association within this category, 
despite their existence on paper.  
 
There are 17 associations of this type in Benghazi, for example, al-Munaẓamah al-
Lībiyyah li Shu’ūn al-Hijrah (The Libyan Organisation for Immigration Affairs) and 
Jam‘iyyat ’Aṣdiqā’ Lībyā wa ’Ītālyā (The Friends of Libya and Italy) and none in 
Misurata. 
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8.9.9 Religion 
Associations falling into this category support religious beliefs and administer religious 
services and rituals. The number of these organisations in Libya is small, perhaps because 
there is little in the way of religious rivalry, which in other countries has led to there being 
large numbers of this type of association. In Benghazi there are 11 of these associations, 
for example, Mu’assasat ‘Arwat al-Taḥbīr li al-’Iṣlāḥ wa al-Taghyīr (‘Arwat al-Taḥbīr 
Reformation and Change Association) and there are two in Misurata, for example, the 
Muslim Life Forum. 
 
8.9.10 Business and Professional 
The classification system used here places many kinds of activities and groups under this 
category. This covers business associations, such as organisations that work to promote, 
regulate and safeguard the interests of special branches of business (e.g. associations for 
manufacturers, farmers or bankers), and professional and employees' associations that 
promote, regulate and protect the interests of their members (e.g. the bar and medical 
associations, and trade unions) (Salamon and Anheier, 1996:21). In Benghazi there are 
33 associations in this group, for example, Tajamu‘ Muhandisūn li ’Ajl Lībyah (Engineers 
for Libya Association),while in Misurata there are three, for example, Jam‘iyyat 
al-’Imdād (al-’Imdād Association). 
 
Business people have been of key importance in the formation of associations in Libya, 
both directly and indirectly. Moreover, the work of these associations played a prominent 
role in financing various aspects of the 2011 uprising, including providing for the basic 
needs of the markets, buying arms and paying the monthly salaries of public sector 
employees in Benghazi. The interviewees for this study interpreted the importance of 
business people in the activities of associations in two key ways. Some argued that the 
response of business people to the crisis of the war reflects a spirit of patriotism, whereas 
others claimed that the Libyan homeland does not mean anything to these people other 
than a source of wealth. This group believed that business people were involved in a form 
of money laundering through their relationship with the Qadhafi regime up to 2011. In 
other words, they were able to earn their wealth because of the corruption inherent in the 
political, financial and administrative systems of the state. Therefore, this prevented the 
researcher from probing into the source of wealth of these types of associations. Those 
who were supportive of business people believed that they had formed the backbone of 
259 
 
the economy in a period of crisis. Yet it is also claimed that these people are motivated to 
influence government policy in order to protect their interests and will play a major role 
in the formation of any new government. Thus, the NTC is now in many respects under 
the control of business people because of its need for financial support. 
 
8.9.11 Not Elsewhere Classified 
There are 40 associations in Benghazi and 23 in Misurata that fall under this unclassified 
heading. Among them are: 
Jam‘iyyat Dir‘al-Thawrā (The Shield of the Revolution Association) 
Jam‘iyyat Abnā’ Misrātā (Sons of Misurata Association) 
Jam‘iyyat Lībyā al-Ḥurrā (Free Libya Association) 
Mu’assasat Afkār Lībyā (Afkār Lībyā Association) 
Jam‘iyyat ‘Umar al-Mukhtār Banghāzī (‘Umar al-Mukhtār Association Benghazi) 
Jam‘iyyat Lībyā li al-Khiṭāb al-’I‘lāmī (Libyan Media Discover Association). 
 
8.10 Funding  
In the previous section I dealt with the activities of the associations, in this section I move 
to look to how these associations fund themselves. The involvement of local communities 
in the funding of associations has been significant. Advertisements can be seen 
everywhere requesting support for associations. Charity markets (or bazaars) sell 
products for the associations' benefit, while some members donate personal funds or 
materials. The researcher attended one such charity market organised by three 
associations in Benghazi, which was followed by a theatrical play. The level of attendance 
for both events was high, with an upper limit of 500 people being imposed. These fund-
raising methods are recent developments, having been absent in the past. 
 
New sources of funding for associations have recently surfaced in the form of foreign 
financing and partnerships with international institutions. These resources have been 
warmly welcomed by the Libyan associations. Some of the interviewees for the study 
stressed that they would accept foreign funding as long as there were no conditions, but, 
all those interviewed emphasised that they had not so far received any such funding. 
Instead, the partnerships they had formed had been limited to the provision of training, 
workshops and material resources including relief aid and medical supplies. 
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The capacity of the associations to accomplish their activities is limited by the lack of a 
permanent source of funding, which may eventually lead to the disappearance of most of 
them. This concern has been expressed by the president of the National Gathering of 
Freedom in Misurata, who said:  
I do not know how organisations are operating to help others without 
sources of funding, or how they can help others when they cannot help 
themselves. In many  cases, the establishment of associations is 
announced first, and then they come to request financial support.  
 
In spite of their having strong grassroots support, the NGOs that participated in the 
interviews highlighted the constraints placed on their abilities to adapt and innovate by 
their limited institutional capacities. There is thus an increasing need to strengthen the 
management capability within the NGOs.  
 
What characterises these organisations is their inequality in terms of how much political 
support they enjoying, reflecting the balance of power in Libyan society. Islamic and 
businessmen associations are the most active. The Islamic associations own huge 
financial resources and have strong connections with similar organisations outside of 
Libya (sometimes on a partnership basis). The international organisation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood works in a manner similar to a trunk connecting a variety of branches. The 
organisations owned by businessmen possess substantial financial resource underpinning 
their activities. 
 
8.11 Advocacy Role 
The growth of advocacy organisations marks this period off from that of the Qadhafi 
regime and the researcher is devoting a separate section to it. A number of organisations, 
at the time of the research, were attempting to influence the policies of the NTC. Many 
of them, especially the ones dealing with law and human rights, were focusing on the role 
they could play as advocates. They were aware that there was a lack of clarity in the 
NTC’s policies, and believed that their voices must be heard. The Executive Director of 
the Libyan Development Organisation stressed that, when demonstration took place in 
Benghazi against the claim of the ‘Coalition of the Seventeenth February' to be guardians 
of the uprising, "we were behind the masses demonstrating against the coalition". 
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In addition, more than 30 human rights associations organised a meeting which resulted 
in the emergence of a bloc committed to the demands of amending or abolishing the 
Constitutional Proclamation. One of the activists, a member of the Women Jurists 
Associations, described the Constitutional Proclamation as:  
The Great Green Charter for Human Rights in the Era of the Masses (al-
wathiqa al-khadra al-kubra lihuquq al-‘insan fi ‘asr al-jamahir). Despite 
the failure of the former regime to honour Qadhafi’s Charter, it was much 
more advanced than this Constitutional Proclamation. It was compiled by 
people who lack experience in these matters, who claimed that the civil 
associations had approved it, whereas we had no knowledge of it. The 
bloc will remain a united front until the proposed Constitution is 
amended (Mabrūka al-Shirīf in Benghazi, September 2011). 
 
The bloc was also behind the mobilisation of people in Benghazi in November 2011 to 
demand a change in the local city council. This was due to failures in the performance of 
the existing council and corruption. The bloc achieved its goal when the director of the 
city council resigned on 3 October 2011. One of the members of the bloc revealed her 
position on the role of the associations after the political changes as follows: 
These institutions are supposed to play a very important role in the 
coming period, especially on the interpretation of many of the legal texts 
which may be seemingly contrary to their targets. The revision of some 
of the texts gives some political groups the opportunity to become 
involved and impose their visions upon other groups, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Also it should be our goal to monitor the authorities' 
commitment to the laws. (Interview with Mabrūka al-Shirīf in Benghazi, 
September 2011) 
 
In the same vein, the director of the Libyan Development Organisation emphasised the 
importance of the role of the associations as follows: 
It is our duty to form pressure groups to check the performance of the 
authorities and determine the extent of deviation from the democratic 
process to which we aspire and the extent of its commitment to 
transparency and human rights. It is also our work to assist other 
associations to strengthen their role in the overseeing of the authorities. 
Moreover, we should help these associations to have a role in the 
establishment of development and democracy. We will take advantage of 
the new climate to benefit from international expertise in building 
effective institutions (Interview with the director of the Libyan 
Development Organisation, ‘Abd Allāh al-Nayhūm, in Benghazi, 
September 2011). 
 
Many associations demand that they should be made channels for lobbying for changes 
to government policies and amendments to laws. In the current context, this may be seen 
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by some people as an attempt by these organisations to become politically active in the 
absence of political parties. Consequently, the person responsible for licensing 
associations in the Executive Office of the NTC confirmed that there are three 
requirements for registration: first, associations should not be political or politically 
oriented; second, they should be non-profit making organisations; and third, their 
activities should be based on voluntary work (interview with Sāmī al-Firjānī, the head of 
the licensing associations office in Benghazi on11/09/2011).  
 
An awareness and understanding of the building of their role can be seen in the work of 
the associations, for example, the al-Tawāṣul Association in Benghazi, has focused on 
the issue of “capacity building” in the work of other associations, in order to create greater 
professionalism in their activities. al-Tawāṣul wants to make associations more active 
agents in the building of civil society. The director of al-Tawāṣul Association stated:  
Everyone wants to develop themselves through building and gaining new 
skills. They feel they have been deprived of these skills. Everyone is willing 
and hungry for such programmes: when we announce a training course, we 
receive more applicants than we expect.  
(Researcher’s interview with ’Amīna al-Mighīrbī, Benghazi, 2011) 
 
Meanwhile, The Libyan Development Organisation, for instance, focuses on fighting 
corruption and promoting transparency as essential elements for all the institutions of a 
democratic society, including associations participating in civil society. The al-Tawāṣul 
Association and the Libyan Development Organisation have gone further by setting up 
workshops and training sessions to educate the community about their roles in building 
and supporting civil society and the state, and to enable the community itself to become 
involved. (The researcher attended part of a workshop held by one of these associations 
in a Benghazi hospital in the first week of September 2011.) 
 
Advocator organisations are now more prominent and abundant than they have previously 
been. Their work focuses on forming strong lobbying groups on many issues, such as the 
Constitutional Proclamation, women's rights and the documentation of war crimes. They 
also work to determine human rights violations. For instance, the director of the Libyan 
Jurists' Association told the researcher that her group was working to document and 
monitor violations against former Qadhafi soldiers held as prisoners by the rebels. She 
also sought to address the issue of the relationship between the people of the city of 
Misurata and the town of Tāwurghā’, which is inhabited by black Libyans who have 
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suffered from racism in the past. Some have characterised racist attitudes towards black 
Libyans as a form of collective revenge by the people of Misurata for the Tāwurghian 
support of Qadhafi. Elmaazi (2013) states that: 
The Ottoman Sultan offered slaves […] the right to emancipation. […] 
The majority […] went to a small village just outside Misurata, called 
Tāwurghā’. Misurata has long been one of Libya’s most entrepreneurial 
communities with trade [including] slaves from sub Saharan Africa, 
being the mainstay of the city’s livelihood. Many ex-slaves […] 
continued to work for their former owners in agricultural jobs or as 
domestic help [...] Tāwurghā’ became a “dormitory” town. The 
relationship between the inhabitants of the town and the city was cordial 
but never one of equals [and] race was always an obstacle to social 
mobility. It is [still] virtually impossible for the grandson of an 
emancipated African slave, to marry into a notable Misuratian family. 
Slavery is still a stigma [though] hardly ever discussed.  
 
Instead of providing services, advocacy organisations focus on defending the human 
rights of individuals and specific groups alike. In addition, they aim to raise awareness of 
issues among the public and to influence public policy. However, their effects are still 
limited in spite of their increasing numbers. 
 
In June 2011 in Benghazi, a civil body was formed by a coalition of civil society 
organisations and political activists (who were not part of the government), to monitor 
the way of which the Libyan government operated. This group was behind the issuing of 
the declaration on 21 January 2012, against the NTC’s policies, which runs as follows:  
Having assessed the performance of the NTC, the Libyan National 
Powers along with the political institutions and the civil society 
organisations which have collectively issued this declaration, are 
announcing that they will not commit perjury or be false witnesses 
regarding the disadvantageous performance of the NTC, and regarding 
overrunning its legitimate authority and violating its founding declaration 
by incorporating in the Constitutional Proclamation wordings that would 
impede the Libyan People from establishing a democratic, civil state: the 
ultimate cause of the revolution of 17th February.  
These national powers confirm their adherence to their demands that 
were included in their note to the NTC in August 18th 2011, and anticipate 
the vulnerabilities and hazardous outcomes that may result from the 
unsound performance and continuing violations in this critical moment, 
which would tremendously affect the future of Libya, and accordingly 
they press the NTC and the Transitional Government for the following:  
The NTC is to act precisely according to its founding declaration, and to 
terminate the Constitutional Proclamation that was issued on August 3rd 
2011, which, by its poor language and contradictory contents, highlighted 
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serious abuses of the basic norms of the revolution of February 17th, and 
that led the country to a state of chaos.  
1. The NTC is to stop making compromises at the expense of the national 
principles, the stability of the country, or anything that would impede 
establishing a civil, democratic state. 
2. The head and members of the NTC are to stop dealing with the NTC’s 
buildings and properties as private properties, by not responding to the 
demands to dismiss the controversial members of the NTC, and by 
violating the founding declaration, when in the Constitutional 
Proclamation they decided to negate the NTC before the end of its 
intended term, which could stir up conflicts over electing a new 
transitional authority in such critical circumstances.  
3. The election draft should be rejected since it was based on the 
confusing, deviated Constitutional Proclamation.  
4. The National powers call the NTC and the Transitional Government 
(TG) to take sensible procedures to enable the state to keep control 
over its investments overseas and combat corruption so as to prevent 
the leaking of the Libyan gold reserves and secure Libyan assets at 
home and overseas.  
5. They are also called to consider their limits as a transitional authority 
whose core role is to ensure stability and security, and to handle the 
citizens' urgent problems. Neither the NTC nor the Transitional 
Government have the authority or the right to sign international 
agreements, including strategic treaties, that would affect the rights of 
the Libyan People or influence negatively the Libyan economic 
interests or the country's sovereignty and it must stop promising 
favouritism or preferences to the country’s friends for the course of 
rebuilding the country. 
6. The National powers call the NTC and the TG to terminate all signs 
of exclusion which would damage the cause of the national 
reconciliation and would impede building the hoped, longed for 
democratic, civil state. 
7. The National powers call the NTC and the TG to adhere to 
transparency by broadcasting their meetings, identifying the quorum 
of the Council, and offering youth the proportion identified in the NTC 
Founding Declaration, which stipulated that youth membership 
should be no less than five out of the thirty members.  
8. The sovereignty of the Libyans over their land and sea borders and 
their wealth shall not be undermined or compromised. The NTC and 
the TG should never neglect preserving and protecting them. They are 
to prevent any overseas intelligence from working in the country; they 
are to consider deporting the special forces and troops belonging to 
foreign countries that have entered Libya for any reasons. They are 
not to remain passive, or silent towards any foreign military 
intervention in Libya under the pretext of protecting their so-called 
economic interests or their citizens and embassies.  
 
Although the above statement mentions the institutions of civil society, it does not state 
whether it was designed specifically for Benghazi or for Libya as a whole. 
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By combining ideas about the role of civil society in democracy, Diamond (1994:6) has 
expressed the belief that “without a free, robust, and inquisitive press and civic groups to 
press for institutional reform, corruption is likely to flourish”. 
  
8.12 Conclusion  
This chapter has given an overview of the political changes in Libya and highlighted some 
of the main events in the Libyan uprising that took place in 2011. It has explained the 
reasons for the Libyan uprising and addressed the question of how the regime collapsed 
easily, leaving no institutional structures to speak of. Having sustained a culture which 
was receptive to civil activism and participation throughout the Qahdafi years, the Libyan 
people were prepared to step in to fill the space now available to them with a rush of 
associational life and NGO activity, in the absence of a functioning state. 
 
NGOs thrive in the absence of totalitarian regimes which limit their activities, on the basis 
of narrow ideologies. The period following the uprising in Libya provided a wide 
opportunity for associations to develop. Some ordinary people established associations 
because they believed in civil society as an element of democracy, which others saw it as 
an opportunity to protect their own interests or as a step towards a political position in the 
future.  
 
When the uprising occurred, it was not led by established civil society institutions (since 
those had not been allowed to develop properly) but, as the hollow state institutions 
quickly fell, the culture of civic activism, volunteerism and participation which had been 
sustained throughout the previous decades meant that Libyans quickly formed 
associations and NGOs to fill the space now available to them, offering good potential 
for the development of a post-transition thriving civil society.  
 
It was to be expected that these associations would indeed flourish after the changing of 
the political regime in Libya, and that they would grow into significant bodies with 
important roles in society. However the lack of political stability and security, which 
threatened the continued existence of the Libyan state itself, ultimately weakened the 
associations and caused them to either decline or collapse completely. Then gradually lost 
their social significance, while the power of militias grew ever stronger.  
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter gives a summary of the arguments and main findings of the thesis. It also 
discusses the contribution the study has made and suggests areas for future research into 
definitions of civil society and their implications. 
 
9.2 An Overview of the Thesis’ Approach 
Although in Western political theory the idea of civil society is strongly connected with 
notions of democracy, in ‘less developed’ countries this linkage is not universally 
accepted. Indeed, it has been quite widely contended that the Western use of the term is 
tied in specifically to Western cultural and historical experience. This thesis avoids 
becoming involved in this controversy, taking a definition of civil society which is both 
sanctioned by a leading global body (the World Bank), and enables the researcher to focus 
directly on her key concern: the nature of NGOs in Libya. The latter are taken as a case 
study, to show how these organisations have operated in Libya relative to other countries.  
This is not, therefore, a discussion of the civil society/democracy relation on the standard 
Western model, since that is not strictly relevant to the discussion.  Whether Libyan 
NGOs are able to operate in an independent manner, without undue state influence or 
control, is of course relevant, and that is given considerable attention here. In the future 
it may of course be possible to see whether Libyan NGOs can play a role in promoting 
democracy in the country, but at the present neither the state of the country nor the level 
of development of the organisations (and country) make that a relevant or feasible topic 
for examination. In the meantime, the focus needs to be on the more limited (World Bank) 
definition of civil society, and on how the organisations which have existed in Libya have 
been fashioned by Libya’s patriarchal state.  
 
The thesis gave some attention to justifying this approach. A key starting-point was 
Sariolghalm’s observation (1997:55) that “The concept of civil society developed and 
matured within a certain historical and socio-economic setting.” This is a theme which 
runs through much of the critical literature relating to applying the Western concept of 
civil society to less developed societies. In the case of Libya there is little doubt that civil 
society (World Bank definition) has at times played an important role in state and society, 
and that this is worth examining, yet it is also true that it has played little role in spreading 
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the values of citizenship and democracy, monitoring government, safeguarding human 
rights etc., as it necessary under the Western concept. The researcher sees the difference 
as stemming from the level of development and the nature of state structures. This, indeed, 
relates not just to Libya but to most other Arab countries (and some others elsewhere), 
where NGOs are inhibited by, first, their inability  to protect individuals against the 
arbitrariness the State, and second, the absence of a law that regulates and protects their 
rights and ensures that they do not lose their privileges. 
 
The emergence of civil society in the West has been associated with democratic society, 
and a democratic society is not based solely on the existence of the legal and democratic 
state, but beyond that on the localised embedding of the principles of democracy in 
practices of both the individual and the society. The talk of civil society and its institutions 
in industrialized countries came as a sign of a mature democracy and the stability and 
maturity of the society. Also, a high degree of interaction and communication between 
the state and society was characteristic. The state, regardless of its actual objectives, 
encourages the society to be innovative and to occupy domains that had previously been 
occupied by the state for a long time. It facilitates the emergence of legal and civil 
institutions, and provides them with financial support and the regulatory and legal 
framework for the role they play. The state therefore operates to extend the democratic 
approach beyond its own legal and governmental framework, into wider society. 
 
States in all democratic countries do not favour the state having a monopoly over the 
entire public sphere. Those democracies have long worked to preserve a space for a 
variety of organisations and institutions. Consequently, non-governmental organizations 
have proliferated that are interested in the same national and international matters that 
were originally the prerogative of the state. Conversely, in a country like Libya, the talk 
of civil society comes perhaps as compensation for the complete absence of this form of 
society, and in response to the vacuum created in public space by the disintegration of the 
state, the corrosion of public authority into the authority of the owners of private interests, 
and the collapse of any rule of law. Strong and stable institutions were in fact lacking in 
both the areas of the state and society. 
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Civil society organisations in nondemocratic societies had to work within the framework 
of the dominant ideology, which also meant on occasions being used as a tool or as a 
means to achieve the state’s objectives and in effect strengthening the state’s political, 
ideological and economic positions, without these being their real concerns. 
 
Civil society under these conditions is not necessarily linked to democratic development, 
and it does not necessarily make it easier to find independent solutions to political 
conflicts. Thus the difference in the nature of the state has produced very important 
differences in the scope of activity and social role which NGOs in Libya (and some other 
less developed countries) play relative to those in more developed countries. Yet their 
role remains one which is worthy of study. This study, indeed, shows that, in spite of the 
differences with Western NGOs, Libyan NGOs have sometimes been significant in 
providing services which fall outside the remit of government. Traditional associations, 
furthermore, have played an important role in meeting people’s general living 
requirements in addition to providing services. This provision became particularly 
important during the period of Italian occupation, and after the fall of the Qadhafi regime. 
The Gadhafi Foundation also provided the population with some much-needed goods 
(material and non-material). 
 
The thesis has explored how Libyan NGOs have developed under two different 
regimes/political phases that of Qadhafi's rule and that of the transitional period that 
followed the 2011 uprising. The various theoretical, political, social and legal factors that 
have affected Libyan NGOs have been examined, and a multi-layered understanding of 
civil society organisations as captured by the World Bank’s definition of the term in Libya 
established. The thesis also tracked the development and practice of several types of 
Libyan associations and evaluated the nature and the roles played by them before and 
after the 2011 uprising. 
 
In an attempt to discover to what extent political, social and legal factors influenced the 
development of NGOs in Libya and to provide an intensive and in-depth examination of 
the factors that influenced the capacities and activities of the Libyan NGOs, the thesis 
adopted both a qualitative and a case study approach. It employed a variety of research 
tools, such as interviews, documentary evidence, discourse analysis, and the researcher’s 
own observations. 
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As noted above, the field of civil society has become a much-discussed subject among 
various disciplines, including political science, and has attracted considerable attention, 
especially after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s. This work on Libya 
complements that body of literature, within a closely specified context.  
 
The central significance of the study is that it adds to our knowledge of the social 
dynamics leading into and resulting from changes in power in Libya, and how the two 
areas of state and civil society have influenced each other. It is hoped that this may make 
some contribution to understanding of processes of change elsewhere, especially in the 
Arab world. Historically, civil associations in Libya played a significant role due to the 
absence of strong state institutions. Subsequently, under the Qadhafi regime, NGOs 
became weaker because the existing associations came under the control of the regime. 
However, since the fall of Qadhafi, NGOs have been playing an important role in the 
absence of a strong central government.  
 
9.3 Major Findings 
Given the lack of relevance of standard Western academic definitions of civil society to 
Libya, the Word Bank’s formulation has been adopted as the most acceptable. Valuable, 
it includes a large variety of different elements.  The World Bank uses the term civil 
society to refer to: 
..the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations 
that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of 
their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political24, scientific, 
religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations 
(CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community 
groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour unions, 
indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, 
professional associations, and foundations. (World Bank,2013) 
 
This thesis shows that, in this conception, a kind of civil society did exist in Libya pre-
1969. This took traditional forms such as the waqf institution and zawāyā (lodges). These 
played a significant civilian role by providing social services such as education and 
medical assistance. The associations also had the ability to mobilise people, and the 
                                                 
24Not 'political' organization but the political interests of NGOs 
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researcher believes that because of this proactive role they may still have a crucial role in 
the future of Libyan civil society. 
 
The World Bank definition can be used to cover traditional as well as modern forms of 
organisation, as long as they are non-governmental (formally, at least) and are non-profit.  
These conditions clearly held, in particular for waqf institutions. The latter were able to 
be independent in their actions, while also avoiding the threat of suspension by the 
government. As a result, they could extend the public space outside the state arena. These 
associations had the ability to mobilize people, either by resisting the colonial state or 
through civilian action. This was seen in the education sector, for example the 
establishment of the Kuttābs. These traditional social institutions allowed society to 
develop civic activism, volunteerism, and participatory activities which were similar to - 
but not necessarily the same as - those of European civil society.  
 
Under the Qadhafi regime NGOs in Libya were effectively absent from the public arena. 
Most associations suffered from a lack of essential skills and training which would have 
enabled them to increase their capacity and improve their performance. They were 
accepted by the regime and integrated into the political sphere. The majority were active 
as charity groups, perhaps to avoid clashes with the government. The prevailing 
supposition was that there was a lack of civic culture in Libyan society, but in fact this 
was only an effect of the political regime. The Qadhafi regime adopted a totalitarian 
ideology which fully occupied the public space in society, and therefore according to 
Qadhafi’s theory there was no real need for these associations and very little justification 
for them to have an independent existence. Nonetheless some of the traditional 
institutions continued to exist, such as the waqf together with some tribal associations. 
The waqf retained its independence from the state, because it derived its legitimacy from 
religion and its funding from the zakāt. Another reason for its continuation outside the 
control of the state was that it took advantage of what was written in The Green Book, 
“The Qur’an is the law of society”, and thus did not explicitly oppose the ideology of the 
government. Also, the waqf had historically proven that it had the ability to continue even 
during the near-total absence of the state during the Italian occupation. The institution of 
the tribe, also, may have remained strong because it formed a traditional, protective 
umbrella in the absence of any modern forms of state institution. It formed a refuge, 
shielding society in its rejection of the regime’s ideology and supporting the lack of desire 
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to integrate with this ideology. This ideology was seen as strange, not a product of the 
society, and needing to be imposed from above. 
 
The officially-recognised NGOs in Libya under the Qadhafi regime, by contrast, were formed 
within the framework created by the regime and were seen as part of the overall system.  
Their roles were closely tied to the requirements of the Qadhafi regime, leading to a 
distrust of the NGOs within the wider society. During the Qadhafi period; therefore, 
NGOs only represented a very limited aspect of civil society. Possibly the only exception 
was the GICDF, which tried to address civil society as an area for reform. The GICDF 
set up some associations, the most important of which was the Human Rights Association, 
and worked as an umbrella for these associations internally and externally. The GICDF 
also encouraged and opened the door to public debate about previously taboo issues such 
the constitution, freedom of the press, and civil society, and it pushed towards the 
establishment of a private media. It held dialogues with the opposition and tried to 
incorporate opposition elements into public life. 
 
In spite of all this, and despite the view that the GICDF provided a way out of the crisis 
(which gained the support of parts of the Libyan elite), it failed to constitute an acceptable 
alternative model for reform and it failed to promote a strong and active civil society at a 
wider level. This failure could be attributed to two factors. First, the GICDF did not 
encourage the establishment of independent associations, or support them in the face of 
the government. Instead it “represented” them by its work on their behalf. Second, its 
work was obstructed by the political regime, which was suspicious of any activity outside 
the framework of the People’s Authority system. Both of these factors related to the 
complex position of Saif Qadhafi who, as the son of the leader, had both greater freedoms 
from, and closer ties with, the regime than an outsider would have had. The failure to 
fulfil the desire of the Libyan people to work beyond the restraints imposed by the 
government fuelled calls for more direct and independent reform, which led to the 2011 
uprising. 
 
The Qadhafi regime and its ideology had become a kind of sacred doctrine which put it 
above any criticism, affecting all aspects of life in Libya. This situation closed the door 
for many associations. Research findings demonstrate that the political regime and the 
272 
 
legal framework governing civil society have been the primary factors in shrinking, 
restricting and shaping Libyan NGOs. 
 
When the uprising occurred, it was not led by civil society associations (since these had 
not been allowed to develop fully) but, as the hollow state institutions quickly fell, the 
culture of civic activism, volunteerism and participation which had been sustained 
throughout the previous decades meant that Libyans quickly formed new associations and 
NGOs to fill the space now available to them, offering good potential for the development 
of a post-transition thriving civil society.  
 
The uprising marked a major turning point in civil society (as defined by the World Bank) 
in Libya. The experience shows how quickly civil society organisations can grow, 
notwithstanding some shortcomings. Libyan society has shown greater awareness than 
was previously thought possible in terms of the importance of these associations and the 
role that they play. The study findings have shown how these associations, which 
developed out of dire circumstances, were “invented” rather than “invited”. 
 
However, the uprising has had a wider range of noticeable impacts and challenges 
throughout the different levels of Libyan society, creating intense rifts and rivalries 
among the various parts of the population. These conflicts have led to a state of chaos and 
may ultimately enable the old alliance between power, armed force and money to 
dominate the political scene via new forms of political manoeuvring, among them control 
of the media by a limited number of businessmen and group leaders. 
 
Even though NGOs did not contribute to the 2011 uprising, their role went beyond 
providing social services. After the withdrawal of the State, they helped to form the NTC 
as a transitional body taking on some aspects of government, with representation from 
various segments of society, such as doctors, engineers and judges. This initiative from 
the NGOs exemplifies the awareness of the effective role of civil society among these 
institutions and their leaders to take the initiative and find creative solutions to 
overcoming obstacles, rather than simply criticising the government. It remains true, 
however, that this hopeful episode has been limited in time.  
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The study shows how quickly and effectively NGOs came together to confront the regime 
and to occupy the public space abandoned by the government, to provide essential 
services and play advocacy roles. The NGOs were able to provide the framework to 
prevent the collapse of society, which showed their strength, effectiveness and 
importance Religious, political and social roles traditionally played by the government 
came to be played by some of these associations for a period of time. New types of 
associations emerged from the uprising, driven by religious, business and advocacy 
concerns. 
 
The research also shows that the Libyan legal framework (as created under the Qadhafi 
regime) had many weaknesses and had a negative effect on NGOs, preventing them from 
strengthening their role and becoming key actors in society. Despite subsequent 
developments, this remains the case today. Thus interviewees who represented NGOs in 
this study agreed that there was a need to change and improve the law governing them. 
The legal restrictions coupled with government intervention which were the main 
impediments under the Qadhafi regime remain in place, although the means to enforce 
them may not be. The political system has changed but there is as yet still no Libyan 
constitution. In order to properly manage the development of NGOs within society, the 
new constitution should describe the right to form associations as a citizen’s rights, rather 
than as a gift from the government. This will pave the way for the establishment and 
strengthening of civil society in Libya. 
 
For civil society to become a vital player within the country, as an independent mediator 
between family and state, it must build influence in the public arena through 
responsiveness and compliance with the requirements of capacity building, transparency 
and good governance. Avoiding being used as an ideological pawn by competing political 
forces will be crucial to its effectiveness. 
 
In this uncertain situation, Libya’s civil society will need to find a creative response to 
the challenges it faces, such as infringements of human rights, and it needs to provide 
opportunities for young people so they are able to play a role within civil society and 
participate in developing a national leadership. Civil society will need to become an 
instrument for balancing power relations between different groups and supporting the 
weak, such as women, the marginalized poor and the disenfranchised. 
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The researcher has discussed the question of whether the NGOs have the potential 
capacity to contribute to the processes of developing civil society under a centralised 
system. This question is still of concern. It is yet to be seen how the creation of a more 
centralised state will affect NGOs and if they are able to build the opportunities to enable 
them to play a fundamental role in society. In addition, the research also examined what 
NGOs might be able to do to promote wider civil society organisation in Libya. 
 
In general, it is clear that the role of NGOs tends to shrink in some areas and increase in 
others, as spaces open or close in the political and social landscape. It was to be expected, 
therefore, that these associations would flourish after the changing of the political regime 
in Libya, and spread and grow into new aspects, due to the reduction of restrictions on 
them. But the lack of political stability and security, which has threatened the entire state 
entity, made these associations withdraw or decline. The experience of what happened in 
Benghazi and Misurata in particular was examined in the thesis. 
 
The Libyan case can be seen as an exceptional one, brought on by the political emergency. 
However, this is not to say that the Libyan case is unique. The analysis of civil society 
and power structures presented here can be usefully applied elsewhere, especially to other 
developing states (and the Arab world within that category). This researcher argues that 
civil society is not a substitute for a strong state and central government, but in fact 
requires a strong (but not dictatorial) state in order to avoid the public sphere being 
dominated by militias or organisations based on divisive tribal formations. The existence 
of the State alongside civil society forces the two sides to work together and cooperate 
for the benefit of society. The challenge facing Libya is that currently the country is 
undergoing two processes: the transformation of the political system and the building of 
civil society. It is important to understand the relation between rebuilding state institutions 
and civil society. Libya needs to develop those two areas in conjunction and redefine the 
relationship between civil society and the state as the country moves through its transition 
period. 
 
The thesis has touched on the issue of human rights and the violations of these rights in 
Libya. It has discussed the emergence of advocacy associations, and the extent to which 
they can defend the idea of a civil society. 
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Finally, on the issue of funding, what has emerged from my interviews shows that in the 
past civil society associations did not receive sufficient financial support from 
government while at the same time the law forbade them from receiving any foreign 
funds. After 2011, some associations received significant support, especially those 
headed by businessmen and Islamic associations. But much of this funding came from 
foreign sources. The associations came to attract elements that did not necessarily believe 
in the mission of civil society, but were mainly interested in access to the funds. This 
problem is one of the main challenges the NGO sector now faces. 
 
In general, the challenges facing the development of civil society in Libya, and the 
required solutions, can be laid out as follows: 
1. The legal framework: this must allow civil society to work and be active 
within the framework of legal legitimacy and provide it with the necessary 
guarantees for all activities. Without suitable structures civil society will be 
weak and unstable; but with protection it can extend its reach and plan more 
effectively. 
 
2. The political framework: this can be most conducive to an active civil 
society if there is a reasonable degree of political and intellectual pluralism, 
where there is support for the freedom of establishment of political and 
social organizations and institutions. Civil society needs to be geared to 
protecting the principles of human rights and freedoms.  Structures that 
oppose or undermine this influence – especially those designed to maintain 
state monopoly over the public sphere – can be damaging to civil society’s 
capacity and objectivity. 
 
3. The economic framework: civil society can contribute to economic and 
social development through the promotion of the private sector and its 
integration in the economic process, as well as through individual initiatives 
undertaken by citizens, which aim to create wealth and growth. Over-
centralised power restricts the opportunities for such innovation, and limits 
the spaces for entrepreneurship that civil society can engender. 
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9.4 Areas for Future Research 
In writing this thesis I have mainly focused on important aspects of the development of 
civil society in Libya to date. However, this is an ongoing process and it needs further 
research. The central significance of the study stems from the fact that it is the first study 
of its kind to tackle the effects of the dramatic changes resulting from the Arab Spring on 
Libyan civil society, a society that has suffered from a lack of attention in terms of 
research. It has also added to our knowledge of the social dynamics resulting from 
changes in power in Libya, and how the two areas of state and civil society have 
influenced each other. It is hoped that this study makes a significant contribution to the 
wider literature on civil society, especially in the Arab world and for specialists in Middle 
East studies.  
 
That said it is worth mentioning that the achievements of this thesis are only a small step 
forward and additional studies which are needed to follow up on the themes discussed 
here. There has been no significant democratisation in Libya, so that dimension can not 
at present be usefully analysed, but there is no doubt that civil society will evolve as the 
country’s political infrastructure changes. It will be of interest to examine how the 
political parties will use civil society for political gain. The development is ongoing, and 
therefore requires ongoing research. 
 
One crucial area of study is the potential influence of Islamic movements on civil society. 
Given their ability to resolve two main problems, funding and volunteering, the researcher 
argues that Islamic associations will have a strong position in the future of Libyan civil 
society. These associations represent a channel of communication between broad 
segments of society and they could help meet basic social needs by aiding the poor and 
providing social and health care. Another function they perform is the mobilization of 
supporters, providing a transition from social work to political action, which in turn may 
facilitate a shift in power within the country, but it remains to be seen what use they will 
make of this.  
 
Civil society actors play an essential role in bringing issues to political debate; this issue 
needs deeper study to explore whether Libyan associations could play this role and in 
what way. Moreover, further study is required to determine whether civil society can exert 
significant and productive influence on shaping the dynamics of the political system, or 
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whether the political system will in fact shape these associations and controls their 
activities.  
 
What has emerged from my interviews is the need for Libyan NGOs to be aware of their 
potential role within society and the need to guarantee their rights under a legal 
framework with the ability to promote the associations. A more comparative analysis 
would help clarify the nature of the relationship between the state and NGOs, determining 
how civil society influences the shaping of the political system and vice versa. 
 
The issue of human rights and their extreme violation is of central importance in Libya, 
and the emergence of advocacy associations has the potential to defend civil society’s 
commitment to the humanitarian ideal. Again, the potential is there, and analysis will be 
needed to see whether that potential is fulfilled. 
 
Finally, research is needed to further examine the role played by social networks, 
specifically those who mobilised during the 2011 uprising, and whether such networks 
will continue to be effective in the future. This may have a significant effect on the nature 
of the associations which will emerge in the future. Crucial also is the development of 
techniques that can effectively monitor the performance of a transitional government 
while remaining alert to the risks to human rights and the prosecution of offenders. Such 
capacities will assist the development of a new democratic legislation that guarantees the 
freedoms of civil society, away from the constraints of any regime that may hinder its 
growth by subjecting it to a state monopoly on public space. 
 
In summary, all the perspectives which this thesis opens up are contingent on both the 
State and civil society actors. The former need to be willing to guarantee the space and 
the freedom for this sector to evolve, flourish and overcome its obstacles, and the latter 
willing to engage with the state in a respectful, responsive manner, and reach out to 
society at large, to represent and reflect all the colours and points of view of Libyan 
society. 
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Figure 10: The Distribution of Associations According to their Activities in Benghazi  
 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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Figure 11: Breakdown of the Activities of Associations in Benghazi Shown as Percentages 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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Figure 12: The Distribution of Associations According to their Activities in Misurata  
 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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Figure 13: Breakdown of the Activities of Associations in Misurata Shown as Percentages 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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Figure 14: Comparison on NGO's Classification between Benghazi and Misurata 
 
Source: researcher fieldwork 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The List of Interview’s Questions 
 
Date: 
Name of interviewee: 
Location of the interview: 
1. What is the organization? Would you please introduce yourself and your work in the 
organization? 
2. And what is your position at the organization? 
3. How long have you been working with this organization? 
 
General Information about the Organization: 
4. When was this organization established?  
5. Does it have other branches? Location/s? 
6. What are the aims of the organization? And how many members? 
7. What kinds of services does your organization offer? 
8. How many employees are there in your organization? 
9. How many members are there in your organization? 
 
General Questions 
10. Why did you take part in this organization? What do you hope to get out of it? Is it 
because you are interested in such kind of activities or is it because you think that 
they become a fashionable trend or it might add to your prestige? Or do you believe 
that through taking part in this organization you can participate in developing your 
society and to promote the culture of civil work and civil society? 
11. Do you think these organizations have any mission?  
12. Do you think that people know enough about the civil society organizations or is 
there lack of information among people about these organizations? 
13. Any idea about the number of recipients?  
14. How was this organization established? In other words was it a response to the needs 
of the community or was it an idea of the founders or there is some role of the state? 
15. Do you see any necessity for a larger role of civil society organizations in the future?  
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16. Where do you think that civil society organizations need to expand? Is it in relief and 
services sector, religious activities, cultural activities, development or promoting 
democratic values and human rights? 
17. Do you see any necessity for a larger role of civil society organizations in the future? 
 
Fund Issue:  
18. Can I see the organization's budget? 
19. What are the sources of your budget? Does it enough for your organization activities?  
20. Have you ever asked the people for donations? And if so, did you get a significant 
amount of donations? If not, what do you think were the reasons? Is it the lack of 
money – disbelieve of the work of the organization - the lack of civic culture – or 
because of the way in which you requested the money? 
21. Who funds or supports your organization?  
22. Are there any other sources of fund that the organization relies on? 
23. Do the members pay any fees for membership? How much is that? 
24. How many members have paid their membership fees this year? 
 
Organization’s Management 
25. What is the purpose of the organization or which kinds of activities the organization 
focus on: children and maternity care, family welfare, social care, health care, 
educational , environmental, religious services, community development, training 
women, cultural activities, care for the aged and the disabled, human rights, relief, 
youth or charities. 
26. How many members does the board of trustees consist of? 
27. What are the criteria in selecting the organization’s head of trustees or board? 
28. What is the procedure adopted in selecting the board of trustees members? 
29. Are there any appointed members in the organization’s board? If yes how many? And 
how do you explain such appointments? 
30. How often does the board of trustees meet? How many times was it held this year?  
31. How do you explain that the highest number of civil society organizations was 
established in 2003 while the lowest number of civil organizations was in year 2001 
and 2006? 
32. How do you explain that the large number of civil society organizations exists in 
Darna city while the small number exists in al-Wahat (region) and Sirt city? 
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Relationship with the State: 
33. How do you describe the relationship with the state?  
34. Does it help the organization get funding?  
35. Does the state respond to the needs and requirements of your organization? 
36. Has the state ever asked you to implement certain types of projects? If yes what are 
the nature of these projects? 
37. How do you evaluate the laws and rules that govern the work of civil society 
organizations in Libya?  
38. Do you think that such laws need to be modified or changed? If yes what type of 
change do you recommend or suggest? 
39. Do you think that the funding you get from state affect your organization work or its 
independence? How? 
40. Who decides the ways/ criteria in which the fund will be spent? 
41. What do you think are the obstacles that face the establishment of any new 
organization? 
42. Does your organization work or cover areas that are not covered by the state? If yes, 
what are these areas? 
43. Do you try to influence at the political level more than the service level? 
44. Did the government ever interfere in your activities? If so how and when? Did this 
interference result in activity modifications, activity cancellation or perhaps support 
for your activities? Would you explain? 
- modification  
- cancel 
- support 
45. What are the factors that hinder the cooperation between state and civil society 
organizations in serving the community? 
46. Do civil society organizations play any role that might affect public polices? And in 
your opinion what are the obstacles that these organizations face in this regard? 
47. What is the motivation leading to creation of a new organisation duringand after 
uprising of 2011?  
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Relationship with foreign organizations: 
48. Have you ever dealt, been in touch or worked with foreign partners or organizations? 
If yes what are these organizations?  
49. What was the areas of cooperation (fund, training, exchange, etc)? How did you find 
this cooperation or relationship? 
50. Was that cooperation, between you and that foreign organizations based on your own 
initiative, was it directed by the state or was it an initiative of the foreign organization 
itself?  
51. If the later was the case did you need to have the state approval? Does the state 
encourage such relationships?  
 
Voluntary work  
52. Do you believe in the importance of organization’s members or recipient's 
involvement in community's voluntary work and what is the importance of that 
involvement? 
53. How many voluntary workers do you have? 
54. Are the current civil society organizations in a position which allows them to work 
and participate with people or with the state to promote civil rights and civil culture 
to development of civil society as another sector? 
55. What are the factors that hinder the participation of these organizations? Are these 
reasons belonging to the weakness of these organizations, the lack of belief in civil 
society organizations role, the shortage of fund or other factors? 
56. In your opinion what are the issues/solutions that might strengthen the role of civil 
society organizations in development and their contribution to change? Do these 
solutions include?  
A- Increasing or having sufficient fund 
B- Awareness of the important roles of these organizations particularly in media 
filed? 
C- Or allowing these organizations to have more independence  
57. Do you face any problems or shortage in the number of volunteers? Is that problem 
more visible with males or females? 
58. In your opinion, what are the reasons behind that problem? And are these reasons 
related to? 
A- shortage of people’s time 
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B- the need for money 
C- traditions (especially when it comes to women)  
D- lack of appreciation or respect to voluntary work  
59. What do you suggest to bridge these problems? Do you believe the shortage of 
volunteers affect the work of civil society organizations? If yes, in what capacity? 
60. Do you believe in the importance of organization’s members or recipient's 
involvement in communities' voluntary workand what is the importance of that 
involvement? 
61. Is there anything you would like to add?  
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Appendix 2 
The List of Interview’s Questions for GICDF 
 
1. How did you get appointed or involved with the GICDF? 
2. Were all board members involved in determining the outcome of discussions?  
3. What were the mechanisms of decision-making? 
4. How many meetings did you attend? What projects or issues have been discussed at 
these meetings? 
5. How often did the Board meet? Were minutes of the meetings kept, and if so is it 
possible to gain access to them?  
6. To what extent has the annual budgets of the Foundation been agreed on proper basis, 
and if so were these budgets accessible? 
7. Has the Board run or manage the Foundation as a whole including all the subsidiary 
associations of GICD For did each association has an independent management? 
8. In your opinion, why has the GICDF abandoned its political activities and stopped its 
support for human rights at its meeting last December?  
9. Do you think the Foundation develops or promotes democratic values and human 
rights? And of so to what extent does this take place? 
10. What are the sources of the Foundation’s funding? 
11. Who decides the ways/ criteria in which the funds are spent? 
12. Have you ever felt that the Foundation was pursuing a strategy which is quite separate 
or independent from that of the Libyan state? 
13. Does the Foundation attempt to gain influence through both political and its activities 
at the service level?  
14. How do you evaluate the Foundation? And does it reflect or represent in any way the 
civil society in Libya?  
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Appendix 3 
List of Associations had been Interviewed on Stage One 
from the Fieldwork (2010) 
 
1. Jamʽiyyat AṣdiqāʼMarḍā al-Sokkar - Misrātā (Association of friends of diabetes –
Misurata) 
2. JamʽiyyatShurūq al-Ḍuḥá lil Marʼah –Ṭarābulus (Shurūq al-Ḍuḥá Association for 
the Disabled Women –Tripoli) 
3. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼIkhwah al-khayrīyyah - Misrātā (al-ʼIkhwahCharity Association – 
Misrata) 
4. al-Jamʻīyyah al-Waṭanīyah lil Mutafawiqīn –Ṭarābulus (National Association for 
Eminent – Tripoli) 
5. al-Jamʻīyyah al-Lībīyyah lil Munʽāqīn wa al-Qasirīn ʻan al-ḥarakah –
Ṭarābulus(Libyan Association for the disabled and Paralyses- Tripoli) 
6. al-Jamʻīyyah al-Lībīyyah li Ḥuqūq al-Ṭifl wa al-Marʼah  fī  Lībiyyā – Ṭarābulus 
(the Libyan Association for Women and Children Rights- Tripoli) 
7. Jamʻīyyat Ḥuqūq al-Marʼah – Banghāzī(Women Human Rights-Bengazi) 
8. Jamʻīyyat Ḥuqūq al-Insān- Banghāzī (Human Rights Association- Benghazi) 
9. Jamʻīyyat al-Nūr lil Kafīf – Banghāzī (al Nour for Visually Impaired- Benghazi) 
10. Jamʻīyyat al-Nūr lil Kafīf –Ṭarābulus (al Nour for Visually Impaired- Tripoli) 
11. Jamʻīyyat al-Anwār al-Khayrīyyah-Misrātā (al-Anwār Charity Association-Misurata) 
12. al-Jamʻīyyah al-Waṭanīyyah li Riʻāyat al-Shabāb– Ṭarābulus  
       (Notional Association of Youth Welfare). 
13. al-Ittiḥād al-ʻĀmm lil Jamʻīyyat al-Ahlīyyah –Ṭarābulus  
      (the National Federation of NGOs – Tripoli) 
14. al-Jamʻīyyah al-ʻArabīyah li Ḥuqūq al-Insān– Ṭarābulus 
      (al-ʻArabīyah Association for Human Rights –Tripoli) 
15. Munsiq al-Jamʻīyyāt al-Ahlīyyah bi Maktab al-Ittiṣāl bi al-Lijān al-Thawrīyah –
Ṭarābulus wa Misrātā 
      (Coordinatorsof NGOs in the Revolutionary Committee Liaison Office-Tripoli and Misrata) 
16. Masʼūl al-Jamʻīyyāt al-Ahlīyyah bi Amānat al-Lajnah al-Shaʻbīyyah al-
ʻāmmah- Majlis al-Wuzarāʼ- Ṭarābulus  
      (Coordinator of NGOs in the General People’s Committee- Cabinet-Tripoli) 
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Appendix 4 
List of Associations had been Interviewed on Stage Two 
from the Fieldwork (2011) 
Benghazi 
1. Mu’assasat Tawāṣul (Tawāṣul Association) 
2. ʼItilāf al- Jamʽiyyat al-ʼAhliyyah al-Lībiyyā (Coalition of Libyan NGO’s ) 
3. Jamʽiyyat al-Midadli al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Midad Charity Association) 
4. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah lil Tanmiyah (Libyan Organization for Development) 
5. Ministry of Culture and Civil Society Affaires (Executive office of Civil Society) 
6. JamʽiyyatLībyā al-ʼInṭifāḍā (Lībyā al-ʼInṭifāḍā Association) 
7. Farīq Nidā’ al-Khayr al-Lībī (Nidā’ al-Khayr Libyan Party) 
8. Munaẓamat al-Taẓamon li-Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (Libyan Human rights solidarity 
Organization – Geneva) 
9. Yunis Dbeesh (Coordinator of Local Social Affairs-Benghazi) 
10. Munaẓamat al-Ḥuqūqiyeen al-Lībiyyīn (Libyan Jurist Organization) 
11. al-Tajamuʽ al-Lībī li ʼIṣlāḥ wa al-‘adālah (Libyan Forum for reform and Justice) 
12. Jabhāt al-Taghyīr (Front of Change) 
13. Majmūʽat al-Tawāṣul byna al-Majlis al-Waṭanī wa al-Shāriʽ (The Connection between 
NTC and Public Group 
14. Jamʽiyyat Sanābil al-Hidāyyā al-Khayriyyā (Sanābil al-Hidāyyā Charity Association) 
15. Jamʽiyyat al-Ḥayāt al-Hurrah (al-Ḥayāt Free Association) 
16. Dewān al-Rʼai al-Thaqāfī (Opinion Court for Culture) 
17. Hay’at al-Daʽm wa al-Mashurah (Support and Consultation Body) 
Misurata: 
1. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼImdād (al-ʼImdād Association) 
2. Jamʽiyyat Waṭan al-ʼAhliyyah (Waṭan Civil Association) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Misrātā al-Khayriyyā (Misurata Charity Association) 
4. Jamʽiyyat al-Nushatāʼ al-ḥuqūqiyyīn li rasd jaraʼim al- harb wa al-jaraʼim ḍed al-
ʼisāniyyah (Association of human rights activists to monitor and document war crimes 
and crimes against humanity) 
5. Jamʽiyyat Jīlunā (Jīlunā Association) 
6. al-Tajamuʽ al-Waṭanī al-Hur (The Free National Association) 
7. Jamʽiyyat Ḥarā’ir Miṣrāṭā (Ladies of Misurata Association) 
8. al-Muntadah al-shamel li Ḥayāt al-Muslim (Forum of Universal Muslim life) 
9. Director of Civil society unit in Misurata city council (Mr. Abdullateef Koleeb) 
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Appendix 5 
List of NGOs Classification in Benghazi and Misurata 
 
Culture and Recreation 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li al-Shaṭaranj (The Libyan Chess Association) 
2. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li al-Mūsīqā wa al-Funūn (The Libyan Art and Music 
Organization) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Banghāzī lil ʼAndiyyā al-Riyāḍiyyā al-ʼIliktrūniyyā (Benghazi Association 
for Electronic Sports Clubs) 
4. al-Markaz al-Lībī al-‘arabī li Fan al-Brutikuwl wa al-Atikīt (The Arab Libyan Centre 
for the Protocol and Etiquette) 
5. Munaẓamat al-Turāth wa al-Taʽdiyā al-Thaqafiyyā (Heritage and Cultural Pluralism 
Organization) 
6. Markaz al-ʼajyāl al-Thaqāfī (Al-ʼajyāl Cultural Centre) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Waṭaniyyā li al-Thaqāfāwa al-ʽUlūm Miṣrātā (The National 
Association for Culture and Science Misurata) 
 
Education and Research 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyah lil ʼIkhtirāʽ wa Taṭwīr (The Libyan Association for 
Invention and Development) 
2. Jamʽiyyat al-Khubarā’ wa al-Istishāriyyīn al-Lībiyyīn (The Libyan Experts and 
Consultants Association) 
3. Markaz Ru’yah li-ʼinmā’ wa Ta’sīl al-Funūn al- Baṣariyyah (Ru’yah Centre for the 
Development and Rooting of Visual Arts) 
4. Mu’assasat Lībyah Mawṭini li al Istishārāt wa al-Tawthīq (Lībyah Mawṭini 
Organization for Consultation and Documentation) 
5. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyah li ʽulūm al- Miyāh (The Libyan Association For Water 
Sciences) 
6. Markaz Lībyah li al-Dirāsāt al-Tārikhiyyah(Libya Centre for Historical Studies) 
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7. Markaz Ḍaif al-Ghazāl al-ʽālami li al-Dirāsātwa al-Buḥūth al-ʼiʽlāmyyā (Ḍaif al-
Ghazāl Centre for Media Studies and Research) 
8. Jamʽiyyat ʼiqraʼ li al-Tanmiyā wa Maḥū al-ʼumiyyā (ʼiqraʼ Association for 
Development and Literacy) 
9. al-Rabiṭā al-Lībiyyā li al-Taʽlīm al-Tiqanī wa al-Mihanī (The Libyan Association for 
Technical and Vocational Education) 
10. al-ʼItiḥād al-Waṭanī li Derāsat wa Abḥāth al-Naftwal Ghāz (The National Union for 
Oil and Gas Research) 
11. al-Markaz al-ʼistrātījī li al-Tadrīb wa al-Tatwīr (The Strategic Centre for Training 
and Development) 
12. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li ’asdiqa’ al-Lughā al-‘Arabiyyā (The Libyan Organization 
for the The Friends of the Arabic Language) 
13. Jamʽiyyat al-Tawāṣul li Taʽlīm wa Tathqīf al-ṣum (al-Tawāṣul Association for the 
Deaf Education) 
14. Jamʽiyyat al-Kalimā al-Tayyibāal-ʽilmiyyā (al-Kalimā al-Tayyibā Scientific 
Association) 
15. Munaẓamat al-ʼibdāʽ al-Handasī li al-ʼabḥāth al-ʽilmiyyā wa al-Tiqaniyyā (Creative 
Engineering Organization for the Scientific and Technical Research) 
16. ʼAriq Nahwā al-ʽulā al-Tarbawiyyā al-Taʽlīmiyyā (ʼAriq Nahwā al-ʽulā Educational 
Association) 
17. al-Mu’assasā al-Lībiyyā li al-Fikr wa al-Tanmiyā wa al-Dirāsāt al-ʼIstrātījiyyā (The 
Libyan Association for Intellect, Development, and Strategic Studies) 
18. al-Markaz al-Lībī li al-Tawthīq (The Libyan Documentation Centre) 
19. al-Munaẓamā al-ʽilmiyyā al-Lībiyyā li Nuẓum al-Maʽlūmāt wa Taqniyātiha (The 
Libyan Scientific Organization for Information Technology) 
 
B- Misurata 
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Health 
Benghazi 
1. Munaẓamat Lībyah al- Waṭaniyyah li Mukāfaḥat al-Tadkhīn wa al-Mukhadirāt wa 
al-Khumūr wa al-Muʼathirāt al-ʽAqliyyah (The Libyan National Organization 
Against Somking, Drugs,Alchohol and Psychotropic Substances) 
2. al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyyah al-Shabābiyyah li Mukāfaḥit al-Mukhadirāt (The 
National Youth Organization Against Drugs) 
3. Jamʽiyyat ṣayadilat ʽAla Khuṭah al-ḥabīb li al-ʼIghātha al-Dawāʼiyyah (ʽAla Khuṭah 
al-Habīb Pharmacists Association for Medical Relief) 
4. Jamʽiyyat al-Shifāʼ li ʼmarāḍ al-Dam wa al-ʼAmrāḍ (al-Shifāʼ Association for Blood 
Diseases and Tumors) 
5. Jamʽiyyat al-Lībī al-Khayriyyah li al-ʼAṭrāf al-ṣināʽiyyah al-Taʽwīḍiyyah (al-Lībī 
Charity Association for Prosthetic Limbs) 
6. Jamʽiyyat al-Ṭib wa al-ʼUsrā (Medicine and Family Association) 
7. al-ʼItiḥād al-Lībī al-Duwalī li al-ʼisʽāf wa al-ʼistijābā (The International Libyan 
Union for Help and Response) 
8. Jamʽiyyat Kuliyyat Tib al-ʼAsnān (School of Dentistry Association) 
9. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībyyā li Faniyyī al-ʼAshiʽā al-Ṭibyyā (The Libyan Association for 
X-Ray Specialists) 
10. ʼItiḥād al-ʽāmilīn bi al-Kulliyyāt al-Ṭibyyā - Jamiʽat Banghāzī (The Union of 
Medical Schools Faculty and Staff - The University of Banghāzī) 
11. Munaẓamat al-ʽAmāl al-Ṭibbī al-Muwaḥḥad (United Medical Work Organization) 
12. Jamʽiyyat Aṣdiqā’ Marḍā al-Sukkar (Friends of Patients woth Diabetes Association) 
13. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li Riʽāyat Ḥasasiyyat al-ʼAghdhiyā (The Libyan Association 
for Food Allergies) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. Jamʽiyyat Aṣdiqā’ al-Sukkarī (Friends of Diabetes Association) 
2. Jamʽiyyat al-ʽIlāj al-Ṭabīʽī Miṣrāṭā (Misurata Physiotherapy Association) 
 
Social Services 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyah li al-ʽAlāqāt al-ʽāmmah (The Libyan Association for 
Public Relations) 
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2. al-Mu’assasah al-Lībiyyah al-ʼIrlandiyyah li al-ʼIghāthah (The Irish Libyan 
Emergency Aid Association) 
3. Mu’assasat ḥayāh Lita’hīl ḍaḥāyah al-ḥarb (ḥayāh Association for the War Victims 
Rehabilitation) 
4. Jamʽiyyat Shabāb al-Bidāyah li al-Tawʽiyah wa al-Tathqīf (The Association of 
Shabāb al-Bidāyah for Awareness and Education) 
5. Jamʽiyyat li Naḥyah min Jadīd li al- ʼaʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-Tawʽiyah wa al-
ʼirshād (Li Naḥya Min Jadīd Association for Charity Works and Awareness) 
6. Samā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Tathqīfiyyah wa al-Tawʽiyah (Samā Association for 
Educational and Awareness Works) 
7. Muntadah Shabāb al-ʽAmal al-Taṭawuʽi (The Youth of Voluntary Work Forum) 
8. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼAmāni li Riʽāyat al ʼAytām wa al-ʼAmrāḍ al Muzminah (al-ʼAmāni 
Charity Association for Orphans and Chronic Diseases Care) 
9. Markaz al-Ghars al-Ṭayyib li al-Tawʽiyat wa Tathqīf al-Ṭifl (al- Ghars al-Tayyib 
Centre for the Child’s Education and Awareness) 
10. Mu’assasat Ṭarīq al-Nūr li al-ʼIslāḥ wa al-Ta’hīl (Ṭarīq al-Nūr Association for 
Reform and Rehabilitation) 
11. al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyyah al-Lībiyyah li al-Daʽm al-ʼIjtimāʽi wa al-Nafsi al-
ʼInsāni (The National Libyan Organization for Social and Psychological Human 
Support) 
12. Mu’assasat ʼItiḥād Saḥāfat al-Tifl (The Union of Child Press Association) 
13. Munaẓamat Maʽan li al-Mustaqbal li al-ʼAʽmāl al-ʼInsāniyyah wa al-Tawʽiyah al-
Fikriyyah (Maʽan lil Mustaqbal Organization for Human Works and Awareness) 
14. Munaẓamat Hibat al-Thawrah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-ʼIghāthah (Hibat 
al-Thawrah Organozation for Charity and Relief Work) 
15. Ṣundūq Riʽāyat al-Yatīm (dhawī al-Sanad) (Orphan Care Fund) 
16. Munaẓamat al-ʼIghāthah al- ʼIslāmiyyah Faransah - Farʽ Lībyah (The Islamic Relief 
Organization France - Libyan Branch) 
17. Jamʽiyyat ʼIttiḥād al-Thuwwār al-Lībiyyīn (The Federation of the Libyan 
Revolutionaries Association) 
18. Jamʽiyyat Arkanu al-Thaqāfiyyah wa al-Khadamāt al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyah (Arkanu 
Cultural Association for Social Services) 
19. Rābiṭat ʼUsar Shuhadā’ Thawrat 17 Fibrāyir Banghāzī (The Families of the Martyrs 
of the 17th of February Revolution Association) 
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20. Mu’assasat al-Murāʽā li al-Shuhadāʼ wa al- Jarḥā wa al-ʼAsrā wa al- Mafqūdīn li 
Thawrat 17 Fibrāyir (al-Murāʽā Association of the 17th of February Martyrs, 
Prisoners and Missings) 
21. Mu’assasat al-Ḥurriyyā li Naṣrat al-Thuwwār wa al-Shuhadā’(al-Ḥurriyyā 
Association for Revolutionaries and Martyrs Support) 
22. Rābiṭat Lībyā li al-ʼAsrāwa al- Mafqūdīnwa al-Jarḥā (Libya Association of 
Prisoners, Missings and Injured) 
23. Mu’assasat Maktab al-ʽImārā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Taṭawuʽiyyā (Maktab al-ʽImārā 
Charity Works Association) 
24. Mu’assasat Nushaṭā’ Ḥimāyat al-ʼInṭifāḍā (Ḥuqūqiyyā - ʼIjtimāʽiyyā -Thaqāfiyyā) 
(The Uprising Protection Activists Association (Juridical-Social-Cultural)) 
25. Mu’assasat Labaykā Waṭanī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-ʼInsāniyyā wa al-Tathqīfiyyā (Labaykā 
Waṭanī Association for Human and Educational Works) 
26. Hay’at Shu’ūn al- Munʽāqīn wa Dhawī al-ʼIḥtiyājāt al-Khāssā (The Board of the 
Disabled and People of Special Needs Affairs) 
27. Jamʽiyyat Lamsat Ḥanān li al-Riʽāyā al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā (Lamsat Ḥanān Social Care 
Association) 
28. Jamʽiyyat Malāk Miṣrātā li al-Ṭufūlā (The Angel of Miṣrātā Childhood 
Association) 
29. Rābiṭat Yūsbrīdus li al-Taṭawuʼ(Yūsbrīdus Volunteering Association) 
30. Jamʽiyyat al-Watīn al-Khayriyyā li al-ʼIghāthā wa al-Tathqīf al-Ṭibī (al-Watīn 
Charity Association for Relief and Medical Awareness) 
31. Markaz al-ʼiʽtiṣām li al-ʼaʽmāl al-Daʽawiyyā wa al-Khayriyyā(al-ʼiʽtiṣām Centre for 
Call and Voluntary Work) 
32. Munaẓamat Hibat al-Thawrā li al-ʼAʽmāl wa al-ʼIghāthā (Hibat al-Thawrā Charity 
and Relief Organization) 
33. Mu’assasat al-Shabakā al-Lībiyyā li al-ʼIʽlām (The Libyan Net Association for 
Media) 
34. Munaẓamat al-ʼIstiqrār li al-Tawʽiyā wa al-Tathqīf (al-ʼIstiqrār Organization for 
Awareness and Education) 
35. Mu’assasat Mazāyā al-ʼIʽlāmiyyā (Mazāyā Media Association) 
36. Jamʽiyyat Nūr al-Hudā al-Khayriyyā li ʼIʽānat al-Shabāb ʽalā al-Zawāj  (Nūr al-
Hudā Association for the Youth Support in Marriage) 
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37. Mu’assasat Banāt al-Mukhtār li al-Tawʽiyyā (Banāt al-Mukhtār Association for 
Awareness) 
38. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li al- Mutakāʽidīn (The Libyan Organization for the 
Retired) 
39. Munaẓamat Shabābunā ʼAwwalan li al-Tawʽiyā wa al-Taqwīm (Shabābunā 
Awareness and Reform Organization) 
40. al-Mu’assasā al-Waṭaniyyā li Mukafaḥat al-ẓawāhir al-Salbiyyā (The National 
Association Against Negative Phenomena) 
41. Mu’assasat Kul al-Lībiyyīn li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-ʼInsāniyyā wa al-
ʼIjtimāʽiyyā wa al-Tathqīfiyyā wa al-Siyāsiyyā (All Libyans Association for 
Charity, Human, Social, Cultural and Political Work) 
42. al-ʼItiḥād al-Lībī li al-Mutaqāʽidīn (The Libyan Union for the Retired) 
43. Mu’assasat Liʼajl Lībyā li al- Ḥiwār wa al-Tanwīr al-Fikrī (For Libya Dialogue and 
Intellectual Enlightement Association) 
44. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li Daʽm al-Muḥāribīn wa al-Jarḥā wa al-ʼUsar wa al-
Shuhadā’ wa al- Mafqūdīn (The Libyan Organization for the Fighters, Injured, 
Martyrs’ Families and Missings Support) 
45. al-Markaz al-ʼIʽlāmī ʼUwbārī (The Media Centre ʼUwbārī) 
46. Mu’assasat Risālatī al-Tarbawiyyā wa al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā wa al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā 
(Risālatī Educational, Social, and Charity Association) 
47. Jamʽiyyat ʼUmmī li Riʽāyat Dhawī al-ʼIḥtiyajāt al-Khaṣṣā (ʼUmmī Association for 
People with Special Needs Care) 
48. Mu’assasat al-Ḥaṣād al-ʼIʽlāmiyyā (al-Ḥaṣād Media Association) 
49. Mu’assasat al-ʼUsrā min ʼAjl al-Muwāṭanā (al-ʼUsrā Association for Citizenship) 
50. Jamʽiyyat wa Taʽāwanū li Riʽāyat al-ʼAytām (wa Taʽāwanū Orphans Care 
Association) 
51. Muaẓamat Riʽāyat al-Shabāb (The Youth Care Organization) 
52. Mu’assasat Mālik al-Khayriyyā al-Tawʽawiyyā al-Tanmawiyyā (Mālik Charity, 
Education, and Development Association) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. Jamʽiyyat Ḥarā’ir Miṣrāṭā (Ladies of Misurata Association) 
2. Jamʽiyyat Miṣrāṭā li al-Daʽmwa al-ʼIsnād (MisurataSupport Association) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Waṭan al-ʼAhliyyah (Waṭan Civil Association) 
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4. Jamʽiyyat al-Shajrā al-Ṭayyibā li al-Muʽāqīn (al-Shajrā al-Ṭayyibā Association for 
the Disabled) 
5. Jamʽiyyat Ayādī al-Salām (Ayādī al-Salām Association) 
6. Rabiṭat al-Mukhtaṭafīn (The Kidnapped Association) 
7. Tajamuʽ Ḥafīdāt al-Suwayḥilī (Ḥafīdāt al-Suwayḥilī Association) 
8. Jamʽiyyat Daʽm wa Musānadat Thuwwār 17 Fibrāyir (The Support of the 17th of 
February Revolutionaries Association) 
9. Jamʽiyyat Aṭfālunā (Aṭfālunā Association) 
10. Jamʽiyyat Sanābil al-ʼAmal (Sanābil al-ʼAmal Association) 
11. Jamʽiyyat ʼAyādī al-Maḥabā (ʼAyādī al-Maḥabā Association) 
12. Jamʽiyyat Jūd (Jūd Association) 
13. Jamʽiyyat Manār (Manār Association) 
14. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼAmal al-Khayriyyā li al-Makfūfīn (al-ʼAmal Charity Association for 
the Blind) 
15. Jamʽiyyat ʼAnwār al-Khayriyyā li Riʽāyat al-ʼAytām (ʼAnwār Charity Association 
for Orphans Care) 
16. Munaẓamat Lībyā li al-Musāʽadāt al-ʼinsāniyyā (Libya Organization for 
Humanitarian Aid) 
17. Jamʽiyyat ʼUm al-Shahīd (ʼUm al-Shahīd Association) 
18. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li Dhawī al-ʼIḥtiyājāt al-Mukhtālifā (The Libyan Association 
for People with Different Needs) 
19. Jamʽiyyat al-Naṣr li Tamwīl al-Jabahāt (al-Naṣr Association for the Frontline 
Funding) 
 
Environment 
A- Benghazi 
1. Jamʽiyyat Assuhūl al-Ghawriyyah li al-Maḥmiyāt al-Ṭabīʼiyyah (Assuhūl al-
Ghawriyyah Association for Nature Reserve)  
2. Mu’assasat al-Muḥsin li al-Difāʽ ‘an Ḥuqūq al-ḥaywān wa al- Bīʼah (al-Muḥsin 
Association for Animal and Environment Rights) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li al-Bīʼā (The Libyan Association for the Environment)  
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Development and Housing 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyah li al-Tanmiyyah al-Mustadāmah (The National 
Organizationfor the Sustainable Development) 
2. Al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyyah li al-Shafāfiyyah wa Mukāfaḥat al-Fasād (The 
National Transperacy Organization) 
3. Muntadah al-Muwāṭanah al-Dīmuqrātiyyah wa al-Tanmiyyah al-Bashariyyah (The 
Citizenship Forum for Democracy and Human Resources) 
4. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-Tanmiyah (The Libyan Organization for 
Development) 
5. al-Tajamuʽ al-Lībī li al-Shafāfiyyah (Libyan Transperacy Association) 
6. al-Majmūʽah al-Lībiyyah li al-Tanmiyah al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyah (The Libyan Group for 
Social Development) 
7. Munaẓamat al-‘āsimah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-Tanmiyyah al-Bashariyyah 
(al-‘āsimah Organization for Charity Works and Human Development) 
8. Markaz Janūb Fazzan li al-Tanmiyah al-Bashariyyah (South Fazzan Centre for 
Human Development) 
9. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-‘Amal al-Ijtimāʽi wa al-Thaqāfi wa al-Tanmiyyah 
(The Libyan Organizationfor Social and Cultural Work and Development) 
10. al-Jamʽiyah al-Lībiyyah li ʼIdārat al-Masharīʽ (The Libyan Association for Project 
Management) 
11. Majmūʽat al-Ruwwād li al-Tanmiyyah al Bashariyyah (al-Ruwwād Group for 
Human Development) 
12. Rabiṭat Jamāʽat al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-Tanmiyyah (The Reform and Development Group 
Association) 
13. Nabḍ al-Ḥayāt li al-ʼAʽmāl al-ʼInsāniyyah wa al-Tanmiyah (Nabḍ al-Hayāt for 
Human Works and Development) 
14. al-Markaz al-Lībī li Tanmiyat al-Mawārid al-Bashariyyā (The Libyan Centre for 
Human Resources Development) 
15. Jamʽiyyat Tawāẓun li al-Tadrīb wa Taṭwīr al-Qudurāt al-Bashariyyā (Tawāẓun 
Foundation for the Training and Development of Human Resources) 
16. Rābiṭat al-Muntasibīn li Ṣundūq al-ʼIʼtimān al-ʼIqtiṣādī wa al-ʼJtimāʽī (The 
Association of the Economic and Social Development Fund members) 
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17. Mu’assasat al-ʼAjyāl al-Lībyyā al-ʽālamiyyā li al-Ṭufūlā wa al-Tanmiyā (The 
Internation Libyan Generations Association for Childhood and Development) 
18. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼIkhwā al-Falastīnyyā al-Lībyyā (The Libyan Palestinian Brothers 
Association) 
19. Jamʽyyat Ḥimāyat al-Mustālik (The Consumer Protection Association)  
20. Mu’assasat Nabḍ al-ḥayāt li al-ʼaʽmāl al-ʼInsaniyyā wa al-Tanmiyā (Nabḍ al-Ḥayāt 
Association for Human Works and Development) 
21. Jamʽiyyat al-Mustaqbal al-Mudīʼ li al-Tanmiyā al-Bashariyyā wa Riʽāyat al-Ṭufūlā 
(al-Mustaqbal al-Mudīʼ Association for Human Development and Childhood 
Protection) 
22. Jamʽiyyat al-Taṭwīr li al-Mawāniʼ wa al-Marāfiʼ al-Lībiyyā (The Development 
Association for the Libyan Ports and Harbours) 
23. Munaẓamat Bināʼ al-Mawārid al-Bashariyyā (Human Resourses Development 
Association) 
24. al-Mu’assasā al-Shabābiyyā al-ʽālamiyyā li al-Tanmiyā wa al-Tatwīr (The 
International Youth Association for Development) 
25. Jamʽiyyat al-Bayān li al-ʽAdālā wa al-Tanmiyā al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā (al-Bayān Justice and 
Social Development Association) 
26. Munaẓamat al-Rashād li al-Shafafiyā wa Mukāfaḥat al-Dhawāhir al-Salbiyyā (al-
Rashād Transperacy Organization) 
27. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li al-Shafāfiyā (The Libyan Transperacy Association) 
28. Munaẓamat al-Ḥuriyyā li Mukāfaḥat al-Fasād al-Mālī wa al-ʼIdārī (Freedom 
Organization Against Financial and Administrative Corruption) 
29. Munaẓamat al-Hadaf li al-Tanmiyā wa al-Tawṣul al-ʼIjtimāʽī (al-Hadaf Organization 
for Development and Social Networking) 
 
B-  Misurata 
1. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Waṭaniyyā li al-Taghyīr wa al-ʼIṣlāḥ (The National Association for 
Change and Reform) 
2. Jamʽiyyat Muntadā al-Ra’y wa al-Mashūrā (The Association of the Opinion and 
Advice Forum) 
3. Tajamuʽ Lībyā li al-Tanmiyāwa al-Dīmuqraṭiyyā (LibyaAssociation for Development 
and Democracy) 
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Law, Advocacy and Politics  
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-Difāʽ ʽan al-Ḥuriyyāt al-ʽāmmah (The Libyan 
Organization for the Defense of Public Freedoms) 
2. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-Lajiʼīn wa al-Muhajirīn wa al-Jaliyāt al-ʼAjnabiyyah 
(The Libyan Organization for Refugees, Immigrants, and Foreigners) 
3. Tajamuʽ al-ʼIntifaḍah (The Uprising Association) 
4. Al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The Libyan Organization for Human 
Rights) 
5. Al-munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li Ḥimāyat al-Ḥuqūq wa al-Ḥurriyyāt (The Libyan 
Organization for the Protection of Rights and Freedoms) 
6. Al-Munaẓaamah al-Lībiyyah al-Shabābiyyah li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The LibyanYouth 
Organization for Human Rights) 
7. Al-Munaẓamah al-Duwaliyyah li al-‘Adālah wa al-Musāwah (dhūd)(The 
International Organization for Justice and Equality) 
8. Munaẓamat 17 Fibrāyir li Ḥuqūq al-Shuhadāʼ wa al-Jarḥah wa al-ʼAsrah wa al-
Mafqūdīn (The 17th of February Organization for the Rights of Martyrs, Injured, and 
Prisoners) 
9. al-Tajamuʽ al-Waṭani min ʼajl al-‘Adālah wa al-Dīmuqratiyyah (The National 
Association for Justice and Democracy) 
10. Munaẓamat Lībyah li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (Libya Organization for Human Rights) 
11. Munaẓamat li’Ajlik li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (li’Ajlik Organization for Human Rights) 
12. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-‘Adālah wa al-Musāwah (The Libyan Organization 
for Justice and Equality) 
13. Hay’at Daʽm Mushārakat al-Mar’ah fī ṣunʽ al-Qarār(The Board of Woman’s Support 
in Decision Making) 
14. Munaẓmat Tarābuṭ li Ḥuqūq al-Mar’ah wa al-Ṭifl wa al-Muʽākīn wa al-ʼAqaliyyāt 
(Tarābuṭ Organization for the Rights of Women, Children, Disabled and Minorities) 
15. Jamʽiyyat al-Sujanāʼ al-Siyāsiyyīn al-Lībiyyīn (Libyan Political Prisoners 
Association) 
16. Mu’assasat Lībyah ʼAwalan li Ḥimāyat al-Thawrah (Libya First for the Revolution 
Protection) 
17. Mu’assasat Iʼtilāf al-Marʼah al-Ḥurrah (The Foundation of Free Woman Coalition)  
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18. Munaẓamat ʼAmal al-Mustaqbal al-Ḥuqūqiyyah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-ʼIsāniyyah (ʼAmal 
al-Mustaqbal Jurist Organization for Humanitarian Work) 
19. Munaẓamat al-Mīzān li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (al-Mīzān Human Rights Organization) 
20. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyah li al- Qānūn al-Duwali al-ʼInsāni wa Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The 
Libyan Association for the International Human Law and Human Rights) 
21. al-Muʼassasah al-Waṭaniyyah wa al-ʽAdālah (The National Association and Justice) 
22. Tajamuʽ al-Wifāq al-Waṭani (The National Agreement Association) 
23. Mu’assasat Sujanāʼ 17 Fibrāyir (17th of February Prisoners Foundation) 
24. al-Markaz al-Lībiy li al-Dīmuqrātiyyah (The Libyan Centre for Democracy) 
25. al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyyah li Ḥimāyat al-Ḥuqūq wa al-Ḥurriyyāt (The National 
Organization for Rights and Freedoms Protection) 
26. Munaẓamat ʼAmān li Munāhaḍat al-Tamayyuz al-ʽUnsuri (ʼAmān Organization 
Against Racial Discrimination) 
27. ʼIʼtilāf Thuwwār Lībyah min ʼAjl Ḥuqūq al-Thuwwār (The Libyan Revolutionaries 
Coalition for the Rights of the Revolutionaries) 
28. Al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li Ḥimāyat Ḥuqūq al-Muwaẓaf wa al-ʼIṣlāḥ al-ʼIdāri (The 
Libyan Organization for the Protection of the Rights of the Employee and the 
Administrative Reform) 
29. Markaz Qatrūn li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (Qatrūn Human Right Centre) 
30. Munaẓamat al-ʽAfū al-ʽArabiyyā (The Arab Amnesty Organization) 
31. Tajamuʽ al-ʽAdālā wa al-Dustūr (Justice and Constitution Association) 
32. al-Munaẓamā al-Waṭaniyyā li ʼAmāzūnāt Lībyā (ʼAmāzūnāt Lībyā National 
Organization) 
33. al-Tajamuʽ al-Jumhūrī (The Republican Party) 
34. Mu’assasat al-Mutawasiṭ li al-Dīmuqrātiyyā wa al-ʼIntikhābat (al-Mutawasiṭ 
Democracy and Election Association) 
35. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Waṭaniyyā li al-Tawaṣul wa al-Ḥiwār (The Libyan Association for 
Dialogue) 
36. Hayʼat al-Daʽm wa al-Mashūrā (Support and Counseling Association) 
37. Ḥarakat Shabāb Lībyā (The Youth of Libya Movement) 
38. Tajamuʽ 24 Dīsimbir al-Waṭanī al-Mustaqil (24th of December National Independent 
Association) 
39. Ḥarakat Shabāb Lībyā (The Youth of Libya Movement) 
40. ʼItiḥād Thuwwar Sūryā fi Lībyā (The Union of the Syrian Revolutionaries in Libya) 
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41. Muntada Lībyā al-Dīmuqrātī (Libya Democratic Forum) 
42. al-Marsad al-Lībiy lil Raqabah wa Huqūq al-ʼInsān (The Libyan Observatory for 
Control and Human Rights) 
43. al-Munaẓamā al-Duwaliyyā li Ḥuqūq al-Mar’ā (The International Women Rights 
Organization) 
44. Tajauʽ Lībyā al-Shabāb al-Dīmuqrātī (The Youth Libya Democratic Association) 
45. ʼItiḥād Shabāb Lībyā (Libya Youth Union) 
46. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Waṭaniyyā li Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The National Human Right 
Association) 
47. Rābiṭat Ḍubāṭ ʼAghustus 1975 (The Officers of August 1975 Association) 
48. Jamʽiyyat Shuhadā’ al-Riḥlā LN1103 (Flight LN1103 Martyrs Association) 
49. Munaẓamat al-Qārrā al-Samrā’ li Ḥuqūq al-ʼIsnān wa al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (The 
Black Continent Organization for Human Right and Charity Works) 
50. ʼItiḥād al-Mullāk al-ʼAṣliyyīn li al-ʼAmlāk al-Mughtaṣabā (The Original Owners 
Union for Usurped Properties) 
51. Tajamuʽ 23 Nuvimbir li al-Ḥuriyyā wa Taṭbīq al-Shūrā wa al-Dīmuqrāṭiyyā wa al-
ʽAdālā al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā (23 November Association for Freedom, Law, Democracy ans 
Social Justice Application)  
52. Munaẓamat al-Ḥuqūqiyeen al-Lībiyyīn (Libyan Jurist Organization) 
53. al-Tajamuʽ al-Lībī li ʼIṣlāḥ wa al-‘Adālah (Libyan Forum for reform and Justice) 
54. Jabhāt al-Taghyīr (Front of Change) 
 
B-  Misurata 
1. Iʼtilāf 17 Fibrāyir (The 17th of February Coalition) 
2. Tajamuʽ Shabāb 17 Fibrāyir (The 17th of February Youth Association) 
3. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībyyā li al-Dīmuqrātiyyā wa Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The Libyan 
Association for Democracy and Human Rights) 
4. ʼItiḥād Thuwwār 17 Fibrāyir (The 17th of February Revolutionaries Federation) 
5. al-Tajamuʽ al-Waṭanī al-Hur (The Free National Association) 
6. Jamʽiyyat al-ʽAdālā al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā (Social Justice Association) 
7. al-Tajamuʽ al-Waṭanī al-Hur (The Free National Association) 
8. Tajamuʽ Wifāq (Wifāq Association) 
9. Muntadā Shabāb Bilādī (Shabāb Bilādī Forum) 
10. Jamʽiyyat Muntadā  ʼāfāq Lībyā (The Association of ʼāfāq Lībyā Forum) 
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11. al-ʼItiḥād al-Waṭanī al-Ḥur (The Free National Union) 
12. Tajamuʽ al-Risālā Miṣrāṭā (Al-Risālā Misurata Association) 
13. Jamʽiyyat Shuhadāʼ wa Sujanā’ al-Waṭan (The Martyrs and Prisoners of the 
Homeland Association)  
14. Jamʽiyyat al-Nushatāʼal-ḥuqūqiyyīn li Rasd Jaraʼim al-Harb wa al-Jaraʼim ḍed al-
ʼIsāniyyah (Association of human rights activists to monitor and document war 
crimes and crimes against humanity) 
 
Philanthropic Intermediaries and Voluntarism Promotion  
A- Benghazi 
1. Munaẓamat Jisr al-Tawāṣul li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (Jisr al-Tawāṣul Charity 
Organization) 
2. Muʼassasat Wiṣāl al-Raḥmah al-Khayriyyah (Wiṣāl al-Raḥmah Charity Foundation) 
3. Jamʽiyyat al-Quds li al-‘Aʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (al-Quds Charity Association) 
4. Mu’assasat al-Dawḥah al-Lībiyyah al-Khayriyyah (Al Dawḥa- Libya Charity Foundation) 
5. al-ʼAndiyyah al-Riyāsiyyah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (The Sports Clubs for 
Charity Works) 
6. Mu’assasat Lībyah al-Khayriyyah li Kafālat al-Yatīm (Libya Charity Association for 
Orphan’s Sponsorship) 
7. Mu’assasat Saʽid al-Khayriyyah (Saʽid Charity Association) 
8. Jamʽiyyat ʼUrināk al-Khayriyyah (ʼUrināk Charity Association) 
9. Jamʽiyyat Nidā’ al-Ḥaq li al ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-Taṭwīʽiyyah (Nidā’ al Ḥaq 
Association for Charity and Voluntary Works) 
10. Jamʽiyyat al-Barā’ah li al-Ṭufūlah al-Khayriyyah (al-Barā’ah Charity Association for 
Childhood) 
11. Jamʽiyyat al-Sharārah wa ʽArūs al-Baḥr li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (al-Sharārah wa 
ʽArūs al Baḥr Charity Works Organization) 
12. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Maṣriyyah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-Taṭawuʽiyyah (The 
Egyptian Association for Charity and Voluntary Works) 
13. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼAyādi al-Baydā’al-Khayriyyah (al-ʼAyādi al-Baydā’ Charity Association) 
14. Jamʽiyyat Kullunah Maʽan li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (Kullunah Maʽan Association 
for Charity Works) 
15. Jamʽiyyat Abu al-Barā’ li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah (Abul Barā’ for Charity Works 
Association) 
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16. Mu’assasat Ḥara’ir Lībyah li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyah wa al-Tawʽiyyah wa al-
ʼIrshād (Free Libyans Association for Charity Works and Counseling) 
17. Jamʽiyyat Siptimus Safriyus al-Khayriyyā (Siptimus Safriyus Charity Association) 
18. Jamʽiyyat Salsabīl al-Khayr li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Salsabīl al-Khayr Charity 
Works Association) 
19. Jamʽiyyat ʼIzdihār Lībyā al-Ḥurrā al-Khayriyyā (The Prosperity of Free Libya 
Charity Association) 
20. Jamʽiyyat Ruḥamā’ Bilā Ḥudūd al-Khayriyyā al-ʽālamiyyā (Ruḥamā’ Bilā Ḥudūd 
International Charity Association) 
21. Jamʽiyyat Da’imat al-ʽAtāʼ(Da’imat al-ʽAtāʼ Foundation) 
22. Farīq Nidā’ al-Khayr al-Lībī (Nidā’ al-Khayr Libyan Party) 
23. Jamʽiyyat ʼīthār li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (ʼīthār Charity Work Association) 
24. Jamʽiyyat Abnāʼ al-Waṭan li Riʽāyat al-ʼAytām wa al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Abnāʼ 
al-Waṭan Association for Orphans Care and Charity Works) 
25. Jamʽiyyat al-Raḥmā al-Khayriyyā li Riʽāyat al-ʼAytām (al-Raḥmā Orphans Care 
Charity Association) 
26. Jamʽiyyat ʼāfaq al-Mustaqbal li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (ʼāfaq al-Mustaqbal Carity 
Work Association) 
27. Mu’assasat al-Daʽwā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Daʽwā Charity Works Association) 
28. Mu’assasat al-Risālā al-Khayriyyā (al-Risālā Charity Association) 
29. Jamʽiyyat Manārat al-Ghad al-Khayriyyā (Manārat al-Ghad Charity Association) 
30. Jamʽiyyat al-Shifā’ li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Shifā’ Charity Works Association) 
31. Jamʽiyyat Khudh bi Yadī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Khudh bi Yadī Charity Works 
Association) 
32. Munaẓamat al-‘ādil li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-‘ādil Charity Works Organization) 
33. Jamʽiyyat Baṣamāt Islāmiyyā li al-ʽAʼmāl al-Khayriyyā (Baṣamāt Islāmiyyā Charity 
Works Association) 
34. Jamʽiyyat al-Taʼākhī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Taʼākhī Charity Works Association) 
35. Jamʽiyyat al-ʽAffāf li al-ʼAʽmāl al- Khayriyyā (al-ʽAffāf Charity Association) 
36. Munaẓamat al-Janūb li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (The South Charity Organization) 
37. Jamʽiyyat Nasīm al-Ḥuriyyāli al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Nasīm al-Ḥuriyyā Charity 
Work Association) 
38. Jamʽiyyat Shuhadāʼ Banīnā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Shuhadāʼ Banīnā Charity 
Works Association) 
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39. Jamʽiyyat al-Qarḍ al-Ḥasan li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Qarḍ al-Ḥasan Charity 
Works Association) 
40. Jamʽiyyat Tarīq al-Maʽālī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Tarīq al-Maʽālī Charity Works 
Association) 
41. Mu’assasat al-ʽAtāʼ al-Daʼim li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-ʽAtāʼ al-Daʼim Charity 
Works Association) 
42. Jamʽiyyat Banghāzī al-Sharārā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-ʼIghāthā (Benghazi 
al-Sharārā Charity and Relief Association) 
43. Jamʽiyyat ʼ Abnā’ Lībyā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (The Sons of Libya Charity Works 
Association) 
44. Jamʽiyyat al-Jūd al-Khayriyyā li Daʼm Muntasibī al-Kulliyāt al-Ṭibiyyā (al-Jūd 
Charity Association for Medical Schools Students) 
45. Jamʽiyyat al-Kawthar li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Al-Kawthar Charity Works Association) 
46. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼAmal li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-Tarbawiyyā (al-ʼAmal Charity 
and Educational Work Association) 
47. Jamʽiyyat Hilāl al-Khayr li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Hilāl al-Khayr Charity Work 
Association) 
48. Jamʽiyyat al-Rabīʽ al-ʽArabī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (The Arab Spring Charity 
Work Association) 
49. Jamʽiyyat Bashāʼir al-Khayr li al-Takāful wa al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Bashāʼir al-
Khayr Support and Charity work Association) 
50. Jamʽiyyat Lībyā al-Salām li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-Taṭawuʽiyyā (Libya the 
Peace Charity and Voluntary Work Association) 
51. Jamʽiyyat 17 Fibrāyir 2006 li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (17 February 2006 Charity 
Association) 
52. Jamʽiyyat Ṭaʽm al-Ḥuriyyā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-ʼIghāthā (Ṭaʽm al-
Ḥuriyyā Charity and Relief Association) 
53. Mu’assasat Banghāzī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Benghazi Charity Work Association) 
54. Jamʽiyyat al-Taraqqī li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Al-Taraqqī Charity Work Association) 
55. Jamʽiyyat Kāfil al-Yatīm al-Khayriyyā (Orphan Sponsor Charity Association) 
56. Jamʽiyyat al-Midādli al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Midad Charity Association) 
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B- Misurata 
1. Jamʽiyyat Misrātā al-Khayriyyā (Misurata Charity Association) 
2. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼIʽmār al-Khayriyyā (al-ʼIʽmār Charity Association) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Jinān li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Jinān Charity Works Association) 
4. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (The Libyan Charity Works Association) 
5. Jamʽiyyat Qaṣr Aḥmad li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Qaṣr Aḥmad Charity Works 
Association) 
6. Jamʽiyyat Tobaktus al-Khayriyyā (Tobaktus Charity Association) 
7. Jamʽiyyat al-Ḥayāt al-Khayriyyā (Al-Ḥayāt Charity Association) 
8. Jamʽiyyat wa ʼIbshirū li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Wa ʼIbshirū Charity Works 
Association) 
9. Jamʽiyyat al-Nawāyā al-Ḥasanā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (al-Nawāyā al-Ḥasanā 
Charity Works Association) 
10. Jamʽiyyat al-Shahīd ʽAbd al-Ghanī Zawbīk al-Khayriyyā (The MartyrʽAbd al-
Ghanī Zawbīk Charity Association) 
11. Jamʽiyyat ʼAzr al-Khayriyyā  (ʼAzr Charity Association) 
12. al-Barā’ā al-Khayriyyā li Riʽāyat al-Ṭufūlā (al-Barā’ā Charity for Childhood care) 
13. Jamʽiyyat al-Maḥabā li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā (Al-Maḥabā Charity Works Association) 
14. Jamʽiyyat ʼAhl al-Birr (ʼAhl al-Birr Association) 
15. Jamʽiyyat Duʽāt al-Raḥmā (Duʽāt al-Raḥmā Association) 
16. Jamʽiyyat Ruʼī al-Khayriyyā (Ruʼī Charity Association) 
 
International 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li Shu’ūn al Hijrah (The Libyan Organization for 
Immigration Affairs) 
2. al-Munaẓamah al-Lībiyyah li al-Tadrīb al-Qiyādāt al-Shabābiyyah wa al-Taʽāwun 
al-Duwaliy (The Libyan Organization for the Youth Leadership Training and 
International Cooperation) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Vāl li al-Ṣadaqah al-Lībiyyah al-Faransiyyah (Vāl Association for Libya 
France Alliance) 
4. Jamʽiyyat al-Ṣadāqah al-Lībiyyah (Libyan Friendship Association) 
5. al-Duwaliyyah al-Lībiyyah li al-Tawāsul (Libyan International for Communication) 
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6. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼRtiqāʼ li al-Taʽāruf al-Duwali (al-ʼRtiqāʼ Association for International 
Dialogue) 
7. Jamʼiyyat Aṣdikā’ Lībyā wa ʼītālyā (The Friends of Libya and Italy) 
8. al-Mu’assasā al-Lībiyyā al-ʼītāliyyā li al-Ṣadāqā wa al-Tanmiyā (The Libyan Italian 
Friendship and Development Association) 
9. Mu’assasat al-Ṣadāqā al-Lībyyā al-Qatariyyā (The Libyan Qatar Friendship Association) 
10. Mu’assasat al-Ṣadāqā al-Lībyyā al-Turkiyyā (The Libyan Turkish Friendship Association) 
11. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li al-Hijrā Ghayr al-Sharʽiyyā (The Libyan Organization for 
Illegal Migration) 
12. Jamʽiyyat al-Ṣadāqā wa al-Taʽāwun al-Brazīliyyā al-Lībiyyā (The Brazilian Libyan 
Friendship and Cooperation Association) 
13. Munaẓamat Shabāb Lībyā al-ʽālamiyyā (Youth of Libya International Organization) 
14. al-Mu’assasā al-Lībiyyā al-ʼīṭalyyā al-ʽālamiyyā li al-Ṣadaqā wa al-Tanmiyā wa 
Ḥuqūq al-ʼInsān (The International Libyan Italian Association for Friendship, 
Development and Human Rights) 
15. Jamʽiyyat al-Ṣadaqā al-Lībiyyā al-Kanadiyyā (The Libyan Canadian Friendship 
Association) 
16. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā al-Mālṭiyyā li al-Tanmiyā wa al-ʼIghāthā wa al-ʽAmal al-Taṭawuʽī 
(The Libyan Malta Organization For Development, Relief, and Voluntary Work) 
17. al-Munaẓamā al-Waṭaniyyā li al-Hijrā Ghayr al-Sharʽiyyā (National Organization for 
Illegal Organization) 
B- Misurata 
 
Religion 
A- Benghazi 
1. Rābiṭat al-ʽAmal al-ʼIslāmi (The Islamic Work Association) 
2. al-Majlis al-ʼAʽlah li al-Taṣawuf al-ʼIslāmi al-Sunni fī Lībyah (The Supreme Council 
for the Islamic Sunni Mysticism in Libya) 
3. Mu’assasat ʽArwat al-Taḥbīr li al-ʼIṣlāḥ wa al-Taghyīr (ʽArwat al-Taḥbīr 
Reformation and Change Association) 
4. Mu’assasat al-ʽurwā al-Wuthkī li al-Daʽwā wa al-ʼirshād(al-ʽUrwā al-Wuthkī Call 
and CounselingAssociation ) 
5. Mu’assasat ʼIslām Tawʽawiyyā Tathkīfiyyā Ḥuqūqiyyā (Islam Awareness, 
Educational and Juridical Association) 
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6. Jamʽiyyat Dhāt al-Niṭāqayn li al-Daʽwā wa al-ʼIrshād (Dhāt al-Niṭāqayn Call and 
Counseling Association) 
7. Markaz al-Fārūq li al-ʼaʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-Daʽawiyyā (al-Fārūq Charity and 
Call Works Centre) 
8. al-Munaẓamā al-Lībiyyā li Naṣrat al-Rusul wa al-ʼAnbiyā’ wa al-ʼAdyān al-
Samawiyyā (The Libyan Organization for Messengers, Prophets and Heavenly 
Religions Support) 
9. Majlis al-Daʽwā wa al-ʼIrshād fī Lībyā (Call and Counseling Council in Libya) 
10. Jamʽiyyat Ḥarth al-ʼākhirā al-Khayriyyā al-Daʽwiyyā (Ḥarth al-ʼākhirā Call and 
Charity Association) 
11. Mu’assasat al-ʼAnṣār li al-ʼAʽmāl al-Khayriyyā wa al-Daʽawiyyā (al-ʼAnṣār Charity 
and Call Association) 
12. Jamʽiyyat Sanābil al-Hidāyyā al-Khayriyyā (Sanābil al-Hidāyyā Charity Association) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. al-Muntadah al-Shamel li Ḥayāt al-Muslim (Forum of Universal Muslim life) 
 
Business and Professional 
A- Benghazi 
1. Tajamuʽ Muhandisūn liʼajl Lībyah (Engineers for Libya Association) 
2. ʼItiḥād ʽUmmāl al-Ḥurriyyah (Labourers of Freedom Union) 
3. Muntadah Lībyah li al Māl wa al ʼAʽmāl (Libya Forum for Finance and Business) 
4. Jamʽiyyat Rijāl al-ʼAʽmāl al-Lībiyyīn ( The Libyan Businessmen Association) 
5. Rabiṭat Muwaḍafī Maṣrif al-Tijārah wa al-Tanmiyah (The Bank of Commerce and 
Development Employees Association) 
6. Rābiṭat Muwaẓafī Maṣrif al-Wiḥdah (The Employees of al-Wiḥdah Bank Association) 
7. al-Jamʽiyyah al-Lībiyyah li al-Takhṭīṭ al-ʽImrāni (The Libyan Organization for 
Structure Planning) 
8. al-Rabiṭah al-Khayriyyah li Aṣḥāb al-Qurtāsiyyat wa al-Maktabāt (The Owners of 
Stationery Shops and Libraries Charity Association) 
9. ʼItiḥād al-Kafā’āt al-Lībiyyah (The Union Of Libyan Technocracy) 
10. al-Rabiṭah al-Lībiyyah li al-ʽUlūm al-Siyāsiyah (The Libyan Association for Political 
Sciences) 
11. al-Mu’assasah al-ʼūlah li Fursān Lībyah (The First Association for Libya Knights) 
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12. Munaẓamat al-Taqniyah al-Ṭibiyyah (Medical Technology Organization) 
13. al-Munaẓamah al-Akadīmiyyah al-Lībiyyah (The Libyan Academic Organization) 
14. Takatul al-Kānūniyyīn al-Lībiyyīn (The Libyan Lawyers Association) 
15. Jamʽiyyat al-Muqāwilīn al-Lībiyyīn (The Libyan Contractors Association) 
16. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībyyā li al-Handasā al-Ṣināʽiyyā (The Libyan Association for 
Industrial Engineering) 
17. al-Iitiḥād al-ʼAkādīmī al-Ṭullābī (The Academic Student Union) 
18. Tajamuʽ al-Muḥāmīn al-Shabāb (The Young Lawyers Association) 
19. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībyyā li al-Faḥṣ wa al-Taṭwīr (The Libyan Organization for Cross-
Checking) 
20. Muntadā Khirrījī al-ʽUlūm al-Siyāsyyā wa al-Maʽāhid al-Dublumāsiyyā (The Forum 
of Social sciences and Diplomacy Graduates) 
21. ʼItiḥād al-Mustashārīn al-Qanūniyyīn Banghāzī (The Union of Legal Counselor) 
22. al-Jamʽiyyā al-Lībiyyā li al-ʽUlūm al-Siyāsiyyā (The Libyan Association for 
Political Sciences) 
23. al-ʼItiḥād al-Lībiyyā li al-ʼIstishārāt al-Handasiyyā (The Libyan Union for 
Engineering Consults)  
24. ʼItiḥād al-Taḍāmun li al-ʽāmilīn bi al-ʼIsmant (al-Taḍāmun Union for the Cement 
Workers) 
25. al-Munaẓamā al-ʽāmmā li al-ʼIkhtisāsiyyīn al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyīn wa al-Nafsiyyīn fī Lībyā 
(The General Organization for Social and Psychological workers in Libya) 
26. Majlis al-Khibrāt al-Masrifiyyā al-Lībiyyā (The Libyan Bank Expertise Council) 
27. al-Hay’ā al-Lībiyyā li al-Miʽmāriyyīn (The Libyan Council for Architects) 
28. Jamʽiyyat Muʽalimī Lībyā al-Ḥurrā al-Fikriyyā al-ʼIjtimāʽiyyā (The Intellectual 
Social Association for Free Libya Teachers) 
29. ʼItiḥād ʽUmmāl al-Nift wa al-Ghāz (Oil and Gas Labourer Union) 
30. Hay’at al-Khubarā’ wa al-Mukhtaṣṣīn al-Lībiyyin (The Libyan Experts and Specialists 
Board) 
31. al-Munaẓamā al-Duwaliyyā li Rijāl wa Sayidāt al-ʼAʽmāl (The International 
Organization for Businessmen and Businesswomen) 
32. ʼItiḥād ʽUmmāl al-Kārubāʼ Banghāzī (Electricians Union Benghazi) 
33. al-ʼItiḥād al-Lībī li Makātib al-ʼItiṣālāt al-Hatifiyyā (The Libyan Union for 
Telecommunication Offices) 
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B- Misurata 
1. al-Tajamuʽ al-Akādīmī li ʼAʽḍā’ al-Hay’ā al-Tradrīsiyyā (Faculty Academic 
Association) 
2. Tajamuʽ al-Burj al-ʼIqtiṣādī (The Economic Tower Association) 
3. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼImdād (al-ʼImdād Association) 
 
Not Elsewhere Classified 
A- Benghazi 
1. al-Munaẓamah al-Waṭaniyah li Shabāb Lībya al-Ḥurrah al-Fatiyyah (The Youth of 
Free Libya National Organization) 
2. Markaz Jīl al-Mustaqbal (The Future Generation Centre) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Iʼtilāf al-Thawrāt (The Revolutions Coalition Association) 
4. ʼItiḥād Thuwwār 17 Fibrāyir (The 17th of February Revolutionaries Federation) 
5. Ḥarakat Wafā’ Thuwwār Lībyah (Libya Revolutionaries Fidelity Organization) 
6.  Jamʽiyyat Aṣdiqā’ Lībyah (Friends of Libya Association) 
7. Jamʽiyyat al-Raḥmah li al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-Salām (al-Raḥmah Association for Reform and 
Peace) 
8. Mu’assasat Naḥnu Hunah al-Lībiyyah (The Libyan Foundation Naḥnu Hunah) 
9. Muntadah Sakīnah wa Rabāb (Sakīnah and Rabāb Forum) 
10. al-Muʼassasah al-Lībiyyah li al-Daʽm wa al-Tansīq (The Libyan Association for 
Support and Coordination) 
11. Rabiṭat Jaysh al-Taḥrīr al-Sunūsi (al-Sunūsi Liberation Army Association) 
12. Mu’assasat Ḥallāqīn Bilā Ḥudūd (Barbers Without Borders Association)  
13. al-Majlis al-ʼAʽlah li al-Shabāb (Youth Supreme Council) 
14. Jamʽiyyat ʼIslāḥ Dhāt al-Bayn (ʼIslāḥ Dhāt al-Bayn Association) 
15. Mu’assasat al-Nahj al-Thābit li al-Mujtamaʽ al-Madani (al-Nahj al-Thābit Civil 
Society Association) 
16. Mu’assasat Nisā’ Bar Lībiyah (Bar Libya Women Association) 
17. Markaz Shabāb al Mustaqbal (Future Youth Centre) 
18. Jamʽiyyat Yālah 111 (Yālah 111 Association) 
19. Jamʽiyyat al-Tawāfuq al-Waṭani (National Compatability Association) 
20. Jamʽiyyat al-Sayyidah Zaynab (al-Sayyidah Zaynab Assocciation) 
21. Hay’at Shabāb al-Thawrah (The Youth of the Revolution Body)  
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22. Jamʽiyyat Ibn Sīnah (Ibn Sīnah Association) 
23. Rabiṭat al-ʼawfiyā’ li riʽāyat ʼUsar al-Shuhadāʼ wa al-Mafqūdīn bi Harb Tshād        
(al-ʼAwfiyā’ Association for the Families of Martyrs and Missings in Chad War) 
24. Majlis al-Murāqibīn (The Overseers Council) 
25. Jamʽiyyat al-ʽālam min ʼajl Lībyā (The World for Libya Association ) 
26. al-ʼItiḥād al-ʽām li Munaẓamāt al-Mujtamaʽ al-Madanī (The General Union of the 
Civil Society Organizations) 
27. Ḥarakat Shabāb Naltaqi li Nartaqi (Naltaqi li Nartaqi Youth Movement) 
28. Jamʽiyyat al-Bunyān al-Marsūs (al-Bunyān al-Marsūs Association) 
29. ʼItiḥād al-ʼIkhwā al- Filastīnī (The Palestinian Brothers Union) 
30. Munaẓamt Bukrā (Bukrā Organization) 
31. Jamʽiyyat Sawfā Nabqā Hunā (Sawfā Nabqā Hunā Association) 
32. Mu’assasat Afkār Lībyā (Afkār Lībyā Association ) 
33. Jamʽiyyat ʽUmar al-Mukhtār Banghāzī (ʽUmar al-Mukhtār Association Benghazi) 
34. Jamʽiyyat Lībyā li al-Khiṭāb al-ʼIʽlāmī (Libya Media Speech) 
35. Mu’assasat Sunnāʽ al-Ḥayāt (Life Makers Association) 
36. Jamʽiyyat La Akhāf al-Mawt (La Akhāf al-Mawt Association) 
37. al-ʼItiḥād al-Lībī li Mu’assasāt al-Tadrīb al-Khaṣṣā (The Libyan Union for Special 
Training Associations) 
38. Munaẓamat al-ʼInḍimmām al-Waṭanī (National Joint Organization) 
39. Mu’assasat Tawāṣul (Tawāṣul Association) 
40. Mu’assasat Hayyā Shabāb (Hayyā Youth Association) 
41. Jamʽiyyat Lībyā al-ʼInṭifāḍā (Lībyā al-ʼinṭifāḍā Association) 
42. Jamʽiyyat al-Ḥayāt al-Ḥurrah (al-ḤayātFree Association) 
 
B- Misurata 
1. Jamʽiyyat Dirʽ al-Thawrā (The Shield of the Revolution Association) 
2. Jamʽiyyat Abnāʼ Misrātā (Sons of Misurata Association) 
3. Jamʽiyyat Lībyā al-Ḥurrā (Free Libya Association) 
4. Jamʽiyyat al-Ṣumūd (al-Ṣumūd Association) 
5. Jamʽiyyat Jīlunā (Jīlunā Association) 
6. Jamʽiyyat al-ʽAṭā’ (al-ʽAṭā’ Association) 
7. Jamʽiyyat al-Muwāsāt (al-Muwāsāt Association) 
8. Jamʽiyyat Min ʼAjl Bilādinā (Min ʼAjl Bilādinā Association) 
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9. Jamʽiyyat Ḥafīdāt al-Mukhtār (Ḥafīdāt al-Mukhtār Association) 
10. Jamʽiyyat al-Wafā’(al-Wafā’ Association) 
11. Jamʽiyyat Bashā’ir Miṣrāṭā (Bashā’ir Miṣrāṭā Association) 
12. Jamʽiyyat Nasā’im Miṣrāṭā (Nasā’im Miṣrāṭā Association) 
13. Jamʽiyyat Samā Miṣrāṭā (Samā Miṣrāṭā Association) 
14. Jamʽiyyat Labaykī Miṣrāṭā (Labaykī Miṣrāṭā Association) 
15. Jamʽiyyat ʼAbnāʼ Lībyā Banghāzī Farʽ Miṣrāṭā (The Sons of Libya Benghazi 
Association Misurata Branch) 
16. Jamʽiyyat dhāt al-ʽImād Miṣrāṭā (Dhāt al-ʽImād Miṣrāṭā Association) 
17. Jamʽiyyat al-Tawāṣul (al- Tawāṣul Association) 
18. Jamʽiyyat Amāṭīn (Amāṭīn Association) 
19. Jamʽiyyat al-ʼIkhwā (al-ʼIkhwā Association) 
20. Jamʽiyyat al-Rāḥimūn (al-Rāḥimūn Association) 
21. Jamʽiyyat Baṣmat al-Ḥuriyyā (Baṣmat al-Ḥuriyyā Association) 
22. Jamʽiyyat al-Qulūb al-Nabiḍā (al-Qulūb al-Nabiḍā Association) 
23. Jamʽiyyat ʼAmwāj Qaṣr ʼAḥmad (ʼAmwāj Qaṣr ʼAḥmad Association) 
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